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Abstract 
 
 
This thesis examines the relationship between nihilism and postmodernism in relation to the 
sublime, and is divided into two parts: theory and literature. Beginning with histories of 
nihilism and the sublime, the Enlightenment is constructed as a conflict between the two. 
Rather than promote a simple binarism, however, nihilism is constructed as a temporally-
displaced form of sublimity that is merely labelled as nihilism because of the dominant 
ideologies at the time. Postmodernism, as a product of the Enlightenment, is therefore 
implicitly related to both nihilism and the sublime, despite the fact that it is often characterised 
as either nihilistic or sub lim e. W h ereas p rio r fo rm s o f n ih ilism  are ‗m o dern ist‘ b ecause th ey 
seek to codify reality, postmodernism creates a new formulation of nihilism –  ‗p o stm o dern  
n ih ilism ‘ –  that is itself sublime. This is explored in relation to a broad survey of postmodern 
literature through a series of interconnected themes. These themes –  apocalypse, the absurd, 
absence, and space –  arise from the debates presented in the theoretical chapters of this 
thesis, and demonstrate the ways in which nihilism and the sublime interact within 
postmodern literature. Because of the theoretical and literary debates presented within it, this 
thesis concludes that it cannot be a thesis at all. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 
‘T h e P reface’ 
 
 
This thesis can be summarised as an exploration of nihilism in relation to postmodern theory 
and literature. This is not to say that it is a survey of all occurrences of nihilism within 
postmodern literature, however, because there is more at stake than merely observing what 
others have already observed: what is at stake, th e ‗an te‘ th at is p ut fo rw ard, is, b ro adly 
sp eakin g, th e future o f n ih ilism . T h ere is m uch  m o re to  n ih ilism  th an  m erely ‗rage again st 
B ein g‘ o r ‗th e destructio n  o f B ein g‘, an d so  th e future o f n ih ilism  is n o t sim p ly a ‗n ih ilism  o f 
the future‘, a p ercep tio n  o f th e future in  w h ich  all is b leak, b ut th e m ean s b y w h ich  w e adm it 
G ian n i V attim o ‘s call fo r p h ilo so p h y to day ‗to  reco gn ise n ih ilism  is o ur (o n ly) ch an ce‘.1 
A lth o ugh  th e argum en t p resen ted h ere is differen t fro m  V attim o ‘s, th e fact n evertheless 
remains that nihilism –  the philosophy of absence and nothingness –  must remain 
p arado xically ‗p resen t‘ w ith in  p h ilo so p h y an d culture. Its eradicatio n  w o uld h ail a n ew  
fundamentalism, a new Enlightenment perhaps even more damaging than the first. Nihilism 
is our (only) chance. 
The approach to nihilism that this thesis proposes is a new formulation of nihilism 
based upon postmodern theory –  a ‗p o stm o dern ‘ n ih ilism . A lth o ugh  m an y critics argue th at 
postmodernism is nihilistic, others argue that postmodernism is a response to an earlier 
‗m o dern ist‘ n ih ilism . T h ese tw o  argum en ts are in co m m en surab le an d so  th is th esis do es n o t 
hope to resolve them, but to instead move them into the arena of the sublime. Although a 
number of studies link postmodernism and nihilism, and others link postmodernism and the 
                                                 
1 David Levin, The Opening of Vision: Nihilism and the Postmodern Situation (London: Routledge, 1988), p. 5; Gianni 
Vattimo, The End of Modernity: Nihilism and Hermeneutics in Post-modern Culture, trans. by Jon R. Snyder 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994), p. 23. 
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sublime, none have yet explicitly linked nihilism and the sublime within postmodernism 
despite the fact that the Enlightenment origins of nihilism and the sublime suggest a link 
between the two. Nihilism, assumed by most to be a negative signifier, an adjective to 
describe that which is bleak and hopeless, and the sublime, frequently interpreted as the 
positive signifier, rich in potential for ethics, are not as distinct as might be assumed. It 
would be facile and obvious to conclude that both nihilism and the sublime mean different 
things to different people. Rather, we must establish why these divisions occur, and so this 
thesis is as much an excavation of the cultural etymology of these signifiers as it is about 
how they function in relation to postmodern literature. 
The first half of this thesis is concerned with the theoretical aspects of nihilism, 
postmodernism, and the sublime. Histories of nihilism (chapter one) and the sublime 
(chapter two) will be discussed and compared, and will then be used in the construction of 
postmodernism. Nihilism and the sublime exist as parallel movements throughout the 
history of modernity. Postmodernism, as the culmination of that movement, therefore 
incorporates both nihilism and the sublime. This association of postmodernism with nihilism 
does not mean that postmodernism is (nihilistically) negative because postmodernism is both 
sub lim e (w e sh o uld talk ab o ut th e ‗sub lim e p o stm o dern , n o t th e ‗p o stm o dern  sub lim e‘) and 
nihilistic. Perceived in this way, postmodernism merely inverts the oppositional hierarchy of 
nihilism and the sublime seen during the Enlightenment period. Thus, nihilism and the 
sublime form the divisions of the final two theoretical chapters, although rather than 
histories, these are accounts of how the two concepts interact within contemporary theory 
an d p o stm o dern ism . T h is study is sep arated in to  ch ap ters o n  th e ‗sub lim e p o stm o dern ‘ 
(ch ap ter th ree) an d ‗p o stm o dern  n ih ilism ‘ (ch ap ter fo ur), th ereb y defin in g the differences 
between nihilism and the sublime within the postmodern. This construction suggests a 
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‗p o stm o dern ‘ fo rm ulatio n  o f n ih ilism , distin ct fro m  earlier fo rm s, th at is itself sub lim e, 
w h ich  is also  called ‗reflexive n ih ilism ‘ o r ‗deco n structive n ih ilism ‘. 
T h e seco n d h alf o f th e th esis co n cen trates o n  h o w  ‗p o stm o dern  n ih ilism ‘ ap p ears in  
postmodern literature. It is intended as a broad survey that, rather than emphasising a 
particular author or set of authors (although this does occur in places), covers a broad cross-
section of postmodern writing in order to demonstrate a number of concepts and their 
develo p m en t w ith in  th e literature o f p o stm o dern ism . A lth o ugh  th e ‗literature o f 
p o stm o dern ism ‘ is a p ro b lem atic lab el, th is th esis fo rm ulates it quite b ro adly. It includes not 
only texts that exhibit a postmodern aesthetic, but also those that are produced under the 
eco n o m ic an d so cial ‗co n ditio n s‘ o f p o stm o dern ity. T h us, w h ilst auth o rs such  as P aul A uster 
and Thomas Pynchon are considered postmodern because of the forms their novels take –  
demonstrating intertextuality, ontological instability, and openness, for example –  we may 
also consider authors such as Bret Easton Ellis and Denis Johnson postmodern in the sense 
that they are writing both about and within a condition of postmodernity. 
For the purposes of this thesis, postmodernism will be argued to be both historic, 
suggesting the interpretations of critics such as Fredric Jameson and David Harvey, and 
aesthetic, suggesting the interpretation of Jean-François Lyotard. In fact, the theoretical nature 
o f th e first p art o f th e th esis w ill sh o w  th at p o stm o dern ism  is a ‗h isto ricised aesth etic‘. F o r 
this reason, the second half of this thesis does not follow the loose chronological structure 
of the first half, but suggests a number of themes that emerge from the conflation of 
nihilism and the sublime: apocalypse (chapter five), the absurd (chapter six), absence 
(ch ap ter seven ), an d ‗sp ace‘ (ch ap ter eigh t). A ll literary texts cited in  th ese ch ap ters in clude 
years of publication with their first mention in the body of the thesis (note that if published 
in a foreign language first, it is this year, and not the year of the first English translation, that 
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is used). These are included because although the literary chapters do not follow a 
chronological structure this does not necessarily preclude a shift in emphasis as the concept 
of postmodernism develops. Thus, such a measure will enable the reader to gauge whether 
such a shift occurs. 
A disclaimer is also required at this point: no translations in this thesis are mine. The 
history of both nihilism and the sublime are often entwined with the predominantly French, 
German, and Russian languages and cultures that produced them. Where possible, non-
English phrases are explained through different translations of texts and translators of 
certain phrases are indicated for the sake of the clarity. Thus, some of the readings presented 
in this thesis will already have been filtered through a translator before the analysis presented 
here. This is an intractable problem, but one that does not invalidate the readings presented. 
Any different translations indicated within the thesis are therefore the result of contrary 
translations and any mistakes noted by the reader are purely my own. 
P arts o f C h ap ter E igh t, ‗―N everlan d‖: T h e Sp ace o f N ih ilism ‘, ap p ear in  th e essay 
‗‗T h is is n o t fo r yo u‖: N ih ilism  an d th e House th at Jacques B uilt‘, in  Nihilism: Theory and 
Praxis, ed. by Alan Pratt (forthcoming from SUNY Press). 
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1. 
Ex Nihilo: Constructing Nihilism 
 
 
W h at do es ‗n ih ilism ‘ m ean ? T h is questio n , p o sed b y F riedrich  N ietzsch e in  The Will to Power, 
is difficult to  an sw er sim p ly. F o r N ietzsch e, n ih ilism  m ean t th at ‗the highest values devaluate 
themselves. T h e aim  is lackin g; ―w h y?‖ fin ds n o  an sw er‘.1 This seems to be the case in the 
postmodern age, where morals are without justification, faith is replaced with cynicism, and 
God is all too evidently missing, presumed dead. Nihilism did not originate with Nietzsche, 
however, and neither did it end with him. Before Nietzsche, philosophies of nihilism are 
evident from classical Greece to Enlightenment Europe; since Nietzsche, and especially 
since the Holocaust, nihilism is no longer a marginalized philosophy, but one that is vital to 
understanding the history of modernity. How we understand nihilism at the dawn of a new 
millennium –  a millennium that is incidentally only possible within a Christian framework –  
depends upon how its history is constructed in relation to modernity. 
If nihilism is implicit in the history of modernity, then constructing a history of 
nihilism is a monumental task: it is, in effect, a historiographical exercise incorporating the 
entirety of Western thought. There are two sides to every (hi)story, however, and nihilism is 
no different in this respect: one side argues that nihilism and the history of modernity are 
fundamentally entwined, the other argues that nihilism is only part of the history of 
modernity, only one thread among many. The former argument is seen nowhere more 
clearly th an  in  M artin  H eidegger‘s p h ilo so p h ical p ro ject o n  th e h isto ry o f m etap h ysics: 
                                                 
1 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power, trans. by Walter Kaufman and R. J. Hollingdale (New York: Vintage, 
1968), §2 (p. 9). 
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Nihilism is a historical movement, and not just any view or doctrine advocated by 
so m eo n e o r o th er. [… ] N ih ilism , th o ugh t in  its essen ce, is [… ] th e fun dam en tal 
movement of the history of the West. It shows such great profundity that its unfolding 
can have nothing but world catastrophes as its consequence. Nihilism is the world-
historical movement of the peoples of the earth who have been drawn into the power 
realm of the modern age.2 
 
Heidegger argues that nihilism is implicit in thought itself and, as such, is irrevocably a 
h isto ry o f m o dern ity. It is a ‗w o rld -h isto rical m o vem en t‘, ‗th e fun dam en tal m o vem en t o f th e 
h isto ry o f th e W est‘ in  w h ich  every actio n  taken  is p art of the development of nihilism. In 
co n trast, Stan ley R o sen  argues th at ‗A lth o ugh  th e dan ger o f n ih ilism  is a p erm an en t h um an  
possibility, the actual pervasive influence of nihilism today is due to a series of specific 
philosophical decisions in the past‘.3 Here, rather than being an implicit part of the history of 
modernity, nihilism is merely one aspect of it, and it is one that could have been avoided. 
A lth o ugh  n ih ilism  is a ‗p erm an en t h um an  p o ssib ility‘, it is no t H eidegger‘s ‗th o ugh t in  its 
essen ce‘ b ut in stead ‗th o ugh t in  its p o ten tial‘. 
Such  argum en ts illustrate th e ‗p ro b lem ‘ o f n ih ilism , revealin g n o t o n ly th at n ih ilism  is a 
problem in relation to culture, but also that defining the term is difficult. Similar to all 
sign ifiers, ‗n ih ilism ‘ h as a n um ber of associations that cannot be inferred directly from its 
etymology. This is because an ideological stance often calls that which is opposed to it 
‗n ih ilistic‘ sin ce it seeks to  m ake th at ideo lo gy ‗n o th in g‘. T h us, th e term  ‗n ih ilism ‘ refers 
historically to a perception of something that exists in opposition to particular ideologies, 
rather than being an ideology of the nihil [n o th in gn ess] as such . A lth o ugh  th e w o rd ‗n ih ilism ‘ 
is concerned with negation, because anything ideologically negative is negation, it is a qualified 
                                                 
2 M artin  H eidegger, ‗T he W o rd o f N ietzsch e: ―G o d is D ead‖‘, in  The Question Concerning Technology and Other 
Essays, trans. by William Lovitt (New York: Garland Press, 1978), pp. 53-112 (pp. 62-63). 
3 Stanley Rosen, Nihilism: A Philosophical Essay (So uth  B en d: St. A ugustin e‘s P ress, 2000), p . xiv. 
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negation based upon the assumption that the opposing ideology is true. This creates a 
n um b er o f h isto rically differen t ‗n ih ilism s‘ th at each  attacks a sp ecific ideo lo gy. O ver th e 
course of time, nihilism comes to stand for any negation that attacks dominant ideological 
practices, becoming a generic category that is an unqualified negation. 
T h is quality o f ‗n egatio n ‘ w ith in  n ih ilism  m ean s th at its usage is culturally sp ecific. In  
general terms, nihilism originates ex nihilo [from nothingn ess]: n ih ilism  is th e ‗system , 
p rin cip le, o r ideo lo gical m o vem en t‘ (OED) of the nihil. For this reason, one could just as 
easily begin with the development of zero in mathematics as with the repeated occurrence of 
‗n o th in g‘ in  th e p lays o f Sh akesp eare w h en tracing the origins of nihilism.4 There are also 
fo rm ulatio n s o f n ih ilism  th at are n o t called ‗n ih ilism ‘ an d h ave little to  do  w ith  ‗n o th in g‘: 
Greek scepticism, for example, exhibits many of the characteristics of nihilism without being 
directly affiliated w ith  ‗n o th in g‘ b ecause o f th e G reek an tip ath y to w ards th e vo id.5 There is 
th erefo re m o re to  n ih ilism  th an  sim p ly ‗n o th in g‘ un less o n e co un ts even  th is ab sen ce o f 
n o th in g as an  in stan ce o f n ih ilism . T h at is, if ‗n ih ilism ‘ delin eates a sp ecific cultural u se of 
n o th in g, an d G reek p h ilo so p h y h ad n o  use fo r ‗n o th in g‘ (sayin g n o th in g ab o ut ‗n o th in g‘), 
then Greek nihilism implies a rejection of Greek philosophy: scepticism. Even in the 
absence of nothing, scepticism is an early form of nihilism because it negates existing 
ideologies. Nihilism is therefore a cultural appropriation of the concept of nothing: the 
value, h o w ever n egative, th at a p articular culture m akes o f n o th in gn ess. W h ereas ‗n o th in g‘ 
                                                 
4 On the history of zero, see, for example, John D. Barrow, The Book of Nothing (London: Vintage, 2001); 
Robert Kaplan, The Nothing That Is: A Natural History of Zero (London: Penguin, 2000); or Charles Seife, Zero: 
The Biography of a Dangerous Idea (L o n do n : So uven ir P ress, 2000). O n  Sh akesp eare and ‗n o th in g‘, see, fo r 
exam p le, D un can  F raser, ‗C ordelia‘s N o th in g‘, Cambridge Quarterly, 8 (1978-79), 1-10. Aside from these, the 
problem of nothingness is dealt with in a number of other ways. See, for example, Marcia L. Colish, 
‗C aro lin gian D eb ates o ver Nihil and Tenebrae: A  Study in  T h eo lo gical M eth o d‘, Speculum, 59:4 (1984), 757-95, or 
Wulf Koepke, ‗N o th in g b ut th e D ark Side of O urselves? T h e D evil an d A esth etic N ih ilism ‘, in  The Fantastic 
Other, ed. by Brett Cooke, George E. Slusser, and Jaume Marti-Olivella (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1998), pp. 143-
63. 
5 See Barrow, pp. 58-60; Kaplan, pp. 14-18; and Seife, pp. 34-35. 
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den o tes an  ab stract co n cep t, ‗n ih ilism ‘ sign ifies ‗n o th in g‘ w ithin an ideological framework. In 
this way, nihilism is interpellated nothingness, nothingness that has always already been 
hailed by a particular ideology.  
The cultural specificity of nihilism means that the question posed by Nietzsche –  ‗w h at 
do es ―n ih ilism ‖ m ean ?‘ –  cannot be answered with a simple statement. Although the first 
in stan ce o f th e term  ‗n ih ilism ‘ in  1799 in dicates its em ergen ce as a distin ct co n cep t, a 
n um b er o f gen eric fo rm ulatio n s exist p rio r to  th is. T h e ‗m ean in g‘ o f n ih ilism  is th erefo re 
dependent upon both a spatial and a temporal understanding of any particular formulation. 
When constructing a history of nihilism, we are not merely talking about when a particular 
formulation arose, but also where. There are therefore two standard methods of historicising 
nihilism, one chronological, and the other genealogical. 
Chronological histories of nihilism demonstrate how the concept of nihilism has 
progressed over time, charting its development through a linear chronology. Texts such as 
Michael Gillesp ie‘s Nihilism Before Nietzsche fall into this category because they determine 
what nihilism means in relation to a series of historical episodes. Such a method, as Gillespie 
h im self w rites, is ‗retellin g th e sto ry o f m o dern ity‘, an d th erefo re falls in to the trap of being a 
grand récit, as John Zammito argues.6 Whilst nihilism is an important factor in European 
history, as both Rosen and Heidegger suggest, nihilism is not equivalent to modernity but 
the response to the various processes of modernity. This criticism means that a chronological 
history of nihilism is an act of hermeneutic violence towards the history of modernity, 
‗fo rcin g‘ a readin g o f b o th  n ih ilism  an d m o dern ity. 
                                                 
6 Michael Allen Gillespie, Nihilism Before Nietzsche (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), p. xxii; John 
Zammito, ‗N ih ilism  b efo re N ietzsch e‘, Journal of Modern History, 68:4 (1996), 976-78. 
 9 
A genealogical history, in contrast, focuses upon a discursive network of different 
fo rm ulatio n s o f n ih ilism . T exts such  as K aren  C arr‘s The Banalization of Nihilism and Johan 
G o udsb lo m ‘s Nihilism and Culture are genealogical because they construct nihilism within a 
sp atial fram ew o rk, p ro p o sin g a ‗fam ily tree‘ o f n ih ilism  in  w h ich  a number of different 
formulations are explored. A genealogical structure therefore demonstrates that a number of 
formulations of nihilism do not fit into the linear pattern of a chronological history. Such 
formulations are not independent of history but embedded within it, emerging and 
submerging in the manner of a genetic inheritance. Thus, genealogical histories explore the 
genus [fam ily] o f n ih ilism  in  relatio n  to  a n um b er o f ‗gen eric‘ co n structio n s. 
Both chronological and genealogical histories of nihilism reveal that the manner in 
which a history of nihilism is constructed alters our perception of its development. This 
chapter outlines the ways in which nihilism is constructed historically to demonstrate the 
exten t to  w h ich  th e co n cep t o f ‗n o th in g‘ is reified within certain cultural systems, and hence 
write a history of nihilism. However, this must be reflexive, with an understanding that this 
construction is itself part of the history. Understanding genealogical characteristics of generic 
‗n ih ilism s‘ allows chronological developments of the term to be gauged, albeit contingently, 
and so this chapter uses both genealogical and chronological histories to show the 
development of the term. Despite the fact that the chronology presented later in this chapter 
is engaged in hermeneutic violence, the genealogy that precedes it demonstrates why such a 
structure is in place, and locates the history itself within a discursive network of other 
histories. 
 
 10 
Generating Nihilism 
There are a number of ways of formulating nihilism throughout history and such 
formulations distinguish between different ideological applications of nothingness. Here, 
rather than applying to historically specific ideologies, the genera of nihilism apply to different 
philosophies. Thus, the formulation of nihilism that deals with ethics –  ethical nihilism –  is 
solely concerned with the relevance of nihilism to the study of ethics. Whilst the study of 
eth ics itself develo p s diach ro n ically, ‗eth ical n ih ilism ‘ is th e n egatio n  o f all p h ilo so p h ies o f 
ethics, no matter where they are located (temporally or spatially). Ethical nihilism is therefore 
disconnected from other areas of philosophical enterprise (such as epistemology or 
ontology) as well as historical formulations of ethics: it is, in a certain sense, independent of 
h isto ry, existin g o n ly w ith in  th e discursive n etw o rk o f n ih ilism . Such  ‗gen eric‘ divisio n s o f 
n ih ilism  are in  m an y w ays arb itrary, fo r th e structure o f th e ‗fam ily tree‘ o f n ih ilism  is alw ays 
an imposed structure. The simplest of these divisio n s are th o se such  as K arl Jasp er‘s 
distin ctio n  b etw een  n ih ilism  as th e ‗den ial o f values‘ o r th e ‗den ial o f b ein g‘, an d N ietzsch e‘s 
‗p assive‘ an d ‗active‘ n ih ilism .7 O n e o f th e m o st co m p lex ‗fam ily trees‘ o f n ih ilism  is 
suggested by Carr, who defines five varieties of generic nihilism: epistemological, 
aleth io lo gical (C arr‘s sp ellin g), m etap h ysical o r o n to lo gical, eth ical o r m o ral, an d existen tial 
or axiological. 
The first two categories –  epistemological and aletheological nihilism –  are commonly 
h eld to  b e syn o n ym o us. ‗E p istem o lo gical n ih ilism ‘ states th at kn o w ledge is im p o ssib le, 
w h ereas ‗aleth io lo gical n ih ilism ‘ states th at an y fo rm ulatio n  o f truth  is im p o ssib le. In  m o st 
                                                 
7 See Johan Goudsblom, Nihilism and Culture (Oxford: Blackwell, 1980), p. 43. The original source is Karl 
Jaspers, Psychologie der Weltanschauungen (Berlin: [Springer], 1954), pp. 285-303. N ietzsch e‘s distin ctio n  b etw een  
‗active‘ an d ‗p assive‘ is discussed later in  th is ch ap ter, alth o ugh  G o udsb lom  h im se lf identifies eight varieties of 
Nietzschean nihilism, divided into four binary oppositions (see p. 10). 
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cases, if one denies the possibility of knowledge, one is also denying the possibility of truth, 
and vice versa, although Carr disagrees with this. She argues: 
 
If knowledge is taken to be justified true belief, then alethiological nihilism entails 
epistemological nihilism; without truth, there can be no knowledge. If, however, 
knowledge is understood differently (for example, as the beliefs deemed legitimate by a 
community of discourse), then one can be nihilistic about truth but not about 
kn o w ledge [… ] N o te th at o n e can  h o ld a th eo ry o f truth  –  an account of what it would 
take for a proposition to be considered true –  and believe that it is impossible to satisfy 
the necessary conditions (i.e., be an alethiological nihilist).8 
 
This distinction allows the possibility of denying knowledge and/or truth. One can believe in 
knowledge whilst denying truth, or believe truth whilst denying knowledge, although this is 
in accurate in asm uch  as C arr‘s ‗co m m un ity o f disco urse‘, like Stan ley F ish ‘s ‗in terp retative 
co m m un ities‘, suggests a ‗justified true b elief‘ in  th at b o th  kn o w ledge an d truth are justified 
consensually (and is therefore both aletheological and epistemological).9 Such distinctions do 
en tail an  exam in atio n  o f w h at ‗truth ‘ m ean s, h o w ever, fo r C arr‘s defin itio n  dep en ds up o n  
w h eth er it is ‗T ruth ‘ (an  ab so lute T ruth , ap p licab le o ver a totality of different knowledge 
b ases) o r ‗truth ‘ (o n e in  an y n um b er o f p o ssib le truth s, o ften  m utually exclusive, fo r 
example, in the case of postmodern pluralism). 
W h en  th ese term s are syn o n ym o us, as is usually th e case, ‗ep istem o lo gical n ih ilism ‘ (as 
it is th en  called) en tails a co m p lete ab sen ce o f th e p o ssib ility o f ‗kn o w ledge‘ an d ‗truth ‘. W e 
cannot know what is true, and what is not. One of the earliest examples of epistemological 
                                                 
8 Karen L. Carr, The Banalization of Nihilism: Twentieth-Century Responses to Meaninglessness (Albany: State University 
of New York Press, 1992), p. 17. 
9 See Stanley Fish, Is There a Text in this Class?: The Authority of Interpretative Communities (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
U n iversity P ress, 1980). C arr‘s distin ctio n  b etw een  ‗aleth io lo gical‘ as ‗th e theo ry o f th e n ature o f truth ‘ an d 
‗ep istem o lo gical‘ as ‗th e th eory o f th e test fo r truth ‘ is fro m  T im o th y Jackso n , ‗T he T heo ry an d P ractice o f 
D iscom fo rt: R ich ard R o rty and P ragm atism ‘, Thomist, 51 (1987), 270-98. See Carr, p. 149, n. 23. 
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nihilism is scepticism, and most notably Pyrrhic scepticism, which argued that the intellect 
cannot reason the truth and that empirical data (from the senses) cannot uncover knowledge: 
 
Neither our perceptions nor our judgments teach us to know truth or untruth. 
Therefore we must not trust either our sense or our reason, but must remain without 
opinion, unmoved, inclining neither to one side nor the other. Whatever the matter in 
question may be, we shall say that one can neither deny nor confirm it, or that one must 
simultaneously confirm and deny it.10 
 
The two internal questions of knowledge and truth continually defer to one another because 
to  ‗kn o w ‘ w e m ust h ave access to  th e ‗truth ‘, an d yet to  h ave access to  th e ‗truth ‘ w e m ust 
‗kn o w ‘ w h at it is. O n ce o n e o f th ese term s is secured, th e o th er falls in to  lin e, yet to  th e most 
ardent nihilists neither can be resolved and therefore there is no truth and no knowledge. 
C arr‘s th ird fo rm ulatio n , ‗m etap h ysical o r o n to lo gical n ih ilism ‘, sign ifies ‗th e den ial o f 
an  (in dep en den tly existin g) w o rld‘.11 This is simply a statement of solipsism –  ‗w ith o ut m e 
th e w o rld do es n o t exist‘ –  although it does have wider reaching implications when it is 
perceived as the belief that nothing exists at all; that is, nothing exists, there is no reality 
against which to measure this, and no-one to measure it anyway. It is based upon the belief 
th at reality is illuso ry, an  arb itrary set o f rules th at h as n o  m ean in g. T h e view  th at ‗n o th in g is 
real‘ can  lead  to  eith er a m agn ificen t furo re o f b ein g th e cen tre o f th e un iverse –  without its 
perception by the observer, the world does not exist –  or to complete impotence in the face 
of an overwhelming nullity, depending upon the extent to which this nihilistic formulation is 
pursued. 
                                                 
10 Quoted in Goudsblom, p. 114. The original source is Aristocles on Pyrrho, quoted by Victor Brochard, Les 
sceptiq u es G recs: O u vrage C ou ron n e par l’A cadem ie D esscien ces M orales et P olitiq u es (Paris: [Vrin], 1932), p. 54. 
G o udsb lo m ‘s tran slatio n . 
11 Carr, p. 17. 
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‗E th ical o r m o ral n ih ilism ‘, C arr‘s fo urth  fo rm ulatio n , claim s th at th ere are no moral 
absolutes and that no system of ethics has any claim to validity. All judgements are invalid 
because they are without ultimate justification. By far the most important aspect of ethical 
nihilism is its seeming tendency towards egocentricity and hedonism, in that, if no absolute 
m o rals exist, o n e can  act exactly as o n e p leases (th e ‗m agn ificen t furo re‘ n o ted in  th e 
p revio us p aragrap h ). T h is ‗eth ic‘ o f n ih ilism  –  ‗if n o th in g is true, th en  everyth in g is justified‘ 
–  is ultimately the product of false assumptions. It presumes that if nothing is true then 
everything must be justified, although if nothing is true then nothing is justified: ‗O n e n eed  
o n ly to  glan ce at th e m ultip licity o f o p tio n s [… ] to  arrive at th e co n clusio n  th at n o th in g is 
true; if the n ext m o ve is to  p ro claim  p ro udly, ―so  everyth in g is justified‖, o n e h as a n ew  
p rin cip le fo r actio n ‘.12 T h is ‗n ew  p rin cip le fo r actio n ‘, w h eth er ego ism  o r vio len ce, h as n o  
grounding in nihilism and is the result of the individual finding meaning where there is none: 
it is an individual response to the problem of nihilism, not the logical result of it. 
C arr‘s fin al fo rm ulatio n  o f n ih ilism  is, in  fact, n o t n ecessarily ‗n ih ilism ‘ at all. Sh e 
in co rp o rates ‗existen tial o r axio lo gical n ih ilism ‘ in to  n ih ilism , defining a form of 
existen tialism  as an  asp ect o f n ih ilism . T h is is, fo r C arr, ‗th e feelin g o f em p tin ess an d  
p o in tlessn ess th at fo llo w s fro m  th e judgm en t, ―L ife h as n o  m ean in g‖‘.13 Carr argues that this 
feeling of ennui is the most common variety of nihilism, and that whilst the previous 
formulations do not necessarily lead to existential despair, they often result in this 
fo rm ulatio n  b ein g realised. T h is m ean s th at it is a ‗seco n dary‘ fo rm ulatio n , in  th at it is 
‗derived fro m  aleth io lo gical, ep istem o lo gical, o r eth ical n ih ilism ‘ an d is th us ‗axio lo gical‘ 
(derived from axioms).14 Jean-Paul Sartre is one such proponent of existentialism, although it 
                                                 
12 Goudsblom, p. 137. 
13 Carr, p. 18. 
14 Carr, p. 20. 
 14 
is doubtful that he would agree that it is a formulation of nihilism. For example, Sartre 
argues in Being and Nothingness that nothingness is the point from which being begins to exist 
‗fo r-itself‘: 
 
The being of consciousness qua consciousness is to exist at a distance from itself as a 
presence to itself, and this empty distance which being carries in its being is 
Nothingness. Thus in order for a self to exist, it is necessary that the unity of this being 
in clude in to  its o w n  n o th in gn ess as th e n ih ilatio n  o f iden tity. [… ] T h e fo r-itself is the 
being which determines itself to exist inasmuch as it can not coincide with itself.15 
 
This does not imply that nothingness leads to existential despair, but that nothingness is an 
in tegral p art o f co n scio usn ess, th at co n scio usn ess o n ly exists b y m akin g a gap  (a ‗n ih ilatio n ‘) 
between itself and its perception of itself. As such, existentialism does not intrinsically lead 
to  desp air an d is n o t n ih ilism  in  an y sen se b ut th e fact th at it is an  ‗in terp ellated n o th in gn ess‘. 
A lth o ugh  existen tialism  is a fo rm  o f n ih ilism  in  th at it ‗m akes use‘ o f n o th in gn ess, it is n o t an  
axio lo gically ‗derived‘ fo rm . 
There are other formulations of nihilism other than those defined by Carr, most 
n o tab ly th o se o f ‗th eo lo gical n ih ilism ‘, ‗p o litical n ih ilism ‘, an d ‗sem an tic n ih ilism ‘, all o f 
which closely correspond to the chronological development of nihilism. Theological nihilism 
is the denial of God, and is one of the cornerstones of modern-day nihilism since 
N ietzsch e‘s fam o us p ro clam atio n  ab o ut th e ‗D eath  o f G o d‘ an d th e rise o f ath eism  durin g 
the Enlightenment.16 It denies the possibility of God and of any other transcendent being 
(and often any transcendent form of being), although there are numerous peculiarities to this 
                                                 
15 Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology, trans. by Hazel E. Barnes 
(London: Routledge, 2000), p. 78. 
16 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science, trans. by Walter Kaufman (New York: Random House, 1974), III, §108 
(p. 181). 
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belief. Many proponents of this, to distinguish it from atheism, believe in the absence that 
h as rep laced G o d sin ce H is ‗dem ise‘: n o t an  absence of belief but a belief in absence. 
L ikew ise, p o litical n ih ilism  is itself divided in to  n um ero us b eliefs. A lth o ugh  ‗p o litical 
n ih ilism ‘ is co n cern ed w ith  th e p h ilo so p h ical rejectio n  o f an y valid m ean s o f go vern m en t, it 
is often connected with terrorism, anarchism, and political extremism, such as the nihilism of 
the Russian Nihilists.17 Political nihilism, like theological nihilism, is a portmanteau category 
comprised of any philosophical formulation that rejects either politics or divinity, 
respectively, w ith o ut regard to  th e exten t o f actual ‗n ih ilistic‘ p h ilo so p h y co n tain ed w ith in  it. 
Political nihilism is therefore not the absence of politics but the politics of absence 
(anarchism). The final generic category of nihilism, semantic nihilism, argues that words and 
concepts are divided, that communication is an illusion, and that language does not function. 
Sem an tic n ih ilism  fun ctio n s ‗b efo re‘ ep istem o lo gical o r aleth eo lo gical n ih ilism , b ecause it 
entails the rejection of all consensual theories of knowledge or truth because these concepts 
rely upon communication in order to function. Furthermore, semantic nihilism rejects any 
formulation of knowledge because language mediates consciousness; thus, whereas 
epistemological nihilism functions only in relation to knowledge, semantic nihilism 
encompasses both semantics and epistemology, and proposes a reason for the impossibility 
of knowledge. This corresponds to the accusations of nihilism levelled at philosophers such 
as Ludwig Wittgenstein and Jacques Derrida, where the (perceived) destruction of language 
is equivalent to semantic nihilism. 
These categories reveal some of the common differences perceived within nihilism, 
alth o ugh  th ey are all sim ilar in  th at each  o f th ese distin ctio n s is co n cern ed w ith  th e ‗truth ‘. 
                                                 
17 For more on th e co m p arison  o f ‗p o litical n ih ilism ‘ as terro rism , see D on ald A . C ro sby, The Spectre of the 
Absurd: Sources and Criticisms of Modern Nihilism (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1988). 
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Thus, ethical nihilism argues that there is no truth in any system of ethics, and 
epistemological nihilism argues that there is no truth in any system of knowledge. This use of 
truth creates problems for nihilism because nihilism dismisses the truth of any system but its 
o w n . M arxism  can  criticise th e ‗truth ‘ o f C h ristian ity b ecause it do es n o t rely o n  ab so lute 
truth to do this but on the laws of production and economy. In contrast, nihilism addresses 
other philosophies at the level of truth, forcing itself into a contradiction: how can it be true 
if there is no truth? Nihilism can only exist to negate another ideology, and can only be true 
‗gen erically‘, n o t ‗gen erally‘. T h is relian ce up o n  an o th er ideo lo gy m ean s th at th e m ean in g o f 
nihilism shifts historically, as once-dominant ideologies become replaced by others, which 
nihilism then attacks instead, its own meaning shifting as a result. It is clear, therefore, that 
nihilism is also diachronic, and this requires a shift in emphasis from genealogy to 
chronology. 
 
Humanist Nihilism (1799-1851) 
The rise of nihilism as a cultural force historically begins with the rise of scientific atheism in 
the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries and, as such, is deeply rooted in European 
experience. Although it can be traced back further, to such philosophers as René Descartes 
and Immanuel Kant, it is the appropriation of these figures and their philosophies that led to 
the use of the term.18 Johann Fichte, a German idealist in the Kantian tradition, extended 
K an t‘s p h ilo so p h y to  th e p o in t th at it b ecam e m o n stro us ego ism . F ich tean  idealism , fo r 
                                                 
18 Gillespie argues that nihilism begins with Descartes, devoting an entire chapter of Nihilism Before Nietzsche to 
D escartes‘ w o rk w h ereas N ietzsch e iden tifies N ico laus C o pern icus as th e so urce o f th e sh ift ‗aw ay fro m  th e 
cen tre to w ards X ‘ (The Will to Power, §1 (p. 8)). Simon Critchley, however, argues in Very Little… A lm ost N othin g: 
Death, Philosophy, Literature (L o n do n : R o utledge, 1997) th at, ‗th e p ro per nam e fo r th is b reakdo w n  [o f religio us 
orthodoxy] is modernity‘ (p . 2). It w o uld b e w ro n g to  argue th at m o dern ity is, in  itself, n ih ilistic –  it is, as page 8 
of th is th esis states, because n ih ilism  is ‗th e response to  th e vario us p rocesses o f m o dern ity‘. K an t do es h ave a 
part to play, however, in the following chapter on the history of the sublime. 
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fello w  p h ilo so p h er F riedrich  Jaco b i, ‗reduces everyth in g to  th e activity o f th e I, an d th us 
reduces G o d  to  a m ere creatio n  o f th e h um an  im agin atio n  [… ] T h e go o d, th e b eautiful, and 
th e h o ly b eco m e m erely h o llo w  n am es‘.19 In 1799, because of a letter from Jacobi, Fichte has 
th e dub io us distin ctio n  o f b ein g th e first ‗n ih ilist‘.20 Jacobi was someone who, whilst praising 
F ich te‘s reaso n , desp aired th at th is w o uld in evitab ly lead to  ath eism : ‗T ruly, m y dear F ich te, 
it should not grieve me, if you, or whoever it might be, want to call chimerism what I oppose 
to idealism, which I reproach as nihilism‘.21 T h is m arks th e em ergen ce o f th e term  ‗n ih ilism ‘ in  
the general debates over religion, rationality, and science. During the heated intellectual 
debates of these ideas, the term for those who were pro-rationality, and anti-deist, was 
‗n ih ilist‘. T h ese early n ih ilists sign ified a b reak in  th e un io n  o f scien ce an d religio n , w ith  th eir 
ever-increasing interest in Man, not God, and in reason, not faith. This, in the modern sense 
o f th e term , is ‗th eo lo gical n ih ilism ‘. 
A t th e b egin n in g o f th e n in eteen th  cen tury, th ere is a co dificatio n  o f th e term  ‗n ih ilist‘ 
for those who are atheistic. Fo r exam p le, it is at th is p o in t th at th e term  ‗n ih ilism ‘ ap p ears in  
a dictionary by Louis-Sébastien Mercier, published in 1801. In this dictionary, we see the 
term, rienniste: ‗N IH IL IST  O R  N O T H IN G IST . O n e w h o  b elieves in  n o th in g, w h o  in terests 
                                                 
19 G illesp ie, p . 66. G illesp ie is parap h rasin g Jaco b i‘s argum en t, th e original source of which is Friedrich Jacobi, 
Werke, 3 vols (Leipzig: Fleischer, 1812-25; rpt. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1968), III, p. 36. 
20 T h ere w ere o th er uses o f th e term s ‗n ih ilism ‘ an d ‗n ih ilist‘ b efo re th is p o in t. O tto  P ö ggeler notes that Jacob 
Obereit, Daniel Jenisch, and Friedrich Schlegel all used the term in the period 1787-1797 (in  ‗H egel un d die 
Anfaenge der Nihilismus-D iskussio n ‘, in  Der Nihilismus als Phaenomen der Geistgeschichte in der wissenschaftlichen 
Diskussion unseres Jahrundert, ed. by Dieter Arendt (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1974), pp. 
307-49, an d in  ‗―N ih ilist‖ un d ―N ih ilism us‖‘, Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte, 19 (1975), 197-210). Most modern 
h isto ries o f n ih ilism  in clude P öggeler‘s sch o larship: see, for example, Gillespie, pp. 275-76, n. 5; Goudsblom, p. 
4, n . 4; an d C arr, p. 13. G illesp ie furth er traces th e first use o f th e term  b ack to  F . L . G oetzius‘ De nonismo et 
nihilismo in theologia (1733), b ut says th at th is w o rk, ‗w as relatively unknown and apparently played no role in the 
later reap pearan ce an d develop m en t o f th e co n cep t‘ (p . 65). 
21 Quoted in Gillespie, p. 65; and Goudsblom, p. 4. The original source is Jacobi, III, p. 44. Carr further notes 
th at fo r Jaco b i, n ih ilism  ‗fun ctio n ed as an argument reductio ad absurdum‘, w h ere, ‗if o n e co uld sh o w  th at n ih ilism  
w as th e co n sequence o f a p articular p o sitio n , th en  th at p o sitio n  w as o b vio usly in valid‘ (p . 14). 
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themselves in  n o th in g‘.22 The emergence of nihilism from the decline of the Church is the 
result of the growing momentum of Enlightenment rationality, implicitly connecting 
Enlightenment humanism to nihilism. Religious bodies condemned this increasing desire for 
human kn o w ledge (at th e exp en se o f faith ) as ‗n ih ilistic‘ b ecause it disp uted certain  
undoubted assumptions, and replaced God with man. Logic dictated that faith was 
incompatible with the world and so the Church began to distance itself from this growing 
movement of reason. 
If scien ce an d ‗ratio n al‘ p h ilo so p h y th us b ecam e o p p o sed to  religio n , in  th e eyes o f 
F ran z vo n  B aader th is dich o to m y co uld lead o n ly to  ‗o b scuran tist p ietism ‘ o r ‗scien tific 
n ih ilism ‘ b ecause o n e m ust eith er b e a deist w ith  n o  reco urse to  reason or a rationalist with 
no moral guidance.23 It is for this reason that nihilism became synonymous with atheism and 
ratio n ality, b ut as D o n o so  C o rtès‘ argued, th is w as m erely th e p relude: 
 
Thus all socialist doctrines, or, to be more exact, all rationalist doctrines, necessarily lead 
to nihilism: and nothing is more natural and logical than that those who separate 
th em selves fro m  G o d sh o uld en d in  n o th in g, sin ce b eyo n d G o d th ere is n o th in g…  T h e 
negation of all authority is far from being the last of all possible negations; it is simply a 
preliminary negation which future nihilists will consign to their prolegomena.24 
 
T h e m o vem en t o f th e m ean in g o f ‗n ih ilism ‘ b etw een  vo n  B aader‘s essay o f 1824 an d C o rtès‘ 
essay of 1851 is indicative of the change from nihilism  as ‗m erely‘ ath eism  to  th at w h ich  
in cludes ‗all ratio n alist do ctrin es‘. T h is n egatio n  o f deist auth o rity, fo r C o rtès, w as o n ly th e 
                                                 
22 Quoted in Goudsblom, p. 3; and Gillespie, p. 276, n. 5. The original source is Louis-Sébastien Mercier, 
Neologie: ou Vocabulaire des mots nouveax à renouveler, ou pris dans des acceptions nouvelles, 2 vols, (Paris: Moussard, 
1801), II, p. 143. 
23 Q uo ted in G o udsb lo m , p. 4. T he origin al so urce is F ran z vo n  B aader, ‗Ü ber K ath o lizism us un d 
P ro testan tism us‘, in  Sämtliche Werke, 16 vols (Leipzig: [Meiner], 1851), I, pp. 71-80. G o udsb lo m ‘s tran slatio n . 
24 Quoted in Goudsblom, p. 5. The original source is Donoso Cortès, Marquis de Valdemagas, Essai sur le 
Catholicisme, le Liberalisme et le Socialisme (L iège: [n .p ub .], 1851), [n .p ag.]. G o udsb lo m ‘s translatio n  an d ellip ses. 
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beginning, and we see that, historically, this was indeed the case. This is the origin of the 
Russian Nihilists, where nihilism moves towards encompassing a quasi-anarchistic, quasi-
Communist, meaning. 
The movement between atheism and anarchism is seen nowhere more clearly than in 
the philosophy of Max Stirner (the pseudonym of Johann Kaspar Schmidt), a philosopher 
who had been  fo llo w in g th e H egelian  m o vem en t in  G erm an y. ‗L eft‘ H egelian ism , w ith  
which Stirner was initially associated, was the quasi-Marxist belief that the progress of history 
w as th ro ugh  so ciety n o t go vern m en t (w h ich  w as ‗righ t‘ H egelian ism ). F o r exam p le, R . W . K. 
P aterso n  argues th at L udw ig F euerb ach  declared th at ‗―G o d‖ is n o th in g b ut th e n am e fo r 
the idealized essence of man himself, and that a perfected human species is the true subject 
o f th e attrib ute ―divin e‖‘.25 Stirner, however, abandoned his leftist roots in favour of 
something more personal, as seen in the title of his philosophical text, The Ego and Its Own. 
He believed that both government and so ciety h eld b ack th e in dividual‘s gro w th  an d  
proposed that only the individual matters (egoism). Furthermore, there was no moral 
framework to this philosophy because such a framework would also restrict the individual 
(eth ical n ih ilism ). It is fo r th ese reaso n s th at Stirn er is kn o w n  as a ‗n ih ilistic ego ist‘, an d th e 
conflation of these two terms is implied throughout The Ego and Its Own in  p h rases such  as ‗I 
h ave m ade n o th in g m y cause!‘.26 For Stirner, the self defines everything, even truth: 
 
The truth is dead, a letter, a word, a material which I can use up. All truth by itself is 
dead, a corpse: it is alive only in the same way my lungs are alive, namely in the measure 
                                                 
25 R. W. K. Paterson, The Nihilistic Egoist: Max Stirner (Oxford: Oxford University Press for the University of 
Hull, 1971), p. 29. For a brief history of the reception of Hegelianism in Germany, see Paterson, pp. 22-35. 
26 Quoted in Goudsblom, p. 162. The original source is Max Stirner, Der Einzige und sein Eigenthum (Leipzig: 
[W igan d], 1845), p . 491. G o udsb lo m ‘s tran slatio n . C arr n otes, h o w ever, th at Stirn er n ever actually lab els 
himself a nihilist (p. 148, n. 10). 
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of my own vitality. Truths are material like vegetables and weeds; as to whether 
vegetable or weed, the decision lies in me.27 
 
This idea of the truth being dead, or somehow centred upon the human, means that truth is 
true only in relation to the individual, and not outside that relation. Stirn er‘s radical 
perspective is therefore the link between the decline in religious orthodoxy (nihilism-as-
atheism) and the rise of political extremism (nihilism-as-anarchism), a movement from the 
origins of nihilism towards Russian Nihilism. 
 
Anti-Authoritarian Nihilism (1852-1871) 
The meaning of nihilism moved from religion to politics in the mid-nineteenth century, and 
shifted from central Europe to Russia. It became associated with politics because of the 
upheaval of the inherited social order that occurred in Russia during the 1850s and 1860s. 
There were thus two meanings of nihilism at this point: atheism (atheism or theological 
nihilism) and anarchism (Russian or political nihilism). These signify two moments in terms 
of the development of nihilism: the passive individual and the active individual. Passive individual 
nihilism, associated with nihilism-as-atheism, is concerned with an alternative proposition to 
the dominant ideology. This is passive because it is not inherently destructive, and individual 
because it is not initially an ideological movement. The formulation of Russian Nihilism is an 
active individual nihilism where individuals seek to subvert a dominant ideology. It was still 
fiercely individualistic (individual) but was no longer passive, but a force of destruction (active). 
Russian Nihilism was conspicuously concerned with relating nihilism to real-world scenarios 
–  a movement from theory to actio n , fo r w h ich  ‗n ih ilism ‘ w as th eir term  fo r revo lutio n ary 
                                                 
27 Quoted in Paterson, p. 289. The original source is Stirner, pp. 414-15. P aterso n ‘s tran slatio n. 
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fervour. Despite this, to attribute any one cause or any one meaning to Russian Nihilism is 
impossible, as there are two differing approaches towards nihilism in this period. These two 
persuasions of Russian Nihilism are roughly characterised by their respective political 
instigators and organs: Nikolai Chernyshevsky and the Sovremennik [Contemporary], and 
Dmitrii Pisarev and the Russkoe Slovo [Russian Word].28 C h ern ysh evsky‘s b ran d o f p o p ulism  
is called nihilism only by default as it was Pisarev who actually adopted the term, after 
readin g Ivan  T urgen ev‘s Fathers and Sons (1862) and empathising with the character of 
Bazarov.29 Chernyshevsky and the Sovremennik group actively opposed the term, arguing that 
it bore no relation to their agenda.  
T h e ch aracter o f B azaro v is o n e o f th e earliest dep ictio n s o f a ‗n ih ilist‘ w ith in  R ussian  
literature and is a compound of the figures of Chernyshevsky and Pisarev.30 Although other 
authors dealt with nihilism, especially Fyodor Dostoyevsky in Demons (1873) and The Brothers 
Karamazov (1880), such texts continued the debate, rather than starting it.31 Within Fathers and 
Sons, th e first ap p earan ce o f th e term  ‗n ih ilism ‘ is m et w ith  so m e co n fusio n  b y N iko lai 
Petrovich, an aged m em b er o f th e ‗o ld guard‘: ‗A  n ih ilist [… ] T h at‘s fro m  th e L atin  nihil, 
nothing, so  far as I can  judge. T h erefo re, th e w o rd den o tes a m an  w h o  …  w h o  do esn ‘t 
                                                 
28 The translations are from Irina Papeno, Chernyshevsky and the Age of Realism: A Study in the Semiotics of Behaviour 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988). 
29 See Franco Venturi, Roots of Revolution: A History of the Populist and Socialist Movements in Nineteenth Century Russia, 
trans. by Francis Haskell (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1964), p. 326; and Peter C. Pozefsky, ‗Smoke as 
―Stran ge an d Sin ister C o m m en tary o n  Fathers and Sons‖: D o sto evskii, P isarev an d T urgen ev o n  N ih ilists an d 
T h eir R epresentatio n s‘, Russian Review, 54:4 (1995), 571-86 (p. 572). Pozefsky also notes that the relationship 
between Turgenev and Pisarev was strained following the appropriation of the character of Bazarov (see 
Pozefsky, pp. 572, 578-81). 
30 Although Turgenev is frequently credited with the first literary mention of nihilism, it appeared earlier in Karl 
Im m erm an n ‘s Die Epigonen. Familienroman in Neun Büchern (1823-1835). This is before both the philosophical 
and novelistic inceptions that are traditionally realised, although Goudsblom notes that this sense of the term 
im p lies ‗go o d -for-n o th in g‘, and th at th e first literary use o f ‗n ih ilism ‘, as ‗th e destructio n  o f all traditio n al values‘ 
is in  K arl G utzko w ‘s Die Nihilisten (1853). See Goudsblom, pp. 6-7. 
31 Besy [Demons] is often translated as The Possessed, alth o ugh  R ich ard P evear n o tes in  h is tran slatio n  th at ‗T h e 
implications of the wo rd are alm o st righ t, b ut it p o in ts in  th e w ro n g directio n  [… T h e] R ussian  title Besy refers 
n o t to  p o ssessed b ut to  p o ssesso rs‘ –  Fyodor Dostoevsky, Demons: A Novel in Three Parts, trans. by Richard 
Pevear and Larissa Volokhonsky (London: Vintage, 1994), p. xiii. T h is corresp o n ds to  th e sh ift fro m  ‗p assive‘ 
n ih ilism  to  ‗active‘ n ih ilism . 
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reco gn ize an yth in g?‘.32 T h is is in terp reted b y P avel, N iko lai‘s b ro th er, to  rep resen t o n e ‗w h o  
do esn ‘t resp ect an yth in g‘.33 T h e resp o n se fro m  A rkady, B azaro v‘s frien d an d N iko lai‘s so n , 
clarifies th e issue th us: ‗A  n ih ilist is a m an  w h o  do esn ‘t ackn o w ledge an y auth o rities, w h o  
do esn ‘t accep t a sin gle p rin cip le o n  faith , n o  m atter h o w  m uch  th at p rin ciple may be 
surro un ded w ith  resp ect‘.34 T urgen ev‘s dep ictio n  o f n ih ilism  fuelled an  im p o rtan t deb ate 
during this period because it highlighted the problem of how social change was to be 
achieved. For example, M. A. Antonovich, a critic for the Sovremennik, called B azaro v ‗a 
ven o m o us creature w h o  p o iso n s everyth in g h e to uch es‘, w h ereas P isarev, o b vio usly 
espousing the Russkoe Slovo lin e, w ro te th at ‗If B azaro vism  is an  illn ess, it is th e illn ess o f o ur 
tim es‘.35 
T h e distin ctio n  b etw een  th e tw o  b ran ch es o f ‗R ussian  N ih ilism ‘ is an  im p o rtan t o n e 
b ecause C h ern ysh evsky‘s aim  w as th e W estern isatio n  o f R ussia, fo llo w in g F euerb ach  an d  
Fichte in a process of anthropocentricism. Hegelianism had been debated in Germany for 
many years and had resulted in what was once a state-authorised philosophy becoming 
increasingly revolutionary due to its atheistic leanings. Elena Dryzhakova summarises 
C h ern ysh evsky‘s p o sitio n , arguin g th at h e rejected ‗religio us an d m o ral assum p tio n s as 
outdated and useless for the solution of social p ro b lem s‘ an d fo un d th at F euerb ach , an d  
o th ers like h im , ‗p ro vided a to tally n ew  fo un datio n  fo r th e reso lutio n  o f m o ral questio n s‘.36 
                                                 
32 Ivan Turgenev, Fathers and Sons, trans. by Richard Freeborn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 26. 
33 Turgenev, p. 26. 
34 Turgenev, p. 27. 
35 Quoted in Pozefsky, pp. 571-72. T h e o rigin al so urces are M . A . A n to n o vich , ‗A sm o dei n ash ego  vrem en i‘, 
Sovremennik, 3 (1861), [n.pag.], rpt. in Literaturno-k ritik hesk ie stat’i (Moscow: [n.pub.], 1961), [n.pag.] (p. 53); and 
D m itrii P isarev, ‗B azaro v‘, Russkoe Slovo, 3 (1862), [n.pag.], rpt. in Literaturnaia kritika v trekh tomakh (Leningrad: 
[n .p ub .], 1981), I, p . 236. P o zefsky‘s tran slatio n . 
36 E len a D ryzh ako va, ‗D o sto evsky, C h ern yshevsky, an d th e R ejectio n  o f N ih ilism ‘, Oxford Slavonic Papers, n.s. 13 
(1980), 58-79 (p. 59). 
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A s th e ch aracter o f B azaro v says, ‗th e G erm an s are o ur teach ers‘ an d, in  th is resp ect, ‗T h e 
Russian debate over nihilism is [… ] an  exten sio n  o f th e G erm an  co n tro versy‘.37 
C h ern ysh evsky‘s ap p ro p riatio n  o f th e G erm an  L eft H egelian ism  m o ved th e deb ate 
fro m  p redo m in an tly th eo lo gical argum en ts to w ards th e n o tio n  o f a ‗un ity o f n ature‘. T h is 
‗un ity‘ m ean t th at m an , as th e cen tral figure in both nature and his own life, derived the 
greatest go o d fro m  ‗ratio n al ego ism ‘ an d b ecause o f th is, ‗w h at is go o d is w h at is 
advan tageo us‘.38 T h is in tro duced th e idea o f ‗utility‘ in to  th e rh eto ric o f th e R ussian  N ih ilists: 
 
In contradistinction to the development of German Left Hegelianism, which accepted 
the necessity of the dialectical development of history and consequently a severe limitation 
on the freedom and power of human will, Russian Nihilism attributed to man an almost 
absolute power to transform his social existence. The theoretical basis for this nihilist 
view was the belief that history was determined not by immutable laws but by free 
individuals.39 
 
D ryzh ako va n o tes th at ‗utility w as declared to  b e th e so le criterio n  o f go o d, an d go o dn ess 
an d utility w ere deem ed to  b e sim p ly th e p ro duct o f ―reaso n ‖‘.40 Chernyshevsky, sufficiently 
imbued with the idea of a Hegelian spiritual progression of history, even if twisted towards a 
more egoistic line of thought, worked patiently for reform. However, the Westernising aims 
of Chernyshevsky, having little to do with an institutionalised program of violence against 
th e state, w ere to  b eco m e co rrup ted. In  1862, th e year th at T urgen ev‘s Fathers and Sons was 
first published, both the Sovremennik and the Russkoe Slovo were suppressed, and 
Chernyshevsky himself arrested, following the St Petersburg fires and the publication of the 
n o to rio us essay, ‗Y o un g R ussia‘. 
                                                 
37 Turgenev, p. 30; Gillespie, p. 138. 
38 Quoted in Dryzhakova, p. 59. The original source is N. G. Chernyshevsky, Polnoe sobranie sochinenii v 15-i 
tomakh (Moscow: [n.pub.], 1939-53), pp. 288-89. D ryzh ako va‘s tran slatio n . 
39 Gillespie, p. 141. 
40 Dryzhakova, p. 59. 
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 ‗Y o un g R ussia‘, th e cause o f so  m uch  up h eaval b o th  to  lib erals an d th e estab lish m en t, 
was written by a young student called Petre Zaichnevsky and contained material that was not 
only politically sensitive but also promoted violence towards the ruling classes: 
 
Soon, soon will come the day when we shall unfurl the great banner of the future, the 
red ban n er, an d w ith  th e lo ud cry o f ‗L o n g live th e so cial an d dem o cratic rep ub lic o f 
R ussia‘ w e sh all m o ve o n  th e W in ter P alace to  liquidate its o ccup an ts.41 
 
C h ern ysh evsky‘s lib eral agen da w as in creasin gly un derm in ed at th is p o in t b y o th er, m o re 
radical voices in Russian culture. Westernisation gave way to the increasingly violent socialist 
agenda of the Russkoe Slovo group, who felt that the attitudes espoused by the writers of the 
Sovremennik were not radical enough. Franco Venturi characterises this aspect of Russian 
N ih ilism  as ‗p o sitivist‘ an d ‗extrem e‘, alth o ugh  G illesp ie disp utes V en turi‘s use o f th e term  
‗p o p ulist‘.42 V en turi argues th at P isarev‘s gro up  reduced everyth in g so lely to  w h at m igh t b e 
term ed a ‗m aterialist realism ‘, sayin g th at ‗A esth etic ―realism ‖ b ecam e in  th eir h an ds a vio len t 
rep udiatio n  o f art; ―utilitarian ism ‖ an  exaltatio n  o f th e exact scien ces, th e o n ly ―useful‖ kin d 
o f h um an  activity; an d ―en ligh ten m en t‖ a glo rificatio n  o f th e educated classes‘.43 This, then, 
is the real moment of Russian Nihilism, the point at which it arguably ceases to be populist 
and allies itself with the intelligentsia. The Russkoe Slovo group was purely interested in 
science –  th e scien ce o f eco n o m ics, o f lib eratio n , an d o f stren gth : ‗T h ey refused to  b elieve 
either in  rulin g classes o r even  in  a m yth  o f th e ―p eo p le‖ an d th e ―p easan ts‖. ―T h e 
                                                 
41 Q uo ted in  D ryzh ako va, p. 63. T he o rigin al so urce fo r ‗Y oun g R ussia‘ is B . P . K o z´m in, Politicheskie protsessy 
60-kh godov, i (Moscow-Petrograd: [n.pub.], 1923), pp. 259-69. D ryzh ako va‘s tran slatio n . 
42 Venturi argues that Chernyshevsky and the other authors of the Sovremennik are n o t ‗n ih ilists‘, an d p refers to  
see Pisarev and the Russkoe Slovo as nihilists who are themselves part of the populist movement –  its ‗enfants 
terribles‘ (p p . 325-26). However, Gillespie partially disagrees with this idea, especially because it seems to him 
th at V en turi still w ish es to  call b o th  gro up s ‗po p ulist‘ (p p . 284 -85, n. 17). 
43 Venturi, p. 325. 
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em an cip atio n  o f th e p erso n ‖ (i.e. th e fo rm atio n  o f in dep en den t ch aracters, ―w h o  th in k 
critically‖) w as m o re im p o rtan t th an  so cial em an cip atio n ‘.44 
The politics of the Russkoe Slovo gro up  do m in ated in terp retatio n s o f ‗n ih ilism ‘ at th is 
point, despite the fact that the Sovremennik group pointed out, quite accurately, that nihilism, 
‗is a w o rd devo id o f m ean in g, less suitab le th an  an y o th er fo r describ in g th e yo un ger 
generation, in which  co uld b e fo un d every o th er kin d o f ―ism ‖ b ut certain ly n o t n ih ilism ‘.45 
These radicals were interested in negation, not nothingness, because aimed to negate the 
do m in an t ideo lo gy o f R ussia at th at tim e, as H erm an n  G o ldsch m idt argued: ‗R ussian  
Nihilism was p o litically lib eral, p h ilo so p h ically m aterialistic an d sp iritually ath eist‘.46 Russian 
Nihilism was social Darwinism: if an institution was strong enough to survive, it would; if it 
was not, it would fall. These aspects of Russian Nihilism were therefore nihilistic only 
inasmuch as they relied upon certain aspects of Western philosophy that were themselves only 
tangentially nihilistic. To call the Russian Nihilists nihilistic is only accurate in historical 
terms –  th ey are th e ‗R ussian  N ih ilists‘ –  because their aims and intentions had little to do 
w ith  n o th in gn ess. H o w ever, n ih ilism  b ecam e, th an ks to  C h ern ysh evsky, th e idea o f a ‗n ew  
m an ‘ w h o  co uld free h im self fro m  h isto ry an d, th an ks to  P isarev, p redicated up o n  n o tio n s o f 
terrorism, of elitist egoism, and of anarchism. 
 
                                                 
44 Venturi, p. 327. 
45 Quoted in Venturi, p. 326. The original source is Mikhail Saltykov-Sh ch edrin , ‗N asha o b sh ch estvenn aya 
zhizn‘, in  Sovremennik, 3 (1864), [n .p ag.]. V en turi‘s tran slatio n . 
46 Quoted in Goudsblom, p. 9. The original source is Hermann L. Goldschmidt, Der Nihilismus im Licht einer 
kritischen Philosophie ([Zürich]: Thayngen-Sch affh ausen , 1941), p . 12. G o udsblo m ‘s tran slation. 
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Anti-Humanist Nihilism (1872-1888) 
Around the same time that the Russian Nihilists were in decline, Nietzsche, writing about a 
‗tran svaluatio n  o f all values‘ in  The Will to Power, brought nihilism back into mainstream 
Western culture.47 Instead of showing nihilism to be an emergent ideology, as both nihilism-
as-atheism and nihilism-as-anarchism indicate, Nietzsche argued that nihilism was something 
that pervaded all European values. Nietzsche (ironically) called Christianity nihilistic because 
C h ristian ity w as so  in vo lved w ith  tellin g th e truth  th at w h en  it w as ‗p ro ved‘ un true it left a 
vacuum in its wake. He also argued that Christianity was nihilistic because, in its struggle for 
the ineffable transcendent, it rejected the natural world. He w ro te o f ‗th e dam age all h um an  
in stitutio n s sustain  if a divin e an d tran scen den t h igh er sp h ere is p o stulated‘: ‗n atural‘ co m es 
to  m ean  ‗co n tem p tib le‘ un til ‗w ith  relen tless lo gic‘ o n e arrives ‗at th e ab so lute dem an d to  
den y n ature‘.48 This definition of nihilism is a passive social nihilism because it is a cultural 
phenomenon, not to be relegated to subversive individuals, but to the entirety of (Christian) 
European civilisation (social). F urth erm o re, C h ristian ity w as in itially a ‗go o d‘ p ro p o sitio n , n o t 
aimed at the destruction of other values (passive). Nietzsche rewrote nihilism to demonstrate 
th at it ‗sh o uld b e regarded n o t as th e p erso n al w h im  o f in veterate n egativists, b ut as th e 
p ro duct o f an  irrefutab le lo gic in h eren t in  E uro p ean  culture‘, th erefo re corresponding to 
H eidegger‘s h isto rio grap h y o f n ih ilism , rath er th an  R o sen ‘s, b ecause it argues th at n ih ilism  is 
always present.49 
N ietzsch e‘s statem en ts co n cern in g n ih ilism  co m e fro m  o n e o f th ree so urces: truth , 
value, and morals. In fact, within Nietzsche‘s p h ilo so p h y th ese th ree co n cep ts are clo sely 
                                                 
47 N ietzsch e‘s legacy is w ell kn o w n  in  th e tw en tieth  cen tury, and can  b e traced th ro ugh  H eidegger, D errida, an d 
Gilles Deleuze, amongst many others. However, in strict relation to nihilism two views predominate: the first 
that Nietzsche invented modern nihilism (critics such as Goudsblom) and the second that Nietzsche misunderstood 
nihilism (critics such as Gillespie). 
48 Nietzsche, The Will to Power, §245 (p. 141). 
49 Goudsblom, p. 140. 
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entwined. It is after the Preface to The Will to Power th at w e see N ietzsch e‘s an sw er to  th e 
questio n  ‗W h at do es ―n ih ilism ‖ m ean ?‘: ‗That the highest values devaluate themselves. The aim is 
lackin g; ―w h y?‖ fin ds n o  an sw er‘.50 Nihilism came about as the result of a belief being 
rejected because of its own criteria –  it lo ses its ‗value‘, it h as n o  ‗m o ral‘ w eigh t o r o b jective 
‗truth ‘. N ietzsch e p erceived n ih ilism  to  b e p rim arily a sickn ess –  ambiguous in that it 
weakens, but that it can also make strong when it is overcome –  and thus nihilism became 
so m eth in g th at w as to  b e o verco m e. P assive n ih ilism  is a sickn ess, ‗a w eary n ih ilism  th at n o  
lo n ger attacks [… ] a sign  o f w eakn ess‘, w h ereas active n ih ilism  ‗reach es its maximum of 
relative stren gth  as a vio len t fo rce o f destructio n ‘.51 Active nihilism can be characterised in 
some ways by the tenets of Russian Nihilism; passive nihilism, according to Nietzsche, was 
nowhere more prevalent than in the Christian monism that had dominated Europe for 
almost two millennia. 
The fact that Nietzsche labelled Christianity as nihilism is ironic, given the origins of 
th e term  w ith in  ath eism . T o  N ietzsch e, n ih ilism  aro se b ecause o f C h ristian ity‘s in sisten ce 
upon a hierarchy of morals, an absolute –  God –  from which to derive all standards. 
C h ristian ity ‗gran ted m an  an  ab so lute value, as o p p o sed to  h is sm alln ess an d acciden tal 
o ccurren ce in  th e flux o f b eco m in g an d p assin g aw ay‘, an d in  so  do in g ‗co n ceded to  th e 
world, in spite of sufferin g an d evil, th e ch aracter o f p erfectio n ‘.52 In fact, Christianity 
‗p o sited th at m an  h ad  a knowledge of absolute values and thus adequate knowledge precisely 
                                                 
50 Nietzsche, The Will to Power, §2 (p. 9). 
51 Nietzsche, The Will to Power, §23 (p . 18). N o te th at th is defin itio n  o f ‗active‘ an d ‗p assive‘ n ihilism  is sim ilar to  
that presented within this chapter. 
52 Nietzsche, The Will to Power, §4 (pp. 9-10). 
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regardin g w h at is m o st im p o rtan t‘.53 However, Christian morality was originally created to 
stop man fro m  fallin g in to  th e n ih ilistic ab yss: ‗It p reven ted m an  fro m  desp isin g h im self as 
man, from taking sides against life, from despairing of knowledge: it was a means of 
preservation. In sum, morality was the great antidote against practical and theoretical nihilism‘.54 
The use of Christian morality to stem nihilism creates nihilism as a human baseline, a chasm 
which is forever threatening when one sees that truth is merely contingent upon human 
need, when the smallness of man is compared to the expanse of the universe. Nietzsche felt 
th at C h ristian ity w as n o  lo n ger required as a ‗cure‘ to  n ih ilism , o r at least, ‗th is first n ih ilism ‘. 
B y th e n in eteen th  cen tury, ‗o ur E uro p e is n o  lo n ger th at un certain , cap ricio us, ab surd‘ an d  
now Christianity is no longer required: ‗―G o d‖ is far to o  extrem e a h yp o th esis‘.55 Christianity 
was a means to an end and thus justified by its initial conditions; those initial conditions, 
however, no longer applied, and therefore Christianity, by devaluating its own values and 
turning into atheism, became the epitome of nihilism. 
In 1887 (the time when Nietzsche was writing this part of The Will to Power), 
Christianity was in decline. Nietzsche charted the fall of Christianity back to Christian 
m o rality itself, sayin g: ‗A m o n g th e fo rces th at morality cultivated was truthfulness: this 
eventually turned itself against morality, discovered its teleology, its partial perspective –  and 
now the recognition of this inveterate mendaciousness that one despairs of shedding 
b eco m es a stim ulan t‘.56 The rise o f th e E n ligh ten m en t ideals o f reaso n , o f h um an ity ‗fo r 
itself‘, fin ally destro yed its o w n  creato r –  th e C h ristian  m o ral o f ‗truth fuln ess‘. L ike O edip us 
                                                 
53 Nietzsche, The Will to Power, §4 (p. 10). §4, §5, §114, and §55 were origin ally to geth er in  N ietzsch e‘s 
notebooks, but as the numbers demonstrate, have been divided in successive compilations of The Will to Power. 
Richard Schacht, in Nietzsche: Selections (New York: Macmillan, 1993), recompiles these in their original format 
under th e h eadin g, ‗E uro pean  N ih ilism ‘. See N ietzsch e, The Will to Power, p. 9, n. 3, and Schacht, p. 267, n. 3. 
54 Nietzsche, The Will to Power, §4 (p. 10). 
55 Nietzsche, The Will to Power, §114 (p. 70). 
56 Nietzsche, The Will to Power, §5 (p. 10). Schacht inserts th e lin e ‗T o  n ih ilism ‘ after th is quo tatio n , so m eth in g 
that is notably absent from the Kaufman/Hollingdale text (p. 267). 
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killing his father, this desire for truth had begun to turn on Christianity, and found it lacking. 
Just as the rise of nihilism is at the heart of the Age of Reason, so too is the fall of 
Christianity. Christianity, which secured humanity against nihilism, eventually exacerbated its 
rise. Thus, those earlier commentators such as Jacobi and Cortès, who found that rationality 
and religion were staunchly opposed, were indeed correct, but sought to lay the blame on 
individuals such as Fichte, not upon Christianity itself. 
F ro m  w h en ce do es n ih ilism  arise th en ? In  N ietzsch e‘s view , it is quite literally th e void 
left b y C h ristian ity‘s ab sen ce. T h e reactio n  to  th e distrust o f C h ristian  m o rality, th e lack o f 
faith in faith itself, leads not to a position of compromise, but to an extreme reaction: 
 
Thus the belief of the absolute immorality of nature, in aim- and meaninglessness, is the 
psychologically necessary affect, once the belief in God and an essentially moral order 
becomes untenable. Nihilism appears at this point, not that the displeasure at existence 
has become greater than before but because one has come to  m istrust an y ‗m ean in g‘ in  
suffering, indeed, in existence.57 
 
T h e gap  left in  m o rality h arks b ack to  N ietzsch e‘s idea th at th e ‗un ten ab ility o f o n e 
in terp retatio n  o f th e w o rld [… ] aw aken s th e susp icio n  th at all interpretations of the world 
are false‘.58 T h is reactio n  is furth er exp lain ed w h en  N ietzsch e argues th at, ‗O n e 
interpretation has collapsed; but because it was considered the interpretation, it now seems as 
if th ere w ere n o  m ean in g at all in  existen ce, as if everyth in g w ere in  vain ‘.59 Thus, for 
Nietzsche, nihilism is fundamentally a thwarted idealism: when the belief fails, only the 
nihilistic void is left. Where perspectivism, or at least relativism, would seem the most 
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obvious recourse, there is rather an extreme reaction to the belief that all interpretations 
must be false. 
N ih ilism , fo r N ietzsch e, stem m ed fro m  m an ‘s in ab ility to  accep t th at w h at h e co uld 
n o t see, w h at h e co uld n o t disco ver, co uld still exist: ‗T h e im m o desty o f m an : to  den y 
m ean in g w h ere h e sees n o n e‘.60 This is a direct indictment o f h um an ity‘s search  fo r m ean in g, 
in that if meaning does not become immediately apparent, humanity assumes that there must 
b e n o n e: ‗O ur w ill requires an  aim ; it w o uld so o n er h ave th e vo id fo r its p urp o se th an  b e 
vo id o f p urp o se‘.61 This leads Nietzsche to  den y an y p h ilo so p h ical ‗truth ‘ in  n ih ilism , fo r it 
o rigin ates o n ly in  m an ‘s in ab ility to  accep t th e reality th at truth  is m an -made: 
 
What, then, is truth? A mobile army of metaphors, metonyms, and anthropomorphisms 
–  in short, a sum of human relations, which have been enhanced, transposed, and 
embellished poetically and rhetorically, and which after long use seem firm, canonical, 
and obligatory to a people: truths are illusions which one has forgotten that this is what 
they are; metaphors which are worn out and without serious power; coins which have 
lost their pictures and now matter only as metal, no longer as coins.62 
 
N ietzsch e‘s so lutio n  to  th e resultin g n ih ilism  is a D io n ysian  w ill-to-power which eternally 
makes and unmakes the world (opposed to an Apollonian will which seeks to stratify and 
codify the world), a world in which man is the centre but is concerned with building his own 
meaning: 
 
This, my Dionysian world of the eternally self-creating, the eternally self-destroying, this 
mystery world of th e tw o fo ld vo lup tuo us deligh t, m y ‗b eyo n d go o d an d evil,‘ w ith o ut 
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goal, unless the joy of the circle is itself a goal; without will, unless a ring feels good will 
towards itself –  do you want a name for this world? A solution for all its riddles? A light for 
you, too, you best-concealed, strongest, most intrepid, most midnightly men? –  This 
world is the will to power –  and nothing besides! And you yourselves are also this will to power 
–  and nothing besides!63 
 
This then, for Nietzsche, is the sublime overcoming of nihilism, the solution to its 
problematic. Although nihilism devalues itself, it does not rebuild, whereas Nietzsche 
p ro p o ses a dualistic creative an d destructive p ro cess, w h ich  G illesp ie argues ‗is to  its very 
core a world in opposition to itself, a world of constant and universal war in which every 
b ein g seeks to  co n quer an d sub due every o th er b ein g‘.64 This sense of eternal conflict as the 
solution to social nihilism gave rise, in the early-twentieth century, to some of the most 
horrific experiences humanity had yet experienced. At this stage, nihilism becomes 
contemporary, meaning the same then as it does now, in the twenty-first century: mass 
destruction. 
 
Authoritarian Nihilism (1889-1945) 
In the twentieth century, nihilism has emerged as the defining factor of Western culture. 
This assertion indicates a certain perception in the historical formation of the twentieth 
century; that modernity, in the guise of the development of Enlightenment ideals, gave rise 
to the traumas that that century witnessed. This association of nihilism with modernity is a 
fundamental stage in the appropriation of nihilism, and a number of critics who perceive 
nihilism to be the dominant factor in twentieth-century culture argue this point, including 
Nietzsche (albeit with foresight), Heidegger, Karl Löwith, and Theodor Adorno. On one 
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side of the argument, Heidegger and Nietzsche oppose nihilism by straining against it, 
leading to the creation of a philosophical backbone for National Socialism. National 
Socialism (mis)read Nietzsche as advocating the supremacy of one kind of man, one race, 
ab o ve all o th ers, an d so ugh t to  destro y everyth in g th at w as ‗o th er‘ to  th is ideal. T h e 
Nietzschean übermensch became a symbol, not of the active overcoming of passive nihilism, 
but of an active, state-authorised nihilism attempting to eradicate all traces of otherness. 
L ikew ise, H eidegger‘s p ro p o sal fo r th e recup eratio n  o f b ein g, o f Dasein [the process of 
being], led towards the active affirmation of an ideal over humanity. On the other side of the 
argument, seen in Adorno and Löwith, the Holocaust itself is the epitome of negation, of 
nihilism. The Holocaust is the point at which nihilism becomes no longer a passive social 
concern, but moves towards an active social nihilism –  attempting, by way of ideological 
p ro cesses an d gen o cide, to  n egate existen ce o n  a m acro  scale. T h e ‗E uro p ean  sickn ess‘ n o ted 
by Nietzsche was no longer passive, but actively concerned with wholesale destruction. In 
both cases, because of the Holocaust, modernity always turns towards nihilism to explain 
itself. 
That Nietzschean philosophy should come to this end is not solely a result of 
E lisab eth  N ietzsch e‘s treatm en t o f h is w o rks (editin g h er b ro th er‘s w o rks to  rem o ve 
anything anti-nationalist or anti-fascist and emphasising anti-Semitic sentiments), or the 
Heideggerian reading that dominates the era. Certain problems exist within Nietzschean 
philosophy that make this reading possible. Although Nietzsche was staunchly anti-
nationalist, the removal of certain mitigating characteristics of his philosophical framework 
recreates the will-to-power as the will-to-destruction; the destruction of what is Other. 
L ö w ith  argued, p arap h rasin g N ietzsch e‘s p o sitio n  o n  m o rality, th at ‗M o rality b eco m es 
 33 
replaced by the will to an end an d h en ce b y th e w ill to  th e m ean s to w ard th at en d‘.65 The 
world as will-to-power (and nothing besides!) relies strongly, perhaps too strongly, on the 
notion of conflict and destruction at the expense of morality. For Löwith, this also appears 
in  H eidegger‘s philosophy: 
 
T h e ‗sp irit‘ o f N atio n al So cialism  h as to  do  n o t so  m uch  w ith  th e n atio n al an d th e so cial 
as with the kind of radical resoluteness and dynamic which rejects all discussion and 
genuine communication because it relies exclusively on itself –  on the (German) 
capacity-for-B ein g w h ich  is alw ays o n e‘s o w n . W ith o ut excep tio n , it is exp ressio n s o f 
power and resoluteness which characterize the vocabulary of National Socialist politics 
an d H eidegger‘s p h ilo so p h y.66 
 
In  L ö w ith ‘s view , H eidegger‘s p o litical and philosophical association with National Socialism 
was not a plan for survival in a hostile regime, but a meeting between two similar 
philosophies.67 H eidegger‘s co n cep t o f Dasein is identical to that ideal state, proposed by 
National Socialist philosophy, of lebensraum [living-space], where the individuals and nations 
exist in conflict with one another over available resources. Only the strong survive this 
co n flict, an d th erefo re th e ‗cap acity-for-B ein g‘ is alw ays fro m  o n e‘s self. 
H eidegger‘s w o rks o n  the construction of Being frequently refer to nihilism and 
n o th in gn ess, b ut th e tw o  m o st exp licit are ‗W h at is M etap h ysics?‘ an d  ‗T h e W o rd o f 
N ietzsch e: ―G o d is D ead‖‘, w h ich  o ffer a sum m ary o f H eidegger‘s ap p ro ach  to  n ih ilism  
without resorting to a detailed examination of his entire corpus. H eidegger‘s w o rk o n  B ein g 
and nihilism was involved with the association of nihilism and metaphysics. Heidegger 
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argued th at yo u co uld n o t exp lo re ‗th at w h ich  is‘ w ith o ut reco urse to  ‗th at w h ich  is n o t‘. In  
his attempts to  ‗take exp licit p o ssessio n ‘ o f Dasein, he notes: 
 
What should be examined are beings only, and besides that –  nothing; beings alone, and 
further –  nothing; solely beings, and beyond that –  nothing. 
What about this nothing? Is it an accident that we talk this way so automatically? Is it 
only a manner of speaking –  and nothing besides?68 
 
His conclusion is that nothing is an integral aspect of Being, as without nothingness there is 
no Being. Furthermore, Heidegger argued that Being and nothingness co-exist in a continual 
ten sio n  n o t un like N ietzsch e‘s co n cep t o f a D io n ysian  w ill-to-power: 
 
T h e w o rd ‗n ih ilism ‘ in dicates th at nihil (Nothing) is, and is essentially, in that which it 
names. Nihilism means: Nothing is befalling everything and in every respect. 
‗E veryth in g‘ m ean s w h at is, in  its en tirety. A n d w h atever stan ds th ere in  every resp ect 
proper to it when it is experienced as that which is. Hence, nihilism means that Nothing 
is befalling whatever is as such, in its entirety. But whatever is, what it is and how it is 
fro m  o ut o f B ein g. A ssum in g th at every ‗is‘ lies in  B ein g, th e essen ce o f n ih ilism  co n sists 
of the fact that Nothing is befalling Being itself.69 
 
If nothing functions as a negation, it is a negation fundamentally at odds with itself. Nothing 
is not part of a straightforward binary opposition between Being and nothing, but an implicit 
p layer in  th e creatio n  o f B ein g: ‗T h e n o th in g do es n o t m erely serve as th e co un terco n cep t o f 
beings; rather, it originally belongs to their essential unfolding as such ‘.70 This statement –  
‗th e n ih ilatio n  o f th e n o th in g‘ –  is th e result o f H eidegger‘s exp lan atio n  o f th e ‗actio n ‘ o f 
nothing: 
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This wholly repelling gesture towards beings that are in retreat as a whole, which is the 
action of the nothing that oppresses Dasein in anxiety, is the essence of nothing: 
nihilation. It is neither an annihilation of beings nor does it spring from a negation. 
Nihilation will not submit to calculation in terms of annihilation and negation. The 
nothing itself nihilates.71 
 
‗T h e n o th in g itself n ih ilates‘ is K rell‘s tran slatio n  o f Das Nicht Nichtet, more commonly 
tran slated as ‗th e n o th in g n o ts‘. H o w ever, w h ilst th e verb  ‗n o ts‘ co n veys th e o rigin al 
‗N ich tet‘, in  th e sen se th at th is w o rd is n eo lo gistic, K rell‘s tran slatio n  allo w s th e reader to see 
a two-fo ld p ro cess. ‗T h e n o th in g itself n ih ilates‘ sh o w s th at n o th in g h as an  actio n  o f 
n ih ilatio n  (‗T h e n o th in g nihilates‘) an d th at th is actio n  refers b ack to  itself (‗T h e n o th in g 
nihilates itself‘). 
If Being and nothing are fundamentally related, then metaphysics (the study of Being) 
is fundamentally related to nihilism (the study of nothing) and nihilism is elevated to a 
‗w o rld -h isto rical m o vem en t‘: 
 
If the essence of nihilism lies in history, so that the truth of Being remains wanting in 
the appearing of whatever is as such, in its entirety, and if, accordingly, Nothing is 
befalling Being and its truth, then metaphysics as the history of the truth of what is 
such, is, in its essence, nihilism. If, finally, metaphysics is the historical ground of the 
world history that is being determined by Europe and the West, then that world history 
is, in an entirely different sense, nihilistic.72 
 
If nihilism is implicitly located within metaphysics and metaphysics traces the movement of 
thought from Platonism to Nietzsche and Heidegger, then nihilism is an implicit aspect of 
world history. Asking about the condition of nihilistic history, Heidegger wrote at the end of 
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‗W h at is M etap h ysics?‘: ‗W h y are th ere b ein gs at all, an d w h y n o t rath er n o th in g?‘.73 
(Nihilistic) history must then ask the questions: Why is what is is, as opposed to what is not? 
Why does what happen happen, as opposed to what does not? Nihilism is thus an implicit 
part of history, and the history of modernity. 
Both Löwith and Adorno support this view of nihilism as an implicit aspect of 
modernity although their arguments indict Nietzsche and Heidegger. Löwith argued that the 
decline of Christianity led to the realisation of nihilism because, after Man became the 
measure of things, he then proceeded to negate himself: 
 
At the same time as Marx and Kierkegaard, all the other radical followers of Hegel made 
the negation of what exists into the principle of their thinking. Marx destroys the 
cap italist w o rld; K ierkegaard in ten sifies th e ‗ab so lute n egativity‘ o f ro m an tic iro n y up  to  
th e p o in t o f leap in g in to  faith ; Stirn er p laces h im self up o n  ‗N o th in g‘; F euerb ach  says 
th at w e m ust b e ‗ab so lutely n egative‘ in  o rder to  create so m eth in g n ew ; an d B auer 
dem an ds ‗h ero ic deeds fro m  o ut o f N o th in g‘ as th e p resupposition of new worlds.74 
 
The history of modernity is summarised by the motion towards negativity. This is trapped 
within the Hegelian dialectic of proposing the destruction (antithesis) of what exists (thesis) 
in order to bring about the advent of the New World Order (synthesis). Nietzsche and 
Heidegger, as players in this Hegelian game, did not bar the doors to nihilism but actually 
opened them wider and issued an invitation: not an Überwindung [overcoming] of nihilism, 
but a Verwindung [resigned acceptance] of it.75 R o sen  argues th at w h ilst H eidegger‘s in ten t 
‗w as to  o verco m e E uro p ean  n ih ilism  b y settin g th e stage fo r a n ew  un derstan din g o f ―th e 
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questio n  o f B ein g‖‘, th is w as ‗tran sfo rm ed in to  a p ro fo un d resign atio n  in  th e face o f 
n ih ilism ‘ as a very result of the history that was unfolding around him.76 Heidegger, in trying 
to overcome Nietzschean nihilism, eventually succumbed to the illness. Löwith, in perceiving 
modernity to be the result of the decline of Christian morality and the rise of totalitarianism, 
blamed both Nietzsche and Heidegger for the fact that nihilism was squarely at the forefront 
of modernity and argued that it is through these attempts to overcome nihilism that nihilism 
came to be realised. 
The expression of this thought is seen clearly in  A do rn o ‘s w o rks, w h ere m o dern ity 
p ro ceeds th ro ugh  th e recup eratio n  o f n ih ilism . H e w rites th at, ‗A cts o f o verco m in g, even  
that of nihilism, together with the Nietzschean one that was otherwise intended but which 
still provided fascism with slogans, are alw ays w o rse th an  w h at th ey o verco m e‘.77 As the 
ab stract exp ressio n  o f th o ugh t, n ih ilism  leads to  destructio n  b ecause ‗N o th in gn ess is th e 
acm e o f ab stractio n , an d th e ab stract is th e ab o m in ab le‘.78 This does not fully explain, 
however, the association of nihilism with the Holocaust, because the Holocaust is anything 
but abstract to Adorno. Nihilism, as the spectre of abstract thought, is likened to the 
H o lo caust b ecause, ‗If th o ugh t is n o t m easured b y th e extrem ity th at eludes th e co n cep t, it is 
from the outset in the nature of the musical accompaniment with which the SS liked to 
dro w n  o ut th e scream s o f its victim s‘.79 If thought does not hear itself because it is hearing 
nihilism, then the Holocaust is only one step away. This is why the Holocaust is, for Adorno, 
the epitome of nihilism. Like Löwith, Adorno argues that nihilism is not connected with 
Nicht [nothing] but with Vernichtung [destruction], a shift from nothing to the process of 
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making nothing, from absence to the extermination of presence. Adorno‘s resp o n se to  
nihilism illustrates the way in which the dialectical game, which occurs so frequently in 
twentieth-century discussions of nihilism, is played with loaded dice: 
 
The true nihilists are the ones who oppose nihilism with their more and more faded 
positivities, the ones who are thus conspiring with all existant malice, and eventually 
with the destructive principle itself. Thought honors itself by defending what is damned 
as nihilism.80 
 
T h is distin ctio n  b etw een  ‗th e true n ih ilists‘ an d ‗n ih ilism ‘ is due to the difference between 
those who strive against nothingness, no matter what the cost, believing at all times in their 
o w n  truth , an d a n ih ilism  th at rejects th ese ‗p etty‘ truth s. ‗T h o ugh t h o n o rs itself b y 
defen din g w h at is dam n ed as n ih ilism ‘ do es not mean that thought should defend nihilism, 
‗h o n o ur‘ h ere b ein g given  a p o sitive im p licatio n , b ut th at th o ugh t h o n o urs itself at the expense 
of the Other by defending what is damned as nihilism. T h e desire fo r th o ugh t to  asso ciate ‗w h at 
is dam n ed‘ w ith  ‗n ih ilism ‘ o ccurs b ecause th o ugh t n eeds so m eth in g again st w h ich  to  strive 
o r, as Sim o n  C ritch ley p h rases it, ‗a straw  m an  o f m ean in glessn ess th at can  easily b e kn o cked 
do w n  so  th at m ean in g can  b e resto red‘.81 
If nihilism is the philosophy of absolute negation, then there can surely be no reason 
to  fo r it to  b e, as G ian n i V attim o  argues, ‗o ur (o n ly) ch an ce‘.82 H o w ever, in  a ‗p o stm o dern ‘ 
n ih ilism  w e fin d ‗th e extrem ity th at eludes th e co n cep t‘ th at A do rn o  desires b ecause such  a 
formulation of nihilism entails reflexivity. ‗P o stm o dern  n ih ilism ‘ is a fo rm ulatio n  o f n ih ilism  
that comes about as a result of the association between nihilism and the sublime within the 
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postmodern. This conflation occurs solely within the postmodern, although throughout the 
history of modernity the connection between the two concepts is implied. Thus, before 
showing the appearance of nihilism within postmodernism, we must first uncover the 
connections between nihilism and the sublime that exist before the postmodern era, in relation 
to the sublime and Enlightenment modernity. 
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2. 
Stylising the Sublime 
 
 
Like nihilism, the sublime has a rich cultural heritage, although the sublime extends 
historically to the concept of beauty, rather than negation. This suggests that nihilism and 
the sublime bear little resemblance to one another to the extent that they may be considered 
opposed binary concepts. Such a perception is supported by the fact that nihilism became an 
independent concept during the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries, whereas the 
sublime dominated aesthetics during the late-seventeenth and early-eighteenth centuries, 
preceding nihilism by at least a century. Although this seems to indicate two different 
concepts, the fact that the sublime was central to seventeenth- and eighteenth-century 
aesthetic discourse suggests that there was an ideological motivation behind the study of the 
sublime and that the construction of the sublime is implicated with the dominant ideologies 
of this period. As this period marks the rise of the Enlightenment Project, which has been 
h ith erto  b een  called ‗th e p ro cess o f m o dern ity‘, it is clear th at b o th  n ih ilism  an d th e sub lim e 
were constructed within the same Enlightenment ideologies and were the result of the same 
social catalysts. This suggests that the sublime is only arbitrarily distinct from nihilism and 
that nihilism is actually a temporally-displaced formulation of the sublime. 
Since an ideology constructs the sublime, there is an intention to its existence. It is as 
historically specific as nihilism, indicating the usefulness of the concept of sublimity to a 
particular historical consciousness. This cultural specificity means that cultural 
understandings of the sublime, like nihilism, shift diachronically. This is not an extraneous 
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observation, despite the fact that all concepts exist diachronically, because it warns us of the 
dangers of anachronism. As Martin Donougho argues, we must be wary of reading meanings 
into the sublime that were not actually present during a given period: 
 
The sublime has by now come to form part of the furniture of our common world 
(artistic, philosophical, or everyday). Yet that should not blind us to the attendant fact 
that –  as with other categories of aesthetics –  the sublime is historically specific, and has 
been taken in a variety of ways. We should be wary of reifying it, therefore, but equally 
wary of reading one sense of the sublime backwards or forwards into another time 
period, thus assimilating history to theory. For all its historical contingency, we may 
nonetheless continue to speak of the sublime, or more cautiously, of styles of the 
sublime.1 
 
When reading formulations of the sublime we should always be aware that it is only a reading 
and that, as such, it is heavily reliant upon our understanding of the period at hand. Likewise, 
w h en  w e sp eak o f ‗styles o f th e sub lim e‘, w e m ust also  un derstan d th at w e are sp eakin g o f 
stylised forms of the sublime within ideological constructions. If the sublime is an ideological 
construct, then what one period considers sublime is not necessarily sublime in another, and 
‗th e sub lim e, righ tly un dersto o d, is n o t all th in gs to  all m en ‘.2 This explains why a number of 
different approaches to sublimity appeared after the initial resurgence of the concept during 
the seventeen th  cen tury, in cludin g E dm un d B urke‘s ‗p sych o lo gical‘ sub lim e, Im m an uel 
K an t‘s ‗n o etic‘ sub lim e, an d th e R o m an tic ‗n atural‘ sub lim e. E ach  o f th ese uses th e sub lim e 
in a different way, emphasising particular formulations of sublimity. These are therefore 
‗stylised‘ fo rm s o f th e sub lim e, ‗styles‘ o f sub lim ity th at o rigin ate w ith in  a given  ideo lo gical 
discourse. 
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Sublime Texts and their Contexts 
T h e ‗styles‘ o f th e sub lim e seen  in  B urke, K an t, an d th e R o m an tics o rigin ate in  th e m id -
seventeenth and late-eighteen th  cen turies, durin g th e sudden  en th usiasm  fo r ‗aesth etic 
th eo ry‘. T h is sudden  p ro liferatio n  o f styles o f th e sub lim e em erged fro m  th e ‗redisco very‘ o f 
one of the earliest works of literary criticism, Peri Hupsous [On Sublimity], supposedly written 
by Cassius Longinus, was a Greek rhetorician and philosopher circa 213-273 CE, although it 
is more likely to be the work of a first-cen tury p h ilo so p h er n o w  kn o w n  as ‗P seudo -
L o n gin us‘.3 The reason for the popularity of this text is primarily due to the translation by 
Nicholas Boileau-Despréaux in 1674, which fed into the emergent discourse on the nature of 
art, and was popularised by John Dryden and The Spectator.4 L o n gin us‘ text is sign ifican t 
because it gave a formal, classical structure to seventeenth-century aesthetic discourse, 
defin in g a fo rm  o f em o tio n al ‗elevatio n ‘ th at is p o ssib le th ro ugh  lan guage an d distin guish in g 
b etw een  ‗b eautiful‘ an d ‗sub lim e‘ fo rm s. T h is m arks th e arrival o f ‗th e sub lim e‘ w ith in  
E n glish  culture b ecause ‗elevatio n ‘ o r ‗h eigh t‘ is the English translation of hypsous (υ̃̃ѺѺψ ου̃̃ς), 
which through the Latin sublimis [lofty or elevated language], came to mean a sublime 
                                                 
3 Peri Hupsous h as altern atively been  translated as ‗O n  Sub lim ity‘ (D . A . R ussell), ‗O n  G reat W ritin g‘ (G . M . A . 
G rube), an d ‗O n  th e Sub lim e‘ (T . E . B . W o o d). A lth o ugh  n o n e o f th ese are ‗literal‘ translatio n s (as th is ch ap ter 
will exp lo re), R ussell‘s tran slatio n  w ill b e used b ecause the suffix in dicates th e ‗quality o r co n ditio n ‘ o f th e 
sublime (OED) rath er th an  ‗th e sub lim e‘ itself, w h ich  is th e aim  o f th e text. In  relatio n  to  its auth o rsh ip , R ussell 
observes in his introduction to On Sublimity (Clarendon: Oxford University Press, 1965) that an Augustan critic 
called Dionysius of Halicarnassus is far more likely to be the author than Cassius Longinus because of certain 
historical references within the text (see pp. x-xi). ‗L o n gin us‘ is used throughout this chapter, but this refers to 
the author of On Sublimity, not to Cassius Longinus. 
4 See Russell in Longinus, pp. xv-xvi. B o ileau‘s w as n o t th e first E n glish  tran slatio n , h o w ever, because Jo h n  
Hall first translated On Sublimity into English in 1652. Likewise, there is evidence of its use prior to this in John 
M ilto n ‘s Tractate on Education (1644) an d G eo rge C h apm an ‘s tran slatio n  o f H o m er‘s Odyssey (1615). The 
trajectory and influence of On Sublimity is confused as many writers of the seventeenth century used the word 
w ith o ut im m ediate reference to  L o n gin us‘ w ork (see W o o d, p p . 9 -10). 
 43 
feeling.5 Most of the structure of On Sublimity is concerned with rhetorical strategies in order 
to  p ro duce th is feelin g o f ‗elevatio n ‘, alth o ugh  it frequen tly suggests the ability of sublime art 
to  free th e m in d fro m  lan guage. T h is is an  im p o rtan t deb ate in  th e classificatio n  o f L o n gin us‘ 
sublime, and is worthy of some discussion. 
Although it is a reductive assertion, there is a discursive shift between the sublime as a 
‗rh eto rical‘ fo rm  an d a ‗n atural‘ fo rm  durin g th e seven teen th  an d eigh teen th  cen turies. 
Sam uel M o n k argues th at th e develo p m en t fro m  L o n gin us‘ rh eto rical m o del to  th e B urkean  
natural model within this period is of primary importance in establishing the development of 
th e co n cep t o f th e sub lim e durin g th e eigh teen th  cen tury. T h is is a sh ift fro m  an  ‗aesth etic‘ 
sub lim e to  an  ‗eth ical‘ sub lim e, an  o b servatio n  th at b eco m es im p o rtan t in  relatio n  to  K an t‘s 
un derstan din g o f th e sub lim e. M o n k argues: ‗O n ce it was seen that the sublime is a state of 
mind evoked by objects and ideas, the objective criteria of the rules were gradually 
in validated‘.6 Other critics, however, have argued that this is too extreme. For example, T. E. 
B . W o o d argues th at h e ‗can n o t really agree with any of this unless qualified to the extent of 
rem o vin g its im p act‘, b ecause L o n gin us‘ sub lim e is ‗a p h en o m en o n  th at exists w h ere th e 
dem an ds o f fo rm , ap p ro p riate sub ject m atter, an d artistic in sp iratio n  are fused‘ an d n o t 
purely rhetorical.7 M o n k suggests th at th e defin itio n  o f a rh eto rical sub lim e is ‗w ro n g‘ an d  a 
n atural sub lim e is ‗righ t‘, a co n structio n  far to o  b lin dly asserted. N everth eless, th e argum en t, 
even when qualified, does retain enough impact to bear scrutiny. The eighteenth-century 
                                                 
5 Here we can understand the significance of On Sublimity in  relatio n  to  A lexan der P o p e‘s satire o f rh eto rical 
strategies in Martinus Scriblerius peri Bathuous; or, The Art of Sinking in Poetry (1728) through the opposition 
b etw een  ‗elevated‘ art (hypsous) an d ‗sin kin g‘ art (bathuous). Russell, however, sees this as a misinterpretation of 
hypsous. See Longinus, p. 2, n. 1. 
6 Samuel Holt Monk, The Sublime: A Study of Critical Theories in XVIII-Century England (Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press, 1960), p. 236. 
7 Wood, pp. 21, 36. 
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sublime is, however, not purely natural or psychological but a mix of classical and romantic 
definitions, and the interpretation of On Sublimity is an integral part of this debate. 
Without entering into the debate over where sublimity of art resides, whether in the 
artist‘s fo rm al co n cep tio n  o r th e audien ce‘s resp o n se, th e structure o f On Sublimity is generally 
more concerned with rhetoric (form) than nature (response), whereas the Burkean 
formulation of the sublime is generally more about nature than rhetoric. On Sublimity is 
p rim arily co n cern ed w ith  rh eto rical strategies in  p ro ducin g ‗sub lim e‘ w ritin g. Its structure 
fo llo w s th e ‗five so urces o f sub lim ity‘ listed in  L o n gin us‘ p reface to  th e text: ‗th e p o w er to  
co n ceive great th o ugh ts‘, ‗stro n g an d in sp ired em o tio n ‘, ‗certain  kin ds o f figures‘, ‗n o b le 
dictio n ‘, an d ‗dign ified an d elevated w o rd -arran gem en t‘.8 Of these five sections, only one is 
in trin sically related to  th e ‗n atural‘ sub lim e –  ‗stro n g an d in sp ired em o tio n ‘ –  although even 
this has only two subsections of its five concerned with nature. However, it is impossible to 
argue that On Sublimity is concerned solely with rhetoric: 
 
Experience in invention and ability to order and arrange material cannot be detected in 
single passages; we begin to appreciate them only when we see the whole context. 
Sublimity, on the other hand, produced at the right moment, tears everything up like a 
w h irlw in d, an d exh ib its th e o rato r‘s w h o le p o w er at a sin gle b lo w .9 
 
W ith o ut th e ‗w h irlw in d‘ o f em o tio n  th ere can  b e no sublime –  ‗exp erien ce in  in ven tio n ‘ is 
not enough. This implies that rhetorical strategy alone is not enough to produce sublimity. 
Furthermore, the passage conflates rhetorical and natural constructions of the sublime 
because rhetoric is subsumed by natural metaphor and nature is reconstructed as an aspect 
o f rh eto ric: sp eech  is a ‗w h irlw in d‘, alth o ugh  it is ‗p ro duced at th e righ t m o m en t‘ an d 
                                                 
8 Longinus, §8 (p. 8). 
9 Longinus, §1 (p. 2). 
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‗exh ib its th e o rato r‘s w h o le p o w er‘. T h is is seen  clearly in  L o n gin us‘ co m p ariso n  o f 
Hyperides and Demosthenes, w h ere alth o ugh  H yp erides ‗rep ro duces all th e go o d features o f 
D em o sth en es‘ h e do es n o t excite th e em o tio n s o f h is aud ien ce, un like D em o sth en es‘ 
p o w erful rh eto ric: ‗T h e crash  o f h is th un der, th e b rillian ce o f h is ligh tn in g‘.10 The message is 
that technique is not enough, and that there must be some stroke of genius –  B o ileau‘s 
ineffable je ne sais quoi –  in  o rder to  im p art an  artw o rk w ith  ‗sub lim e‘ feelin g: th is gen ius is 
not bred but born and is therefore akin to a natural, not rhetorical, formulation of the 
sublime. 
W o o d disagrees w ith  M o n k b ecause h e feels th at M o n k ‗essen tialises‘ eigh teen th -
cen tury fo rm ulatio n s o f th e sub lim e th at are ‗a co m p licated b len d, if yo u w ill, o f th e 
traditio n al [W o o d defin es th is as ‗fo rm , gen re, an d deco rum ‘] an d p sych o lo gical conceptions 
o f w h at th e artistic p ro cess an d th e art w o rk are‘.11 This is due to the proliferation of 
‗aesth etic th eo ry‘ w ith in  th e eigh teen th  cen tury th at ran ges, as P eter de B o lla argues, ‗fro m  
―gen eral w o rks‖ th ro ugh  arch itecture an d garden in g, p icto rial and plastic arts, literature and 
dram a, to  m usic‘.12 A lth o ugh  de B o lla calls it a reductive descrip tio n , h e defin es ‗aesth etic 
th eo ry‘ as ‗th e relatio n sh ip  b etw een  a th eo ry an d th e o b jects it describ es an d an alyses‘.13 This 
p ro liferatio n  o f ‗aesth etic th eo ry‘ suggests a h isto rical co n text th at gestures to w ards an  
exp lan atio n  o f b o th  L o n gin us‘ text an d h is p o p ularity durin g th e n eo classical p erio d. T h e 
conception of On Sublimity occurred during a period when rhetoric was the doctrinal core of 
civilisation and art and had been since the height of Attic art.14 Longinus was arguably 
seeking to incorporate the idea of genius, of artistic creativity, into this stagnant doctrine, an 
                                                 
10 Longinus, §34 (pp. 40-41). 
11 Wood, pp. 17-18, n. 2. 
12 Peter de Bolla, The Discourse of the Sublime: Readings in History, Aesthetics and the Subject (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 
1989), p. 29 
13 de Bolla, p. 29. 
14 See Russell in Longinus, p. xi. 
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in terp retatio n  o f th e sub lim e m o de in  w h ich  ‗O ur th o ugh ts o ften  travel b eyo n d th e 
boun daries o f o ur surro un din gs‘.15 Likewise, the neoclassical era was attempting to assert a 
style that was both independent and classical, fusing classical forms with new rhetorical 
strategies. The translation of Longinus during this period gave credence to the idea of a 
creative rhetoric, not a mimetic one. 
This discursive and ideological shift of sublimity is an integral part of demonstrating 
th e lin k b etw een  n ih ilism  an d th e sub lim e. G iven  M o n k‘s p ro p o sitio n  o f th e rh eto rical fo rm  
o f L o n gin us‘ sub lim e an d W o o d‘s sub sequen t qualificatio n , it is clear th at th e B urkean  an d  
Kantian formulations of the sublime both move towards a psychological or rational 
approach to the sublime. One of the most important ways in which we see this shift occur is 
in  th e ‗C o n texts‘ that Wood gives the reader. Wood summarises a number of different 
sources to demonstrate the uses seventeenth- and eighteenth-century writers made of the 
sub lim e. W o o d‘s survey is im p o rtan t b ecause o f th e idea o f ‗elevatio n ‘ th at recurs 
throughout his sources: ‗D efin in g ―h up so us‖ as ―elevatio n ‖, it is im m ediately ap p aren t th at, 
if anything, its interpretation widens during the century, because in addition to the retention 
o f o lder m ean in gs [… ] th ere is th e additio n  o f th e p sych o lo gical sch o o l‘s usage o f th e 
w o rd‘.16 W o o d also  argues th at ‗T h ere is n o  do ub t th at th e eigh teen th  cen tury yo ked  
Longinus, Christianity, and the Bible together in order to serve its purposes‘ (m y em p h asis).17 
These two statements reveal that throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries there 
is an ideological shift in the use of the sublime, and that furthermore this shift indicates a 
move away from the idea of divine elevation towards a more natural or psychological 
elevatio n  o f th e h um an . A lth o ugh  W o o d argues th is to  b e a ‗w id en in g‘, it is p o ssib le to  see 
                                                 
15 Longinus, §35 (p. 42). 
16 Wood, p. 209. 
17 Wood, p. 29. 
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th is as a sh ift in  th e do m in an t p aradigm  o f th e sub lim e fro m  ‗divin e elevatio n ‘ to  ‗h um an ist 
elevatio n ‘. In  o rder to  ‗w iden ‘ th e sub lim e, th e ‗divin e‘ w o uld h ave to  retain  its im p o rtan ce. 
However, the sublime elevates humanity over divinity to replicate the dominant ideology of 
Enlightenment humanism, thereby suggesting a paradigm shift signifying the alteration, not 
extension, of the parameters of the sublime. 
These arguments parallel the movement presented in the previous chapter, where the 
rise of nihilism was connected with the decline of religious and classical authority. This is 
w h at G illesp ie calls ‗a n ew  co n cep t o f divin e o m n ip o ten ce an d a co rresp o n din g co n cep t o f 
h um an  p o w er‘, w h ere th e religio us m akes w ay fo r th e secular, where the human gradually 
replaces the divine.18 This was primarily understood to be a movement in the concept of 
nihilism, but is now also seen in conceptions of the sublime, since the sublime began as a 
p redo m in an tly classical o r religio us m o del o f ‗elevatio n ‘ an d sh ifted to w ards a p sych o lo gical 
and natural phenomenon –  a movement from religion to empiricism, from faith to 
rationality. This shift occurs in the development of the concept under Enlightenment 
rationality, most notably exemplified in the formulations of Burke and Kant. 
 
The Burkean Formulation of the Sublime 
B urke‘s A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful (1757) 
presented the sublime as a phenomenon that transcended the empirical world but not the 
imagination.19 F ro m  th is fo un datio n , w e see th at B urke‘s n o tio n  o f th e sub lim e is p redicated 
upon terror; the sublime, for Burke, exists primarily as an immediate emotional response to 
                                                 
18 Michael Allen Gillespie, Nihilism Before Nietzsche (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), p. vii. 
19 Years of publication will be included for primary treatises on the sublime because this chapter is not as 
chronologically explicit as the preceding chapter on nihilism.  
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‗dan gero us‘ o b jects b efo re reaso n  can  en gage itself. T h is creates tw o  different approaches to 
understanding the Burkean sublime: one that immediately affects the observer with a sense 
of danger and one that relies upon the imagination of the individual in the face of possible 
danger. An example might be a person standing at the foot of a mountain imagining an 
avalanche. In the first instance, it is sublime because his emotions are ruling his reason, 
causing him to imagine something that he cannot sense and, in the second, were an 
avalanche to actually fall down on him, it would so overwhelm his senses that his reason 
would temporally be overwhelmed. This is obviously an artificial scenario, however, because 
th e b o dy m ust n o t b e actually h arm ed, just feel itself to  b e in  ‗h arm ‘s w ay‘. T h e B urkean  
sublime haunts reason –  it is when imagination and the irrational have temporary control 
over the rational –  and is generally produced as an emotional response to a perceived danger. 
T h at th e sub lim e is an  em o tio n al resp o n se is an  im p o rtan t asp ect o f B urke‘s Enquiry, 
for he does not direct his studies towards an aesthetic representation (a rhetorical analysis) of 
th e sub lim e excep t in  p art. B urke‘s m ain  o b jective is to  classify th e m ech an ism s b y w h ich  th e 
sublime manifests itself: 
 
I am afraid it is a practice much too common in inquiries of this nature, to attribute the 
cause of feelings which merely arise from the mechanical structure of our bodies, or 
from the natural frame and constitution of our minds, to certain conclusions of the 
reasoning faculty on the objects presented to us; for I should imagine, that the influence 
of reason in producing our passions is nothing near so extensive as it is commonly 
believed.20 
 
This passage demonstrates the disdain that Burke feels towards a sublime produced by the 
rational mind (an aesthetic sublime). This suggests, as we have seen, a movement away from 
                                                 
20 Edmund Burke, A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful, ed. by Adam Philips 
(Glasgow: Oxford World Classics, 1998), I, §13 (p. 41). 
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a rhetorical form of the sublime towards a more empirical representation of the sublime 
o rigin atin g fro m  ‗b ein g in  th e w o rld‘. F o r B urke, th e sub lim e is a p rim al resp o n se th at o ccurs 
within the body befo re th e ratio n al m in d can  attem p t to  grasp  th e ‗dan gero us‘ o b ject: th ere is 
an unremitting immediacy within the Burkean sublime that comes from the inability of 
reason to respond to such objects. 
T h e defin itio n  o f ‗dan gero us‘ o b jects is qualified b y B urke, and can be characterised as 
those connected with power, magnitude, and infinity. Each of these, to some degree, 
produces a feeling of terror in the observer, due to the very inability of the rational mind to 
co m p reh en d  th em . In deed, B urke w rites th at ‗o b scurity‘ aids th e creatio n  o f sub lim ity: ‗T o  
make any thing very terrible, obscurity seems in general to be necessary. When we know the 
full extent of any danger, when we can accustom our eyes to it, a great deal of the 
ap p reh en sio n  van ish es‘.21 As reason begins to classify the sublime object, it ceases to be 
sublime precisely because we have become accustomed to it. Wordsworth suggests this in 
The Prelude (1850) when he writes: 
 
That men, least sensitive, see, hear, perceive, 
And cannot choose but feel. The power, which all 
Acknowledge when thus moved, which Nature thus 
To bodily sense exhibits.22 
 
Here, we see the way in which the Burkean sublime affects the observer of nature –  he 
‗can n o t ch o o se b ut feel‘ an d feels it ‗b o dily‘.23 Without the initial apprehension of the object, 
                                                 
21 Burke, II, §3 (p. 54). 
22 William Wordsworth, The Prelude: The Four Texts (1798, 1799, 1805, 1850), ed. by Jonathan Wordsworth 
(London: Penguin, 1995), XIV. 85 (p. 515). All references to Wordsworth are from the 1850 edition of The 
Prelude. 
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th ere w o uld b e n o  sub lim e. C o n sider, fo r exam p le, B urke‘s discussio n  o f th e n ature o f 
power in connection with the sublime. He writes: 
 
Pain is always inflicted by a power in some way superior, because we never submit 
willingly. So that strength, violence, pain and terror, are ideas that rush in upon the mind 
together. Look at a man, or any other animal of prodigious strength, and what is your 
idea before reflection? Is it that this strength will be subservient to you, to your ease, to 
your pleasure, to your interest in any sense? No; the emotion you feel is, lest this 
enormous strength should be employed to the purposes of rapine and destruction. That 
power derives all its sublimity from the terror with which it is generally accompanied, 
will appear evidently from its effect in the very few cases, in which it may be possible to 
strip a considerable degree of strength of its ability to hurt. When you do this, you spoil 
it of every thing sublime, and it immediately becomes contemptible.24 
 
Wh at is sub lim e ab o ut th e ap p earan ce o f so m eth in g p o w erful is th at o b ject‘s in trin sic 
un decidab ility. W ere w e to  accep t th at it w as ‗un der‘ us, to  b e ratio n ally aw are o f its 
limitations and uses, it would not be sublime. The three wanderers that Wordsworth 
en co un ters o n  Sn o w do n  are exam p les o f th is, b ecause o f th eir ‗m ajestic in tellect‘: ‗T h ere I 
beheld an emblem of a mind / That feeds upon infinity, that broods / Over the dark abyss, 
in ten t to  h ear‘.25 T h ese w an derers m ay b e ratio n al, b ut th ey ‗feed‘ o n  n atu re an d ‗b ro o d‘ o n  
co n cep ts. T h ey are to o  ‗in ten t to  h ear‘ to  ever h ear an yth in g, as W o rdsw o rth  later w rites: 
‗m o ral judgem en ts w h ich  fro m  th is p ure so urce / M ust co m e, o r w ill b y m an  b e so ugh t in  
vain ‘.26 The mind must be open to Nature, not searching for a sublime experience. 
                                                                                                                                                 
23 There are problems with incorporating the Wordsworthian conception of the sublime into Burke because 
Wordsworth suggests that this ability to feel is inherent within certain people, as The Prelude states after the 
discussio n  o f ‗b o dily sen se‘: ‗th at glo rio us faculty / T h at h igh er m in ds bear w ith  th em  as th eir o w n ‘ (X IV . 89 
(p. 515)). This suggests that it is, in fact, a way of thinking, an openness to the world, which creates the sublime 
feeling. This sublimity is not pre-rational, but purely noetic, suggesting a Kantian, not Burkean, modulation. 
Despite this, Wordsworth does serve to illustrate, although not prove, B urke‘s sub lim e. 
24 Burke, II, §5 (p. 60). 
25 Wordsworth, XIV. 70 (p. 515). 
26 Wordsworth, XIV. 128 (p. 517). 
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‗O b scurity‘ is w h y, acco rdin g to  B urke, p o w er is sub lim e. It is p recisely b ecause w e do  
not know how power will affect us that the initial terror causes a sublime feeling: its origins 
and intent are obscured and we are faced with potential harm. The same mechanism creates 
sub lim ity in  relatio n  to  m agn itude an d  in fin ity. B urke w rites th at ‗G reatn ess o f dim en sio n , is 
a p o w erful cause o f th e sub lim e‘ an d th at ‗In fin ity h as a ten den cy to  fill th e m in d w ith  th at 
sort of delightful horror, which  is th e m o st gen uin e effect, an d truest test o f th e sub lim e‘.27 
Both of these come from immediate, not mediated sources, and the terror originates from 
the fact that the rational mind has yet to come to terms with them. It is for this reason that 
the Burkean mode of sublimity is both affective (and thus pre-ratio n al) an d a ‗m o m en t‘ 
(being produced and dissipating simultaneously). Although Burke argues that some terror 
rem ain s w ith  us after th e sub lim e exp erien ce, th is is a sub lim e ‗aftersh o ck‘ an d n o t th e  
sublime experience itself. 
T h e co n cep t o f ‗m agn itude‘ is o f in terest h ere as it m arks a p o in t o f divergen ce aw ay 
fro m  L o n gin us‘ idea o f ‗elevatio n ‘ an d later b eco m es sign ifican t in  th e develo p m en t o f th e 
postmodern sublime. In On Sublimity, Longinus at one point defines the difference between 
hypsous [elevation] and megethos [size]: ‗T h e differen ce lies, in  m y o p in io n , o n  th e fact th at 
sublimity depends on elevation [hypsous], whereas amplification [megethos] involves extension; 
sublimity exists often in a single thought, amplification cannot exist without a certain 
quan tity an d sup erfluity‘.28 B urke, in  co n trast, w rites th at ‗exten sio n  is eith er in  len gth , h eigh t, 
o r dep th ‘, devaluin g th e co n cep t o f elevatio n , an d adds th at ‗h eigh t is less gran d th an  dep th ‘, 
seem in gly suggestin g th e altern ate L atin ate etym o lo gy o f ‗sub lim e‘ as sub-limen [under the 
threshold], not sublimis.29 T h o m as W eiskel do es o b serve, h o w ever, th at ‗H eigh t an d dep th  are 
                                                 
27 Burke, II, §7 (p. 67); II, §8 (p. 67). 
28 Longinus, §12 (p. 17). See also Russell in Longinus, pp. xvi-xvii. 
29 Burke, II, §7 (p. 66). 
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of course merely two perspectives for the same dimension of verticality; w h at is ―lo fty‖ fo r 
th e idealist w ill b e ―p ro fo un d‖ fo r th e n aturalizin g m in d‘.30 This point also marks an 
extension of the Burkean sublime into the Kantian in the sense that an object is sublime in 
relation to magnitude only if it is a unitary object that is perceived, not a quantity of objects, 
suggestin g th e K an tian  requirem en t o f a ‗to tality‘ to  b e p resen t in  th e sub lim e (discussed 
later in  th is ch ap ter). T h is is b ecause ‗T h e sum  to tal o f th in gs o f vario us kin ds, th o ugh  it 
should equal the number of uniform parts composing some one entire object, is not equal in 
its effect up o n  th e o rgan s o f o ur b o dies‘. B urke qualifies th is requirem en t fo r ‗un ity‘ later in  
th e p assage, alth o ugh  it is n o t en tirely clear: ‗So  th at every th in g great b y its quan tity m ust 
necessarily b e, o n e, sim p le, an d en tire‘.31 Where Longinus declares that it is the quantity of 
objects that creates a feeling of amplification distinct from sublimity, and Kant argues that 
only a totality (a unified object) can be sublime, Burke argues that a quantity of uniform 
objects can lead to sublimity providing they seem to be an undifferentiated whole. 
If th e B urkean  sub lim e is b ased up o n  th e im m ediate ap p reh en sio n  o f an  ‗ap p aren t‘ 
object, the relation between Burke and nihilism initially seems tenuous. However, 
nothingness can, under these conditions, produce a mode of the sublime similar to that 
which Burke proposed. Several aspects of the Burkean sublime suggest that nothingness is 
sub lim e b ecause it is un fath o m ab le. In  h is discussio n  o f ‗o b scurity‘, Burke quotes an example 
fro m  Jo h n  M ilto n ‘s Paradise Lost (1667): 
 
 The other shape, 
If sh ap e it m igh t b e call‘d th at sh ap e h ad n o n e 
                                                 
30 Thomas Weiskel, The Romantic Sublime (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1986), p. 24. This again suggests a 
distinction between pathos and bathos, b etw een  sub lim ity an d p ro fun dity, an d b etw een  ‗elelvation ‘ an d 
‗am p lificatio n ‘. 
31 Burke, IV, §10 (p. 126). 
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Distinguishable in member, joint, or limb, 
O r sub stan ce m igh t b e call‘d th at sh ado w  seem ed, 
F o r each  seem ‘d eith er; b lack it stood as Night, 
Fierce as ten Furies, terrible as Hell, 
A n d sh o o k a dreadful D art; w h at seem ‘d  h is h ead  
The likeness of a Kingly Crown had on.32 
 
B urke argues th at th is is sub lim e b ecause ‗A ll is dark, un certain , co n fused, terrib le, an d  
sublime to the last degree‘.33 O th er exam p les o f th is ‗sub lim e vo id‘ ab o un d in  B o o k T w o  o f 
Paradise Lost: ‗th e dark un b o tto m ‘d in fin ite A b yss‘, ‗th e vo id p ro fo un d / o f un essen tial n igh t‘, 
‗w ith  lo n ely step s to  tread / T h ‘un fo un ded deep , an d th ro ugh  th e vo id im m en se / to  
search ‘.34 It is this very uncertainty and confusion –  the inability of the rational mind to 
comprehend –  th at m akes n ih ilism  a can didate fo r sub lim ity. T o  fin d a p un  in  o n e o f B urke‘s 
descrip tio n s, h e w rites: ‗T h e ideas o f etern ity, an d in fin ity, are am o n g th e most affecting we 
have, and yet there is nothing of which we really understand so little, as o f in fin ity an d etern ity‘ (m y 
emphasis).35 T h e n o tio n  o f un derstan din g b rin gs to  th e fo re th e co n cep t o f n ih ilism . ‗T h ere 
is nothing of which we understand so little‘ except for perhaps nothingness itself. Although we 
cannot understand infinity, or eternity (an extension of the infinite into time), neither can we 
understand nothingness, standing as we do on the side of Being. That is, we do not 
understand nothingness, and yet it can produce a strong emotional response within us, 
precisely because of the incapacity of the rational to comprehend the essentially irrational. If 
the sublime is pre-rational and we cannot rationalise nothingness, then nothingness when 
presented can be considered a sublime form. 
                                                 
32 John Milton, Paradise Lost, ed. by Christopher Ricks (London: Penguin, 1989), II.  666 (p. 46). 
33 Burke, II, §3 (p. 55). 
34 Milton, II. 405, 438, 828 (pp. 39, 40, 50). 
35 Burke, II, §4 (p. 57). 
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There are, of course, counter-arguments to this production of the Burkean sublime 
through nihilism. One of the most important of these is the requirement of immediate 
danger. Although nihilism can threaten our sense of Being, and does indeed correspond to a 
‗th reat to  B ein g‘, it is n o t en o ugh  to  justify a sen se o f dan ger m erely fro m  th e th o ugh t o f 
nihilism. The Burkean sublime is connected with physically existing objects –  the 
presentation of the object –  and although nihilism may be the most terrifying of all 
p o ssib ilities an d o b jects, it can  n ever b e co n sidered ‗p h ysically existen t‘. W h en  B urke defin es 
the difference between pain and terror we see that nihilism, whilst producing a response, can 
never actually produce the type of sublime that Burke discusses: 
 
The only difference between pain and terror, is, that things which cause pain operate on 
the mind, by the intervention of the body; whereas things that cause terror generally 
affect the bodily organs by the operation of the mind suggesting the danger; but both 
agreeing, either primarily, or secondarily, in producing a tension, contraction, or violent 
emotion of the nerves.36 
 
That nihilism and a sense of nothingness can produce terror in the reader is indeed arguable. 
However, the problem is that the emotional response to nihilism tends to be existential 
despair or fear of meaninglessness; despair does not produce the sublime mode, and the fear 
provoked by nothingness does not entail a further physical response. Although conceiving 
ab sen ce m ay b e terrifyin g, it is n o t ‗p resen t en o ugh ‘ to  th reaten  th e view er‘s sen se o f b ein g. 
This does not mean to say, however, that the production of a nihilistic sublime is 
impossible.37 It only implies that attempting to conflate a nihilistic moment with a sublime 
                                                 
36 Burke, IV, §3 (p. 120). 
37 This is precisely that to which Donougho refers when he argues that we must be careful of appending 
m ean ings to  th e sub lim e th at m ay n o t b e presen t w ith in  th e sub lim e itself. A n y readin gs of a ‗n ih ilistic sub lim e‘ 
must finally occur on the terms of the sublime itself, and the historical period in which it comes forth, and 
cannot merely be conflated because of similarities. 
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m o m en t is p ro b lem atic un der th e B urkean  m o de o f sub lim ity. In  th e fin al an alysis, B urke‘s 
comments about darkness may be crucial to understanding a nihilistic sublime, and 
demonstrate why other conceptions of the sublime are necessary before we can finally see a 
nihilistic sublime emerge: 
 
Such a tension it seems there certainly is, whilst we are involved in darkness; for in such 
a state whilst the eye remains open, there is a continual nisus to receive light; this is 
manifest from the flashes, and luminous appearances which often seem in these 
circumstances to play before it, and which can be nothing but spasms, produced by its 
own efforts in pursuit of its object.38 
 
In a struggle to find meaning in nihilism, the critic frequently sees flashes of inspiration that 
are, in fact, no more than illusory mechanisms of the mind itself. In darkness, nothing can be 
seen  (b ut w e can n o t see ‗n o th in g‘) an d in  resp o n se to  th is darkn ess, th e m in d creates o b jects 
to fill the void. The problem is not with illuminating nihilism, but with our very seeking of 
illum in atio n , th at eup h em ism  fo r ‗un derstan din g‘. R ath er, it is in  o ur very in ab ility to  
understand nihilism that we see the nihilistic sublime, and why this argument must move 
forward towards the Kantian formulation of the sublime. 
 
The Kantian Formulation of the Sublime 
T h e K an tian  sub lim e ap p ears p rim arily w ith in  tw o  o f K an t‘s w o rks, The Critique of Judgement 
(1790) and Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime (1764), both of which are 
heavily influenced by the debate on the nature of the sublime written by Burke, as well as 
other eighteenth-century aesthetic theorists. There are number of initial similarities between 
                                                 
38 Burke, IV, §16 (p. 132). 
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the Burkean and Kantian sublimes, such as the comparisons between beauty and sublimity, 
the concern with what can be apprehended not comprehended, and thus the invocation of 
the sublime through feelings of terror.39 K an t‘s texts are p ro b lem atic fro m  th e p ersp ective o f 
a study of the sublime because in the interim period between publications there are a 
n um b er o f sign ifican t alteratio n s to  K an t‘s fo rm ulatio n  o f th e sub lim e, n o t least o f w h ich  is 
its movement away from the empirical study of the sublime. For example, although Monique 
David-Ménard sees a number of links between both Observations and The Critique of Judgement, 
sh e righ tly co n cludes th at th ere is a ‗radical reversal‘ in  K an t‘s th o ugh t b etw een  Observations 
and The Critique of Pure Reason (1781), which implies an increased distance between 
Observations and The Critique of Judgement.40 
Despite this, the later formulation of the sublime found in The Critique of Judgement is 
sign ifican tly differen t fro m  B urke‘s Enquiry not only in that it moves away from the 
em p iricism  p resen t in  B urke (an d in  K an t‘s earlier Observations), but that in so doing Kant 
also brings together the notions of morality and beauty/sublimity.41 In contrast to those 
eighteenth-cen tury aesth etic th eo rists w h o , ‗so ugh t to  lib erate th e realm  o f aesth etics fro m  its 
submission to ethics, or in another formulation, to distinguish a kind of feeling in which no 
desire w as im p licated‘, K an t delib erately asso ciated th e feelin g o f th e sub lim e w ith  m o rality, 
and thus implicated aesthetics with ethics.42 This synthesis of previously dichotomous 
concepts (ethics and aesthetics) demonstrates the Kantian sublime to be primarily dialectical. 
                                                 
39 ‗A p p rehen ded‘ h ere m ean s th e in itial p resen tatio n  o f an  o b ject, b ut it also  carries th e suggestio n  
‗ap p reh en sio n‘, th at is, an xiety an d terro r. In  co n trast, ‗co m preh en sio n‘ m ean s th at th e ratio n al m in d can  ‗grasp ‘ 
the object, thereby ensuring that it is not sublime. 
40 Monique David-M én ard, ‗K an t‘s ―A n  E ssay o n  th e M aladies o f th e M in d‖ an d Observations on the Feeling of the 
Beautiful and the Sublime‘, tran s. by Alison Ross, Hypatia, 15:4 (2000), 82-98 (p. 93). 
41 See E va Sch aper, ‗T aste, sub lim ity, an d gen ius: T he aesth etics o f n ature an d art‘, in  The Cambridge Companion to 
Kant, ed. by Paul Guyer (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 367-93 (pp. 381-82). 
42 John Zammito, T he G en esis of K an t’s ‘C ritiq u e of Ju dgm en t’ (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), p. 273. 
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This is an important shift, and one that is especially relevant to those postmodern studies of 
the sublime that are fundamentally predicated upon the Kantian model. 
Two principles are involved in the discussion of the Kantian sublime –  the 
mathematical and the dynamic. These allow the Kantian sublime to resolve the duality of 
aesthetics and ethics. The mathematical sublime (§25-27 of The Critique of Judgement) is 
seemingly concerned with the reception of magnitude by the senses, as with the Burkean 
sublime, just as the dynamic sublime (§28 and §29) seems to initially correspond to ideas of 
might, power, and terror. Thus, it may be incorrectly assumed that Kant merely divided the 
Burkean sublime into two distinct ideas. This, however, is not entirely accurate, as the 
distinction formulated by Kant indicates: 
 
Hence it [the feeling of the sublime] is referred through the imagination either to the 
faculty of cognition or to that of desire; but to whichever faculty the reference is made to the 
finality of the given representation is estimated only in respect of these faculties (apart 
from end or interest). Accordingly the first is attributed to the Object as a mathematical, 
the second as a dynamical, affection of the imagination. Hence we get the above double 
mode of representing an object as sublime.43 
 
Although Kant divided the Burkean sublime into two, these distinctions are more subtle 
th an  m erely cleavin g it in to  ‗sen se‘ an d  ‗size‘ catego ries; rath er, K an t distin guish ed b etw een  
th o se o b jects o f th e sub lim e th at are referred to  as th e ‗ratio n al‘ an d th e ‗em o tio n al‘. T h us, 
th e dyn am ically sub lim e co rresp o n ds to  th o se o b jects th at are a ‗so urce o f fear‘, w h ilst th e 
mathematical sub lim e co rresp o n ds to  th o se o b jects ab o ut w h ich  th e ‗im agin in g‘ m in d  is 
                                                 
43 Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Judgement, trans. by James Creed Meredith (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1957), 
§24/247 (p. 94). The second section number is an alternative form of reference that refers to the secondary 
divisions present in this text. 
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incapable of forming a coherent idea because they do not conform to our patterns of 
thought.44 
At this point, we see one of the fundamental distinctions between the Burkean and the 
Kantian formulations of the sublime: the Burkean sublime is predicated upon the notion of 
the senses, that the sublime is an empirical phenomenon arising from circumstance, whilst 
the Kantian sublime actually arises from mental activity. In opposition to Burke‘s 
‗p h ysio lo gical‘ sub lim e, w h ich  is a ‗m erely em p irical exp o sitio n  o f [w h ere] th e sub lim e an d  
b eautiful w o uld b rin g us‘, th e K an tian  sub lim e is ‗tran scen den tal‘.45 Where Burke argues that 
the sublime originates from the pre-rational apprehension of an object, Kant argues that no 
judgement on sublimity can ever be pre-rational and that, in fact, it is only through our 
reason that the sublime may occur. One might consider Wordsworth here: 
 
 Mighty is the charm 
Of those abstractions to a mind beset 
With images, and haunted by herself, 
And specially delightful unto me 
Was that clear synthesis built up aloft 
So gracefully; even then when it appeared 
Not more than a mere plaything, or a toy 
To a sense embodied: not the thing it is 
In verity, an independent world, 
Created out of pure intelligence.46 
 
A lth o ugh  th e sub lim e m ay b e p ro duced b y a ‗sen sed‘ o b ject, o ur o w n  m in d p ro vides th e 
feelin g: ‗It co m es th at th e sub lim e is n o t to  b e lo o ked fo r in  th e th in gs o f n ature, b ut o n ly in  
                                                 
44 Kant, §28/260 (p. 109). 
45 Kant, §29/277 (p. 130). 
46 Wordsworth, VI. 158 (p. 217). 
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our own ideas. But it must be left to D eductio n  to  sh o w  in  w h ich  o f th em  it resides‘.47 Whilst 
Burke argued that the sublime is that which is observed and felt –  the sense of terror created 
by a dangerous, empirically-sensed object –  Kant argued that the sublime is created by a 
mental object an d is th us n o t em p irical: it is ‗created o ut o f p ure in telligen ce‘. T h at is, B urke 
argued that the object is the important aspect of sublimity, which creates in the observer the 
feeling of terror necessary to create the sublime re-vivification of the self. Kant, in contrast, 
argued that our innate ability to create the sublime leads to the sublime feeling, and that the 
o b ject is n o t as im p o rtan t as th e o b server‘s ab ility to  feel th e sub lim e. 
To clarify this, consider these formulations in relation to an immense mountain. For 
Burke, this object creates sublimity by its size relative to us, causing terror as the sense of 
selfhood becomes obliterated by the immensity of what our senses dictate, a reception of the 
mountain that creates a feeling in the observer. For Kant too, this object may be 
(dynamically) sublime, but the sublime feeling originates not in our reception of the 
mountain, which only acts as a catalyst for our own mind: it is our idea of the mountain that 
creates the feeling of the sublime. To quote from The Prelude again: 
 
 That very day, 
From a bare ridge we also first beheld 
Unveiled the summit of Mont Blanc, and grieved 
To have a soulless image on the eye 
That had usurped upon a living thought 
That never more could be.48 
 
                                                 
47 Kant, §25/250 (p. 97). 
48 Wordsworth, VI. 524 (p. 237). 
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Here, we see that the reality of Mont Blanc rid Wordsworth of the sublime feeling because 
th e reality o f th e m o un tain  is a ‗so ulless im age‘. W o rdsw o rth  felt th at it w as n o t as p o w erful 
as th e feelin g created b y h is im agin atio n , an d ‗h ad usurp ed up o n  a livin g th o ugh t / T h at 
never m o re co uld b e‘. F o r th is reaso n , th e trip  o ver th e A lp s is an ticlim actic: ‗B ut every w o rd  
th at fro m  th e p easan t‘s lip s / C am e in  rep ly, tran slated b y o ur feelin gs, / E n ded in  th is, –  that 
we had crossed the Alps‘.49 Wordsworth crossed the Alps without experiencing the sublimity of 
nature as it was presented to him. To Wordsworth, it is not the presentation of an object 
that causes sublimity, but his imagination. Kant argues thus: 
 
W h o  w o uld ap p ly th e term  ‗sub lim e‘ even  to  sh ap eless m o un tain  m asses to w erin g  above 
one another, with their pyramids of ice, or to the dark tempestuous ocean or such like 
things? But in the contemplation of them, without regard to their form, the mind abandons 
itself to the imagination and to a reason placed, though quite apart from any definite 
end, in conjunction therewith, and merely broadening its view, and feels itself elevated 
in its own estimate of itself on finding all the might of the imagination still unequal to its 
ideas.50 (My emphasis) 
 
Although the eyes and senses cannot truly detect the object, the experience is still sublime 
because the mind –  reason –  can create an idea of them that is beyond that of the 
imagination to comprehend. This supersensible idea of the sublime distinguishes the Kantian 
formulation from the earlier, more pre-rational, sense of the Burkean sublime. The sublime 
is actually, as Jo h n  Z am m ito  argues, ‗a p h en o m en al exp erien ce‘ th at creates ‗a reflectio n  in  
th e sub ject n o t regardin g th e o b ject b ut regardin g itself [… ]. In  sh o rt, th e sub lim e is an  
experience which occasions self-co n scio usn ess th ro ugh  aesth etic reflectio n ‘. Z am m ito  later 
co n cludes th at, ‗K an t‘s w h o le th eo ry o f th e sub lim e revo lved aro un d ―sub rep tio n ‖ –  viewing 
an object of nature as though it were the ground of a feeling which in fact had its source in 
                                                 
49 Wordsworth, VI. 589 (p. 239). 
50 Kant, §26/256 (p. 105). 
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th e self‘.51 The mountain itself is only important, to the Kantian formulation, for the mind to 
create an  im age o f th e m o un tain ; it is th e ‗sen se‘ o f th e m o un tain , n o t th e ‗sen sed‘ m o un tain , 
which allows us to create the sublime feeling in ourselves. In turning away from the empirical, 
Kant created the necessary step towards an ethical dimension of the aesthetic experience of 
the sublime. 
T h is is cen tral to  K an t‘s th esis. T h e sen se o f Geistesgefühl [sentiment of the mind], the 
ability of people to represent the sublime in objects, is a human faculty, both moral (ethical) 
and aesthetic. The object itself is not sublime because it is our ability to represent the sublime 
within an object creates the feeling of sublimity. That this is a moral action in the Kantian sublime is 
revealed in  K an t‘s discussio n  o n  th e law  o f reaso n  th at, ‗w e sh o uld esteem  as sm all in  
comparison with ideas of reason everything which for us is great in nature as an object of 
sen se‘.52 The inability of the imagination to comprehend an object creates, for reason, a 
feelin g o f sub lim ity b ecause w e ‗fin d every stan dard o f sen sib ility fallin g sh o rt o f th e ideas o f 
reaso n ‘.53 This, in itself, does not seem intrinsically moral, but it must be remembered that, 
for Kant, the entire principle of The Critique of Judgement was not the explication of the 
sublime, but the revelation of the connection between free will and the natural world. 
A lth o ugh  th is do es n o t seem  to  co n n ect th e sub lim e an d eth ics, it is in  K an t‘s m eth o d o f 
reconciling these that the sublime originates.  
At this point, it is worth departing from a discussion of the Kantian sublime and 
return in g, alb eit b riefly, to  th e study o f n ih ilism  in  G illesp ie‘s Nihilism Before Nietzsche. We 
h ave seen  th at G illesp ie fin ds N ietzsch e‘s understanding of nihilism to be fundamentally 
flaw ed, an d discusses th e o rigin s o f n ih ilism  fro m  th e ‗declin e‘ o f G o d seen  in  D escartes‘ 
                                                 
51 Zammito, pp. 278, 280. 
52 Kant, §27/257-58 (p. 106). 
53 Kant, §27/257-58 (p. 106). 
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philosophy. It is pertinent to a discussion on the sublime because Kant figures in this 
argument, and Gillespie rather eloquently describes the problem facing Kant in reconciling 
human moral law (freedom) with natural law. He writes: 
 
If the laws of nature applied to things-in-themselves, human freedom would be 
impossible and, if there were no human freedom, there could be no moral law, since 
individuals would not be responsible for their actions. The existence of a moral law is an 
indication that human beings are free and thus something different from all other 
natural beings, not mere means or links in the chain of natural causation but ends in 
themselves, beings who can originate action. The apparent contradiction of nature and 
freedom that appeared in the antinomy of reason and causality is thus resolved by 
transcendental idealism.54 
 
For Kant, there was an intrinsic problem in the concept of both human free will and natural 
causality existin g sim ultan eo usly. G illesp ie argues th at th is m ean s ‗m an  is b o th  in  n ature an d  
ab o ve it‘ b ecause ‗h e is th o ro ugh ly determ in ed b y n atural n ecessity th ro ugh  h is p assio n s an d  
desires‘ an d  yet ‗h is w ill, h o w ever, is free, fo r it can  reco gn ise w h at o ugh t to  b e an d  elevate 
itself ab o ve its n atural im p ulses‘.55 H e sum m arises b y sayin g th at, ‗M an  stan ds b etw een  
nature and the divine and is pulled by powerful forces in opposite directions. The 
transcendence of nature through moral law, however, is the sole legitimate end of human 
life‘.56 A lth o ugh  th is go al can  n ever b e reach ed, it is m an ‘s duty to  free h im self fro m  n ature –  
indeed his own nature –  and become more through the extension of his capacity for reason. 
K an t‘s ‗tran scen den t idealism ‘ p ro claim ed h um an ity th e n ew  ruler o f n ature, an d b ecause th is 
devalued G o d (in  readin gs such  as F ich te‘s), it is p erceived as n ih ilistic. 
                                                 
54 Gillespie, pp. 71-72. 
55 Gillespie, p. 72. 
56 Gillespie, p. 72. 
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At this point we begin to see the threads of the Kantian sublime drawing together, for 
it is through the sublime that the nature of man (and, indeed, Nature) can be defeated by the 
sup rem acy o f reaso n . T h us, K an t created an  ‗E n ligh ten m en t‘ sub lim e, w h ere reaso n  is 
proclaimed the new God and man gains dominion over the world. Although humanity may 
never be free from nature per se, because it exists within the natural world, it is free inasmuch 
as ‗w ill‘ is free fro m  ‗im agin atio n ‘ durin g sub lim e m o m en ts o f exp erien ce. W e see h ere a re-
m o dulatio n  o f L o n gin us‘ co n cep t o f sub lim e freedom where the sublime frees man from the 
w o rld th ro ugh  h is o w n  n ature (‗It is o ur n ature to  b e exalted an d elevated b y true sub lim ity‘) 
an d deifies h um an ity (‗sub lim ity raises us to w ards th e sp iritual greatn ess o f a go d‘).57 This is 
unlike the Burkean sub lim e, in  w h ich  sub lim ity is p ro duced b y a ‗trap p ed‘ p h ysicality in  th e 
p ain /p leasure dim en sio n . Z am m ito  agrees w ith  G illesp ie o n  th is p o in t, arguin g th at ‗W h at 
Kant appears to have meant is that the reconciliation of the laws of nature and the laws of 
freedo m  co uld b e th o ugh t o n ly in  term s o f th e idea o f a ―sup ersen sib le gro un d‖, th e 
tran scen den t un ity o f n ature an d m an ‘.58 A cco rdin g to  Z am m ito , K an t‘s aim  o f 
reconstructing a bridge between man and nature was only possible with the construction of a 
sublimity that originated in the inter-relation between man and nature. This is seen 
throughout The Critique of Judgement, sometimes ambiguously, but nowhere more clearly than 
when Kant writes: 
 
The feeling of the sublime is, therefore, at once a feeling of displeasure, arising from the 
inadequacy of imagination in the aesthetic estimation of magnitude to attain to its 
estimation by reason, and a simultaneously awakened pleasure, arising from this very 
judgment of the inadequacy of the greatest faculty of sense being in accord with ideas of 
reason, so far as the effort to attain to these is for us a law.59 
                                                 
57 Longinus, §7 (p. 7); §36 (p. 42). 
58 Zammito, p. 266. 
59 Kant, §27/257 (p. 106). 
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This is the reason why the Burkean sublime, despite its reliance upon paradoxical affective 
responses, and other aesthetic theories of the early-eighteenth century, were not able to 
sustain  th e m o ral side o f K an t‘s p h ilo so p h ical aim s –  th ey rem o ved th e ‗h um an ‘ fro m  th e 
‗h um an  exp erien ce‘. T h e m o ral law  is th e desire fo r freedo m  w h ich  n ature b o th  defeats (in  
the sense of the displeasure) and to which it loses (in the sense of the pleasure of reason 
overcoming imagination). Thus, whilst experiencing the sublime moment, man is both 
overcome by nature and overcoming it, and this is the reason why the Kantian sublime is a 
conflation of both the ethical and aesthetic and w h y Z am m ito  can  argue th at, ‗T h e sub lim e 
was the aesthetic experience which par excellence symbolised the moral dimension of human 
existen ce‘.60 
This is not to say that the Kantian presentation of the sublime is without problems. 
The sense of The Critique of Judgement is difficult to ascertain, given the shifts in thought even 
within the text itself. Mary McCloskey, for example, points out a number of problems 
involved in the distinction between the positive pleasure of beauty and the negative pleasure 
of th e sub lim e, an d th e ‗lim ited‘ an d ‗lim itless‘, w h ich  are o n ly ‗facilely co n trasted‘ b y th e 
separation into qualitative and quantative judgments.61 Her most damaging criticism is that 
th e K an tian  (dyn am ical) sub lim e‘s fo rm  do es n o t necessarily frustrate the imagination and 
excite reaso n . T h e o n ly w ay o f reso lvin g th is, fo r M cC lo skey, is to  p o in t to  a sh ift in  K an t‘s 
use of the imagination: 
 
                                                 
60 Zammito, p. 279. 
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In fact, in the dynamically sublime we have a case where imagination and understanding 
must of necessity be working perfectly w ell to geth er fo r us to  fin d th e scen e ‗fearful‘. If 
imagination is still said in such case to be outraged by sublime objects, it must be 
b ecause ‗im agin atio n ‘ m ean s so m eth in g differen t in  th is co n text. Im agin atio n  b eco m es 
how we picture or think it might be for us if the threat of the object seen as fearful were 
to be realised.62 
 
Thus, the problem of the dynamical sublime is only solved when imagination itself becomes 
reflective and the dynamical sublime becomes subordinate to the mathematical sublime.63 
Arguably, we find that the dynamical sublime itself may be a gesture towards explaining 
B urke‘s argum en ts o n  th e sub lim e un der a K an tian  system , rath er th an  an  im p licit p art o f 
th at system  itself. T h is m ean s th at th e m ath em atical sub lim e is th e ‗w o rkin g m o del‘ th at 
must be used for the analogic status between nihilism and the Kantian sublime to be 
uncovered, if there is such a connection.  
Although a number of surface analogies exist between the two concepts, the most 
important contribution that Kant makes towards a conflation of nihilism and the sublime is 
in  th e in tro ductio n  o f a ‗m en tal‘ sub lim e, w h ere even  th e ‗lim itless‘ an d th e ‗fo rm less‘ (called  
Das Unform by Kant) may be perceived as sublime, provided that they can be demonstrable mental 
objects. Earlier in this chapter, we saw the importance of the mental conception of the 
sub lim e in vo lvin g th e ‗sh ap eless m o un tain ‘.64 T h is relates to  th e ‗sh ap eless‘ n ature o f 
n o th in gn ess th at can  b e p erceived as sub lim e b ecause, as K an t argues, ‗T h e sub lim e is fo u nd 
in an object even devoid of form, so far as it immediately involves, or else by its presence 
provokes, a representation of limitlessness, yet with the super-added th o ugh t o f its to tality‘.65 
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64 Kant, §26/256 (p. 105). 
65 Kant, §23/244 (p. 90). 
 66 
This quotation reveals that nothingness (and, by extension, nihilism) may be considered 
sublime given the following conditions: 
 The nihil can be considered an object. 
 That this nihilistic object may seem infinite to the senses or imagination. 
 That this nihilistic object be grasped as a totality by reason. 
If we accept that the nihil (as Das Unform) may be considered as an object, then it is an object 
o f R easo n , th at is, so m eth in g th at reaso n  can  ‗o b jectify‘. A s reaso n  can  (an d o b vio usly h as) 
made nihilism into a system, it therefore follows that reason has some innate grasp of a sense 
of nothingness, and thus that the nihil may be considered a mental object, in the sense that it 
is a concept that can interact with others within the mental landscape. The second criterion 
is co vered b y th e idea th at alth o ugh  th e ‗exp an se‘ of nothingness can be judged an object by 
reason, the imagination cannot necessarily imagine nothingness, and certainly perceives a 
nihilistic void as infinite in its very lack of anything and everything. The third criterion 
solidifies this viewpoint because reason may be able to reconstruct a nihilistic void as a 
to tality (it is an  ‗in fin ite vo id‘). T h is m ean s th at a n ih ilistic sub lim e is p o ssib le w ith in  th e 
parameters of the Kantian system, although there are insurmountable problems with 
actualising such a conflation. This is primarily because there are problems with defining 
nothingness as an object (it could equally be considered the absence of an object) and because, 
in order for this conjunction to occur, nothingness must be brought into existence through 
reason (invalid given that nothingness is that which must remain outside of a rational 
fram ew o rk). T h is do es n o t m ean  th at a p ercep tio n  o f n ih ilism  as th e ‗sub lim e vo id‘ is 
impossible, however, because that is one of the elements of the sublime feeling within 
Romantic poetry. Rather, it suggests that a sublime nihilism cannot be conceptualised within 
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either Burkean or Kantian modulations of the sublime, but only with the extension of these 
that we see in the Romantic sublime. 
 
The Romantic Sublime 
The ‗R o m an tic‘ sub lim e is h isto rically quite distin ct fro m  th e K an tian  an d B urkean  
formulations of the sublime although elements of them exist within it. Although the 
preceding models have applications within Romanticism, they are historically distinct from 
what m igh t b e called th e ‗R o m an tic Sub lim e‘, as E va Sch ap er argues: 
 
K an t‘s ideas o n  th e sub lim e h ave deep ly in fluen ced  R o m an tic th o ugh t an d h elp ed to  
shape in particular the Romantic conception of imagination. For Kant, though, 
imagination, in presenting and holding together what sensibility could provide, is 
unequal to cope with that which cannot be sensed or understood and for which a 
judgment as to its beauty would be inadequate. Sublimity transcends the bounds of 
sense and understanding.66 
 
This suggests that a Romantic formulation of the sublime would turn Kant away from a 
noetic sublime towards an empirical sublime, suggesting a return to Burke. However, this is 
inaccurate as poets such as Wordsworth felt that it is within the nature of humanity that 
sublimity occurs, an internal, not external, mechanism. This suggests that the Romantic 
sub lim e is (1) m an ‘s in n ate ab ility to  feel sub lim ity (in tern al an d K an tian ) th ro ugh  (2) 
commune, often solitary, with nature (external and Burkean). 
Constructing a Romantic sublime is not that simple, however, and is not merely a 
syn th esis o f B urkean  an d K an tian  m o des o f sub lim ity. W eiskel‘s co n cep tio n  o f th e 
                                                 
66 Schaper, p. 384. 
 68 
‗R o m an tic sub lim e‘, in  de B o lla‘s view , is itself an ach ro n istic b ecause it ‗is n o t to  b e seen  as a 
continuation or outgrowth of the discourse of the sublime since its functions and situates 
itself in  very differen t w ays‘. T h is is p rim arily b ecause: 
 
If one were to locate the continuation of the eighteenth-century debate it would be in 
the social and economic theory of the 1840s where one would find the same obsessions 
with the interrelations between ethics, aesthetics and rhetoric, and that debate would 
more likely be understood historically in terms of the discourse of politics, or political 
economy, than aesthetics.67 
 
Rather than being the continuation of the Burkean and Kantian traditions, or even 
seventeenth- and eighteenth century aesthetic discourse, which were concerned with 
aesthetics were eighteenth-cen tury versio n s o f ‗p o litical eco n o m y‘, W eiskel‘s fo rm ulatio n  of 
the romantic sublime demonstrates a sharp break with previous formulations. Donougho 
even  go es so  far as to  suggest th at rath er th an  th e ‗R o m an tic sub lim e‘ it sh o uld b e called ‗th e 
Yale sub lim e‘ b ecause th e th eo rists in vo lved in  its co n structio n  –  Thomas Weiskel, Geoffrey 
Hartman, and Harold Bloom –  were actually all twentieth-century Yale critics.68 
The construction of this Romantic sublime is thus indebted to a number of readings 
that seem to bear little relation to the experience of sublimity within Romanticism itself. For 
example, Weiskel proposes a clear opposition between Kantian and Wordsworthian 
sub lim ity b ecause K an t‘s system  is ‗the aggrandizement of reason at the expense of reality and the 
imaginative apprehension of reality‘, w h ereas W o rdsw o rth ‘s is ‗B ath o s, o r th e art o f th e 
p ro fo un d‘.69 For Weiskel, the sublime is constructed in two modes, the metaphorical and the 
metonymical. T h e m etap h o rical sub lim e is ‗th e n atural o r K an tian ‘ sub lim e, a ‗h erm en eutic o r 
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―reader‘s‖‘ sub lim e in  w h ich  th e ‗ab sen ce o f determ in ate m ean in g‘ is reso lved b y 
‗sub stitutio n ‘.70 T h e m eto n ym ical sub lim e o ccurs w h en  th e m in d, ‗o verw h elm ed b y m ean in g‘ 
(im agin ative excess), reso lves th e co n flict ‗b y disp lacin g its excess o f sign ified in to  a 
dimension of contiguity which may be sp atial o r tem p o ral‘, a ‗p o et‘s‘ sub lim e.71 Weiskel 
further opposes these by arguing that the metaphorical sublime is negative because of 
‗sub rep tio n ‘ (w h ere th e o b ject is m istaken  fo r th e cause o f sub lim ity), w h ich  is a ‗sup p ressio n  
of the facts, concealment, deception –  in  sh o rt, a ch eat‘, w h ereas th e m eto n ym ical sub lim e is 
p o sitive b ecause it is ‗ego tistical‘ an d w o uld even tually ‗sub sum e all o th ern ess, all p o ssib ility 
o f n egatio n ‘.72 In  fact, th e o n ly w ay W eiskel can  use K an t‘s w o rk is fo r it to  b e ‗p urged of its 
idealist m etap h ysics‘, suggestin g th at th e R o m an tic sub lim e is n o t a fo rm  o f tran scen den tal 
idealism.73 
These statements delineate a linguistic turn in constructing the sublime, where 
sublimity appears in the signification of reality. This is not quite a return to the rhetorical 
strategies of Longinus, however, because it is concerned with how the sublime breaks 
through language, and disrupts it, rather than rhetorical strategies for evoking the sublime. 
T h e term s ‗m etap h o rical‘ an d ‗m eto n ym ical‘ suggest only a linguistic axis to understanding 
the sublime, and the further clarifications of this opposition –  hermeneutic/egotistical and 
readerly/poetic –  suggest that this is a contest for control of the text between the reader and 
the author. In contrast, th e K an tian  sub lim e is frequen tly cen tred o n  th e o b ject in  th e ‗field  
o f rep resen tatio n ‘: 
                                                 
70 Weiskel, p. 29. 
71 Weiskel, p. 30. 
72 W eiskel, p p . 46, 49. T he use o f ‗m etap h o r‘ as a n egative rep resen tatio n  o f th e sub lim e ech oes L o n gin us‘ 
statem en t th at th e use o f ‗figures‘ w ith in  rh etoric may be hidden by a well-p laced sub lim e m o m en t: ‗T h e artifice 
o f th e trick is lo st to  sigh t in  th e surro un din g b rillian ce o f b eauty an d grandeur, an d it escap es all susp icio n ‘ –  
Longinus, §17 (p. 26). 
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The Sublime is therefore the paradox of an object which, in the very field of 
representation, provides a view, in a negative way, of the dimension of what is 
unrep resen tab le. It is a un ique p o in t in  K an t‘s system , a p o in t at w h ich  th e fissure, th e 
gap between phenomenon and Thing-in-itself, is abolished in a negative way, because in 
it th e p h en o m en o n ‘s very ab ility to  rep resen t th e T h in g adequately is inscribed in the 
phenomenon itself.74 
 
Ž ižek‘s in terp retatio n  o f K an t argues th at sub lim ity is th e failure o f th e m en tal o b ject to  
present itself in language, rather than the failure of language to present the object. Although 
the Kantian sublime has hitherto been considered noetic and imaginary in opposition to 
B urke‘s em p irical an d n atural sub lim e, acco rdin g to  W eiskel, th e K an tian  sub lim e is itself 
n atural in  co n trast to  th e R o m an tic lin guistic sub lim e. A lth o ugh  K an t‘s sub lim e is ‗n egative‘ 
in both readings, Weiskel criticises Kant for being noetic, not linguistic. 
O f co urse, W eiskel‘s co n cep tio n  o f sub lim ity w ith in  R o m an ticism  is flaw ed b ecause it 
is anachronistic. This is inadvertently indicated by Weiskel when he analyses The Prelude and 
finds within Wordsworth a duality that symbolises two states of mind, one past and one 
p resen t: ‗T w o  co n scio usn esses, co n scio us o f m yself / A n d o f so m e o th er B ein g‘.75 Weiskel 
argues th at th is ‗o th er B ein g did n o t exist in  th e p ast; th o ugh  h e n o w  exists th ere, h e is a 
creation of the p resen t‘.76 T h is is in dicative o f W eiskel‘s ap p ro ach  to  W o rdsw o rth  b ecause 
th e lin guistic co n structio n  o f W o rdsw o rth ‘s sub lim e is itself ‗a creatio n  o f th e p resen t‘. 
W eiskel‘s fo rm ulatio n  o f R o m an tic sub lim ity is also  arguab ly anachoristic (and therefore ‗m is-
p laced‘ as w ell as an ach ro n istically ‗m is-tim ed‘) b ecause it ‗p laces‘ th e W o rdsw o rth ian  
sublime within language, rather than in the solitary apprehension of Nature. Instead, it is 
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possible to see in Wordsworth, and other Romantic poets, an extension of the Burkean and 
Kantian modes of sublimity: 
 
Dizzy Ravine! And when I gaze at thee, 
I seem, as in a trance sublime and strange, 
To muse on my own separate fantasy, 
My own, my human mind, which passively 
Now renders and receives fast influencings, 
Holding an unremitting interchange 
With the clear universe of things around.77 
 
Sh elley‘s resp o n se to  th e ravin e in  ‗M o n t B lan c‘ (1816) suggests a m ix o f B urkean  an d 
Kantian sublimes, in which the ravine begins the sublime feelings (a natural Burkean 
response) but also  creates a ‗sep arate fan tasy‘ (a n o etic K an tian  resp o n se). It furth er suggests 
am b ivalen ce b etw een  th e p assive B urkean  ‗recep tio n ‘ o f n ature an d th e K an tian  ‗ren derin g‘ 
o f th e n atural w o rld. H o w ever, th is p assage also  suggests an  ‗un rem ittin g in terch an ge‘ th at, 
although linguistic (as Weiskel suggests), is sublime because Shelley is both placed in the world 
by nature and also places the world in relation to himself. There is no terror in this passage, 
o n ly so litary co m m un e ‗w ith  th e clear un iverse o f th in gs aro un d‘.  
W h ilst critics such  as F ran ces F erguso n  w o uld em p h asise th e ‗so litary‘ asp ect o f th is 
sub lim ity b ecause ‗so litude co m es to  b e cultivated as a sp ace fo r co n scio usn ess in  w h ich  th e 
in dividual is n o t an sw erab le to  o th ers‘, th is so litude is actually subordinate to something else, 
a m o m en t w h ere th e ‗I‘ is clearly sep arated in to  tw o  distin ct iden tities, th e ‗I‘ receivin g th e 
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im ages an d th e ‗I‘ th at w atch es th e first co n scio usn ess.78 This is not, as Weiskel would imply, 
‗a gap  b etw een  th e im agin ed self an d th e O th er‘ b ut a gap  p resen ted w ith in  co n scio usn ess 
itself, th e Sartrean  m o m en t o f B ein g ‗fo r-itself‘.79 This implies that nature acts as the 
‗n o th in gn ess‘ p resen t in  a Sartrean  co n scio usn ess an d th at R o m an tic im ages o f n ature 
invariably involve the presentation of absence. This explains the distinction within 
W o rdsw o rth  ab o ut ‗T w o  co n scio usn esses, co n scio us o f m yself / A n d o f so m e o th er B ein g‘ 
in  w h ich  it is n o t a p ast self b ut h is p resen t self th at is th e ‗o th er B ein g‘ b ein g w atch ed, th e 
ineffable m o m en t o f tryin g to  catch  th e ‗n o w ‘. T h is furth er suggests w h y th e search  fo r 
sublimity always ends in failure: 
 
Remembering how she felt, but what she felt 
Remembering not, retains an obscure sense 
Of possible sublimity, whereto 
With growing faculties she doth aspire, 
With faculties still growing, feeling still 
That whatsoever point they gain, they yet 
Have something to pursue.80 
 
W eiskel reads th is p assage as sub lim e b ecause ‗T h e en ergy th at en sures co n tin uity is directed 
towards the possibility (never to be realized) of an adequate signifier, for what the soul 
o rigin ally felt h as disap p eared in to  th e vacan cy‘.81 This passage also suggests, however, an 
internal conflict that is the search for an individuated cohesion, the transcendental moment at 
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which the ‗I‘ b eco m es th e ‗I‘. T h is im p lies th at th e sub lim e is th e feelin g o f frustratio n  th at 
originates in the inability to reconcile two aspects of the self whose difference is not 
tem p o ral b ut sp atial; a ‗re-m em b erin g‘ rath er th an  ‗rem em b erin g‘ o f th e self. T h e reason why 
‗w h atso ever p o in t th ey gain , th ey yet / H ave so m eth in g to  p ursue‘ is th erefo re in  th e in ab ility 
of humanity to gain access to this individuated cohesion, suggesting that the search for the 
absolute self becomes an infinite regression, an ouroburotic skirting of absence. The sublime 
feeling present within Romanticism is therefore the result of a kind of nihilistic vertigo, a 
dizziness caused by reflection on the absent centre of the self. 
T h is exp lain s th e relatio n  b etw een  th e ‗ro m an tic sub lim e‘ (in its various forms) and 
nihilism and why certain critics have observed nihilistic elements in Romantic poetry.82 The 
repeated use of abyssal imagery and the sublime void suggest that absence is central to an 
un derstan din g o f a ‗ro m an tic sub lim e‘: th e ‗ab yss‘ h as alread y b een  seen  in  m o st o f th e 
p o etic p assages w ith in  th is ch ap ter. W eiskel suggests th at th e ap p earan ce o f th e ‗ab yss‘ an d 
th e ‗vo id‘ is p redo m in an tly lin guistic, in  th at it is th e ‗atten uatio n  o f th e text (sign ifier) to  th e 
zero  degree‘, in  w h ich  th e lan guage o f sub lim ity b eco m es ‗b eyo n d w o rds‘. F o r W eiskel, 
sub lim ity m arks th e m o m en t at w h ich  th e ‗ab sen ce o f a sign ified itself assum es th e status o f 
a sign ifier‘ th ereb y ‗m akin g ab sen ce sign ifican t‘, clearly talkin g ab o ut th e ‗ab yss‘ o f lan guage .83 
It also suggests, however, that the rhetoric of nihilism –  an apocalyptic revolutionary nihilism 
–  w as en terin g in to  th e vo cab ulary o f so ciety at th e tim e. T h e ‗en d o f th in gs‘ p resen t in  th e 
rhetoric of the English Civil War and the French Revolution clearly had an impact in 
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creating the sublime moment of the seventeenth century, and it also gave credence to the 
subsequent rise of nihilism in the eighteenth century. 
Although the sublime pre-dates nihilism in terms of its development and discursive 
shifts, there are parallels with how these terms were used. Both nihilism and the sublime 
signify a distinct moment in the evolution of the concept of modernity, from the 
Renaissance, through the Enlightenment, to the present day. Where the sublime started and 
shifted in emphasis from rhetoric to psychology to rationality, nihilism similarly followed 
suit, highlighting the shift from religion to secularism (albeit in a negative mode). Where the 
sublime stands for the celebrative aspect of an ideology, nihilism stands for its demise, the 
p o in t at w h ich  it b eco m es residual to  a ‗n ew ‘ em ergen t ideo lo gy, ep ito m ised b y a ‗n ew ‘ 
sub lim e. T h us, n ih ilism  can  b e said to  fun ctio n  as a ‗tim e-lag‘ fo rm  o f sub lim ity, in  w h ich  
they both signify a similar concept in two distinct periods. Although they are never 
equivalent and cannot be conflated at such points, there is a connection between them that 
comes to fruition under the auspices of postmodernism. 
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3. 
Nihilism and the Sublime Postmodern 
 
 
The fact that both nihilism and the sublime have their origins in the rise of Enlightenment 
humanism suggests that they are not as distinct as contemporary scholarship often argues. 
Histories of the Enlightenment and the sublime rarely include nihilism, despite the fact that 
it is predominantly a product of the Enlightenment. Similarly, histories of nihilism do not 
asso ciate n ih ilism  w ith  th e sub lim e. E ven  G illesp ie‘s Nihilism Before Nietzsche, with its reliance 
on Descartes and Kant to demonstrate the historical construction of nihilism, shies away 
from this point. Likewise, critics such as Carr, Löwith and Adorno, whilst observing that 
there are parallels between nihilism and Enlightenment humanism, fail to recognise the 
sublime –  an integral aspect of Enlightenment humanism –  as an integral aspect of nihilism, 
un less it is as th e ideo lo gical ‗false co n scio usn ess‘ b y w h ich  n ih ilism  co m es to  b e realised. 
The reasons for the distinction between nihilism and the sublime are located within the 
ideology of Enlightenment humanism itself: if rationality was a social good then an anti-
social nihilism must be evil. Although nihilism was a fundamentally rational philosophy, it 
demonstrated the point at which Enlightenment rationality broke down and was dismissed 
as a ‗reductio ad absurdum‘ b y critics of rationality.1 Similarly, the condemnation of nihilism by 
p ro p o n en ts o f E n ligh ten m en t h um an ism  w as n o t ‗ratio n al‘ b ut ‗a ratio n ale‘. If n ih ilism  w as 
truly opposed to Enlightenment ideals, then a priori judgem en ts w h ich  ‗disp ro ved‘ n ih ilism  
were possible; instead, critics could only formulate a posteriori arguments. The very fact that 
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th ese w ere ‗after-the-fact‘ argum en ts dem o n strates th at n ih ilism  w as an  un fo reseen  p ro duct 
of Enlightenment rationality. Despite this, the arguments seem to have worked, and Kant is 
the point of bifurcation between nihilism and the sublime. Nihilism, for most critics, began 
w h en  ‗n ih ilists‘ such  as F ich te ‗ap p ro p riated‘ K an t‘s tran scen den tal idealism . Such  critics 
neglect the fact that nihilism is implicit to the Enlightenment Project itself. Because of this, 
Burke and Kant are judged far more kindly than Pisarev and Chernyshevsky, Nietzsche and 
Heidegger: nihilism is negative and the sublime is positive. 
Nihilism came to symbolise a negative perception of a particular philosophy (for 
example, atheism in relation to a predominantly Christian ideology) where the sublime 
symbolised the positive perception of the same philosophy (both Burke and Kant can be 
argued to be atheistic in their reduction of the divine). This reification reached its climax 
w ith in  th e tw en tieth  cen tury, w h en  th e term  ‗n ih ilism ‘ b ecam e a term  o f ap p ro b atio n  an d its 
usage merely an adjunct to qualify other philosophies. As a result, nihilism is no longer a 
noun –  the ideology of the nihil –  but an adjective, wh ere so m eth in g is ‗n ih ilistic‘ if it is 
disagreeable. Postmodernism and poststructuralism are no different in this respect, for they 
both attribute a secure meaning to nihilism despite the play of différance. Both postmodern 
and poststructural critics stron gly resist b ein g lab elled as ‗n ih ilists‘ b ecause o f th e n egative 
connotations that surround the word. The reverse is true of the sublime, where the 
p o stm o dern  sub lim e, p redicated up o n  a ‗p o sitive‘ co n cep tio n  o f th e p lay o f différance, is 
always positive. P aul C ro w th er, fo r exam p le, w h ilst w ritin g th at ‗If [… ] w e are to  h ave a 
theoretically adequate notion of the sublime, we must –  in a way Lyotard does not –  show 
some logical kin sh ip  b etw een  its n egative an d p o sitive co m p o n en ts‘ is n o t referrin g to  m akin g 
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the sublime nihilistic.2 He is instead referring to the modes of sublimity observed by critics 
such as Weiskel, where different forms of sublimity arise as a result of either metaphorical or 
m eto n ym ical feelin gs. T h is ‗n egative‘ sub lim e is still, in  effect, positive. It is merely a 
different way of finding a positive feeling of the sublime, not a negated sublime, or a 
nihilistic sublime. Nihilism is anathema to postmodernism, whilst the sublime is its 
apotheosis. 
 
A Postmodern Enlightenment? 
Postmodern critics separate nihilism and the sublime because of the origins of 
postmodernism, and construct postmodernism in such a way as to reinforce this gap, despite 
the fact that the origins of postmodernism are themselves debatable. Charles Jencks, for 
example, locates the advent of postmodernism as 3.32pm on the 15 July 1972, with the 
demolition of the Pruitt-Igoe housing development in St. Louis.3 This symbolised the 
destruction of functional modernist architecture and the rise of new architectural forms that 
embodied a spirit of playfulness. This architectural paradigm is important, but it does omit 
the most important contributing factor to the development of a postmodern sensibility –  the 
Second World War. From the ashes of the massive economic, emotional, and physical 
devastation of this war, the postmodern phoenix rose. This metaphor suggests not only the 
eth ical turn  th at p o stm o dern ism  w as to  take ‗in  th e face‘ o f th e H o lo caust (th e reaso n  fo r 
this phrasing will become clear) but also the fact postmodernism is essentially a rebirth, a 
post-apocalyptic philosophy intended to remedy that which led to the Holocaust –  
                                                 
2 Paul Crowther, ‗Les Immatériaux an d th e P o stm o dern  Sub lim e‘, in  Judging Lyotard, ed. by Andrew Benjamin 
(London: Routledge, 1992), pp. 192-205 (p. 201). 
3 See Charles Jencks, The Language of Postmodern Architecture (London: Academy Editions, 1991), p.23. 
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Enlightenment modernity. It also suggests ambivalence, however, in that this symbolises 
anamnesis –  a recollection of that which came before –  as well as its destruction.4 This 
ambivalence is at the heart of postmodern theory and determines the extent to which 
nihilism and the sublime merge within postmodernism. 
Perceiving postmodernism to be the result of the Holocaust locates its origins in 1945. 
Although existentialist literature and philosophy also blossomed at this point, 
postmodernism was to gradually encompass these within its own sphere of discourse. It 
appropriated some existentialist ideas, such as absurdity, and recast them in its own image. 
Others it rejected entirely, viewing them as vestiges of an ancien régime, such as the 
postmodern rejection of a subjective mode of being –  being based on the Self –  towards an 
intrasubjective one –  being based on the Other. This epitomises the (perceived) distinction 
between postmodernism and Enlightenment modernity, and defines the moment at which 
postmodernism rejected nihilism as a valid philosophy. For postmodernism, the Second 
World War and the Holocaust were the products of Enlightenment totalitarianism, for 
w h ich  ‗h um an ism ‘ w as a m isp laced adden dum . T h e ‗h um an ism ‘ o f E n ligh ten m en t 
humanism was not about being human, but about deposing a tyrannical God and replacing 
him with an equally tyrannical Man. It was not social emancipation but individual 
emancipation (as seen in Russian Nihilism), not freedom from superstition but subjection to 
th e law s o f R easo n . ‗M o dern ity‘, th e in creasin g in dustrialisatio n  o f W estern  so cieties, m erely 
enabled this law to be realised. Faster communication and increasing reliance upon 
tech n o lo gical m o des o f p ro ductio n  ab stracted ‗th e h um an ‘ in  a m o ve ‗aw ay fro m  th e cen tre 
                                                 
4 David Levin argues in The Opening of Vision: Nihilism and the Postmodern Situation (London: Routledge, 1988) that 
p o stm o dern ism  is n ih ilistic b ecause it fails to  ach ieve ‗a reco llectio n  o f B ein g, o f its dim en sio n ality‘ (p . 5), 
although this is flawed inasmuch as postmodernism is about retrieving the positive aspects of the 
Enlightenment from the Enlightenment Project itself. 
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to w ards X ‘.5 T h us, ‗E n ligh ten m en t m o dern ity‘ w as th e ab stractio n  o f h um an ity im p licit to  
Enlightenment rationality and came to symbolise all that led towards the Holocaust, a 
perception reinforced by critics such as Adorno and Löwith. 
Postmodernism therefore distanced itself from Enlightenment modernity and, at the 
sam e tim e, n ih ilism . H o w ever, as C h risto p h er N o rris argues, ‗P o stm o dern ism  o n ly gain s its 
appearance of liberating movement when set against that false image of modern 
(―en ligh ten ed‖) ratio n ality an d truth  w h ich  p resup p o ses th e existen ce o f self-authorizing 
gro un ds fo r th e co n duct o f reaso n ed deb ate‘.6 Postmodernism creates its own version of the 
Enlightenment in order to demonstrate its own ethical validity. This act of hermeneutic 
violence suggests a deliberate turn away from what the Enlightenment was saying, towards 
what postmodernists such as Lyotard wanted it to say, as David Hollinger observes: 
 
The profound tensions within the work of the 1890-1930 generation were relaxed by a 
new historiography responsive to the hegemonic ambitions of persons who claimed 
postmodernism as their vehicle. The 1890-1930 historical moment was thus virtually 
evacuated in order to create a more stark and momentous confrontation between 
postmodernism and the old Enlightenment of Descartes and Kant.7 
 
Like Norris, Hollinger argues that postmodernism deliberately misread the Enlightenment: 
‗p o stm o dern ists ap p ro p riated th e most exciting of the contributions of the canonical 
m o dern ists an d effaced th e m o vem en t th at p ro duced th em ‘.8 Postmodernism can therefore 
                                                 
5 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power, trans. by Walter Kaufman and R. J. Hollingdale, ed. by R. J. Hollingdale 
(New York: Vintage, 1968), §1 (p. 8). 
6 Christopher Norris, The Truth about Postmodernism (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), p. 231. 
7 D avid H o llin ger, ‗T he E n lighten m en t an d th e G enealo gy o f C ultural C o n flict in  th e U n ited States‘, in  W hat’s 
Left of Enlightenment?: A Postmodern Question, ed. by Keith Michael Baker and Peter Hanns Reill (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2001), pp. 7-18 (p. 12). 
8 Hollinger, p. 12. 
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o n ly b e ‗p o stm o dern ‘ th ro ugh  a delib erate rejectio n  o f w h at ‗E n ligh ten m en t‘ an d ‗m o dern ity‘ 
mean. 
Postmodernism obscures the fact that a definition of the Enlightenment is just as 
debatable as postmodernism. Securing the heterogeneous nature of postmodernism by 
interpreting the Enlightenment as homogeneous ignores the heterogeneous nature of the 
Enlightenment: when critics secure one meaning to the Enlightenment, they ignore its 
‗co un ter-h isto ry‘. H o llin ger argues th at th e E n ligh ten m en t is actually th e p arallel m o vem en t 
of two very different tendencies, the first of which is primarily absolutist: 
 
The Enlightenment project denied the constraints and the enabling consequences of 
history by assigning to human reason the role of building life anew from a slate wiped 
clean of tradition. This project tyrannized a host of particular cultural initiatives and 
tried to make everyone alike by advancing universal rules for identifying goodness, 
justice, and truth. Politically, the Enlightenment promoted absolutist and imperialist 
initiatives. Above all, the Enlightenment project blinded us to the uncertainties of 
knowledge by promoting an ideal of absolute scientific certainty.9 
 
This is a negative presentation of the Enlightenment, in which it is configured as tyrannical. 
It is ‗b lin din g‘ b ecause th ere is to o  m uch  ligh t to  see an yth in g ‗in  th e dark‘ (ap p lyin g as m uch  
to a racist, colonial mentality as it does to scientific rationality). Hollinger points another way 
of reading the Enlightenment, however, which is by no means as negative: 
 
The Enlightenment project brought under devastating scrutiny the prejudices and 
superstitions that protected slavery and a virtual infinity of other injustices. It created 
the historical and social scientific inquiries that enable us to speak with such confidence 
about the social dependence of the self. The Enlightenment promoted religious 
tolerance against the imperialist ambitions of conflicting absolutisms. Above all, the 
                                                 
9 Hollinger, p. 8. 
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Enlightenment was subversive of traditional political authority, and ultimately it gave us 
democracy.10 
 
This is a positive presentation of the Enlightenment, where it is an emancipatory project. By 
scrutinising received wisdom, the Enlightenment was a subversive act that freed humanity 
from history and absolutism, rather than being promoting imperialism and tyranny. 
H o w  can  th e E n ligh ten m en t b e ‗ab o ve all‘ b o th  a p ro ject o f b lin din g and of 
scrutinising, of tyranny and subversion, of absolutism and tolerance? Hollinger argues that 
both interpretations are possible: 
 
The Enlightenment led to Auschwitz, just as it had led to the Terror; or the 
Enlightenment led to the principles by which we judge the Terror to have been 
excessive, just as it led to standards by which Auschwitz can be most convincingly 
condemned today.11 
 
T h is suggests an  ‗eith er/o r‘ cultural in terp retatio n , in  w h ich  th e reader‘s p ercep tio n  
determ in es a culture‘s m ean in g. A lthough this is indeed valid, it suggests a hermeneutic (the 
interpretation depends upon the reader) rather than synthetic (both interpretations are true) 
interpretation of historical consciousness. The synthetic interpretation can be defined as 
‗b o th /an d‘ b ecause an y given  p erio d is ‗b o th  x and y‘ rath er th an  ‗eith er x or y‘. A lth o ugh  th e 
syn th etic is o b vio usly ‗h erm en eutic‘ in  th e sen se th at it is a readin g, it suggests th at duality is 
                                                 
10 Hollinger, p. 8. 
11 Hollinger, p. 9. 
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the most important aspect of a given ideology.12 In relation to the Enlightenment project, 
these two interpretations suggest the conflation of opposing precepts: nihilism (the negative 
moment) and the sublime (the positive moment). 
T h is p aradigm  h o lds true w h en  w e co m p are, as C arr suggests, T urgen ev‘s Fathers and 
Sons with Kant‘s ‗A n sw erin g th e Q uestio n : W h at is E n ligh ten m en t?‘.13 Turgenev argues that 
‗A  n ih ilist is a m an  w h o  do esn ‘t ackn o w ledge an y auth o rities, w h o  do esn ‘t accep t a sin gle 
p rin cip le o n  faith , n o  m atter h o w  m uch  th at p rin cip le m ay b e surro un ded w ith  resp ect‘.14 
Similarly, Kant argues: 
 
E n ligh ten m en t is m an ‘s release fro m  h is self-in curred tutelage. T utelage is m an ‘s 
inability to make use of his understanding without direction from another. Self-incurred 
is this tutelage when its cause lies not in lack of reason, but in lack of resolution and 
courage to use it without direction from another. Sapere Aude! [‗D are to  b e w ise!‘] ‗H ave 
co urage to  use yo ur o w n  reaso n !‘ –  that is the motto of enlightenment. 15  
 
Both contain ideas on reason as being of paramount importance, but where one is a negative 
dep ictio n  o f n ih ilism , th e o th er is a p o sitive dep ictio n  o f sub lim ity (K an t‘s th eo ry o f 
Enlightenment is achieved through adumbrating the sublime within rational Enlightenment 
discourse). Each, however, connects rebellion against established norms with rational 
progress. Thus, nihilism and the sublime are intrinsically linked within the Enlightenment 
                                                 
12 R ath er th an  R aym o n d W illiam s‘ trin ary percep tio n  o f ideo lo gical p rogression (dominant, residual, and 
emergent ideologies competing within a given historical moment), this suggests that there is a duality within any 
h isto rical m om en t w h ere ‗pro gress‘ is m easured in  th e ten sio n  b etw een  tw o  op p o sin g ideo lo gies. In  fact, th is is 
an  exten sio n  o f Jen ck‘s ‗do ub le-co din g‘ acro ss th e h isto ry o f m o dern ity, rath er th an m erely w ith in  ‗the 
p o stm o dern  turn ‘ –  a ‗p o stm o dern ‘ E n ligh ten m en t. See R aym o n d W illiam s, Marxism and Literature (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1977), pp. 121-27, and Charles Jencks, What is Postmodernism? (London: Academy 
Editions, 1986), p. 7. 
13 See Karen L. Carr, The Banalization of Nihilism: Twentieth-Century Responses to Meaninglessness (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 1992), pp. 15, and 148, n. 11. 
14 Ivan Turgenev, Fathers and Sons, trans. by Richard Freeborn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 27. 
15 Im m an uel K an t, ‗A n sw erin g th e Q uestio n : W h at is E n lighten m en t?‘, in  Kant: Selections, ed. by Lewis White 
Beck (New York: Macmillan, 1988), pp. 462-67 (p. 462). 
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Project and are entwined with its concerns over power, knowledge, and language. Nihilism 
reflects the so-called negative reading concerned with the destruction of the old hierarchy –  
the proposal of rationalism at the expense of the faith, of the human at the expense of the 
divine. The sublime reflects the positive reading of the Enlightenment using precisely the 
same points, from the promotion of rational psychology over divine ideology to the rise of 
scien tific p o sitivism , an d th e p ro p o sal o f ‗th e h um an ‘ as th e m o st im p o rtan t elem en t o f th e 
world. 
This creates a new perception of postmodernism because without either nihilism or 
the sublime, which are both embedded within the Enlightenment, the postmodern could not 
have happened. This suggests that postmodernism is both a result of, and response to, the 
Enlightenment (a synthetic interpretation). Like the Enlightenment, postmodernism is an 
amalgam of both nihilism and the sublime, and just as mercurial. This dualism demonstrates 
b o th  p o stm o dern ism ‘s in terp retatio n  o f th e E n ligh ten m en t an d th e p ro b lem s suggested b y 
critics such as Hollinger and Norris: postmodernism merely inverts the opposition between 
nihilism and the sublime. This inversion, or displacement, of nihilism and the sublime occurs 
throughout history, as the following table illustrates: 
 
Dominant Ideology Sublime Moment Nihilistic Moment 
Christianity Divine elevation Rationality /  Humanity 
Enlightenment Modernity Rationality /  Humanity 
The Divine / 
Authoritarianism 
Postmodernism Irrationality Transcendence / Metanarratives 
3.1 Nihilistic and Sublime Moments within Ideologies 
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This suggests that the opposition between nihilism and the sublime functions not only 
within any historical moment (as two opposing ideologies), but also within certain 
‗do m in an t‘ ideo lo gies (as tw o  o p p o sin g m o m en ts). C h ristian ity p ro p o ses a sub lim e th at is 
reliant upon the idea of divine elevation (Longinus) and labels rationality and humanism as 
n ih ilistic (C o rtès an d Jaco b i) b ecause it o p p o ses th is. ‗E n ligh ten m en t m o dern ity‘ p ro p o ses a 
rational or anthropocentric sublime (Kant and Burke) and labels the divine as nihilistic 
(Nietzsche). Christianity labels the Enlightenment as nihilistic, and vice versa. 
Postmodernism elevates the irrational as sublime and decries metanarratives and the idea of 
transcendence as nihilistic, thereby implicating both Christianity and the Enlightenment with 
nihilism. To answer the question Lyotard (through Kant) asks –  ‗w h at is p o stm o dern ism ?‘ –  
therefore requires conceptualisation of both nihilism and the sublime. However, 
postmodernism is not a conflation of these concepts, a synthetic (in Hegelian terms) 
construction of thesis (sublime) and antithesis (nihilism), but an ante-bifurcatory form that 
exists b efo re th e divisio n  ever arises o r in  th e ‗excluded m iddle‘ b etw een  th e tw o . T h is m arks 
the point at which the postmodern sublime implicates itself with nihilism. Although both 
Lyotard and Jean Baudrillard differ in their perceptions of postmodernism and its sublimity, 
both inevitably return, despite their best efforts, to nihilism.  
 
The Sublime Postmodern I: Lyotard and the Unpresentable 
L yo tard‘s defin itio n  o f th e p o stmodern sublime is one of the most often quoted sections of 
his seminal text, The Postmodern Condition, in which he argues that unpresentability is one of 
th e m ain stays o f ‗p o stm o dern  art‘. T h is co m es fro m  L yo tard‘s readin g o f th e K an tian  
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sublime that, when coupled with his reading of Emmanuel Levinas, gives rise to a definition 
of the postmodern: 
 
The postmodern would be that which, in the modern, puts forward the unpresentable in 
presentation itself; that which denies itself the solace of good forms, the consensus of a 
taste which would make it possible to share collectively the nostalgia for the 
unattainable; that which searches for new presentations, not in order to enjoy them but 
in order to impart a stronger sense of the unpresentable.16 
 
Here, postmodern ism  is defin ed in  term s o f th e sub lim e, as ‗th at w h ich  p uts fo rw ard th e 
un p resen tab le in  p resen tatio n  itself‘. T o  discuss th e sub lim e as m erely so m e co m p o n en t o f 
p o stm o dern  th o ugh t is to  m iss th e p o in t th at th e p o stm o dern , in  L yo tard‘s defin itio n , is 
itself sub lim e. T h e ‗p o stm o dern  sub lim e‘ do es n o t refer to  a m o dulatio n  o f th e sub lim e, 
directly comparable to either the Kantian or Burkean modes, but to the fact that the 
postmodern is sublime. This distinction is crucial, for all postmodern artefacts –  whether art 
or theory –  must in some way be sublime, else they are no longer postmodern: they are not 
p art o f a ‗p o stm o dern  sub lim e‘ b ut th e ‗sub lim e p o stm o dern ‘. 
This conceptualisation of postmodernism explains why Lyotard characterises the 
postmodern as a break from the modernist hegemony of art. Lyotard uses the term modern 
‗to  design ate an y scien ce th at legitim ates itself w ith  referen ce to  a m etadisco urse‘.17 In 
co n trast, h e w rites th at ‗Post modern would have to be understood according to the paradox of 
the future (post) anterior (modo)‘.18 Lyotard indicates here the capability of postmodernism to 
b reak do w n  th e estab lish ed rules o f m o dern ism , in  effect, b efo re th ey are w ritten . L yo tard‘s 
                                                 
16 Jean-François Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, trans. by Geoff Bennington and Brian 
Massumi (Manchester: University of Manchester Press, 1999), p. 81. 
17 Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition, p. xxiii. 
18 Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition, p. 81. 
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p o stm o dern ism , w h ilst h isto rically ‗after‘ m o dern ism , is th eo retically ‗b efo re‘ it. F o r th is 
reaso n , L yo tard‘s co n cep tio n  o f a ‗sub lim e p o stm o dern ism ‘ m irro rs a K an tian  m o dulatio n  o f 
the sublime in which Das Unform [the formless] is one of the major aspects of its creation: 
 
In Burke as well as Kant, the sublime emerges when there is no longer a beautiful form. 
Kant himself said that the feeling of the sublime is the feeling of something Das Unform. 
Formless. The retreat of rules and regulations is the cause of the feeling on the 
sublime.19 
 
T h is ‗retreat o f rules an d regulatio n s‘ causes th e sub lim e an d th us w h ere ‗m o dern ‘ is to  b e 
un dersto o d as ‗rules an d regulatio n s‘, th e p o stm o dern  is th eir retreat. L yo tard furth er 
qualifies th is w h en  h e discusses ‗Ideas o f R easo n ‘, such  as ‗so ciety‘, ‗a b egin n in g‘, o r ‗w o rld‘. 
These are sublim e b ecause w e h ave n o  ‗sen so ry in tuitio n ‘ o f w h at th ey are: ‗an  Idea in  
general has no presentation, and that is the question of the sublime‘.20 This is a recuperation of the 
Kantian sublime because it is not the presentation of an object but the imagining of an Idea 
that brings about a feeling of the sublime. 
L yo tard‘s in terp retatio n  o f K an t h as b een  m uch  m align ed, due to  th e sp ecial status h e 
gives to  un p resen tab ility. N o rris suggests th at L yo tard actually ‗disfigures‘ th e K an tian  
sublime, in the sense that Lyotard both abuses it and removes its figurative nature.21 This is a 
result, Norris argues, of the textual interpretations of critics such as J. Hillis Miller in which 
‗ap o rias [sic]‘ w ith in  K an t‘s w o rk in variab ly lead to w ards ‗rh eto rical ―un decidab ility‖ w h ich  
                                                 
19 Jean-F ranço is L yo tard, ‗C om p lexity an d th e Sub lim e‘, in  Postmodernism: ICA Documents, 4, collected in 
Postmodernism: ICA Documents 4 & 5, ed. by Lisa Appignanesi (London: Free Association Books, 1986), pp. 10-
12 (p. 11). 
20 Lyotard, ‗C o m p lexity an d th e Sub lim e‘, p . 11. 
21 See Norris, pp. 182-256. This disfiguring occurs throughout the history of the sublime as each age seeks to 
justify its own perception of the sublime through an act of hermeneutic violence. This similarly occurs in 
n ih ilism , w h ere V attim o  w rites in  ‗O p tim istic N ih ilism ‘ (Common Knowledge, 1:3 (1992), 37-44) th at ‗Verwindung 
also  m ean s ―disto rtio n ‖, [… ] a disto rted accep tan ce‘ (p . 38), an d th at studies o f n ih ilism  alw ays in vo lve a 
Verwindung of a previous formulation of nihilism. 
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th reaten  to  co llap se th e en tire edifice o f K an tian  critical th o ugh t‘.22 Norris contrasts this to 
O n o ra O ‘N eill‘s in terp retatio n  th at, alth o ugh  ‗revisio n ist‘, is p rim arily p o sitivist: ‗O ‘N eill is 
m o re in clin ed to  co n strue K an t‘s argum en ts in  th e rational-reconstructive mode, that is to 
say, as capable of justification in terms that respect his philosophical purposes while 
an sw erin g to  th e b est, m o st acco un tab le stan dards o f curren t p h ilo so p h ical deb ate‘.23 Norris, 
w h o  ten ds to w ards O ‘N eill‘s argum en ts, reads Kant in an entirely different manner to 
Lyotard: 
 
[K an t] view ed [… th e sub lim e] as p o in tin g th e w ay to  th at realm  o f ‗sup ersen sib le‘ 
judgements whose rule was not given by cognitive requirements that concepts match up 
with sensuous institutions, but by the exercise of reason in that higher tribunal where 
issues of aesthetics could be seen as analogous with issues of ethical conscience.24 
 
Where Lyotard concentrates on Das Unform, the Kantian sublime is implicit to the 
construction of a rational moral code –  it is, after all, an  ‗E n ligh ten m en t‘ sub lim e. L yo tard  
conflates two different systems within the postmodern because he removes Enlightenment 
ethics from the Kantian sublime (leaving only Kantian aesthetics) and replaces them with 
Levinasian ethics. This appropriation is signalled when Lyotard writes of Barnett Newman, 
‗It‘s still sub lim e in  th e sen se th at B urke an d K an t describ ed an d yet it isn ‘t th eir sub lim e an y 
m o re‘.25 L yo tard‘s in ten tio n al use o f L evin asian  eth ics acco m p lish es tw o  th in gs: firstly, the 
rejection of metanarrative (i.e. Enlightenment or modern) forms by way of Levinasian ethics 
                                                 
22 N o rris, p . 212. M iller‘s argum en t ap p ears in  The Ethics of Reading: Kant, de Man, Eliot, Trollope, James, and 
Benjamin (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987). 
23 N o rris, p p . 182, 212. O ‘N eill‘s argum en ts ap p ear in  Constructions of Reason : E x ploration s of K an t’s P ractical 
Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987). 
24 Norris, p. 246. 
25 Jean-F ranço is L yo tard, ‗T h e Sub lim e an d th e A van t-G arde‘, tran s. b y A n drew  B en jam in , in  The Lyotard 
Reader, ed. by Andrew Benjamin (London: Blackwell, 1989), pp. 196-211 (p. 199). 
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an d seco n dly, th e p ro p o sitio n  o f an  aesth etic sub lim ity th at is suitab le ‗after A usch w itz‘ b y 
way of the Kantian Das Unform.  
This obviously states that the ‗sub lim e p o stm o dern ‘ is n o t directly K an tian  an d 
exp lain s th e reaso n  w h y L yo tard‘s m o dulatio n  o f th e sub lim e evo kes th e idea o f 
un p resen tab ility in  relatio n  to  itself. D w igh t F urro w  n o tes th at ‗T h e K an tian  sub lim e 
acknowledges the unpresentable, but substitutes for it a fiction that serves the function of a 
regulative ideal –  th e h yp o th esis o f a n atural teleo lo gy fo r h um an kin d‘. T h is is rejected b y 
L yo tard w h o , rath er th an  ‗b eco m e n o stalgic b y in vo kin g th e illusio n  o f a redem p tive, fin al 
en d [… ] co n tin ually makes reference to the impossibility of presenting the unpresentable by 
refusin g to  reco n cile th e o p p o sin g feelin gs‘.26 Kant presents a dialectical, synthetic sublime 
that is refuted by the Lyotardian sublime, which instead refuses the possibility of synthesis 
w ith in  itself. L yo tard w o uld disagree w ith  F urro w ‘s readin g o f K an t, h o w ever, as th e 
unabridged version of his discussion of Das Unform reveals: 
 
I also have something to say to the questioner who said that the sublime in Kant is 
always limited and absorbed by the idea of a law-governed universe. In Burke as well as 
Kant, the sublime emerges when there is no longer a beautiful form. Kant himself said 
that the feeling of the sublime is the feeling of something Das Unform. Formless. The 
retreat of rules an d regulatio n s is th e cause o f th e feelin g o n  th e sub lim e. T h at‘s w h at I 
w as tryin g to  say w ith  th e idea o f death . It is also  th e death  o f G o d (I do n ‘t sup p o se 
Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe would agree with me, because this is of course exactly 
N ietzsch e‘s p o sition).27 
 
L yo tard‘s p o sitio n  o n  K an t is th at Das Unform is the basis of the Kantian sublime, although 
th is is n o t en tirely th e case. F urro w ‘s argum en t is p ersuasive b ecause o f th e fact th at K an t 
                                                 
26 Dwight Furrow, Against Theory: Continental and Analytic Challenges in Moral Philosophy (New York: Routledge, 
1995), p. 180. 
27 L yo tard, ‗C o m p lexity an d th e Sub lim e‘, p . 11. 
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sees th e sub lim e as a tran scen den t ideal (w h y else is h e a ‗tran scen den t idealist‘?) an d th us, 
although the Kantian sublime promotes Das Unform an d th e ‗retreat o f rules an d regulatio n s‘, 
it stops short of undermining itself. Whilst the Kantian sublime is not necessarily a 
‗regulative idea‘, it do es co n tain  ‗a n atural teleo lo gy‘. In  co n trast, L yo tard‘s defin itio n  o f th e 
p o stm o dern  refutes th e idea o f an y n atural teleo lo gy, as th is w o uld even tually b eco m e ‗a 
go o d fo rm ‘: 
 
In the resolute refusal to impose finality on any discourse, the integrity of the various 
phrase regimes and genres is preserved because the encroachments among them are 
mere analogical borrowings. Ethics may employ narrative, but only for the purposes of 
demonstrating the limitations of a particular prescription; narrative may employ moral 
prescriptions, but only to demonstrate the limitations of a literary gambit or claim to 
historical authenticity..28 
 
F urro w ‘s sum m ary dem o n strates th e co n tin gen t n ature o f p o stm o dern  disco urse –  its 
‗refusal to  im p o se fin ality‘ ap p lies also  to  itself. T h is asp ect o f postmodernism results from 
L yo tard‘s im p licit use o f L evin asian  eth ics, in  w h ich  bonne conscience [good conscience] –  read 
as a L yo tardian  ‗go o d fo rm ‘ –  is essen tially ‗un eth ical‘. 
Problems exist within this definition of postmodernism. This very coercion to be 
mindful of the preservation of unpresentability gives rise to the problem of presentability. 
This has been observed by several critics of postmodernism and is neatly summed up by 
Furrow: 
 
Although Lyotard claims that the unity of a final end no longer serves as a ‗guid in g 
th read,‘ as it did fo r K an t, th e disun ity suggested b y th e in jun ctio n  to  b ear w itn ess to  th e 
                                                 
28 Furrow, p. 181. 
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impossibility of presenting the unpresentable seems no less a regulative idea –  thus 
preserving the teleological structure of the Kantian sublime.29 (My emphasis) 
 
B ecause o f th e ‗in jun ctio n ‘ to  p reserve th e un p resen tab le as unpresentable, Lyotard is issuing 
a diktat. Sim ilarly, w h en  L yo tard w rites th at ‗Sim p lifyin g to  th e extrem e, I defin e postmodern as 
in credulity to w ards m etan arratives‘, th is may be interpreted as an imperative –  ‗B e 
in credulo us to w ards m etan arratives‘ –  an d  th erefo re gives rise to  a ‗p o stm o dern ‘ 
metanarrative.30 This implies that postmodern reflexivity creates a paradox within 
postmodernism, where its own ethical stance invalidates it. 
These problems occur because Lyotard appends Levinasian ethics to Kantian 
aesth etics. L evin as‘ co n cep t o f th e O th er, b ro ugh t ab o ut b y h is exp erien ces o f th e 
Holocaust, promotes an ethical relationship between Self and Other based upon an 
intrasubjective, not subjective, mode of Being. Furrow summarises the argument as follows: 
 
If th e p o stm o dern  is ‗th at w h ich , in  th e m o dern , p uts fo rw ard th e un p resen tab le in  
p resen tatio n  itself,‘ th en  p o stm o dern  justice p uts fo rw ard w ith in  th e attem p ts to  p resen t 
justice –  within the forms and institutions justice presently takes –  the absolutely Other. 
In so doing it is not seeking to fulfil an aim, like integrity or particularity, which can be 
characterised independently of the Other and its claim on us, but is simply responding 
to the face-to-face confrontation with the Other.31 
 
T h is dem o n strates b o th  th e K an tian  m o dulatio n  o f th e sub lim e (p uttin g fo rw ard ‗th e 
un p resen tab le in  th e p resen tatio n  itself‘) an d th e eth ical relatio n  p o sed b y L evin as (‗th e face-
to-face co n fro n tatio n  w ith  th e O th er‘). L evin asian  eth ics p ro p o ses a n ew  w ay o f lo o kin g at 
                                                 
29 Furrow, p. 182. 
30 Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition, p. xxiv. 
31 Furrow, p. 184. 
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B ein g th at is n o t b ased up o n  th e in dividual sub jectivity b ut up o n  th e in dividual‘s relatio n sh ip  
with other individuals (intrasubjectivity).  
Levinas dispenses with the ideas of the Cartesian cogito and with the Sartrean 
existen tialist ‗fo r-itself‘ o f B ein g, an d in stead p ro p o ses th at B ein g, as kn o w ledge o f o n eself, 
can only arrive after face-to-face contact with an-Other Being. This intrasubjectivity is seen 
clearly when Levin as argues th at th e desire ‗to  kn o w ‘ is alw ays co n cern ed w ith  th e 
incorporation of what is Other into the Self: 
 
Since Hegel, any goal considered alien to the disinterested acquisition of knowledge has 
been subordinated to the freedom of knowledge as a science (savoir); and within this 
freedom, being itself is from that point understood as the active affirming of that same being, 
as the strength and strain of being.32 
 
Levinas argues that in order to know something, Being consciously seeks to colonise the 
Oth er. R ath er th an  m eet th e O th er, it seeks to  use its o w n  term s to  ‗p igeo n h o le‘ th e O th er 
into a category. Levinas calls this mode of Being bonne conscience, b ecause it h as ‗go o d 
co n scien ce‘ w ith  itself. L evin as p ro p o ses th at B ein g m ust h ave mauvaise conscience instead; a 
mode of Being that is based upon the capacity to feel guilty that you exist only because of 
the Other: 
 
The human is the return to the interiority of non-intentional consciousness, to mauvaise 
conscience, to its capacity to fear injustice more than death, to prefer to suffer than to 
commit injustice, and to prefer that which justifies being over that which assures it.33 
 
                                                 
32 E m m an uel L evin as, ‗E th ics as F irst P h ilo so p h y‘, tran s. b y Seán  H an d an d M ich ael T em ple, in  The Levinas 
Reader, ed. by Seán Hand, pp. 75-87 (p. 78). 
33 L evin as, ‗E th ics as F irst P h ilo so p h y‘, p . 85. 
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Mauvaise conscience is a mode of Being that realises it exists only because of the Other, that the 
diacritic relation between itself and the Other is such that should the Other cease to exist, so 
will it cease to exist. This arises by the face-to-face relation because the face of the Other 
brings us to the awareness of who we are and forces us into responsibility towards it. 
Levin as w rites th at ‗T h e face, it is in vio lab le; th ese eyes ab so lutely w ith o ut p ro tectio n , th e 
most naked part of the human body, offer, nevertheless, an absolute resistance to possession 
[… ] T o  see th e face is already to  h ear: ―T h o u sh alt n o t kill‖‘.34 It is the reception of that face, 
the recognition that the Self and Other are not the same, that brings the Self towards an 
ethical relationship with the Other: we are obliged to the Other for our existence. Guilt is 
the primary mode of Being in mauvaise conscience, guilt because we exist from and for the 
O th er, guilt b ecause w e are resp o n sib le fo r th e O th er‘s w ell-being.35 That this is a response 
to  th e even ts o f th e H o lo caust is clear: if p eo p le h ad feared ‗in justice m o re th an  death ‘ th en  
more would have been saved, an d if p eo p le h ad  th o ugh t ab o ut ‗th at w h ich  justifies b ein g 
[th e O th er] o ver th at w h ich  assures it [th e Self]‘ th en  it m ay n o t h ave o ccurred at all. 
Although Levinas does not explicitly represent the Holocaust, his ethics emerge from it, in 
the only ethical relation he can have with the Holocaust: mauvaise conscience. 
T h is is arguab ly th e reaso n  fo r L evin as‘ n eed to  p lace eth ics as th e ‗F irst P h ilo so p h y‘ 
and form a mode of Being predicated not upon itself, but upon the existence of the Other. 
                                                 
34 Quoted in Jill Robbins, Altered Reading: Levinas and Literature (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1999), p. 63. 
The original source is Emmanuel Levinas, Difficult Freedom, trans. by Seán Hand (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1990), p. 8. Robb in s‘ descriptio n  o f th e L evin asian  face also exp lain s w h y L yo tard ‗dis-figures‘ 
th e K an tian  sub lim e, b ecause to  ‗figure‘ is to  ‗lo se w hat is h um an , to  b e turned in to  a statue, to  b e turned in to  
sto n e‘ (p . 50) an d th erefo re, ‗T o  figure a face is to  de-face it‘ (p . 57). 
35 It is useful to compare Martin Jay and Levin here. In Downcast Eyes: The Denigration of Vision in Twentieth-
Century Western Thought (B erkeley: U n iversity o f C alifo rn ia P ress, 1994), Jay calls th is ‗facial‘ eth ic th e ‗eth ics o f 
b lin dn ess‘ (p . 543), an d ch aracterises p o stm odern ism  as ‗ethical‘ in  a L evin asian  sen se. In  co n trast, L evin  calls 
fo r ‗th e opening o f visio n ‘ to  co m b at p o stm o dern ism  (p . 8). A lth o ugh  L evin  argues th at ‗w e are beh o lden  to  
others, beholden to the being of others, for a visio n  o f o ur o w n  iden tity‘ (p . 260), h e do es n o t refer to  L evin as 
and so sees postmodernism nihilistically.  
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Whereas p h ilo so p h y sin ce P lato  w as ‗th e disin terested acquisitio n  o f kn o w ledge‘, L evin as 
proposed that ethics replace ontology as the primary mode of philosophy: 
 
This is the question of the meaning of being: not the ontology of the understanding of 
that extraordinary verb, but the ethics of its justice. The question par excellance or the 
questio n  o f p h ilo so p h y. N o t ‗W h y b ein g rath er th an  n o th in g?‘, b ut h o w  b ein g justifies 
itself.36 
 
T h is m ean s th at p h ilo so p h y m ust n o w  deal w ith  th e questio n  o f ‗h o w  to  b e‘ n o t ‗w h y  we 
are‘. T h e p revio us m o de o f B ein g –  the nihilistic destruction of the Other to assure the Self, 
the diacritic definition of the Self against nothing rather than an-Other self –  led to the 
nihilistic excess of the Holocaust.37 Levinasian ethics proposes a move towards the Other in 
which Being accepts that the Other is different and must remain so. 
T h is L evin asian  eth ic is tran sferab le to  L yo tard‘s defin itio n  o f p o stm o dern ism : th e 
postmodern obsession with unpresentability is a product of this ethical response towards 
that which is Other. The postmodern, in its desire to avoid categorisation, addresses this 
co n cern  o f p ro p o sin g ‗fo rm s‘ an d ‗regulatio n s‘ in  o rder to  avo id affirm in g itself at th e 
expense of the Other. Its demand to respect unpresentability is an ethical demand from the 
face o f th e O th er an d its ‗kn o w ledge‘ is co n cern ed w ith  p reservin g th e rep resen tatio n al ‗gap ‘ 
–  w h at is co n tin gen t as o p p o sed  to  w h at is ab so lute. H o w ever, w h ilst th e ‗sub lim e 
p o stm o dern ‘ o p p o ses itself to  E n ligh ten m en t n ih ilism , and proposes an ethical turn towards 
Das Unform, this turn is already implicated with nihilism because the interrelation between 
                                                 
36 L evin as, ‗E th ics as F irst P h ilo so p h y‘, p . 86. 
37 T h is juxtap o sitio n  is seen  clearly in  P aul A uster‘s The Invention of Solitude (New York: Penguin, 1982) where, 
up o n  go in g to  visit th e attic in  w h ich  A n n e F ran k sp en t m o st o f th e w ar, A uster o b serves ‗th e rear w in do w  o f a 
h o use in w h ich  D escartes o nce lived‘ (p . 83). 
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nihilism and the sublime that exists within the Enlightenment cannot be so easily dismissed. 
Lyotard may wish to escape from nihilism, but it haunts the postmodern nevertheless. 
 
Nihilism and the Lyotardian Sublime 
F o r all L yo tard‘s attem p ts to  dism iss n ih ilism  fro m  th e ‗sub lim e p o stm o dern ‘, 
postmodernism demonstrates a distinctive familiarity with what might be termed its 
‗n ih ilistic‘ ro o t an d a p ro p en sity to  dism iss th is in  favo ur o f ‗th e sub lim e‘. O n e o f th e 
p rim ary in dicato rs o f th is is th e w ay in  w h ich  each  o f L yo tard‘s statem en ts ab o ut th e sub lim e 
always refer back to nihilism in some way. Not only are there such statements as ‗Das 
Unform‘ to  co n sider in  th e ligh t o f n ih ilism  (th e K an tian  sub lim e as N ietzsch e‘s ‗death  o f 
G o d‘) b ut also  th e fact th at each  tim e L yo tard en co un ters n ih ilism  o r th e sub lim e th e o th er 
tends to appear, with Lyotard generally choosing to perceive the sublime as more important 
than nihilism. In discussing the postmodern destruction of history, for example, Lyotard 
notes both the Nietzschean and Kantian interpretations to such an approach: 
 
Modernity, in whatever age it appears, cannot exist without a shattering of belief and 
w ith o ut disco very o f th e ‗lack o f reality‘ o f reality, to geth er w ith  th e in ven tio n  o f o th er 
realities. 
W h at do es th is ‗lack o f reality‘ sign ify if o n e tries to  free it fro m  a n arro w ly 
historicized interpretation? The phrase is of course akin to what Nietzsche calls nihilism. 
But I see a much earlier modulation of Nietzschean perspectivism in the Kantian theme 
of the sublime. I think in particular that it is in the aesthetic of the sublime that modern 
art (including literature) finds its impetus and the logic of the avant-garde finds its 
axioms.38 
 
                                                 
38 Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition, p . 77. T h is also  sign ifies th e ‗p o stm o dern ‘ fo rm ulation of nihilism presented 
b y th is th esis, in  th at it ‗tries to  free‘ n ih ilism  ‗fro m  a n arrow ly h isto ricized in terp retatio n ‘, w h ich  is itself b o th  
sublime and nihilistic, whilst paradoxically remaining within a historical postmodern framework. 
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Lyotard argues that the contemporary always rejects the formulations of the past (as both 
h o w  th e p ast is fo rm ulated an d th o se ‗p ast‘ fo rm ulatio n s) an d exp lain s h o w  th e ‗p o stm o dern ‘ 
differs fro m  th e ‗m o dern ‘. L yo tard exp licitly lin ks th is to  ‗th e K an tian  th em e o f th e sub lim e‘ 
because postmodernism derives itself from the Kantian sublime at the expense of nihilism. 
In fact, he rejects Nietzsche and nihilism by arguing that Nietzsche derived nihilism from the 
K an tian  sub lim e. T h is is also , h o w ever, L yo tard‘s rejectio n  o f G erm an  idealism , w h ich  ‗in  
p articular sub sum ed‘ L o n gin us‘ sub lim e ‗un der th e p rin cip le th at all th o ugh t an d reality 
fo rm s a system ‘.39 Lyotard compares Fichte and Hegel with Kant and Burke, thus implying 
th at w h ilst F ich te an d H egel ‗in particular sub sum ed‘ th e sub lim e, so too did Kant and Burke: 
the difference is only one of degree. This explains how Lyotardian postmodernism continues 
to use the sublime without feeling that it is in any way implicated with nihilism. 
It could be inferred from this that postmodernism and nihilism actually have little in 
common and that it is merely an anachronistic reading or a historical quirk of fate that 
nihilism and the sublime seem to reach their apogee in  L yo tard‘s ‗sub lim e p o stm o dern ‘. 
H o w ever, it is th e co n cep t o f un p resen tab ility at th e h eart o f L yo tard‘s defin itio n  o f th e 
p o stm o dern  th at suggests its relatio n  to  n ih ilism . L yo tard‘s desire to  b e eth ical to w ards th e 
unpresentable (the conjunction of Kant and Levinas) leads to a particular formulation of the 
ro le o f ab sen ce w ith in  th e p o stm o dern . In  th e p o stm o dern , as R en ée van  de V all n o tes, ‗a 
sp ecial p lace is design ated to  silen ce‘. Sh e co n tin ues: 
 
Where traditionally philosophy has regarded silence as lacunae, uncharted territory that 
should be mapped with concepts, reasonings and conclusions, Lyotard is very reticent. 
He is aware of the fact that charting a philosophical white spot is often the first stage of 
                                                 
39 Jean-Franço is L yo tard, ‗N ew m an : T h e In stan t‘, tran s. by D avid M acy, in  The Lyotard Reader, ed. by Andrew 
Benjamin, pp. 240-249 (p. 245). 
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co n cep tual co lo n isatio n . [… ] Silence indicates inevitable gaps in our comprehension, 
gaps that should be respected, rather than bridged.40 
 
Lyotard constructs silence as something that is Other to discourse, although in order to 
remain ethical towards this representational gap he must remain silent about silence. John 
Cage is an example of this form of sublimity because of works such as 4 ’ 3 3 ” , which is four 
minutes and thirty-three seconds of silence. In fact, it is not only silence that suggests the 
unpresentable, but any formulation of absence, as Lyotard also observes a similar thread 
within abstract painting: 
 
The current of abstract painting has its source, from 1912, in this requirement for 
indirect and all but ungraspable allusion to the invisible in the visible. The sublime, and 
not the beautiful, is the sentiment called forth by these works.41 
 
T h us, ‗silen ce‘ an d ‗in visib ility‘ are sim ilar w ith in  L yo tard‘s co n cep tio n  o f th e sub lim e. B o th  
silence and invisibility suggest the absence of representation, where silence is the absence of 
representative language, and invisibility is the absence of representative symbols. This form 
of Lyotardian sublimity appears in the works of, for example, Yves Klein, Robert Ryman, 
Robert Rauschenberg, Ad Reinhardt, and Mark Rothko. 
Many of the paintings of these artists, like C age‘s ‗m usic‘, are sublime in a similar 
m an n er to  B arn ett N ew m an ‘s w o rks, w h ich  fo rce th e reader to  co n fro n t terro r b ecause o f 
the sheer blankness –  the presence of absence –  thrust upon them. When discussing 
N ew m an ‘s p ain tin gs, L yo tard defines this moment of terror: 
                                                 
40 R en ée van de V all, ‗Silen t V isio n s: L yo tard on  th e Sub lim e‘, Art & Design Profile, 40 (1995), 68-75 (p. 69). 
41 Jean-François Lyotard, The Inhuman: Reflections on Time, trans. by Geoff Bennington and Rachel Bowlby 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991), p. 126. 
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One feels that it is possible that soon nothing more will take place. What is sublime is 
the feeling that something will happen, despite everything, within this threatening void, 
th at so m eth in g w ill take ‗p lace‘ an d w ill announce that everything is not over. That place 
is m ere ‗h ere‘, th e m o st m in im al o ccurren ce.42 
 
T h e fo rm  o f th e ‗zip ‘ in  N ew m an ‘s p ain tin gs, such  as Vir Heroicus Sublimis (1950-1951), 
suggests a m o de o f b ein g (B ein g?) un der p ressure, a th in  strip , o r ‗zip ‘, o f p resen ce h em m ed 
in  b y a larger sp ace o f ab sen ce: ‗F o r N ew m an , creatio n  is n o t an  act p erfo rm ed b y so m eo n e; 
it is w h at h ap p en s (th is) in  th e m idst o f th e in determ in ate‘.43 The artist and his audience have 
a tenuous sense of being in a field of indeterminate relations. The sublime moment –  the 
point at which the self reasserts itself –  o ccurs w h en  ‗T h e w o rk rises up  (se dresser) in an 
instant, the flash of the instant strikes it like a minimal command: Be‘.44 This is why, as van 
de V all o b serves, ‗T h e sublime feeling is the feeling not of what happens, but that anything 
h ap p en s at all‘.45 T h is is n o t th e m o m en t o f ‗H ere‘, ‗N o w ‘, ‗I am ‘, an d ‗T h is is‘, b ut th e 
moment –  th e ‗in stan t‘ –  in which this occurs: 
 
So we must suggest that there is a state of mind wh ich  is a p rey to  ‗p resen ce‘ (a p resen ce 
which in no way present in the sense of here-and-now, i.e. like what is designated by the 
deictics of presentation), a mindless state of mind, which is required of mind not for 
matter to be perceived or conceived, given or grasped, but so that there be something.46 
 
Lyotard argues that this is not a re-vivificatio n  o f th e self b ecause ‗th is in stan t in  turn  can n o t 
be counted, since in order to count this time, even the time of an instant, the mind must be 
                                                 
42 L yo tard, ‗N ew m an : T he In stan t‘, p . 245. 
43 L yo tard, ‗N ew m an : T he In stan t‘, p. 243. 
44 L yo tard, ‗N ew m an : T he In stan t‘, p . 249. 
45 van de Vall, p. 71. 
46 Lyotard, The Inhuman, p. 140. 
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active‘.47 The m in d th us ‗exists‘ in  th e sub lim e state th at is ‗a m in dless state o f m in d‘, it is th e 
‗N o w ‘ in  w h ich  th e ‗I‘ is n o t: ‗th e p icture p resen ts th e p resen tatio n , b ein g o ffers itself up  in  
th e h ere an d  n o w ‘.48 This is the moment, in Levinasian terms, of the il y a [there is], the 
m o m en t w h ich  is ‗th e disap p earan ce o f all o b jects‘ an d ‗th e extin ctio n  o f th e sub ject‘.49 As Jill 
R o b b in s sum m arises, quo tin g L evin as, ‗th e il y a is a n o cturn al sp ace, a sp ace o f h o rro r, ―th e 
event of being that returns at the heart of negatio n ‖, ―a return  o f p resen ce in  ab sen ce‖‘.50 
This sublime is nihilistic in the sense that Lyotard describes the white painting, 
p resum ab ly o f R ausch en b erg, as ‗rep resen tin g n o th in g (un less it b e th at th ere is so m e 
un p resen tab le)‘ an d h is descrip tio n  o f th e terro r th at causes th e sub lim e as ‗th e feelin g th at 
n o th in g m igh t h ap p en : th e n o th in gn ess n o w ‘.51 Depictions of nothingness create a sublime 
feelin g, alth o ugh  th is co uld equally p ro vo ke th e m o m en t o f th e ‗I am ‘ –  a re-vivification of 
the self –  rather than of the I-less (and eyeless, because it is the point at which the mind is 
blind) instant. Similarly, there are problems with the depictions of nothingness in Cage, 
Rauschenberg, Ryman, Reinhardt, Rothko, and Klein. They may be considered sublimely 
nihilistic but for the fact that they are not dealing with nothingness. Reinhardt, Ryman, Rothko, 
an d R ausch en b erg do  n o t p ain t m o n o ch ro m es (as ‗o n e-co lo ur‘), b ut w h ite-on-white or 
black-on-b lack. E ven  K lein ‘s m o n o ch ro m es do  n o t reflect n o th in gn ess b ecause h e w rites 
th at ‗H avin g rejected n o th in gn ess, I disco vered th e V o id‘, th e vo id in  questio n  b ein g 
rep resen ted b y ‗K lein  b lue‘.52 T h ese p ain tin gs are n o t ‗n o th in g‘, b ut so m eth in g. L ike C age‘s 
4 ’ 3 3 ” , they are actually concerned with performativity. C age w rites: ‗T h ere is no such thing as 
                                                 
47 Lyotard, The Inhuman, p. 140. 
48 L yo tard, ‗N ew m an : T he In stan t‘, p . 244. 
49 Quoted in Robbins, p. 92. The original source is Emmanuel Levinas, Existence and Existents, trans. by 
Alphonso Lingis (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1978), p. 67. 
50 Robbins, p. 92. Quotations are from Levinas, Existence and Existents, pp. 61, 65. 
51 Lyotard, The Inhuman, p. 121; L yo tard, ‗T h e Sub lim e an d th e A van t-G arde‘, p . 198. 
52 Quoted in Matthew Collings, This is Modern Art (London: Seven Dials, 2000), p. 170. 
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an empty space or an empty time. There is always something to see, something to hear. In 
fact, try as w e m ay to  m ake a silen ce, w e can n o t‘.53 This means that although the work itself 
seems blank, it is actually different depending upon its relative performance. Each piece of 
art will differ in performance, whether it is in the way in which it is lit within an exhibition or 
the noises in the ambient environment, such as shuffling and coughing. These works 
demonstrate a performative aspect th at is n o t sub lim e ‗n ih ilistically‘, excep t in asm uch  as th ey 
are dep en den t up o n  ab sen tin g th em selves an d fo cusin g th e audien ce‘s atten tio n  o n  th eir 
immediate environment. 
The issue of nihilism also arises in conjunction with the Levinasian roots of the 
‗sub lim e p o stm o dern ‘. T h e desire fo r an  eth ical relatio n  to  th e face o f th e O th er, in  th e 
mauvaise conscience o f B ein g, is ‗to  p refer th at w h ich  justifies b ein g o ver th at w h ich  assures it‘.54 
Although Levinas uses these terms specifically, it must be realised that on a broader palette, 
the ultimate justification for Being (existence) is non-Being (non-existence). Being cannot 
exist in isolation, and must be defined diacritically by what it is not –  in  L evin as‘ term s th is is 
the face-to-face relation of man to the Other –  and, to allow an awkward phrasing, being is 
not non-being. Non-being does not assure being, but destabilises it, forces it to justify is own 
existence –  w h y is it? Sartre w rites th at ‗nothingness haunts being‘ b ecause ‗n o th in gn ess, which is 
not, can  o n ly h ave a b o rro w ed existen ce, an d it gets its b ein g fro m  b ein g [… ] Non-being exists 
only on the surface of being‘.55 M artin  Jay n o tes th at L evin as disliked ‗Sartre‘s reductio n  o f alterity 
to nothingness and his belief in the totalising project of th e self‘.56 However, nihilism is not a 
‗reductio n  o f alterity to  n o th in gn ess‘ b ut th e p resen tatio n  o f n o th in gn ess as alterity –  it is an 
                                                 
53 John Cage, Silence: Lectures and Writings (London: Marion Boyars, 1978), p. 8.  
54 L evin as, ‗E th ics as F irst P h ilo so p h y‘, p . 85. 
55 Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology, trans. by Hazel E. Barnes 
(London: Routledge, 2000), p. 16. 
56 Jay, p 557, n. 61. 
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ideological use of nothingness. Nihilism is founded upon the presence of absence, 
n o th in gn ess b ro ugh t ‗in to  b ein g‘ (w hether linguistically or noetically). As a being, it can 
th erefo re exist as ‗o th erw ise th an  b ein g‘ b ecause it is th e existen t trace o f n o n -being that is 
always Other to humanity.57 In deed, as Jay n o tes, ‗L evin as‘ p ro ject m ay, in  fact, b e 
characterised grosso modo, as th e vin dicatio n  o f th e ―m eo n to lo gical‖ (fro m  meon, nonbeing), 
ethical impulse that has been buried under the ontological preoccupation of the dominant 
W estern  traditio n ‘.58 The concern of Levinasian ethics is not only with the previous non-
existen ce o f eth ics (th e rejectio n  o f an  earlier ‗eth ical n ih ilism ‘), b ut also  w ith  th e 
meontological over the ontological, where non-being is that which defines being (in the 
sen se th at eth ics is th e ‗first p h ilo so p h y‘, p rio r to  ep istem o lo gy) –  in fact, where that which 
p revio usly ‗w as n o t‘ n o w  ‗is‘. T h is suggests th at th e co re o f L evin asian  p h ilo so p h y is th e 
recuperation of that which was previously made nothing, a solution to nihilism. 
This recuperation is unethical, however, in Levinasian terms, because it ignores the 
‗face‘ o f n ih ilism , just as th e ideo lo gical fo rm ulatio n  o f n ih ilism  is un eth ical b ecause th e 
action of bringing nothingness into being (through nihilism) totalises nothingness and 
ign o res its ‗face‘: n ih ilism  is th at w h ich  rem ain s ab sen t an d can n o t b e b ro ugh t ‗in to  b ein g‘. 
Although nihilism does not possess a physical face, this does not preclude it from being 
understood as possessing the same ethical demand as Levinas ascribes to the face. The face 
o f th e O th er is itself ‗figured‘ in  L evin as‘ w o rks, which is why Robbins asks: 
 
                                                 
57 See Emmanuel Levinas, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, trans. by Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: 
Duquesne University Press, 1999). 
58 Jay, p. 555. 
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W h at is th e reader to  m ake o f th e o b vio us m etap h o ricity o f ‗T h e face is a h an d, an  o p en  
h an d,‘ o r, ‗T h e w h o le b o dy –  a hand or a curve of the shoulder –  can  exp ress as a face‘, 
which even suggest a transfer between synecdochic figures for the human?59 
 
To avoid this figuring, one must remain silent, allowing the Other to present its face. 
N ih ilism , w h ich  is th e ab sen ce o f th e face, do es ‗face‘ us, h o w ever, b ecause it is so m eth in g 
that we must face (although not necessarily overcome, as Nietzsche or Heidegger would 
argue) without bringing it into presence. Ann Smock notes that both Maurice Blanchot and 
L evin as sh o w  a ‗co n cern  fo r b ein g‘s effacem en t itself: co n cern , p recisely, lest it show, lest it 
be robbed of that indefiniteness, that seclusion, that foreignness fro m  w h ich  it is in sep arab le‘.60 
The action of bringing absence into presence is, for Levinas, unethical: that is why the 
Holocaust remains so conspicuously absent in the majority of his works. It is in fact possible 
to ch aracterise th e H o lo caust as ‗th o se O th ers m ade ab sen t b y th e to tal co n cretisatio n  o f 
p resen ce‘, w h ich  suggests th at th e H o lo caust is an  ab sen t face to  w h ich  L evin as addresses 
h im self. H o w ever, th is also  m ean s th at th at in  h is co n cern  fo r ‗b ein g‘, o th erw ise or not, 
Levinas is himself being unethical –  showing bonne conscience –  towards eradicating 
nothingness: he is ignoring the (absent) face of nihilism. 
 
The Sublime Postmodern II: Baudrillard and the Hyperreal 
The works of Baudrillard suggest another possib ility in  th e creatio n  o f a ‗n ih ilistic sub lim e‘. 
B audrillard‘s w o rk o n  th e sub lim e is p assive (co m p ared to  L yo tard‘s active use o f th e 
                                                 
59 Robbins, p. xxiv. The original quo tatio n s are fro m  E m m anuel L evin as, ‗T h e P arado x o f M o rality‘, tran s. b y 
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60 Quoted in Jay, p. 554. The original source is Maurice Blanchot, The Space of Literature, trans. by Ann Smock 
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1982), p. 8. 
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sublime), in which he notes within postmodernism certain characteristics that resemble the 
sub lim e. B audrillard‘s w o rk is n o t ab o ut th e sub lim e, as is L yo tard‘s, b ut is rath er co n cern ed  
with the condition of postmodernity: it is the way in which he reads this that defines 
p o stm o dern ism ‘s sub lim ity. T h ere is th erefo re a differen ce b etw een  L yo tard‘s ‗p o stm o dern ‘ 
and Baudrillard‘s ‗p o stm o dern ity‘. ‗P o stm o dern ity‘ is a resp o n se to  eco n o m ic co n ditio n s 
w ith in  cap italism . B audrillard fo llo w s b o th  F redric Jam eso n ‘s an d D avid H arvey‘s 
p ercep tio n s o f p o stm o dern ism , as ‗th e cultural do m in an t o f th e lo gic o f late cap italism ‘ an d  
th e ‗d yn am ism  o f cap italism ‘s h isto rical-geo grap h ical develo p m en t‘, resp ectively.61 H arvey‘s 
co n cep t o f ‗o veraccum ulatio n ‘ is essen tially a m o m en t o f cap italism  in  w h ich  ‗idle cap ital an d 
idle labour supply could exist side by side with no apparent way in which to bring these idle 
reso urces to geth er to  acco m p lish  so cially useful tasks‘.62 In such phases, which recur 
p erio dically, ‗w e can  exp ect th e turn  to  aesth etics an d to  th e fo rces o f culture as b o th  
explanations and loci of active struggle to be particularly acute‘.63 Baudrillard differs from 
Jameson and Harvey, however, because he emphasises the technological, rather than 
economic, aspects of postmodernism. For Baudrillard, the rise of instantaneous 
co m m un icatio n s gives rise to  a p o stm o dern  ‗h yp erreality‘. 
Baudrillard‘s co n cep tio n  o f p o stm o dern ity is a realm  o f sign ificatio n  th at co n tain s n o  
m ean in g o th er th an  as a gh o stly feedb ack sign al th at p erp etuates itself. H e w rites th at, ‗F ro m  
today, the only real cultural practice, that of the masses, ours (there is no longer a 
difference), is a manipulative, aleatory practice, a labyrinthine practice of signs, and one that 
                                                 
61 Fredric Jameson, Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism (London: Verso, 1991), p. 45. 
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n o  lo n ger h as an y m ean in g‘.64 There is no more information, that assemblage of data that 
produces meaning, but only a self-referential cycle of raw data that can only produce more 
data: ‗T h us all m essages in  th e m edia fun ctio n  in  a sim ilar fash io n : n eith er in fo rm atio n  n o r 
co m m un icatio n , b ut referen dum , p erp etual test, circular resp o n se, verificatio n  o f th e co de‘.65 
T h is ‗verificatio n  o f th e co de‘ serves no function other than to ensure its own existence. For 
Baudrillard, postmodernity is centred upon the idea that the real no longer exists or, rather, 
that the real no longer contains any measure of reality. What has replaced the real is its 
simulacrum, a ‗false‘ real th at is n o w  m o re real th an  reality itself: ‗T h e real do es n o t efface itself 
in favor of the imaginary; it effaces itself in favor of the more real than real: the hyperreal. 
T h e truer th an  true: th is is sim ulatio n ‘.66 
Simulation arises from the Enlightenment desire to attribute Reason as the measure of 
all things, to quantify and control by scientifically replicating the Real under laboratory 
conditions. It evolves as a result of this gradual construction of the Real, as defined by 
B audrillard‘s ‗o rders o f th e im age‘: 
 
It is the reflection of a profound reality; 
It masks and denatures a profound reality; 
It masks the absence of a profound reality; 
It has no relation to any reality whatsoever: it is its own pure simulacrum.67 
 
                                                 
64 Jean Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation, trans. by Sheila Faria Glaser (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan 
Press, 1997), p. 65. 
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These four stages mark the demise of the Real and the rise of the simulation, in a rough 
ch ro n o lo gical o rder. O n e p o ssib le in feren ce fro m  th is is th at th ere w as at o n e stage a ‗R eal‘, 
an d it is in  th e sub sequen t attem p ts to  catego rise an d defin e th is ‗R eal‘ th at th e o n set o f 
simulation began.68 Although this is arguably the product of any kind of organised human 
endeavour since the rise of homo sapiens and cosmological mythology, it is useful to consider 
that the real onset of this was when humanity began to have some measure of success at 
rep licatin g th is ‗R eal‘: th e E n ligh ten m en t. A lth o ugh  th e R en aissan ce sp arked a ren ew ed 
interest in knowledge, the effects of a predominantly religious environment and a profoundly 
superstitious populace hampered rationality. The rise of printing and literacy gradually 
brought about a profound shift in the possibility of sharing knowledge across national and 
cultural boundaries, with a concomitant rise in the number of participants interested in such 
a debate –  as communications became faster, the progress of simulation accelerated 
proportionally, which eventually gave rise to the Enlightenment Project. The Enlightenment 
is actually th e ‗E m p ire o f th e R eal‘, in asm uch  as it estab lish es em p irical co n ditio n s fo r th e 
production, and verification, of the Real. 
T h e first stage, th e ‗reflectio n  o f a p ro fo un d reality‘, arises o ut o f th e artistic n o tio n  o f 
realism and the scientifically rational construction of mathematical order. These attempt to 
measure reality in terms of its representation, whether in the use of art that reflects what is 
‗real‘ (th is defin itio n  o f co urse ch an ges acco rdin g to  th e p ercep tio n s o f th e artist), o r in  th e 
rise o f m ath em atics an d scien ce to  accurately reflect th e ‗real‘ w o rld, o fferin g p recise 
explanations for natural phenomena according to a set of internally consistent rules. This, in 
turn , creates th e situatio n  w h ereb y th is ‗m easure o f reality‘ b eco m es m o re im p o rtan t th an  
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reality itself, th e seco n d stage in  w h ich  th e im age ‗m asks an d den atures a p ro fo un d reality‘. 
This stage is analogous to the debates surrounding realism in the world of art (questions 
such  as ‗w h y is o n e p iece o f art m o re realistic th an  an o th er?‘ o r ‗w h o se art is realistic an d  
w h o se is n o t?‘) an d in  th e scien tific deb ates co n cern ed w ith  p ro vidin g w o rkab le h yp o theses 
based upon experimental data in which these hypotheses are tested against each other. It 
reveals an increasing interest in comparison between formulations of the Real, rather than in 
the Real itself. Artists have their artworks and scientists have their data, and there is thus no 
longer need to refer to the Real to establish whether the art or data is an accurate reflection 
or not. In terms of the sublime, the question became no longer whether a mountain was 
sublime or not, but whether it was Burke or Kant that gave the most accurate depiction of 
how it was sublime: the mountain itself no longer mattered. 
By slowly ceasing to compare the image against the Real, and instead comparing 
im ages, th is gave rise to  th e th ird stage in  w h ich  th e im age ‗m asks th e absence of a profound 
reality‘. N o  lo n ger carin g ab o ut th e R eal, scien tists an d artists deb ated en dlessly ab o ut w h at 
was real, not realising that the Real no longer existed anywhere but in their formulations of 
it. Debates about what was real were so intense that nobody realised that the image had 
replaced the Real (the signifier replacing the signified as the producer of meaning) and was 
takin g its p lace. T h is is seen  clearly in  R en é M agritte‘s The Treason of Images (1928-1929), 
where people mistake a picture of a signifying image of the pipe for the signified pipe itself –  
there is no paradox involved in the painting, only in our perception of it. 
T h e fin al stage in  th e ‗o rders o f th e im age‘, th e ‗p o stm o dern  co n ditio n ‘ acco rdin g to  
Baudrillard, is the stage at w h ich  w e n o w  fin d o urselves. A t th is stage, th e im age ‗h as n o  
relatio n  to  an y reality w h atso ever: it is its o w n  p ure sim ulacrum ‘. T h is leap  co m es ab o ut b y 
the production of the image that no longer has to maintain the illusion of reality: the image 
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has completely usurped the Real and need only refer to all the other fourth-order images in 
order to maintain its cohesion. Rather than being connected in any way to the Real, the 
image and all its associated images combine to form a closed network of interconnections 
that are the only reality we know. They exist as a matrix of pure simulation from which we 
no longer have any access to the Real, but merely a series of self-replicating, reflexive images 
th at co n tain  th e sum  o f h um an  existen ce, w ith  n o  ‗reality‘ w h atso ever. T h e sim ulacrum  is 
‗n ever exch an ged fo r th e real, b ut exch an ged  fo r itself, in  an  un in terrup ted circuit w ith o ut 
referen ce o r circum feren ce‘ an d th us, as a result, th e p o stm o dern  is n o t ab o ut em an cip atio n  
but about control; it is no longer real, but hyperreal.69 This is seen clearly in both the 
W ach o w ski B ro th ers‘ The Matrix (1999) an d M ich ael P attm an ‘s Virtual Nightmare (2000), 
w h ere ‗virtuality‘ rep laces reality. 
B audrillard‘s M arxist ro o ts b eco m e clear at th is p o in t b ecause h e assesses th e impact of 
th is sim ulacral im age up o n  ideo lo gical co n tro l, sayin g th at ‗A ll th e p o w ers, all th e in stitutio n s 
speak of themselves through denial, in order to attempt, by simulating death, to escape their 
real death  th ro es‘.70 T h is m ean s th at all ‗o p p o sitio n ‘ h as been co-opted into this matrix of 
im ages, n o t actually o p p o sin g each  o th er, b ut servin g as b uttresses to  each  o th er‘s existen ce:  
 
T h e status o f all n egativity in  th e W est: p o litical o p p o sitio n s, th e ‗L eft‘, critical disco urse, 
etc. –  a simulacral contrast through which power attempts to break the vicious circle of 
its o w n  n o n existen ce, o f its fun dam en tal irresp o n sib ility, o f its ‗susp en sio n ‘. P o w er 
floats like money, like language, like theory. 71 
 
This is not a dream out of science fiction: everywhere it is a question of doubling the 
process of work. And of a doubling of the process of going on strike –  striking 
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incorporated just as obsolescence is in objects, just as crisis is in production. So, there is 
no longer striking, nor work, but both simultaneously.72 
 
B audrillard‘s readin g o f th e p o stm o dern  differs sign ifican tly fro m  L yo tard‘s in  th at it is n o t 
an escape from Enlightenment rationality but the ultimate culmination of it. We see this 
nowhere more clearly than in his tirade against Reason, which gives rise to the reading that 
the orders of the image are a product of the Enlightenment: 
 
What is essential is that nothing escape the empire of meaning, the sharing of meaning. 
Certainly, behind all that, nothing speaks to us, neither the mad, nor the dead, nor 
children, nor savages, and fundamentally we know nothing of them, but what is 
essen tial is th at R easo n  save face, an d th at everyth in g escap e silen ce [… ] In  a w o rld b en t 
on doing nothing but speak, in a world assembled under the hegemony of signs of 
discourse, their silence weighs more and more heavily on our organisation of meaning.73 
 
T h e ‗em p ire o f m ean in g‘ an d th e im p o rtan ce ‗th at R easo n  save face, an d th at everyth in g 
escap e silen ce‘ directly co n trasts w ith  th e L yo tardian  co n cep tio n  o f th e p o stm o dern as 
essentially an ethical stance towards the silent Other. It is thus possible to argue, given that 
L yo tard‘s stan ce o n  th e p o stm o dern  is so  clo sely allied to  th e K an tian  co n cep tio n  o f th e 
sublime, that Baudrillard has little, if anything to do with the sublime. This, however, is not 
th e case. C ro w th er, fo r exam p le, sees in  th e B audrillardian  h yp erreal a sen se o f K an t‘s idea 
of excess: 
 
T h e b o un daries b etw een  self an d w o rld are disso lved in  th e ‗p lay‘ o f sign s an d 
representations. We have an excess of images an d sign s. [… It] is sub lim e in  th e K an tian  
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sense. The sensory and imaginative excess can be comprehended as an idea. It revivifies 
our capacity for rational insight –  our very ability to create and discover meaning.74 
 
C ro w th er‘s readin g o f B audrillard  argues that the hyperreal is sublime because of its status as 
something that exceeds the boundaries of the self. It can be comprehended only through 
‗o ur cap acity fo r ratio n al in sigh t‘. T h us, fo r C ro w th er, th e h yp erreal is sub lim e p recisely 
because we can somehow imagine the existence of this hyperreal: a concept exists that allows 
us to grasp something that is essentially out of our reach, a concept that is itself excessive.  
C ro w th er‘s argum en t cen tres up o n  th e idea th at w e can  disco ver m ean in g in  th e 
hyperreal –  th at w h ich  resists all m ean in g. B audrillard‘s sub lim e do es n o t stem  fro m  th e 
production of meaning, however, because it is the very denial of meaning implicit in the 
hyperreal that creates the sublime feeling. Baudrillard, rather than talking about the 
‗p ro ductio n  o f m ean in g‘, argues th at ‗p ro ductio n ‘ –  the economy of signification –  has 
o vertaken  ‗m ean in g‘, th us leavin g th e p h rase ‗p ro ductio n  o f m ean in g‘ o b so lete; in  th e fo urth -
o rder n etw o rk o f im ages, th ere is o n ly ‗p ro ductio n ‘. A lth o ugh  B audrillard‘s dealin gs w ith  th e 
notion of excess are indeed sublime, it is more accurate to say that the Kantian sublime 
observed in Baudrillard has very little connection to the world of meaning and much more 
to  do  w ith  its lack. It is a p erfect exam p le o f ‗Das Unform‘ b ecause th e h yp erreal is ‗a 
liquidatio n  o f all referen tials‘.75  
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Nihilism and the Baudrillardian Sublime 
Baudrillard discusses nihilism in relation to the hyperreal in the last chapter of Simulacra and 
Simulation, in which he refutes any connection between the hyperreal and nihilism. He even 
refutes th e p o ssib ility o f n ih ilism  itself, sayin g ‗in  fact, n ih ilism  is im p o ssib le b ecause it is still 
a desperate but determined theory, an imaginary of the end, a weltanschauung [world-view, 
life-philosophy] o f catastro p h e‘.76 D iscussin g B audrillard‘s M arxist ro o ts, h o w ever, A n th o n y 
K in g w rites th at ‗In  th e co n text o f th is p o stm o dern  o rder, h e h as ren o un ced all critique an d, 
in stead, o p ted fo r n ih ilism ‘.77 K in g argues th at B audrillard‘s rejectio n  o f critical referral (the 
idea th at critics can  co m m en t up o n  an d alter th e ‗real w o rld‘ b y o b servatio n  an d argum en t) 
and subsequent turn towards an internalised ouroburotic technique (refuting the meaning 
and intentions of academic discourse within the framework of academic discourse), gives rise 
to  n ih ilism . T h is is w h at N o rris h as term ed ‗B audrillard‘s style o f p uckish  n ih ilist ab an do n ‘.78 
It is n ih ilistic b ecause th e critical referral to w ards an  extern al ‗reality‘ o r ‗h yp erreality‘ m arks 
the rise of a second-order image, in  w h ich  ‗A n  excrescen t system  o f in terp retatio n  develo p s 
w ith  n o  relatio n s to  its o b ject‘: th e n ature o f academ ic disco urse, ‗th e dialectical stage, th e 
critical stage‘ is ‗em p ty‘.79  
A lth o ugh  K in g is co rrect in  h is in terp retatio n  o f B audrillard‘s n ih ilism, his justification 
fo r B audrillard‘s ‗adm issio n ‘ o f n ih ilism  is ten uo us. H e cites B audrillard‘s ‗co n fessio n ‘: ‗I am  
a terrorist and nihilist in theory as the others are with their weapons. Theoretical violence, 
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n o t truth , is th e o n ly reso urce left us‘.80 However, King neglects to inform the reader of the 
co n ditio n al p h rasin g o f th is ‗adm issio n ‘: 
 
If being a nihilist is carrying, to the unbearable limit of hegemonic systems, this radical 
trait of derision and violence, this challenge that the system is summoned to answer 
through its own death, then I am a nihilist in theory as the others are with their weapons. 
Theoretical violence, not truth, is the only resource left us.81 (My emphasis) 
 
If nihilism is the radical destruction of the inherited social order (as with the Russian 
Nihilists) then Baudrillard is a nihilist. Baudrillard would disagree with this because, after he 
h as m ade h is alleged co n fessio n  o f n ih ilism , h e w rites, ‗such  a sen tim en t is uto p ian . B ecause 
it would be beautiful to be a nihilist, if their were still radicality –  as it would be nice to be a 
terro rist, if death , in cludin g th at o f th e terro rist, still h ad m ean in g‘.82 This inability to be 
terroristic –  the untenability of nihilism –  also  ap p ears w h en  h e discusses th e ‗B eaub o rg 
E ffect‘: ‗N o thing. The void that would have signified the disappearance of any culture of 
meaning and aesthetic sentiment. But this is still too romantic and destructive, this void 
w o uld still h ave h ad value as a m asterp iece o f an ticulture‘.83 Baudrillard rejects any possibility 
o f sum m o n in g th e system  ‗to  its o w n  death ‘ b ecause o f ‗sim ulacral do ub lin g‘ in  th e o rders o f 
th e im age. B audrillard w rites th at ‗T h e im agin ary o f D isn eylan d is n eith er true n o r false, it is 
a deterrence machine set up in order to rejuvenate the fiction of the real in the opposite 
cam p ‘, m ean in g th at D isn eylan d o n ly exists to  m ake th e ‗real w o rld‘ lo o k serio us, an d th at 
th e ‗real w o rld‘ o n ly exists to  m ake D isn eylan d lo o k ‗fun ‘.84 This reciprocal relationship, this 
‗do ub lin g o f th e p ro cess o f w o rk‘, transfers to academic discourse, which only exists in order 
                                                 
80 King, p. 97. 
81 Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation, p. 163. 
82 Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation, p. 163. 
83 Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation, p. 164. 
84 Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation, p. 13. 
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to justify the hegemonic regime of culture, which in turn only exists to justify the existence 
of academic discourse –  we are essentially trapped in the hegemonic ideology of simulation.85 
Having said this, Baudrillard is a nihilist, although not in the manner that King ascribes 
to him. Where King argues that Baudrillard is a nihilist because he is a terrorist, it is actually 
b ecause h e is n o t. W h ere K in g w rites th at, ‗T h ro ugh  th e in furiatin g b ew ilderment the later 
texts [o f B audrillard] cause th em , th o se readers w ill b e driven  to  o p p o se h yp erreality itself‘, it 
is th ro ugh  th e ‗in furiatin g b ew ilderm en t‘ th at th ey w ill co m e to  un derstan d th at th ey can n o t 
oppose hyperreality.86 Where King dismisses Baudrillard‘s terro rism  as ‗self-delusio n ‘ 
b ecause it ‗h alts th e dialectical p ro cess at its first an d m o st in adequate in itial p o in t‘, th is is 
precisely the reason why Baudrillard is not a terrorist and cannot be read as such.87 King 
misunderstands Baudrillard, even through he is right to call Baudrillard a nihilist. Baudrillard 
is a nihilist by not explaining hyperreality, by not conforming to academic syllogisms to create 
meaning, by not creating a dialectical argument. Rather, Baudrillard realises the futility of 
discussin g co n cep ts such  as ‗n ih ilism ‘ an d ‗th e h yp erreal‘ w ith in  academ ic disco urse by the act 
of discussing them, suggesting that it is through its performance that the hyperreal comes to be 
recognised. Baudrillard recycles his own argument to come back upon itself: 
 
The Gordian knot can at least be cut. The Möbius strip, if one divides it, results in a 
supplementary spiral without the reversibility of structures being resolved (here the 
reversible continuity of hypotheses). Hell of simulation, which is no longer one of 
torture, but of the subtle, maleficent, elusive twist of meaning.88 
 
                                                 
85 Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation, p. 27. 
86 King, p. 97 
87 King, p. 101. 
88 Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation, pp. 17-18. 
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W h ere critics exp ect to  b e ab le to  cut B audrillard‘s argum en t, all th ey get is th e ‗sub tle, 
m aleficen t, elusive tw ist o f m ean in g‘ o f th e M ö b ius strip . T h e n ih ilism  o f Baudrillard is 
nowhere more apparent than in this cyclicism: 
 
Hypersimilitude was equivalent to murder of the original, and thus to a pure non-
meaning. Any classification of signification, any modality of meaning can thus be 
destroyed simply by logically being elevated to the nth power –  pushed to the limit, it is 
as if all truth  sw allo w ed its o w n  criteria o f truth  as o n e ‗sw allo w s o n e‘s b irth  certificate‘ 
and lost all of its meaning.89 
 
Simulacra and Simulation is not a dissertation on the hyperreal, but a hyperreal artefact itself. 
By pushing the concept of the hyperreal to its nth power, Baudrillard effectively destroys it 
o f an y m ean in g. It is th e very act o f discussin g B audrillard‘s w ith in  th e fram ew o rk o f 
academic discourse that recreates the hyperreal and this is why Baudrillard ends Simulacra and 
Simulation o n  th e n o te o f seductio n : ‗T h is is w h ere seductio n  b egin s‘.90 By discussing the 
h yp erreal w ith in  ‗critical th eo ry‘ it is p recisely at th is p o in t th at th e h yp erreal b egin s: w e h ave 
been seduced by Baudrillard in to  justifyin g th e co n cep t‘s existen ce, in co rp o ratin g it w ith in  a 
self-referen tial academ ic fram e o f sign s w h ich  is h en cefo rth  to  b e kn o w n  (iro n ically) as ‗th e 
h yp erreal‘. T h e o n ly so lutio n  to  th is is to  n o t discuss it an d h ead to w ards th e ab sen t presence 
o f a text th at b y its very ab sen ce rein fo rces th e ‗do ub lin g o f w o rk‘ b y its n o n -inclusion, again 
leadin g to w ards ‗th e h yp erreal‘. T h is is co m p arab le to  N ietzsch e‘s defin itio n  o f n ih ilism  –  ‗the 
highest values devaluate themselves‘.91 Just as the rationality of the Enlightenment produces the 
‗o rders o f th e im age‘ th at destro y it, so  to o  B audrillard sub verts h is o w n  co n cep t o f th e 
hyperreal, and causes academia to subvert itself. 
                                                 
89 Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation, p. 108. 
90 Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation, p. 164. 
91 Nietzsche, The Will to Power, §2 (p. 9). 
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It is in this sense that Baudrillard is nihilistic and thus that the sublime observed is 
indeed a nihilistic sublime. Baudrillard, when discussing binary oppositions, theorises what 
th e o p p o site o f a ‗rem ain der‘ m ay b e, an d in  so  do in g arrives at a b lan k p o in t: ‗O n e can  say 
the right/the left, the same/the other, the majority/the minority, the crazy/the normal, etc. 
―  b ut th e rem ain der/ ? N o th in g o n  th e o th er side o f th e slash ‘.92 In the remainder, the 
origins of a truly nihilistic sublime become clear. It seems that nothing is opposed to the 
rem ain der (in  b o th  sen ses o f ‗n o th in g‘) an d yet th is b lan k sp ace, th is ‗rem ainder of the 
rem ain der‘, is n ih ilistic: 
 
And yet, what is on the other side of the remainder exists, it is even the marked term, 
the powerful moment, the privileged element in this strangely asymmetrical opposition, 
in this structure that is not one. But this marked term has no name. It is anonymous, it 
is unstable and without definition. Positive, but only the negative gives it the force of 
reality. In a strict sense, it cannot be defined except as the remainder of the remainder.93 
 
There is no opposite of the remainder, but only the remainder itself. No longer is it a case of 
everything versus nothing (belief versus nihilism) but the remainder versus nothing, the structure 
w ith o ut structure, an  ‗an o n ym o us‘, ‗un stab le‘ term  w ith  ‗n o  n am e‘ th at is ‗w ith o ut d efin itio n ‘: 
n o th in gn ess. T h e gen ius o f B audrillard‘s th esis in  Simulacra and Simulation thus resides in the 
fact that nihilism is itself an untenable position and that Baudrillard cannot be a nihilist. 
H o w ever, it is p recisely b ecause B audrillard‘s n ih ilistic position is untenable that it is 
nihilistic: it is a position he cannot take and yet does, and in taking the position, it means he 
can n o t. B audrillard‘s argum en t itself b eco m es th e reflexive p arado x, th e kn o t th at can n o t b e 
cut, part of the formulation o f w h at is a ‗p o stm o dern  n ih ilism ‘. 
                                                 
92 Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation, p. 143. 
93 Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation, p. 143. 
 114 
4. 
Postmodern Nihilism 
 
 
So far, this thesis has excavated the link between the historical development of nihilism and 
the sublime in order to establish how these two concepts interact within postmodernism. 
There are oth er elem en ts vital to  fo rm ulatin g ‗p o stm o dern  n ih ilism ‘, h o w ever. A lth o ugh  
these still revolve around the play between nihilism and the sublime, the focus here is upon 
the way in which these appear throughout recent critical and literary theory, and the impact 
this has on understanding the ideological function of postmodern nihilism. The two most 
significant theories in this debate are poststructuralism and postmodernism –  those literary 
theories/philosophies most commonly associated with late-twentieth-century nihilism. 
Nihilism, postmodernism, and poststructuralism are frequently confused, primarily because 
of the way in which they each construct truth. The aletheologies connected with 
postmodernism and poststructuralism –  relativism and pluralism –  reject the idea of absolute 
truth and so, to many critics, postmodernism and poststructuralism must be nihilistic. 
Although both reject the idea of absolute truth, the manner in which this rejection occurs 
differs from nihilism and thus postmodernism and poststructuralism  are ‗n ih ilistic‘ o n ly in  
certain senses of the term, not generically. 
Rather than being nihilistic themselves, both postmodernism and poststructuralism 
affect how nihilism is constructed. Seen in this way, postmodern nihilism can be understood 
in much the same way as Jeffrey Nealon constructs postmodernism in Double Reading. For 
Nealon, deconstruction affects how postmodernism is constructed and hence Double 
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Reading‘s sub title: ‗p o stm o dern ism  after deco n structio n ‘. In  relatio n  to  n ih ilism , th e 
construction of a postmodern nihilism is therefore conditioned by both poststructuralism 
and postmodernism: nihilism after ‗p o stm o dern ism  after deco n structio n ‘. T h is creates a 
postmodern formulation of nihilism that is as indebted to deconstructive practice as it is to 
th e ‗sub lim e p o stm o dern ‘. P o stm o dern  n ih ilism  m arks th e p o in t at w h ich  n ih ilism  b eco m es 
reflexive, deco n structin g its o w n  axio m s, an d is th us equally a ‗deco n structive‘ o r ‗reflexive‘ 
nihilism. Furthermore, this demonstrates an extension, rather than invalidation, of the 
in terp retatio n s o f n ih ilism  m ade b y N ietzsch e an d H eidegger, w h ere th eir ‗readin gs‘ o f 
nihilism are deconstructed when located within (as opposed to outside) nihilism. 
Such a formulation of nihilism is inadvertently epitomised b y E ugen e O ‘N eill in  A 
L on g D ay’s Jou rn ey in to N ight (1956), when the character of Edmund desires a place in which, 
‗E veryth in g lo o ked an d so un ded un real. N o th in g w as w h at it is‘. H e co n tin ues, ‗T h at‘s w h at 
I wanted –  to be alone with myself in a world where the truth is untrue and life can hide 
fro m  itself‘.1 This suggests nihilism (and especially postmodern nihilism) in a number of 
w ays. ‗N o th in g w as w h at it is‘ suggests n o t o n ly th at n ih ilism  is n o th in gn ess b ut also  th at its 
self-identity is invalidated; ‗to  b e alo n e w ith  m yself‘ suggests a dual, alm o st Sartrean , 
co n scio usn ess w ith in  n ih ilism ; an d ‗life can  h ide fro m  itself‘ suggests th e H eideggerian  
m o m en t in  w h ich  th e b ein g o f n ih ilism  (an )n ih iliates its o w n  b ein g. F in ally, th e p h rase ‗truth  
is un true‘ indicates a point of convergence between aletheology and nihilism because 
nihilism is predicated upon the rejection of truth. Although it implies a formulation of 
n ih ilism  th at is itself un true (a ‗p o stm o dern ‘ n ih ilism ), it sh o w s h o w  n ih ilism ‘s rejectio n  o f 
the truth differs from the rejection of truth seen in relativism and pluralism. 
 
                                                 
1 E ugene O ‘N eill, A  L on g D ay’s Jou rn ey in to N ight (London: Jonathan Cape, 1990), IV (p. 113). 
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‘T ru th  is u n tru e’: N ih ilism , R elativism , an d  P lu ralism  
The importance of relativism and pluralism to twentieth-century theory cannot be 
overemphasised. Although relativism and pluralism existed before the twentieth century, 
they became important at that point for two reasons. To some, they were part of the 
progress of nihilism in which the (moral) truth was devalued; to others, they were the 
remedy to moral absolutism (i.e. nihilism), which is the postmodern or poststructuralist 
perception of relativism and pluralism. This is again implicated with the Holocaust. Where 
the former perspective argues that the Holocaust occurred because of the rise of relativism 
and pluralism (there was no absolute moral authority to prevent it), the latter argues that 
their ascent was not until after the Holocaust, due to the subsequent rejection of 
auth o ritarian ism  an d to talitarian ism . G en e B lo cker argues th at ‗A lw ays in  th e h isto ry o f 
philosophy unity, permanence, eternality, completeness and rationality are grouped together 
and opposed to multiplicity, change, sensuous desire and the temporal, partial, and 
defective‘, alth o ugh  th ere is a p artial sh ift w ith in  th e tw en tieth  cen tury fro m  n egative 
in terp retatio n s o f relativism  an d p luralism  (in dicated b y ‗defective‘) to w ards m o re p o sitive 
readin gs in  w h ich  ‗p erm an en ce, etern ality, co m p leten ess an d ratio n ality‘ b eco m e n egative.2 
R elativism  an d p luralism  can  b o th  b e defin ed b y T o n y Jackso n ‘s succin ct summary of 
relativism : ‗W h at m atters m o st ab o ut relativistic th in kin g, esp ecially in  th e co n text o f 
poststructuralism, is that it always admits, one way or another, the paradoxical truth that 
th ere is n o  ab so lute truth ‘.3 This understanding of the truth –  ‗th ere is n o  ab so lute truth ‘ –  
determines both relativism and pluralism, and the distinction between them is subtle. 
Relativism argues that truth is relative because although truth exists, it is relative to your 
                                                 
2 Gene Blocker, The Meaning of Meaninglessness (Belgium: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974), p. 54. 
3 Tony Jackso n, ‗N ih ilism , R elativism , an d L iterary T heo ry‘, SubStance, 24:3 (78) (1995), 29-48 (p. 30). 
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p o sitio n . O n e ‗truth ‘ is co n tin gen t up o n  its relationship to all other appearances of truth 
(both spatial and temporal). Pluralism is an extension of relativism where all truths are 
equally valid and applicable even if they are mutually exclusive. This raises the issue of 
‗incommensurability‘, w h ich  states that certain forms of the truth cannot be directly 
compared because there is no common frame of reference. Whereas relativism states that 
there is no need to compare formulations of the truth (they are all relatively true), pluralism 
states that all forms of truth are equally true but that some do not fit together: they are 
incommensurable. 
Relativism and pluralism can be illustrated with a fence painted white on one side and 
black on the other. Observer A might say that the fence is white (if he is stood on that side) 
and be relatively but not absolutely true. To observer B, on the other side of the fence, there is 
no way of gauging the accuracy of this statement. He could (relatively) truthfully say that A is 
lying because the fence is (relatively) b lack. T o  un derstan d th e ‗n ature‘ o f th e fen ce, A and B 
both have to trust that the other is telling the truth. The différend [dispute, conflict, 
dissension] emerges when A and B disagree because although both are true, their arguments 
are incommensurable: o n e uses ‗w h ite‘ to  defin e h is argum en t w h ile th e o th er uses ‗b lack‘. 
Pluralism, in contrast to relativism, is observer C who is sitting on the fence (a traditional 
poststructural or postmodern position): to him the fence is both black and white and both A 
and B are true. In absolute truth, only C is true; in relative and pluralist truth, all are true. The 
differen ce b etw een  ‗relative‘ an d ‗p luralist‘ em erges fro m  th eir ‗relative‘ p o sitio n s: relativism  
is based upon a relative microcosmic position of A and B, and relies upon trust to understand 
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th e m acro co sm . P luralism  exists ‗ab o ve‘ b o th  A and B, and calls them both true: it is 
macrocosmic.4 
This explains why relativism and pluralism are often used synonymously in relation to 
poststructuralism and postmodern ism , an d w h y Jackso n ‘s defin itio n  o f relativism  ap p lies to  
pluralism also. Although postmodernism is most commonly associated with pluralism and 
poststructuralism with relativism, such boundaries are fluid because they at no point involve 
a movement away from the localised, or equivalent, truth-processes that postmodernism and 
poststructuralism generate. This also explains why both poststructuralism and 
postmodernism have been called nihilistic: they have devalued the concept of absolute truth. 
This is inaccurate b ecause ‗T o  argue th at it is ab so lutely true th at th ere is n o  ab so lute truth  is 
n o t to  argue th at th ere is ab so lutely n o  truth ‘.5 If both relativism and pluralism deny any 
form of absolute truth, and if nihilism is the absolute denial of truth, then nihilism cannot be 
equated with either relativism or pluralism. The difference is between relativism and 
p luralism  arguin g ‗th ere is n o  absolute truth ‘, an d n ih ilism  arguin g th at ‗th ere is absolutely no 
truth ‘: relativism  an d p luralism  b o th  claim  th at there is some form of truth possible, whilst 
nihilism claims that there is no such thing as truth. In relation to our metaphysical fence, a 
n ih ilist w o uld claim  th at all th e o b servers are ‗un true‘ b ecause th e fen ce is n o t ‗b lack‘, ‗w h ite‘, 
o r ‗b lack an d w h ite‘. T h is o rigin ates in  th e co m p ariso n  b etw een  relative truth s –  nihilism 
uses A to disprove B and C, B to disprove A and C, and C to disprove A and B –  and 
therefore implies that nihilism is actually a form of misplaced relativism. Likewise, it is 
diametrically o p p o sed to  p luralism  in  th e sen se th at, w h ere p luralism  claim s th at ‗ab so lutely 
                                                 
4 T h e use o f ‗m acroco sm ic‘ co uld b e in ferred to  m ean  a m etan arrative, alth o ugh  w h at th is actually m ean s is th at 
all microcosmic truths are placed at the same level within a macrocosmic structure. It is therefore not the 
application of one macrocosmic truth to validate or invalidate microcosmic truths (metadiscourse) but the 
elevatio n  o f all m icroco sm ic truth s to  a m acroco sm ic level (a ‗sp h ere o f discourse‘). 
5 Jackson, p. 37. 
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everyth in g is true‘, n ih ilism  claim s th at ‗ab so lutely n o th in g is true‘. In  fact, extrem e 
formulations of nihilism would argue that the fence did not exist at all. 
This relatio n  b etw een  n ih ilism , relativism , an d p luralism  is clear in  G o udsb lo m ‘s 
defin itio n  o f th e ‗n ih ilist p ro b lem atic‘, in  w h ich  p luralism  gives rise to  n ih ilism : 
 
The co-existence of truths only becomes problematic when one is prepared to compare 
and assess them as equals. Then the arguments pro and contra assume a new cogency, 
with the possible result that one begins to doubt the validity of claims of any of the 
parties.6 
 
This places nihilism within a realm of choice: having looked at the truths on offer in society, 
a nihilist then proceeds to reject all of them, for each have an equal weighting. Thus, 
pluralism and relativism –  th e ‗co -existen ce o f truth s‘ –  lead to nihilism, although it is only a 
possibility: 
 
The nihilist problematic is within many people‘s reach . T o  th o se w h o  h ave lo st track o f 
the truth amid a multiplicity of options it is a command to reject all current truths; to 
others it offers a liberation from the prevailing norms and a rationale for exercising this 
option. It can lead to despair or tranquillity, to tragic faith or laconic disbelief.7 
 
N ih ilists h ave ‗lo st track o f th e truth  am id a m ultip licity o f o p tio n s‘. T h is fo rm ulatio n  o f 
nihilism (in relation to pluralism) argues that it is the inability to find truth, a lack of truth. In 
comparison, Blocker argues that nihilism and meaninglessness originate in the rejection of 
truth , seen  in  h is discussio n  o f th e differen ce b etw een  ‗p ro jective‘ an d ‗n o n -p ro jective‘ 
meaning: 
                                                 
6 Johan Goudsblom, Nihilism and Culture (Oxford: Blackwell, 1980), p. 92. 
7 Goudsblom, p. 142. 
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There is nothing tragic simply in the realisation that meaning is projection; this becomes 
tragic only where it means, as it does for many of us in the 20th century, that meaning is 
not nonprojective. It is only by contrast with the supposed ideal of nonprojective meaning 
that the realisation that meaning is a form of projection has the tragic consequences it 
has for many people today. Without this ideal, meaninglessness would simply be the 
realisation that the meaningful world of everyday experience is an interpreted world, a 
human accomplishment. Without the nonprojective ideal of meaning, this is what 
constitutes a meaningful world, not what denies meaning to that world.8 
 
Blocker argues that truth is what we make it and that this is in no way a bad thing. He 
implies, like Nietzsche, that nihilism comes about because of not accepting that meaning is 
projected onto the world.9 T h is search  fo r a ‗h ard co re o f n o n p ro jected m ean in g un derlyin g 
th e deceitful w o rld o f o rdin ary ap p earan ces‘ results in  th e co n clusio n  th at ‗th e w o rld is 
th o ro ugh ly m ean in gless‘, th at is, n ih ilism ‘s search for absolute truth rejects any possibility for 
relative or pluralist truths.10 
Like Goudsblom and Blocker, Jackson also argues that nihilism is a misplaced 
fo rm ulatio n  o f th e truth , alth o ugh  in  h is argum en t, as ‗relativism  m isco m p reh en ded‘. T h is is 
because o f th e ‗leap ‘ b etw een  th e ‗P lato n ic so lidity‘ o f truth  an d a ‗n ih ilistic n o th in gn ess‘ th at 
is a result o f relativism  b ut is n o t a ‗lo gically n ecessary co n clusio n ‘. H e argues th at ‗w h erever 
the leap occurs, it reveals an inadequate understanding of the meaning of relativism: we may 
in  fact defin e n ih ilism  as relativism  m isco m p reh en ded in  th is sp ecific w ay‘.11 Unlike 
G o udsb lo m , an d like B lo cker, Jackso n  argues th at n ih ilism  fun ctio n s as a ‗rejectio n ‘ o f truth , 
rath er th an  as a ‗lack‘ o f truth : 
                                                 
8 Blocker, p. xiii. 
9 B lo cker w o uld disagree w ith  th is in terp retatio n  o f N ietzsch e, b ecause h e sees N ietzsch e as ‗o b viously 
co n tradicto ry‘. T h e differen ce stem s fro m  th e fact th at B lo cker claim s th at N ietzsch e ‗co ncluded th at 
kn o w ledge w as a m ean in gless illusio n ‘ w hereas N ietzsche actually celeb rated th e illusory n ature o f m ean in g (see  
Blocker, pp. 82-83 and page 30 of this thesis). 
10 Blocker, p. 91. 
11 Jackson, p. 37. 
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The truth in general could only be evaluated as a lie if there were somewhere some 
realm of true truth (i.e. Platonic truth) in relation to which the truth that we live with 
could be found to be false. Falsehood can only be determined, pragmatically, in relation 
to some specific realm of operative truth.12 
 
Nihilism can only function as a kind of generic falsehood that can only be determined in 
relation to some realm of truth. These three critics all implicate nihilism with a search for 
truth that is frustrated and argue that nihilism is either miscomprehension or ignorance of 
relativist and pluralist theories of truth. 
There is more to the relationship between nihilism, poststructuralism, and 
postmodernism than merely aletheology, however, because it is the ways in which 
postmodernism and poststructuralism reject truth that determine their nihilistic tendencies. 
For example, humanist critics reject the textuality of postmodernism and poststructuralism, 
religious critics reject their secularity, and social-reform critics reject th eir ‗th eo reticality‘ an d 
political conservatism –  for these critics, therefore, both postmodernism and 
poststructuralism are nihilistic. Although these criticisms are accurate in the loosest possible 
sense (nihilism as the negation of an existing ideology), in specific ways they are misleading. 
In  o rder to  fo rm ulate a ‗p o stm o dern  n ih ilism ‘, it is vital to  un co ver th e w ays in  w h ich  
nihilism, poststructuralism, and postmodernism interact at a local level, rather than merely 
generalising nihilism to such an extent that any philosophy could be considered nihilistic. 
 
                                                 
12 Jackson, p. 34. 
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‘N oth in g w as w h at it is’: N ih ilism  an d  P oststru ctu ralism  
Analyses of poststructuralism were (and are) dominated by its relationship to nihilism. Those 
theorists who disapprove of poststructuralism frequently call it nihilistic whereas those 
theorists who support poststructuralism argue that it is not nihilistic, and that it is in fact 
those structural biases within other theories that are in fact nihilistic. Nihilism is always 
negative in such readings, and what is in question is merely its application, not its 
characteristics. The relationship between nihilism and poststructuralism is often seen in 
relatio n  to  deb ates o ver n ih ilism , relativism , an d p luralism  as, fo r exam p le, in  N o rris‘ 
rejection of poststructuralism, which is worth quoting in full: 
 
And indeed, for all its talk of self-reflexivity and textual mise-en-abîme, post-structuralism 
is clearly caught on the horns of a familiar relativist dilemma when advancing its more 
assertive claims as regards the obsolescence of truth-values, the demise of enlightened 
(‗m eta-n arrative‘) disco urse, th e illusio n  o f referen tiality, etc. A t th e very least th ere is an  
element of self-disabling paradox –  a performative contradiction –  involved in these 
sweeping pronouncements that affect to underline the veridical status of any such 
utterance, their own (presumably) included. Of course this line of counter-argument has 
long been used against sceptics and relativists of various persuasions, from Socrates 
versus Protagoras to the current debate around canny rhetoricians like Richard Rorty and 
Stanley Fish. And the latter have always bounced back –  as now –  with some version of 
the standard knock-do w n  resp o n se: th at ‗truth ‘ is n o th in g m o re th an  a lan guage game, 
th e cultural ‗fo rm  o f life‘, th e in terp retative fram ew o rk o r co n cep tual sch em a w h ich  
happens to prevail at some particular time and place. In this sense one could argue that 
the new textualism is just an updated version of old relativism, with the difference that it 
goes more elaborate ways around –  or adopts more sophisticated strategies of textual 
deconstruction –  in order to make its otherwise familiar point.13 
 
N o rris argues th at w h ilst p o ststructuralism  th in ks it is arguin g ab o ut ‗self-reflexivity and 
textual mise-en-abîme‘, it is actually return in g to  an  ‗o th erw ise fam iliar p o in t‘ o f relativism  an d  
falling upon the same hurdles. The association of poststructuralism with relativism suggests 
n ih ilism  b ecause o f th e ‗self-disab lin g p arado x‘ an d ‗p erfo rm ative co n tradictio n ‘ im p licit 
                                                 
13 Christopher Norris, The Truth about Postmodernism (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), pp. 198-99. 
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within poststructural discourse –  how can it write that there is no possibility of meaning and 
hope to be understood? 
It is not simply a matter of pro and contra, however, because there are also debates 
about the appropriation of deconstruction –  what might be called the practical aspect of 
poststructuralism. Nealon, for example, argues that what critics frequently perceive to be 
deco n structio n  is n o t D errida‘s defin itio n  o f deco n structio n  at all, b ut rath er th e 
institutionalised literary criticism of Yale critics such as Paul de Man and Miller.14 There is 
therefore not only a distinction between deconstruction (praxis) and poststructuralism 
(th eo ry), b ut b etw een  ‗deco n structio n  as literary criticism ‘ an d ‗deco n structio n  as 
p h ilo so p h y‘. T h is is seen  w h en  N ealo n  w rites ‗G asch é attacks an d sub verts th is p ractice o f 
deconstructive literary criticism in defense o f deco n structio n  [… ] –  in  defen ce o f D errida‘s 
thought against those who (ab)use it by turning it into an unproblematic, nihilistic method for 
readin g literary texts‘.15 Deconstruction, as philosophy, suggests a way of thinking that 
problematises itself, and if we allow this distinction, then we must also allow that within 
deconstructive philosophy there will be very different interpretations.16 
Without resorting to a detailed examination of deconstruction, it is worth examining a 
few key points in the debate. Deconstruction, in its simplest incarnation, is a method of 
thinking about the construction of meaning through language. It attempts to reveal those 
structures that create meaning that are implicit in the structure of the text and inherent 
within language. To argue that deconstruction is nihilistic is not necessarily incorrect, 
although the current terms in the debate need to be reviewed: what is meant by 
                                                 
14 T h is is essen tially a sum m ary o f th e seco n d ch ap ter o f Jeffrey N ealo n ‘s Double Reading: Postmodernism after 
Deconstruction (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), pp. 22-49. 
15 Nealon, p. 24. 
16 See Nealon, p.27. 
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‗deco n structio n ‘ an d ‗n ih ilism ‘? T h o se sign ifiers th at are taken  to  b e stab le m ust b e 
deconstructed themselves before we can understand the connections between nihilism and 
deconstruction because deconstruction, like nihilism, is a problematic term in its own right. 
A working definition of deconstruction within literary studies would be the practice of 
reading a text according to poststructuralist principles. As such, deconstruction often stands 
accused of reducing a text to nothingness, and is more frequently interpreted as being 
‗destructio n ‘ th an  ‗de-co n structio n ‘. M eyer A b ram s argues th at p o ststructural th eo ry 
recreates th e text as ‗a vertical an d lateral reverb eratio n  fro m  sign  to  sign  o f gh o stly 
nonpresence emanating from no voice, intended by no one, referring to nothing, 
b o m b in atin g in  a vo id‘.17 He argues that deconstructive practice reduces all texts to 
nothingness, because deconstruction first creates everything as text and then de-textualises 
itself. This, for Abrams, is a totalising nothingness because all texts become identical under a 
deconstructive reading. Other critics have also perceived a nihilistic threat to literature within 
deconstructive practice. René Wellek, for example, argues that deconstruction is the new 
nihilism, destroying any potential for literature: 
 
No self, no author, no coherent work, no relation to reality, no correct interpretation, 
no distinction between art and nonart, fictional and expository writing, no value 
judgment, and finally no truth, but only nothingness –  these are negations that destroy 
literary studies.18 
 
These statements reveal the extent to which poststructuralism is associated with the 
destruction of a literary text and therefore nihilistic. It is perceived to replace the text with a 
                                                 
17 M . H . A b ram s, ‗T he D eco n structive A n gel‘, Critical Inquiry, 3 (1977), 425-38 (p. 431). 
18 R ené W ellek, ‗T h e N ew  N ih ilism  in  L iterary Studies‘, in  Aesthetics and the Literature of Ideas: Essays in Honor of 
A. Owen Aldridge, ed. by François Jost and Melvin J. Friedman (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1990), 
pp. 77-85 (p. 80). 
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vo id, m ean in g th at all texts are essen tially th e sam e. A s a result o f th is, ‗text‘ b eco m es 
meaningless and deconstruction becomes the literary study which destroys all literary studies. 
Wellek continues his analysis of deconstruction with the damning indictment that, of all 
literary th eo ries, ‗O n ly deco n structio n  is en tirely n egative‘.19 
Abrams and Wellek both agree that deconstructive reading reduces the quality of the 
text, removing the author, the reader, historical circumstance, and eventually the text itself. 
Their criticisms stem from an understanding of deconstruction that is entirely negative: by 
neutralising all the binary oppositions in the language of a text, the text is absented from 
itself. This process is repeated across all texts, and so literature, as the totality of all texts, is 
reduced to nothingness. Conversely, the other side of the critical divide argues that this 
perception of deconstruction is deeply flawed, because rather than deconstruction being 
about the destruction of th e text, it is ab o ut determ in in g th o se m etap h ysical ‗cen tres‘ o f th e 
text and decentring them. Mark Wigley argues: 
 
D eco n structio n  is [… ] un dersto o d as an  affirm ative ap p ro p riatio n  o f structures th at 
identifies structural flaws, cracks in the construction that have been systematically 
disguised, not in order to collapse those structures but, on the contrary, to demonstrate 
the extent to which the structures depend on both these flaws and the way in which 
they are disguised.20 
 
To Wigley, deconstruction is no t ‗en tirely n egative‘ b ut an  ‗affirm ative ap p ro p riatio n ‘. 
Jo n ath an  C uller‘s in terp retatio n  o f p o ststructuralism  is sim ilarly affirm ative: deco n structio n  
reveals ‗a ch ro m atic p len itude, a p layin g o f all p o ssib le n o tes in  all p o ssib le registers, a 
                                                 
19 Wellek, p. 83. 
20 M ark W igley, ‗T h e D o m esticatio n  o f th e H o use: D eco n structio n  after A rch itecture‘, in  Deconstruction and the 
Visual Arts: Art, Media, Architecture, ed. by Peter Brunette and David Wells, pp. 203-27 (p. 207). 
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saturation  o f sp ace‘ th at is ch aracterised b y a sen se o f p lay, n o t destructio n .21 Thus, 
argum en ts co n cern in g th e ‗n ih ilism ‘ o f deco n structio n  seem  to  revo lve aro un d th e exten t to  
which deconstruction is seen to negate existing methodologies –  it is only nihilistic if you 
believe in that methodology. 
O n e o f th e m o st im p o rtan t elem en ts o f deco n structio n  is p lay. T h is ‗p lay‘ is th e ‗p lay 
o f th e sign ifier‘ th ro ugh  w h at D errida calls différance, which implies both difference (signifiers 
gaining meaning in their difference from other signifiers) and deferral (signification acting as 
a chain, along which meaning is forever deferred). Roland Barthes defines this play as part of 
th e ‗infinity o f th e sign ifier‘: 
 
The infinity of the signifier refers not to some idea of the ineffable (the unnameable 
signified) but to that of a playing; the generation of the perpetual signifier (after the 
fashion of a perpetual calendar) in the field of the text (better, of which the text is the 
field) is realized not according to an organic process of maturation or a hermeneutic 
course of deepening investigation, but, rather, according to a serial movement of 
disconnections, overlappings, variations.22 
 
This definition of play is a positive perception of deconstruction, in which play is the most 
imp o rtan t elem en t o f a text. T h e ‗p erp etual sign ifier‘ do es n o t arise eith er fro m  an  ‗o rgan ic 
p ro cess o f m aturatio n ‘, w h ere m ean in g b eco m es clearer as th e reader m o ves th ro ugh  th e text 
(a syn tagm atic readin g), o r fro m  ‗a h erm en eutic co urse o f deep en in g in vestigatio n ‘, w h ere 
meaning becomes clearer in relation to close reading of certain parts of the text (a 
p aradigm atic readin g). In stead, it em erges fro m  th e p lay b etw een  th ese readin gs, in  th e ‗serial 
                                                 
21 Jo n ath an  C uller, ‗P ro lego m ena to  a T h eo ry of R eadin g‘, in  The Reader in the Text, ed. by Susan Suleiman and 
Inge Crosman (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), pp. 46-66 (p. 47). 
22 Roland Barthes, Image –  Music –  Text, trans. by Stephen Heath (London: Fontana, 1977), p. 158. 
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m o vem en t o f disco n n ectio n s‘ w h ere readin g is co n tin ually frustrated and meaning forever 
deferred. This is jouissance, the pleasure of reading that comes from the difficulty of the text. 
Not everybody agrees with this perception of play. To some, the poststructuralist 
interpretation of différance suggests that there is no meaning, and that it is therefore nihilistic. 
D errida w rites in  ‗L ivin g O n : Borderlines‘ th at ‗A  text is h en cefo rth  n o  lo n ger a fin ish ed  
corpus of writing, some content enclosed in a book or its margins, but a differential network, 
a fabric of traces referring endlessly to something other than itself, to other differential 
traces‘.23 This differential network seems to recreate the world as a text, supported by 
D errida‘s fam o us Il n ’y a pas de hors-texte [there is nothing outside of the text].24 This has 
frequen tly b een  in terp reted as suggestin g a ‗p riso n -h o use o f lan guage‘ in  w h ich  lan guage 
defines everything, a form of consciousness in which language creates the world around us. 
T h is is b ecause in  m uch  th e sam e w ay as L yo tard w rites th at w o rds ‗are always older than 
th o ugh ts‘, D errida w rites th at w e ‗th in k o n ly in  sign s‘.25 This suggests, to some critics, an 
in validatio n  o f ‗reality‘: ‗T h e do ctrin e o f th e ‗p riso n -h o use o f lan guage‘ is m an ifestly ab surd. 
It would reduce literature to a play of words with no meaning for people and society: it 
w o uld relegate it to  a m usty co rn er o f th e in tellectual un iverse‘.26 It is primarily for this 
reason that Derrida has been labelled a nihilist. 
                                                 
23 Jacques D errida, ‗L ivin g O n: Borderlines‘, in  Deconstruction and Criticism, ed. by Harold Bloom, pp. 75-176 (p. 
83). 
24 See Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, trans. by Gayatri Spivak (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1976), p. 163. 
25 Jean-François Lyotard, The Inhuman: Reflections on Time, trans. by Geoff Bennington and Rachel Bowlby 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991), p. 142; Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, trans. by Gayatri Spivak (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), p. 50. 
26 Wellek, p. 78. 
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It is ironic that Derrida has been labelled as such despite his insistence th at ‗P lay is 
alw ays p lay o f ab sen ce an d p resen ce‘.27 Poststructuralism is not concerned with absence, but 
with the interrelation and play between absence and presence. Miller interprets this as the fact 
th at ‗D eco n structio n  is n eith er n ih ilism  [ab sen ce] nor metaphysics [presence] but simply 
interpretation as such, the untangling of the inherence of metaphysics in nihilism and of 
n ih ilism  in  m etap h ysics b y w ay o f th e clo se readin g o f texts‘.28 Carr observes that this 
suggests ‗th at th e deco n structive critic operates from some privileged place, outside of either 
n ih ilism  o r m etap h ysics, calm ly p o in tin g o ut th e p arasitic relatio n sh ip  b etw een  th e tw o ‘.29 
Sh e allo w s M iller to  ‗w rite b ack‘ an d clarify h is earlier statem en t: ‗D eco n structio n  do es n o t 
provide an escape from nihilism, nor from metaphysics, nor from their uncanny inherence in 
one another. There is no escape. It does, however, move back and forth within this 
in h eren ce‘.30 T h is is seen  w h ere D errida w rites th at h e tries to  keep  h im self ‗at th e lim it o f 
philo so p h ical disco urse‘, alth o ugh  h e do es ‗n o t b elieve th at so m eday it w ill b e p o ssib le to  
sim p ly escap e m etap h ysics‘.31 C arr alleges, in  resp o n se to  th is, th at M iller p lays ‗w ith  th e 
term s in  a dizzyin g an d co n fusin g fash io n ‘ b ecause h e argues th at ‗th ese are two names for 
essentially the same thing –  h um an  th o ugh t‘.32 T h is suggests th at, co n trary to  C arr‘s 
hypothesis, nihilism is anything but banal.  
In fact, deconstruction reveals the intricate connections between nihilism and the 
sublime, seen nowhere more clearly th an  w h en  D errida h im self discusses ‗p lay‘. D errida 
                                                 
27 Jacques Derrida, Writing and Difference, trans. by Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997), p. 
292. 
28 J. H illis M iller, ‗C ritic as H o st‘, in  Deconstruction and Criticism, ed. by Harold Bloom and others (New York: 
Seabury Press, 1979), pp. 217-53 (p. 230). 
29 Karen L. Carr, The Banalization of Nihilism: Twentieth-Century Responses to Meaninglessness (Albany: SUNY Press, 
1992), p. 107. 
30 M iller, ‗C ritic as H o st‘, p . 231. Q uo ted in  C arr, p . 107. 
31 Jacques Derrida, Positions, trans. by Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), pp. 6, 17. 
32 Carr, p. 107. 
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characterises play positively, although his use of Nietzsche is indeed suggestive of nihilism to 
some: 
 
We must affirm this, in the sense which Nietzsche puts affirmation into play, in a certain 
laughter and a certain step of the dance.33 
 
Turned towards the lost or impossible presence of the absent origin, this structuralist 
thematic of broken immediacy is therefore the saddened, negative, nostalgic, 
Rousseauistic side of the thinking whose other side would be the Nietzschean 
affirmation, that is the joyous affirmation of play of the world and of the innocence of 
becoming, the affirmation of a world of signs without fault, without truth, and without 
origin.34 
 
This celebration suggests that poststructuralism is not nihilistic because it accepts, and 
celebrates, the projective nature of meaning. This is relativism, not nihilism, and as such 
realises the performativity of its own axioms. This also reveals that deconstructive play is 
sublime, where rather th an  b ein g th e ‗sadden ed, n egative, n o stalgic‘ search  fo r n o n p ro jective 
m ean in g, it is th e ‗jo yo us affirm atio n ‘ o f p ro jective m ean in g. W h ereas N ietzsch e argues th at 
th is affirm atio n  is ‗m y Dionysian world of the eternally self-creating, the eternally self-
destro yin g‘, im p lyin g a ten den cy to w ards co n flict, D erridan  p lay suggests ‗th e in n o cen ce o f 
becoming, the affirmation of a world of signs without fault, without truth, and without 
o rigin ‘.35 Rather than propose a cycle of birth and death, of becoming, Being, then 
unbecoming, Derrida proposes a world (of signification) in which it is only ever becoming, 
and never reaches the stage of being at which conflict would start. 
                                                 
33 Jacques Derrida, Margins of Philosophy, trans. by Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), p. 27. 
34 Derrida, Writing and Difference, p. 292. 
35 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power, trans. by Walter Kaufman and R. J. Hollingdale (New York: Vintage, 
1968), §1067 (p. 550). 
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The relationship between nihilism and metaphysics that deconstruction excavates 
suggests Jo h n  B o ly‘s in terp retatio n  o f th e ‗reductive‘ m o m en t in  p h en o m en o lo gy. B o ly 
defines this in Husserlian terms, the eidetic p h ase in  w h ich  ‗p h en o m en a are released, so  far as 
this is possible, into a preflective and preconceptual mode, as pure perceptions still awaiting 
th e activity o f m ediatio n ‘ an d th e transcendental p h ase, w h ich  ‗select[s] an d arran ge[s] a 
p o ten tially in fin ite sem an tic p o ten tial in to  actual m ean in gs‘.36 R eductio n  fun ctio n s in  B o ly‘s 
argum en t as th e ‗co n tin uo us in terp lay b etw een  en ergy an d o rd er, dyn am ism  an d system ‘, as 
control and entropy within the semantic system. Boly argues that without the transcendental 
p h ase, ‗th e eidetic p h ase w o uld b eco m e in co h eren t an d lap se in to  sp eech less n ih ilism ‘.37 This 
is relevant to deconstruction because Boly feels that Derrida proposes the eidetic at the 
exp en se o f th e tran scen den tal; D errida ‗reacts to  an y fo rm al, o rgan izin g structure as if it w ere 
ipso facto a clo sed system ‘. T h is results in  ‗a sterile dualism , ch aracteristic o f deco n structio n , 
between anarch y an d tyran n y, ran do m n ess an d determ in ism ‘.38 Boly argues that, in the desire 
for a completely open system, Derrida absolutises phenomenology and tends towards the 
‗sp eech less n ih ilism ‘ o f th e p urely eidetic p h ase. H o w ever, D errida argues th at o n e can n o t 
escape metaphysics, thereby realising the impossibility of a purely eidetic phase: if, as we 
h ave seen , w e can  o n ly ‗th in k in  sign s‘, th en  an y h um an  un derstan din g o f a p reco n cep tual 
p h ase is o b vio usly im p o ssib le. T h is suggests rath er th at B o ly‘s o p p o sition (via Husserl) 
between the eidetic and transcendental is exactly that moment which deconstruction seeks to 
find in the opposition between nihilism (the eidetic) and metaphysics (the transcendental). 
If Derrida accepts that deconstruction is finally part of the metaphysical/nihilistic 
opposition, then this implies that deconstruction is indeed nihilistic because it seeks to 
                                                 
36 Jo h n  R . B o ly, ‗N ih ilism  A side: D errida‘s D ebate o ver In ten tio n al M o dels‘, Philosophy and Literature, 9:2 (1985), 
152-65 (p. 153). 
37 Boly, p. 153. 
38 Boly, p. 154. 
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subvert the metaphysical system. This would be a misreading, however, because there is a 
doubling-back within deconstruction: 
 
Deconstruction cannot limit itself or proceed immediately to a neutralization: it must, by 
means of a double gesture, a double science, a double writing, practice an overturning of 
the classical opposition and a general displacement of the system. It is only on this 
condition that deconstruction will provide itself the means with which to intervene in the 
field of oppositions that it criticizes, which is also a field of non-discursive forces.39 
 
Deconstruction can only neutralise the text as the first part of the deconstructive process: it 
m ust alw ays b e fo llo w ed b y ‗a gen eral displacement o f th e system ‘. M o st critics o f 
deconstruction omit this second stage in their critiques of deconstruction, thereby omitting 
its very purpose. The first phase is often argued to be th e raisin g o f th e ‗traditio n ally 
den igrated p o le o f w h atever o p p o sitio n  is un der co n sideratio n ‘ w h ilst th e seco n d p h ase is 
th e rein scrip tio n  o f th is o p p o sitio n  ‗w ith in  th e field o f an  ―un decidab le‖ th ird term , o n e 
which usually retains the old, denigrated n am e (e.g. ―w ritin g‖), th ereb y rem ain in g w ith in  th e 
terms of the opposition yet warding off every attempt to read it as a simple dialectical 
sub latio n  o f th e tw o ‘.40 This suggests that deconstruction can indeed mediate between 
metaphysics and nihilism without being nihilistic, although the impossibility of figuring the 
‗un decidab le‘ th ird term  in  th is m ediatio n  suggests a p o in t at w h ich  deco n structive p ractice 
in variab ly un do es itself. D errida w rites th at ‗T ruth , un veilin g, illum in atio n  are n o  lo n ger 
decided in the appropriation of the truth of being, but are cast into its bottomless abyss as 
non-truth , veilin g, an d d issim ulatio n ‘.41 Here, deconstruction deconstructs itself, as Norris 
                                                 
39 Derrida, Margins of Philosophy, p. 329. 
40 Stephen Adam Schwartz, ‗T h e D eco n structive Im perative‘, Modern Language Notes, 105:4 (1990), 857-74 (pp. 
861-62). 
41 Jacques Derrida, S pu rs: N ietzsche’s S tyles, trans. by Barbara Harlow (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1979), p. 119. 
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h as suggested, b ecause it can n o t ‗truly‘ say th at th e truth  is n o t true. This is similar to the 
ambiguous moment that Heidegger observes within nihilism: 
 
‗N ih ilism ‘ rem ain s am b iguo us, an d seen  in  term s o f tw o  extrem es, alw ays h as first o f all 
a double meaning, inasmuch as, on the one hand it designates the mere devaluing of the 
highest values up to now, but on the other hand it also means at the same time the 
unconditional countermovement to devaluing.42 
 
The attempt to overcome nihilism is still nihilism, just as deconstructive theory, when 
applied to the opposition of metaphysics/nihilism, must deconstruct itself as both the 
devaluin g an d th e ‗un co n ditio n al co un term o vem en t‘ to  devaluin g. T h is suggests th at 
deconstruction is itself the undecidable third term within the opposition between 
metaphysics and nihilism, and suggests that the relationship between poststructuralism and 
nihilism is analogous. 
Constantin Boundas refers to these links between nihilism and deconstruction in order 
to  refo rm ulate n ih ilism  th ro ugh  ‗th e deco n structio n  o f n ih ilism ‘ –  nihilism after 
deconstruction.43 H e attem p ts to  create a ‗deco n structive n ih ilism ‘ b ased up o n  a readin g o f 
n ih ilism  in  w h ich  n ih ilism , rath er th an  b ein g ‗th e assim ilatio n  o f differen ce‘, is ch aracterised  
b y ‗o p en n ess to  un assim ilated O th ern ess‘.44 B o un das‘ th esis is flaw ed, h o w ever, b ecause 
w h ilst h e reco gn ises th at tw o  fo rm ulatio n s o f deco n structio n  exist, a ‗do m in an t‘ tren d an d a 
‗m in o ritarian ‘ tren d (w h at m igh t b e term ed ‗first-p h ase‘ an d ‗seco n d -p h ase‘ deco n structio n , 
respectively), he mistakenly argues that Derrida is himself part of the dominant trend. 
                                                 
42 M artin  H eidegger, ‗T h e W ord o f N ietzsch e: ―G o d is D ead‖‘, in  The Question Concerning Technology and Other 
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D errida is iro n ically (an d deco n structively?) ab sen t fro m  B o un das‘ so -called Derridan 
deconstruction –  ‗th e fash io n ab le ―an ti-fo un datio n alist‖ m erry-go-rounds of arch-w ritin g‘ –  
and is rather part of the tradition that Boundas identifies as ‗m in o ritarian ‘.45 This 
‗m in o ritarian ‘ deco n structio n , w h ich  ‗p ro claim s th e critical n ecessity o f o n to lo gy w ith o ut 
m etap h ysics‘, is L evin asian  in  th e sen se th at it refuses to  assim ilate th e O th er w ith in  its 
discourse.46 W h ilst B o un das‘ co n structio n  o f a ‗deco n structive n ih ilism ‘ is laudab le, it fails to  
take into account the links between Derrida and Levinas that Robbins observes: 
 
At the limit, not only can deconstructive questioning be said to respond to an ethical 
demand when, seeking out suppressed alterities, it interrupts the totalities of a discourse. 
B ut also  w h en  L evin as [… ] exp o sits th e self(-same) as internally bordered by the other, 
ethics entails precisely the deconstruction of a secure and self-sufficient self.47 
 
Levinasian ethics is deconstructive, and Derridan deconstruction is ethical: it is only the 
ap p ro p riatio n  o f deco n structio n  b y o th ers th at creates a ‗do m in an t‘ deco n structio n . 
A lth o ugh  B o un das‘ deco n structio n  o f th e rh eto ric o f n ih ilism  suggests a p o ten tial 
formulation of deconstructive nihilism, this is already structured within a framework 
un suited to  it. B o un das‘ deco n structive n ih ilism  is m o re ab o ut th e n ih ilism  o f deco n structio n  
than it is about the deconstruction of nihilism, and we must therefore turn to other 
arguments in order to  see th e fo rm ulatio n  o f a ‗p o stm o dern ‘ n ih ilism . 
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‘E veryth in g looked  an d  sou n d ed  u n real’: N ih ilism  an d  P ostm od ern ism  
The arguments surrounding nihilism and postmodernism are similar to those surrounding 
nihilism and poststructuralism: those who disagree with postmodernism call it nihilistic and 
those who agree with postmodernism defend it from nihilism. Many critics call 
postmodernism nihilistic because postmodernism rejects certain concepts as metanarratives. 
For example, Christian critics reject postmodernism because it is a secular philosophy and 
Marxist critics reject postmodernism because it is deeply embedded within, and complicit 
w ith , ‗late cap italism ‘. A lth o ugh  th ese p o sitio n s take differen t ap p ro ach es to  th e ‗n ih ilism ‘ o f 
postmodernism, they both  o rigin ate fro m  th e sam e so urce, as N ealo n  argues: ‗T h e do m in an t 
critique of postmodernism, in whatever form, is that it does not attend to such a 
m etap h ysical o r h isto rical ―real‖‘.48 T h e relatio n  o f th is ‗real‘ to  p o stm o dern ism  reflects th e 
attitude of Christianity and Marxism towards postmodernism. 
Christianity (more generally, orthodox religion) calls postmodernism nihilistic because 
it rejects th e idea o f a tran scen den t divin e. T o  such  religio n s, th is is a m etap h ysical ‗real‘, an d 
so its rejection must be nihilistic. Postmodernism, to many, indicates the widespread moral 
decay of Western, primarily Christian, standards. Critics such as Anthony Harrigan feel that 
this decay is nihilistic and, if it is attributable to postmodernism, then postmodernism is 
nihilistic: 
 
The essence of post-modernism is nihilism –  the denial of any meaning or purpose in 
existence –  or, more exactly, the triumph of nihilism in societies of the Western world. 
It is a phenomenon identical with atheism as it denies the existence of any permanent 
ethical order. It marks a turning away from the moral teachings that have come down to 
us from Moses and brought to their highest level in Christianity. Nihilism is worse than 
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paganism because the pagans knew no better. It is worse than barbarism, for the 
barbarians of antiquity at least based their lives on tribal rules.49 
 
Postmodernism is nihilistic because it promotes a pantheon of modern gods: contingency, 
not absolutism; ethical relativism, not Christian morality; the present, not the past. Harrigan 
charts this growing nihilism in postmodern America from Nazi attacks on Christianity to 
sexual educatio n , fro m  lin guistic an d artistic p ro fan ity to  ‗ro ad rage‘. T h ese are all exam p les 
o f ‗n ih ilism ‘ fo r H arrigan , an d are all asp ects o f th e ‗p o stm o dern  turn ‘: ‗G radually, h o w ever, 
over a half century, the old moral order was forced to give way to nihilism, to a belief in 
n o th in g, an d th e retreat fro m  m o ral civilizatio n  w as clo aked an d disguised‘.50 The absence of 
th e deistic ‗real‘ m ean s, fo r H arrigan, that postmodernism is nihilistic. 
Likewise, Marxists reject postmodernism because it places no weight upon historical 
circum stan ce, b ecause it rejects th e ‗reality‘ o f p ro ductio n . M arxist critics argue again st 
postmodernism on the grounds of its textuality, its replacement of history with narrativity, 
an d its in ab ility to  fo rm ulate ‗real w o rld so lutio n s‘ to  ‗real w o rld p ro b lem s‘. Stuart Sim , fo r 
exam p le, argues th at p o stm o dern ism  is p o litically im p o ten t: ‗T h e questio n  at issue is n o t 
really whether narrative or metanarrative is preferable, but whether these terms have any 
relevance –  or reference –  within the socio-p o litical sp h ere‘.51 Sim uses Marxist terms to 
criticise p o stm o dern ism ‘s lack o f p ro gress to w ards th e em an cip atio n  o f th e w o rkin g classes. 
In  fact, p o stm o dern ism  is n o t p o litically ign o ran t b ut reactio n ary. H e w rites th at ‗T en din g to  
your own little narrative, agonistically or otherwise, looks very much like a conservative 
tactic to keep change to a manageable minimum within the confines of a comfortable status 
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quo‘.52 Such interpretations suggest that postmodernism –  as postmodernity –  is implicit with 
the rise of consumer capitalism, as both Jameson and Harvey argue. This is nihilistic 
inasmuch as it is again part of the moral decline of the Western world, only this time because 
p o stm o dern ism  rejects eco n o m ic ‗real‘ o f M arxism . 
In some ways, therefore, postmodernism is equivalent to nihilism because 
postmodernism refutes other philosophies and thus the (perceived) destruction of 
Christianity and Marxism by postmodernism means that postmodernism is nihilistic to 
Christianity and Marxism. There are problems with these critiques of postmodernism, 
however, because of the problem of the différend. Similarly, it is difficult to blindly accept 
Lyotard‘s o w n  in credulity to w ards m etan arratives. T h e différend, as we have seen, arises when 
th ere is a co n flict b etw een  tw o  fo rm s o f argum en t: ‗A  case o f th e différend between two 
p arties takes p lace w h en  th e ―regulatio n ‖ o f th e co n flict th at o p p o ses th em  is do ne in the 
idiom of one of the parties while the wrong suffered by the other is not signified in the 
idio m ‘.53 Thus, the différend em erges w h en  th ere is a co n flict b etw een  tw o  ‗gen res o f 
disco urse‘ w h ich  each  sup p lies ‗a set o f p h rases, each  arisin g fro m  so m e p h rase regim en ‘.54 
This conflict cannot be resolved because both the phrases and genres are heterogeneous. 
Neither Marxism nor Christianity can validate their criticisms of postmodernism because 
th ey do  n o t argue fro m  th e sam e ‗gen re o f disco urse‘ o r ‗p h rase regim en ‘ as p o stm o dern ism . 
Similarly, postmodernism invalidates its own criticisms of metanarratives such as Marxism 
and Christianity because they must be allowed to retain their Otherness. 
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T h ere are o th er w ays in  w h ich  th e ‗un reality‘ o f p o stm o dern ism manifests itself in 
relatio n  to  n ih ilism . T h e destructio n  o f th e real (w h at B audrillard h as called ‗the desert of the 
real‘) p o in ts to w ards a fo rm ulatio n  o f p o stm o dern ism  in  w h ich , ‗everyth in g lo o ked an d 
so un ded un real‘.55 Postmodernism can be understood as a discursive n etw o rk o f th e ‗un real‘ 
founded upon the decline of manufacturing (post-industrial) and the rise of information as a 
co m m o dity, w h at L yo tard calls ‗th e m ercan tilizatio n  o f kn o w ledge‘.56 This is, of course, akin 
to  B audrillard‘s h yp erreal, in  w h ich  it is ‗th e m ap  th at p recedes th e territo ry‘, alth o ugh  m o st 
critics see th e In fo rm atio n  A ge as so m eh o w  p o stm o dern : L yo tard‘s ‗lan guage gam es‘ 
emphasise its linguistic and communicative variants, Vattimo analyses its impact on 
hermeneutics, and Paul Virilio studies its militarism.57 However, where Lyotard and Vattimo 
are optimistic about the Information Age, Baudrillard and Virilio are not so convinced. 
Furthermore, although both Vattimo and Lyotard agree on the positive view of the 
Information Age, they disagree on the extent to which nihilism is part of this transformation. 
Lyotard argues that postmodernism is a (sublime) response to the nihilism of modernity, 
whereas Vattimo sees in postmodernism the realisation of an (sublime) emancipatory 
nihilism. 
Lyotard argues that pluralism originates in the distribution of information because 
were everybody given access to all information (not only that held about them, but also 
about others) then emancipation from totalitarian control could occur. For Lyotard, ‗th e 
mercantilization of knowledge is bound to affect the privilege the nation-states h ave en jo yed‘ 
to  th e exten t th at th is m ay th reaten  th eir very existen ce. H e co n tin ues: ‗T h e ideo lo gy o f 
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co m m un icatio n al ―tran sp aren cy,‖ w h ich  go es h an d in  h an d w ith  th e commercialization of 
kn o w ledge, w ill b egin  to  p erceive th e State as a facto r o f o p acity an d ―n o ise‖‘.58 Although 
Lyotard realises that there are problems with this –  n ew  questio n s to  an sw er, such  as, ‗W h o  
w ill h ave access [… ]? W h o  w ill determ in e w h ich  ch an n els o r data are fo rb idden ?‘ –  his 
so lutio n  seem s n aïve: ‗G ive th e p ub lic free access to  th e m em o ry an d  data b an ks‘.59 The 
ultim ate ‗tran sp aren t so ciety‘ is, fo r L yo tard, co m p lete freedo m  o f in fo rm atio n  fo r all, 
predicated upon the delegitimisation of knowledge, where information and knowledge are 
no longer legitimated by the State or the Corporation (which was the case within nihilistic 
modernity), but instead remain contingent, subject to alteration at any point. This creates a 
differential network of Wittgen stein ian  lan guage gam es w h o se rules ‗do  n o t carry w ith in  
th em selves th eir o w n  legitim atio n ‘, so  th at ‗th ere is n o  gam e‘ desp ite th e fact th at ‗every 
utteran ce sh o uld b e th o ugh t o f as a ―m o ve‖ in  a gam e‘ (w h at L yo tard calls agonistics).60 
This contrasts sharp ly w ith  V attim o ‘s p ercep tio n  o f a ‗tran sp aren t so ciety‘. L yo tardian  
transparency originates in the delegitimation of knowledge, which for Vattimo is part of the 
problem: 
 
The freedom given by the mass media to so many cultures and Weltanschauungen has 
belied the very ideal of a transparent society. What could freedom of information, or 
even the existence of more than one radio or TV channel, mean in a world where the 
norm is the exact reproduction of reality, perfect objectivity, the complete identity of 
map and territory?61 
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Vattimo suggests that there is no point in delegitimating knowledge if knowledge is still the 
reificatio n  o f N ature (‗th e co m p lete iden tity o f m ap  an d territo ry‘), sidin g w ith  B audrillard 
against Lyotard. However, in contrast to Baudrillard, Vattimo argues that there is real 
emancipatory potential within the Information Age, which arises from a Nietzschean 
co n flict w h ere ‗th e in crease in  p o ssib le in fo rm atio n  o n  th e m yriad fo rm s o f reality m akes it 
increasingly difficult to conceive of a single reality‘ –  the realisation of the fabular nature of 
the world.62 F o r V attim o , ‗th e ideal o f em an cip atio n ‘ h as sh ifted fro m  ‗lucid self-
co n scio usn ess‘ to  ‗th e ero sio n  o f th e very ―p rin cip le o f reality‖‘.63 T h us, alth o ugh  ‗th e m ass 
media play a decisive ro le in  th e b irth  o f p o stm o dern  so ciety [… ] th ey do  n o t m ake th is 
p o stm o dern  so ciety m o re ‗tran sp aren t‘, b ut m o re co m p lex, even  ch ao tic‘ to  such  an  exten t 
th at ‗it is in  p recisely th is relative ―ch ao s‖ th at o ur h o p es fo r em an cip atio n  lie.64 Rather than 
mass m edia p ro ducin g th e ‗gen eral h o m o gen isatio n  o f so ciety‘ p ro p o sed b y A do rn o  an d 
M ax H o rkh eim er‘s Dialectic of Enlightenment, V attim o  argues th at ‗w h at actually h ap p en ed, in  
spite of the effort of monopolies and major centres of capital, was that radio, television and 
newspapers became elements in a general explosion and proliferation of Weltanschauungen, of 
w o rld view s‘.65 This is an opaque pluralism, where the promulgation of difference (différance?) 
leads to  an  o verco m in g o f a p rio r n ih ilism . V attim o ‘s p erception of postmodernism is still 
nihilistic, however, because it originates in his positive perception of Nietzsche and 
Heidegger. This means that Vattimo, whilst seeing nihilism in postmodern society, perceives 
th is to  b e p o sitive b ecause ‗in  dem o n strating that being does not necessarily coincide with 
w h at is stab le, fixed an d p erm an en t‘, n ih ilism  sh o w s b ein g to  b e co n cern ed w ith  ‗th e even t, 
w ith  co n sen sus, dialo gue an d in terp retatio n ‘. B o th  N ietzsch e an d H eidegger are ‗tryin g to  
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show us how to take the experience of oscillation in the postmodern world as an 
o p p o rtun ity o f a n ew  w ay o f b ein g (fin ally, p erh ap s) h um an ‘.66 
Whilst Lyotard and Vattimo characterise the postmodern as an emancipatory pluralism 
in  w h ich  ‗th e p en  is m igh tier th an  th e sw o rd‘, V irilio argues, like Baudrillard, that the 
knowledge economy this is predominantly concerned with control, although for Virilio this 
is th e realisatio n  o f ‗p ure w ar‘: 
 
Pure War is n eith er p eace n o r w ar; n o r is it, as w as b elieved, ‗ab so lute‘ o r ‗to tal‘ w ar. 
Rather, it is th e m ilitary p ro cedure itself, in  its o rdin ary durab ility [… ] In  sh o rt, th e 
disso lutio n  o f th e state o f w ar an d th e m ilitary‘s in filtratio n  in to  th e m o vem en ts o f daily 
life.67  
 
 ‗P ure w ar‘ arises in  th ree stages, each  reflectin g a m o vem en t in  th e  concentration of 
humanity in cities. The first is tactics, o r ‗th e art o f th e h un t‘, w h ich  is fo r th e m o st p art th e 
most basic human war –  w h at V irilio  elsew h ere calls ‗direct co n fro n tatio n ‘.68 The second, 
strategy, occurs with the rise of the city-state or polis an d is ‗th e w h o le m ilitary-political system 
o f th e traditio n al city‘.69 ‗Strategy‘ is th e stage at w h ich  ‗true‘ w ar ap p ears (rath er th an  p rio r 
‗tum ults‘), b ecause th e rise o f th e polis corresponds to self- and national-identification.70 The 
third stage, the war economy, occurs when ‗L o gistics takes o ver‘.71 
O f th ese th ree stages, th e ‗w ar eco n o m y‘ (as ‗lo gistics‘) is th e m o st im p o rtan t to  
understanding the nihilism of postmodernism. Although this seems initially to reflect a 
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Marxist perception of postmo dern ism  (in asm uch  as it is an  ‗eco n o m y‘), V irilio  argues th at 
‗W h en  th e State w as co n stituted, it develo p ed w ar as an  o rgan izatio n , as territo rial eco n o m y, 
as eco n o m y o f cap italizatio n , o f tech n o lo gy‘.72 This adumbrates industrialisation, economics, 
and politics w ith in  ‗lo gistics‘, in  w h ich  everyth in g is sub o rdin ate to  m ilitary p lan n in g. 
Furthermore, logistics is implicated with the Enlightenment Project: the rise of rationality 
(‗to  co n duct a w ar is to  execute a ratio n al p lan ‘) an d th e p ro m o tio n  o f T ech n o logy over 
N ature (‗It is o ur o w n  n ature exch an gin g w ith  all o f N ature‘) are b o th  step s in  th e creatio n  o f 
a w ar eco n o m y‘.73 It is therefore significant that Virilio identifies the origins of the war 
economy in the 1870s, with increased military budgets and the logistical planning of 
warfare.74 The 1870s was the period of Russian Nihilism –  nihilism as emancipation from 
state control –  b ut it w as also  th e tim e w h en  th e ‗state o f n ih ilism ‘ cam e to  b e realised, w h at 
V irilio  calls ‗th e n ih ilism  o f co n sum p tio n  (co n sum p tio n  o f n o th in g, security an d services)‘.75 
It also marks the advent of Nietzschean nihilism, not in the death of God, but in the 
creation of the will-to-power. The Nietzschean conflict that Vattimo emphasises in the 
p o stm o dern  is p art o f V irilio ‘s ‗w ar eco n o m y‘ in asm uch  as th e ‗Dionysian world of the 
eternally self-creating, the eternally self-destro yin g‘ is th e ‗will to power –  and nothing besides!‘.76 
The Nietzschean will-to-power is merely another expression for the rise of pure war because 
w e m ust ‗n ever confuse Pure Power (the military thing) with Domination (th e State)‘.77 
‗L o gistics‘ is th erefo re sim ilar to  B audrillard‘s h yp erreal b ecause it is n o t ‗do m in atio n ‘, in  
w h ich  th ere is alw ays a do m in an t fo rce, b ut ‗p ure p o w er‘, th e co m p lete ab stractio n  im plicit 
in a militaristic ideology without armies, generals, or nations. 
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T h e relatio n  o f th is to  th e ‗tran sp aren t so ciety‘ o f p o stm o dern ism  is seen  th ro ugh o ut 
V irilio ‘s w o rks. M edia is th e ultim ate fo rm  o f w arfare b ecause it realises th e ‗state o f n ih ilism ‘ 
inasmuch as this is about communication and concentration –  tightly-planned and executed 
‗delivery‘ system s o f b o th  m issiles an d m issives (to  use D errida‘s p un ) –  rather than the 
‗traditio n al‘ w arfare o f territo ry.78 The Information Age is the realisation of logistics because 
war is no longer territorial, but domestic:  
 
Today, in order to create a totalitarian Lebensraum, it is no longer necessary to resort to 
extraordinary invasions with the motorized vehicles, tanks and stukas of lightning 
warfare, since one can use the ordinary penetration of the new media, the information 
blitz.79 
 
This domestication of war is the result of the increased abstraction of humanity and Nature 
to  such  an  exten t th at it is n o t th at ‗th e m ap  th at p recedes th e territo ry‘ b ut th at the map itself 
no longer exists. Physical location is no longer important, as the media gives global coverage, 
an d so  ‗p ure w ar‘ is m uch  m o re co n cern ed w ith  co m m un icatio n s tech n o lo gy th an  it is w ith  
physical territory –  the pen is the sword. Seen in this way, the rhetoric of poststructuralism 
an d p o stm o dern ism  ap p ears in  a n ew  ligh t. D eco n structio n , defin ed b y D errida as ‗an  
overturning of the classical opposition and a general displacement o f th e system ‘, attem p ts to  
deconstruct the violent hierarchy of representation.80 Its rhetoric is one of philosophical 
w arfare, w ith  ‗o p p o sitio n s‘, ‗fo rces‘, ‗o verturn in gs‘, an d ‗n eutralizatio n ‘. Sim ilarly, L yo tard‘s 
co n clusio n  to  ‗W h at is P o stm o dern ism ?‘ exp licitly evo kes co n flict: ‗L et us w age w ar o n  
totality; let us be witnesses to the unpresentable; let us activate the differences and save the 
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h o n o r o f th e n am e‘.81 Seen in this way, both poststructuralism and postmodernism become 
im p licated in  th e rise o f th e ‗w ar eco n o m y‘ an d th e exp ressio n  o f ‗p ure w ar‘. 
This is part o f V irilio ‘s ‗aesth etics o f disap p earan ce‘, th e disso lutio n  o f m o vem en t in to  
sp eed, again  rep risin g th e ‗tran sp aren t so ciety‘, o n ly th is tim e in  its disap p earan ce in to  sp eed: 
‗the true physical body of the modern totalitarian State, it speed-body‘.82 The ‗aesth etics o f 
disap p earan ce‘ exp licitly lin ks n ih ilism  w ith  th e p o stm o dern  b ecause th e disap p earan ce o f 
reality m irro rs th e rise o f th e ‗state o f n ih ilism ‘. V irilio ‘s defin es p icn o lep sy, fo r exam p le, a 
co n ditio n  in  w h ich  p eo p le ‗p h ase o ut‘ o f tem p o ral aw areness, in terms of nihilism. The 
picnoleptic is unable to construct a continuous narrative from his personal experience 
b ecause th ere are to o  m an y b lan ks: ‗H e‘ll b e in clin ed to  b elieve (like Sextus E m p iricus) th at 
nothing really exists; that even if there is existence, it cannot be described; and that even if it 
co uld b e d escrib ed, it co uld certain ly n o t b e co m m un icated to  o th ers‘.83 This, Virilio writes 
elsew h ere, ‗co n firm s o ur sen se th at acceleratio n  an d deceleratio n , o r th e m o vem en t o f 
movement, are the only true dimensions of space, of speed-sp ace, o f dro m o sp h eric sp ace‘.84  
‗Sp eed‘, seen  in  term s o f in stan tan eo us in fo rm atio n  tran sfer an d glo b al n etw o rks, 
marks the disappearance of being into space. Everything is subordinated to speed because 
‗T o  go  n o w h ere, even to ride around in a deserted quarter or on a crowded freeway, now 
seems natural for the voyeur-vo yager in  h is car‘ to  such  an  exten t th at ‗to  sto p , to  p ark, are 
un p leasan t o p eratio n s‘.85 Virilio frequently makes reference to the archetypal road trip, the 
need for speed in empty space, although this is not a celebration of freedom, but the 
revelatio n  o f ‗p ure w ar‘:  
                                                 
81 Lyotard, p. 82. 
82 Virilio, Popular Defense and Ecological Struggles, p. 92. 
83 Paul Virilio, The Aesthetics of Disappearance, trans. by Philip Beitchman (New York: Semiotext(e), 1991), pp. 10-
11. See also page 12 of this thesis. 
84 Paul Virilio, The Lost Dimension, trans. by Daniel Moshenberg (New York: Semiotext(e), 1991), p. 102. 
85 Virilio, The Aesthetics of Disappearance, p. 67. 
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A n d w hat if the prim ary goal of travel w as n ot to ‘go’ som ew here, bu t sim ply to n o lon ger be w here on e 
is? What if the aim of movement has become like that of military invasions or sports 
records: to go faster while going nowhere, in other words to disappear? Drop-outs, beat 
generation, migrants, motorists: the unknown soldiers of the order of speeds‘.86 
 
This, for Virilio, epitomises the p o stm o dern  age. In  co n trast to  B audrillard‘s D isn ey-fication 
o f reality, w h ich  fun ctio n s as a ‗false co n scio usn ess‘, sp eed is a m o re secure realisatio n  o f 
‗p ure w ar‘ b ecause ‗T h e n ih ilism  o f tech n ique destro ys th e w o rld less surely th an  th e n ih ilism  
of speed destro ys th e w o rld‘s truth ‘.87 Being is consumed in speed –  ‗you  don ’t have speed, you  
are speed‘ –  and therefore all truth is destroyed by speed: 
 
[Speed is] a final abolition of differences, of distinctions between nature and culture, 
utopia and reality, since technology, in making the rite-of-passage a continuous 
phenomenon, would make of the derangement of the senses a permanent state, 
conscious life becoming an oscillating trip whose only absolute poles would be birth and 
death; and all this would mean, of course, the end of religions and philosophies.88 
 
Thus, postmodernism –  as the era of speed (and the culmination of the Enlightenment 
Project) –  is equivalent to nihilism because the destruction of real is the (un)realisation of 
‗p ure w ar‘. It is th e ultim ate culm in atio n  o f w arfare to  such  an  exten t th at th e ‗tran sp aren t 
so ciety‘ sign ifies th e disap p earan ce o f h um an ity. 
T h ere is an  altern ative to  th is ‗state o f n ih ilism ‘, w h ich  return s us b riefly to  M arxist 
th eo ry. In  H arvey‘s th eo ry o f ‗o veraccum ulatio n ‘, p o stm o dern ism  is co n structed as ‗a 
condition in which idle capital and idle labour supply could exist side by side with no 
                                                 
86 Virilio, Popular Defense and Ecological Struggles, p. 99-100. V irilio ‘s use o f ‗sp o rts reco rds‘ h ere evo kes L yo tard‘s 
‗ago n istic‘ lan guage gam es, o n ly th is tim e as part o f th e ‗n ih ilism  o f sp eed‘, rath er th an  Sim ‘s ‗status quo ‘. 
87 Virilio, The Aesthetics of Disappearance, p. 69. 
88 Virilio, The Aesthetics of Disappearance, pp. 92-93. 
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apparent way in which to bring these idle resources together to accomplish socially useful 
tasks‘.89 This adumbrates postmodernism within the sphere of economic practice and 
p resen ts it as a reactio n ary m o vem en t in ten ded to  co un ter ‗o veraccum ulatio n ‘ –  excess 
production –  before it threatens capitalism. Despite this, Harvey inadvertently refers to the 
kn o w ledge eco n o m y, in  w h ich  ‗o veraccum ulatio n ‘ is an  asp ect o f th e ‗cap ital‘ o f ideas, rath er 
th an  m o n etary eco n o m ics: ‗T h e sh arp  catego rical distin ctio n  b etw een  m o dern ism  an d  
postmodernism disappears, to be replaced by an examination of the flux of internal relations 
within capitalism as a w h o le‘.90 A lth o ugh  th ese ‗in tern al relatio n s‘ are seen  in  relatio n  to  
cap italism , th ey also  sign ify ‗co n sum er‘ ch o ices fro m  th e ‗cap ital‘ o f ideas. T h ere are 
therefore two possible interpretations of nihilism in relation to postmodernism that, 
although  resp o n ses to  o veraccum ulatio n , suggest a distin ctio n  b etw een  a n ih ilism  o f ‗p ure 
w ar‘ an d a n ih ilism  o f em an cip atio n . 
The first interpretation suggests that philosophy has integrated nihilism within it and 
reveals itself when Harvey demonstrates the methods of capitalism to contain 
‗o veraccum ulatio n ‘ –  ‗devaluatio n ‘, ‗m acro -eco n o m ic co n tro l‘, an d ‗ab so rp tio n ‘. T h ese th ree 
m eth o ds o f dealin g w ith  o veraccum ulatio n  co rresp o n d lo o sely to  W alter A n derso n ‘s th ree 
p o ten tial resp o n ses to  th e ‗p o stm o dern  co n ditio n ‘ –  constructivism, play, and nihilism.91 
‗M acro -eco n o m ic co n tro l‘ is an  allego ry o f a return  to  m etan arratives, th e ‗in stitutio n alizatio n  
o f so m e system  o f regulatio n ‘ in  w h ich  differen ce is co -opted into one over-arching 
thematic: this corresponds loosely to  A n derso n ‘s co n structivist p ersp ective, in  w h ich  ‗ro les 
                                                 
89 David Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change (Cambridge, MA: 
Blackwell, 1994), p. 180. 
90 Harvey, p. 342. 
91 W alter T ruett A n derso n , ‗F our D ifferen t W ays to  B e A b solutely R igh t‘, in The Fontana Postmodernism Reader, 
ed. by Walter Truett Anderson (London: Fontana Press, 1996), pp. 106-12 (p. 107). 
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are go o d, useful to o ls fo r m akin g a so ciety w o rk an d givin g p eo p le a sen se o f iden tity‘.92 
Although the constructivist viewpoint admits that social behaviour is reified, it deems it 
important to the construction of society: Rorty and Fish are critics that promote this kind of 
p o stm o dern  p ersp ective. T h e seco n d m eth o d, ‗ab so rp tio n ‘, is th e m eth o d b y w h ich  
postmodernism continues to function as postmodernism because it suggests temporal and 
spatial disp lacem en t. T h e first ab so rp tive m eth o d is ‗an  acceleratio n  in  turn o ver tim e‘ 
suggested b y th e D errida‘s ‗n eed fo r sp eed‘ an d V irilio ‘s ‗n ih ilism  o f sp eed‘.93 The second, 
‗th e ab so rp tio n  o f excess cap ital an d lab o ur in  geo grap h ical exp an sio n ‘, is seen  in  th e  
globalising tendencies of postmodernism where the rise of postcolonial and feminist writing 
is not a search for difference but a deferment of the centre towards the periphery.94 The 
third method –  ‗tim e-sp ace disp lacem en ts‘ –  delineates the instantaneous communication 
n o ted b y B audrillard, in  w h ich  it is b o th  ‗in stan tan eo us‘ (tem p o ral) an d ‗co m m un icatio n ‘ 
(spatial).95 T h is co rresp o n ds to  A n derso n ‘s co n cep t o f ‗p o stm o dern  p lay‘, w h ere p layers 
‗b ro w se am o n g cultural fo rm s, p lay m ix -and-match with all the pieces of our various 
h eritage‘.96 It is ‗devaluatio n ‘, h o w ever, th at suggests n ih ilism  b ecause it im p lies a 
Nietzschean moment at which capitalism must devaluate itself in order to survive –  Virilio 
an d B audrillard‘s th eses o f ‗you  don ’t have speed, you  are speed‘ an d ‗sim ulacral do ub lin g‘, 
respectively.97 T h is readin g dem o n strates n ih ilism  as m erely an o th er ‗co n sum er‘ ch o ice fro m  
th e ‗cap ital‘ o f ideas b ecause alth o ugh  n ih ilism  an d p o stm o dern ism  are co n trasted, th ey are 
implicitly related to metaphysical modes of thought. 
                                                 
92 Harvey, p. 180; Anderson, p. 111. 
93 Harvey, p. 182. See Derrida, ‗N o  A p o calyp se, N o t N o w ‘, p p . 20 -21 and Virilio, The Aesthetics of Disappearance, 
p. 69. 
94 H arvey, p. 183. T h is suggests th at p o stm o dern ism  is an ideo lo gical ‗false co n sciousn ess‘ th at h ides th e 
overaccumulation through displacement. 
95 Harvey, p. 184. See Jean Baudrillard, The Illusion of the End, trans. by Chris Turner (Oxford: Polity Press, 
1994). 
96 Anderson, p. 108. 
97 H arvey, p. 181. See p age 110 o f th is th esis fo r a discussio n  o f B audrillard‘s con cep t o f ‗sim ulacral do ub lin g‘. 
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T h e seco n d in terp retatio n  o f p o stm o dern ism ‘s n ih ilism , n ih ilism  as em an cip atio n  fro m  
th e eco n o m y o f ideas, relies o n  lin kin g H arvey‘s ‗o veraccum ulatio n ‘ to  G o udsb lo m ‘s ‗n ih ilist 
p ro b lem atic‘: 
 
The co-existence of truths only becomes problematic when one is prepared to compare 
and assess them as equals. Then the arguments pro and contra assume a new cogency, 
with the possible result that one begins to doubt the validity of claims of any of the 
parties.98 
 
‗T h e co -existen ce o f truth s‘ im p lies o veraccumulation within philosophy, and nihilism is 
th erefo re th e refusal to  ‗b uy in to ‘ an y o f th e ch o ices p resen ted. If each  ‗co n sum er ch o ice‘ is 
equally invalid, then there is a warning –  Caveat Emptor! –  that the buyer must beware of any 
of the philosophies on display, and leave the metaphysical shop altogether. This second 
in terp retatio n  defin es ‗p o stm o dern  n ih ilism ‘ b ecause alth o ugh  n ih ilism  is co n sidered un der 
the auspices of postmodernism, it is a nihilism that devalues itself, that defers the possibility 
o f co m in g in to  th e ratio n al eco n o m y o f th e kn o w n . W h en  B audrillard w rites th at ‗W h at is 
essen tial is th at n o th in g escap e th e em p ire o f m ean in g‘, th is th erefo re sign ifies n o t o n ly th e 
to talisin g p ro ject o f th e kn o w ledge eco n o m y b ut also  th e fact th at ‗n o th in g‘ m ust alw ays 
rem ain  o utside ‗th e em p ire o f m ean in g‘: a ‗p o stm o dern ‘ n ih ilism .99 
 
Postmodern Nihilism 
In  ‗Ex nihilo‘, th is th esis exp lo red h isto rical versio n s o f n ih ilism  an d n o th in gn ess, b efo re th e 
‗p o stm o dern  era‘. N ih ilism  w as o p p o sed to  th e ideo lo gical norm: to Christianity, nihilism is 
                                                 
98 Goudsblom, p. 92. 
99 Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation, p. 137. 
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atheism; to authoritarian ideologies, nihilism is anarchism; to post-Christian thought, 
Christianity itself is nihilistic; and to the contemporary sensibility, nihilism is equated with 
barbarism and destruction: 
 
 Passive Active 
Individual Rationality 
(Humanist) 
Russian Nihilism 
(Anti-Authoritarian) 
Social Christianity 
(Anti-Humanist) 
National Socialism 
(Authoritarian) 
4.1 Nihilisms before Postmodernism 
 
A lth o ugh  th ese fo rm ulatio n s are ‗valid‘ w ith in  th eir resp ective chronological periods, 
problems arise when nihilism is considered in relation to postmodernism because these 
binary oppositions –  individual/social, passive/active, and humanist/anti-humanist –  break 
down under the postmodern. This is due to the paradoxical nature of postmodernism and its 
p ro p en sity fo r ‗do ub le-co din g‘, a m o vem en t th at co n flates o p p o sin g co n cep ts w ith in  th e 
postmodern (as pluralist truth, not as synthesis). Postmodernism only really contains one 
exception to this breakdown of binary oppositions: the opposition between authoritarianism 
and anti-authoritarianism. Although both authoritarianism and anti-authoritarianism are 
significantly altered, the opposition remains. This is no longer ideological nihilism (National 
Socialism) as opposed to anti-ideological nihilism (Russian Nihilism) but aesthetic 
distinctions in the creation of art that themselves suggest ideological approaches –  a case of 
life reflecting art or, at least, theory. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, there are 
only two formulations of nihilism –  ‗m o dern ist n ih ilism ‘ an d ‗p o stm o dern  n ih ilism ‘. 
‗M o dern ist n ih ilism ‘ sum m arises th o se earlier revo lutio n ary fo rm ulatio n s o f n ih ilism  th at 
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sought to escape from certain strictures but which reinforced themselves: authoritarian 
n ih ilism . ‗P o stm o dern  n ih ilism ‘, in  co n trast, is th at w h ich  attem p ts to  escap e fro m  even  its 
own strictures. Postmodernism suggests the possibility of a reflexive nihilism that is not 
cultural ennui but a liberating (or, at the very least, ethical) turn away from ideological 
processes: anti-authoritarian nihilism. 
M o dern ist n ih ilism  is co n structed in  such  a w ay th at th e statem en t, ‗T h ere is n o  truth ‘ 
rem ain s o utside th e ‗sp ace o f disco urse‘ it is tryin g to  n egate, even though it is actually part of that 
space. T o  say th at th ere is n o  truth , w ith o ut reflexivity, is to  say th at, ‗th ere is n o  truth  b ut th is 
statem en t‘. T h is m ean s, in  eth ical n ih ilism , th at ‗th ere is n o  m o ral law  b ut th is m o ral law ‘, in  
sem an tic n ih ilism  th at ‗th ere is n o  sen ten tial structure o r meaning past that which conveys 
th e m ean in g o f th is sen ten ce‘, an d in  ep istem o lo gical n ih ilism  th at ‗th ere is n o  kn o w ledge 
p ast th e kn o w ledge co n tain ed in  th is sen ten ce‘. E ach  o f th ese statem en ts is proscriptive, 
proscribing a state of affairs beyond the immediate sentence whilst refusing to invalidate 
th em selves: th ey im p o se a fo rm  o f co n tro l w h ere th ey retain  ‗truth ‘ b ut n o th in g else do es. 
The statement itself retains truth unattainable to other semantic formulations because it 
remains outside the discursive space that it devalues. Modernist nihilism –  the sum of the 
historical nihilisms –  is a totalitarian nothingness where nothing else but nihilism can exist. It 
is an  attem p t to  rem ain  w h at L yo tard w o uld term  a ‗go o d fo rm ‘ b y lo catin g itself o utside th at 
which it is erasing: 
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4.2 Modernist Nihilism 
 
Modernist nihilism is, in effect, a metanarrative, a weltanschauung that denies all others. This is 
modernist in the sense that Lyotard uses the term modern ‗to  design ate an y scien ce th at 
legitimates itself w ith  referen ce to  a m etadisco urse‘.100 Modernist nihilism legitimates itself by 
being a metadiscourse, by remaining outside of discourse and proscribing the truth. When 
nihilism is proscriptive, it is the centre from which all judgements about truth are made, and 
yet, in order for this to be true, its centre has to be somewhere other than in this proscribed 
to tality o f un truth . R eturn in g b riefly to  D errida, w e can  see th is in  relatio n  to  h is fam o us ‗th e 
cen tre is n o t th e cen tre‘ argum en t: 
 
Classical thought concerning structure could say that the centre is, paradoxically, within 
the structure and outside it. The centre is the centre of the totality, and yet, since the 
centre does not belong to the totality (is not part of the totality), the totality has its centre 
elsewhere. The centre is not the centre.101 
 
W h en  w e see n ih ilism  in  th is w ay, w e see th at it h as th e sam e ‗sym p to m ‘ as th o se 
transcendental signifiers that Derrida criticises. The centre of nihilism cannot be the centre 
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101 Derrida, Writing and Difference, p. 279. 
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of nihilism. Nihilism –  ‗m o dern ist n ih ilism ‘ –  can only function by decentring itself. If, 
however, nihilism is to be a valid philosophy and one that has emancipatory potential, it 
m ust b e so m eth in g th at destro ys itself. T h at is, o n e m ust read ‗th ere is n o  truth ‘ as a 
semantic paradox: even the statement itself is not true. 
Postmodern nihilism is concerned with the idea that nihilism cannot truthfully say that 
‗th ere is n o  truth ‘. T h is fo rm ulatio n  w o uld n o t attem p t to  rem ain  o utside o f th at w h ich  it 
negates, meaning that the statement itself would be both true and untrue, or, as it is nihilism, 
neither true nor untrue. This can be considered postmodern because it cannot remain true and 
dictate the truth to everything else. In this formulation, the nihilistic statement itself is part 
of that which it is negating –  ‗th ere is n o  truth ‘ ap p lyin g to  itself as w ell as everyth in g else: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.3 Postmodern Nihilism 
 
In this way, postmodern nihilism can be considered reflexive, not commenting on anything 
outside of itself, or rather including itself in that which it is negating. Nihilism, as we have 
seen , em p h asises th at ‗th ere is n o  truth ‘; fo r n ih ilism  to  b e stab le, th is statem en t m ust b e 
true. If this statement is true, however, nihilism is ultimately self-defeating because it cannot 
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be ‗true‘ th at th ere is n o  ‗truth ‘. T h us, n ih ilism  is n eith er true n o r false: a ‗deco n structed‘ 
nihilism. Of course, this suggests a Sartrean consciousness within reflexive nihilism, in which 
n o th in gn ess exists in  th e un reso lved co n flict b etw een  ‗n ih ilism ‘ an d ‗n ih ilism ‘. A lth o ugh  th is 
co uld b e term ed ‗existen tial n ih ilism ‘, it also  im p lies th e sub lim e m o m en t iden tified in  
relatio n  to  th e ‗ro m an tic sub lim e‘, w h ich  again  return s n ih ilism  b ack to  th e sub lim e fo rm .102 
Postmodern nihilism therefore delegitimises itself, is incredulous of its own 
m etan arrativity, an d ‗den ies itself th e so lace o f go o d fo rm s‘.103 This formulation is, in fact, an 
inherent potential throughout the history of nihilism although it is never fully realised in any 
period before postmodernism. This becomes clear in relation to certain conceptions of 
n ih ilism  th at w ere p resen ted in  ‗Ex nihilo‘. R eflexive n ih ilism  is sim ilar to  N ietzsch e‘s 
defin itio n  o f n ih ilism  in  th at n ih ilism  m ean s ‗That the highest values devaluate themselves‘.104 
However, where N ietzsch e‘s defin itio n  w as used again st C h ristian ity in  o rder to  defin e 
Christianity as nihilistic, Nietzsche did not refer this statement to nihilism itself: he wrote 
fro m  ‗o utside‘ n ih ilism , rath er th an  fro m  ‗w ith in ‘ it. Sim ilarly, H eidegger d efin es th e ‗actio n ‘ 
o f n ih ilism  as ‗T h e n o th in g itself n ih ilates‘.105 This translation of Das Nicht nichtet can suggest, 
as I have said, not only that nihilation is the action of nihilism but also that nihilism nihilates 
itself.106 This formulation of nihilism is a blank vo id th at is n eith er ‗b lan k‘ n o r a ‗vo id‘ b ecause 
to label it as such would suggest a linguistic construction in which nihilism is brought into 
being. The closest linguistic approximation of what reflexive nihilism means is perhaps 
‗[nihilism] does not exist‘, w h ere even  as it attem p ts to  b e w ritten  it is b ein g un w ritten , o r in  
a m o re extrem e fo rm ulatio n  ‗[… ]‘, w h ere th e ellip ses are th em selves actin g un der erasure 
                                                 
102 See pages 13-14 and 72-74 of this thesis. 
103 Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition, p. 81. 
104 Nietzsche, §2 (p. 9). 
105 Martin Heidegger, ‗W hat is M etap h ysics?‘, in  Martin Heidegger: Basic Writings from Being and Time (1927) to 
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and the absence absents itself.107 This conception of nihilism is central to both this thesis and 
to postmodernism, and relies upon the principles of paradox and self-referential semantic 
statements. 
The principle of reflexive sentential paradoxes, or semantic paradoxes, is the creation 
of a grammatically valid sentence that is neither true nor false; in fact, that disproves itself. 
There are numerous versions of paradoxes that demonstrate the propensity of language 
to w ards lo gical n o n sen se, such  as ‗T h e P reface‘ an d ‗T h e P reface A gain ‘. ‗T h e P reface‘ 
paradox comes from the fact that an author often submits a preface explaining that there 
m ay b e in accuracies in  th e text an d yet ‗a sin cere auth o r w ill b elieve everyth in g asserted in  
th e text‘, fo rcin g h im self in to  a co n tradictio n .108 T h is is ‗w eak‘ p arado x, h o w ever, b ecause it 
relies upon notions of belief and truth and so although it is inconsistent it is not truly 
p arado xical. A  stren gth en ed versio n  o f th is ap p ears in  ‗T h e P reface A gain ‘: 
 
Sup p o se an  auth o r‘s p reface co n sists so lely in  th is rem ark: ‗A t least o n e statem en t in  th is 
b o o k is false‘. T h en  the body of the book must contain at least one false statement. For 
suppose it does not. Then if the preface is true, it is false, and if it is false, it is true; 
which is impossible.109 
 
This is a stronger paradox, as it allows the referential nature of the statement to work against 
itself, but it is still reliant upon the fact the text does not contain any errors; if the text 
contains errors then there is no paradox. Such paradoxes are common and, following this 
‗P reface‘ th read, can  b e p ared do w n  b y rem o vin g any external material that refers to the 
                                                 
107 These figures suggest th e fo rm s used b y H eidegger an d D errida w h en  th ey use term s such  as ‗Being‘ to  
sign ify th e w ay is w h ich  b ein g is b o th  ‗w ritten ‘ an d ‗w ritten  o ver‘. T he p ro b lem  w ith  th e fo rm ulatio n ‗[nihilism] 
does not exist‘ is th at it suggests th at n ih ilism  h as b een  w ritten and then erased. The second formulation avoids 
this, although at the expense of defining nihilism in any meaningful way –  which is exactly the point. 
108 R. M. Sainsbury, Paradoxes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 148. 
109 Sainsbury, p. 148. 
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referen tial n ature o f th e statem en t: ‗A ssum e th at th ere is a text co n tain in g o n ly o n e p h rase: 
―A t least o n e statem en t in  th is b o o k is false‖‘. If th is is th e case th en  th e o n ly statem en t to  
which it can refer is itself, implying a self-referential statement. As the reflexive nature of this 
sentence disproves itself (that is, if it is true, it is false, and if it is false, it is true), only 
semantic paradox remains. 
This kind of semantic paradox can be further pared down, for if the text contains only 
o n e sen ten ce, th en  th ere is n o  n eed to  refer to  a ‗text‘ at all, an d th e statem en t n eed  o n ly 
refer to  itself. H en ce, w e see th e statem en t ‗T h is statem en t is false‘, o r, in  o rder to  retain  th e 
requisite definition of truth , ‗T h is statem en t is n o t true‘. T h is retain s all th e p revio us features 
of semantic paradox without having to refer to anything outside of itself. This statement 
cannot be true without being exempt from its own criteria, and is in fact a stronger version 
o f th e p h rase ‗th ere is n o  truth ‘ th at h as b een  used th ro ugh o ut th is th esis to  defin e 
nihilism.110 Reflexive nihilism becomes paradoxical, and rather than being totalitarian and 
proscriptive, becomes ouroburotic, not being able to proclaim its own truth, lost in the void 
of its own creation. 
T h is is true n o t o n ly o f sin gle statem en ts such  as ‗T h is statem en t is n o t true‘, b ut also  
of statements that refer to each other, such as the much-vaunted Liar Paradox. This paradox 
is p redicated up o n  th e statem en t ‗T h is statem en t is n o t true‘ b ut it co m es in  tw o  p arts, th e 
first of which may refer to such self-falsifyin g statem en ts. T h e first claim  is th at, ‗(S) T h ere is 
a sen ten ce th at says o f itself o n ly th at it is n o t true‘; th e seco n d claim  is th at, ‗(T ) A n y 
                                                 
110 ‗T h ere is n o  truth ‘ is n o t in h eren tly p arado xical. If it is co n sidered true, th en  it creates a p arado x b ecause it is 
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considered true that it creates a paradox, in much the same way as critics suggest that nihilism must be invalid 
for this very reason. Having now introduced this stronger formulation of nihilism, from this point on nihilism 
can  be co n sidered equivalen t to  th e statem en t th at ‗T h is sen ten ce is n o t true‘. 
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sentence is true if, an d o n ly if, w h at it says is th e case‘.111 The first claim is obviously matched 
b y such  statem en ts as, ‗T h is sen ten ce is n o t true‘, an d R o b ert M artin  diagn o ses th e 
incompatibility thus: 
 
Suppose (S) is true, and let s be any such sentence. Then s cannot be true, for, since s 
says it is not true, if it were true it would not be true (by (T)). But since s is not true, and 
since that, and only that, is what s says, then (by (T)) s is true.112 
 
In this we see yet another problem with the problem of self-referential statements. Semantic 
paradoxes do not defy logic so much as take logic to the nth degree, whereupon it begins to 
delegitimise itself. Logically, the sentence s is both true and false simultaneously (and 
therefore neither true nor false). The distinction between the Preface Paradoxes and the Liar 
Paradox is important in relation to postmodernism because there are two formulations of 
th e p arado xical p o stm o dern  n o vel: o n e w h ich  is in tern ally in co n sisten t (a ‗P reface‘ 
formulation) and one in which paradox emerges through the presence of opposing 
ideo lo gies w ith in  th e sam e text (a ‗L iar‘ fo rm ulatio n ). 
T o  return  to  th e questio n  th at w as asked at th e en d o f ‗Ex nihilo‘, if n ih ilism  is th e 
philosophy of absolute negation, then why should it have any relevance, especially to ethics? 
A lth o ugh  A lain  B adio u h as argued th at eth ics is in trin sically n ih ilistic, sayin g th at ‗eth ics 
would be better named –  since it speaks Greek –  a ―eu-oudénose‖, a sm ug n ih ilism ‘, it is rath er 
the case that nihilism is ethical (as opposed to ethics being nihilistic).113 Adorno argued that 
                                                 
111 R o b ert L . M artin , ‗In tro ductio n ‘, in  Recent Essays on the Truth and Liar Paradox, ed. by Robert L. Martin 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), pp. 1-8 (p. 1) 
112 Martin, p. 2. 
113 Alain Badiou, Ethics: An Essay on the Understanding of Evil, trans. by Peter Hallward (London: Verso, 2002), p. 
38. 
 156 
n ih ilism  w as ‗th e acm e o f ab stractio n , an d th e ab stract is th e ab o m in ab le‘ alth o ugh  h is 
dem an d fo r a ‗n egative dialectics‘ suggests th at n ih ilism  m ay in  fact b e eth ical: 
 
If negative dialectics calls for the self-reflection of thinking, the tangible implication is 
that if thinking is to be true –  if it to be true today, in any case –  it must also be thinking 
against itself. If thought is not measured by the extremity that eludes the concept, it is 
from the outset in the nature of the musical accompaniment with which the SS liked to 
drown out the screams of its victims.114 
 
R eflexive n ih ilism  is th e ‗self-reflectio n  o f th in kin g‘ b ecause it calls in to  b ein g h o w  w e are to  
think about nothingness: it is the ‗th in kin g again st itself‘ th at A do rn o  dem an ds. L ikew ise, o ur 
in ab ility to  reco n cile n ih ilism  w ith  itself suggests ‗th e extrem ity th at eludes th e co n cep t‘. 
Thus, we do not overcome this formulation of nihilism because we have always already 
failed to understand it –  it marks the point at which thought devaluates itself (Nietzsche), the 
point at which nihilism (an)nihilates itself (Heidegger). This is ethical because it suggests that 
we no longer have the right to propose anything, to act, or to do, because ‗if n o th in g is true, 
th en  n o th in g is justified‘ (G o udsb lo m ). T h is fo rm ulatio n  also  suggests th at everyth in g th at 
exists within the realm of Being is Other to nothingness: in order to preserve its otherness 
we must not speak about it. Thus, it is that which  calls th e Self in to  questio n  an d fo rces it ‗to  
p refer th at w h ich  justifies b ein g o ver th at w h ich  assures it‘ (L evin as).115 Reflexive nihilism 
forces us to justify Being, and forces us to justify why we are, as opposed to why we are not. 
T h is is th e ‗true‘ eth ic o f n ih ilism , in  w h ich  reflexive n ih ilism  is n o t ‗eth ical n ih ilism ‘ b ut an  
‗eth ical‘ n ih ilism  th at in fo rm s o ur sen se o f existen ce. 
                                                 
114 Theodor W. Adorno, Negative Dialectics (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973), pp. 380, 365. 
115 Levinas, p. 85. 
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5. 
‘W elcom e to th e F all’: N ih ilism  an d  A pocalyp se  
 
 
Everything is useless 
Nothing works at all 
Nothing ever matters 
Welcome to the Fall. 
 –  M in istry, ‗T h e F all‘.1 
 
One of the most explicit strands of nihilism running throughout postmodern literature is the 
co n cep t o f ap o calyp se. A s th e lyrics fro m  ‗T h e F all‘ in dicate, th e ap o calyp se sym b o lises 
complete destruction; nothing functions, nothing matters. There is a movement in the lyrics 
fro m  ‗E veryth in g is useless‘ to  ‗N o th in g w o rks at all‘, h o w ever, w h ich  in dicates th e 
im p o rtan ce o f n ih ilism  to  th e ap o calyp se. ‗E veryth in g is useless‘ suggests th at all th in gs do  
not work, whereas ‗N o th in g w o rks at all / N o th in g ever m atters‘ suggest an  in versio n  o f th e 
previous statement –  o n ly ‗N o th in g‘ w o rks, o n ly ‗N o th in g‘ ever m atters. ‗W elco m e to  th e 
F all‘ th erefo re suggests n o t o n ly th e B ib lical F all b ut also , in  m o dern  tim es, ‗th e death  of 
G o d‘, after w h ich  o n ly n ih ilism  rem ain s. P o stm o dern ism , as th at w h ich  o rigin ates in  th e 
Holocaust, is therefore implicated with nihilism through its apocalyptic origins. 
T h e co n cep t o f ‗ap o calyp se‘ is actually o n e o f th e m o st im p o rtan t features o f 
postmo dern  literature, en co m p assin g b o th  ‗th e ab surd‘ an d ‗ab sen ce‘: th e ab surd is th e 
response to apocalypse and absence is what remains after the apocalypse. The literature of 
the postmodern apocalypse is essentially one that deals with the extreme limits of being –  
                                                 
1 M in istry, ‗T h e F all‘, fro m  Filth Pig. Warner Bros. 1995. 
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being, as it were, at the end of the world. The Holocaust informs much postmodern theory, 
through figures such as Levinas and Blanchot, and this is reflected in the apocalyptic 
literature of postmodernism. Throughout postmodern discourse there is a sen se th at ‗th e 
apocalypse has, in some sense, already happened‘.2 This retrospective apocalypse is tempered by a 
prospective apocalypse: postmodern fictions must also deal with the nuclear age and potential 
ecological disaster. There are therefore two extremes between which postmodernism is 
caught: the analeptic recuperation of previous traumas and the proleptic trace of 
(bi)millennial anxiety, the apocalypse that has been and the apocalypse to come. In this way, 
postmodernism can be characterised by the ‗tw o -faced‘ R o m an  go d, Jan us. It is ‗tw o -faced‘ 
n o t o n ly b ecause it is ‗do ub le-co ded‘ –  full of unresolved dyads –  but also because it looks to 
the future and the past simultaneously. 
Of course, postmodern literature is not the only form of literature concerned with the 
ap o calyp se. L iterature h as alw ays b een  co n cern ed w ith  th e ‗en d o f th in gs‘ b ecause it 
rep resen ts so cial an xieties an d so  ap o calyp tic an xiety ap p ears in  every h isto rical p erio d: ‗T h e 
apocalyptic as a literary genre must be understood as a species of the larger genre of 
eschatology, the study of end things –  ta eschata, th e edge o f h o rizo n  sp atially o r tem p o rally‘.3 
This definition of apocalypse as horizon signifies the range that apocalyptic discourse may 
take. It may be concerned with death and rebirth, or just death; it may be concerned with the 
destruction of humanity or the destruction of an idea; it may signify a moving beyond a 
previous horizon or a turning back to a previous one. Literature does not use one formal 
                                                 
2 Jam es B erger, ‗T w en tieth -C en tury A p o calypse: F orecasts an d A fterm ath s‘, Twentieth Century Literature, 46:4 
(2000), 387-95 (p. 388). 
3 Q uo ted in  E lan a G o m el, ‗T h e P lague o f U to p ias: P estilen ce an d th e A p o calyp tic B o dy‘, Twentieth Century 
Literature, 46:4 (2000), 405-33 (p. 407). The original source is Catherine Keller, Apocalypse Now and Then: A 
Feminist Guide to the End of the World (Boston: Beacon, 1966), p. 20. 
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rhetorical strategy or symbol to convey the meaning of apocalypse and so postmodern 
literature of the apocalypse is merely part of the larger apocalyptic genre. 
Within the twentieth century itself, modernism and modernist literature deal with the 
idea of apocalypse. There are explicit associations between modernism and the apocalypse, 
fo r exam p le, in  T . S. E lio t‘s ‗T h e W aste L an d‘ (1922). Although the apocalyptic Grail 
lan dscap e o f ‗T h e W aste L an d‘ is historically specific, such vistas extend to become the 
apocalyptic landscapes of p o stm o dern  literature. C o n sider, fo r exam p le, E lio t‘s ‗T h e H o llo w  
M en ‘ (1925): 
 
This is the way the world ends 
This is the way the world ends 
This is the way the world ends 
Not with a bang but a whimper.4 
 
‗This is the way the world ends‘ suggests th at, fo r E lio t, th e ap o calyp se is ‗n o w ‘, in  th e p resen t, 
neither retrospective nor prospective. The relationship between modernist and postmodern 
apocalypses demonstrates the extent to which postmodernism is conditioned by an 
awareness of the modernist apocalypse. Although modernist literature deals with apocalypse, 
it cannot have the foresight to deal with elements of apocalypse that culminate later in the 
twentieth century. Postmodernism is post-apocalyptic, seeing in modernism the culmination 
of an apocalyptic Enlightenment modernity, and realises what Eliot cannot: the world may in 
fact en d w ith  a ‗b an g‘ b ecause n uclear ap o calyp se is n o t a ‗w h im p er‘. E ven  after th e cultural 
sh o ck o f th e ‗G reat W ar‘ th ere w as th e H o lo caust, M A D  (a suitab le acro n ym  fo r ‗M utually 
                                                 
4 T . S. E lio t, ‗T he H o llo w  M en ‘, in  Selected Poems (London: Faber and Faber, 2002), pp. 67-70 (p. 70). 
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A ssured D estructio n ‘), an d en viro n m en tal catastro p h e. It is w ith  th ese fo rm s o f ap o calyp se 
that postmodern literature is primarily concerned. Postmodernism may exist in the 
‗w h im p er‘ b ut realises th at th ere m ay b e an o th er ‗b an g‘ to  co m e. 
 
(Post)Modern Apocalypses 
In the latter part of the twentieth century, there are a number of recurring tropes in the 
rep resen tatio n  o f th e ap o calyp se. Jam es B erger h as argued th at th ere are ‗fo ur p rin cip le areas 
o f p o stw ar ap o calyp tic rep resen tatio n ‘, w h ich  are n uclear w ar, th e H o lo caust, ‗ap o calyp ses o f 
lib eratio n ‘, an d ‗p o stm o dern ity‘.5 Literature dealing with nuclear war and the Holocaust are 
self-eviden tly ap o calyp tic disco urses, alth o ugh  ‗ap o calyp ses o f lib eratio n ‘ an d  
‗p o stm o dern ity‘ seem  n o t to  fit w ith in  C ath erin e K eller‘s afo rem en tio n ed defin itio n  o f 
ap o calyp se as ‗th e study o f en d th in gs‘. B erger argues th at th ese are ap o calyp tic disco urses 
because they act in a destructive manner upon previous ideological formulations, which they 
attempt to suppress. This is nihilism  in asm uch  as n ih ilism  w as defin ed h isto rically as ‗any 
n egatio n  th at attacks do m in an t ideo lo gical p ractices‘: an  ideo lo gical ap o calyp se.6 
‗A p o calyp ses o f lib eratio n ‘ are th o se n arratives co n cern ed w ith  fem in ism , 
postcolonialism, and queer theory. These are apocalyptic because such narratives rupture the 
h egem o n ic disco urse o f w h ite ‗W estern ‘ m en : ‗T h e en ds –  imagined, wished for, struggled 
for, and resisted –  of male, white Euro-American colonial and heterosexist domination (and 
even of gender, race, and nation as meaningful concepts) all have been figured in apocalyptic 
term s‘.7 B y in terro gatin g such  term s, th ese p revio usly ‗O th ered‘ n arratives act in  an  
                                                 
5 Berger, p. 390. 
6 See page 7 of this thesis. 
7 Berger, p. 391. 
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apocalyptic manner upon hegemonic discourse. Such narratives interpret history as 
apocalyptic, as well as acting in an apocalyptic manner upon history, because not only do 
they seek to destroy those values which gave rise to the persecution of those Other to white, 
Western, heterosexual, masculine discourse, but they also exhibit a rhetoric in which they are 
th em selves un der th e in fluen ce o f a p ast ap o calyp se. T h e ‗ap o calyp ses‘ o f fem in ism , 
postcolonialism, and queer theory not only act in an apocalyptic manner, but also write from 
the apocalypse that was white, male, colonial, heterosexual discourse. 
The ‗p o stco lo n ial‘ ap o calyp se ap p ears in  b lack fictio n  o f th e 1950s an d 1960s, w ith  th e 
rise o f th e civil lib erties m o vem en t. T h is ‗p o stco lo n ial ap o calyp se‘ is, in  m an y w ays, a 
‗p o stco lo n ial n ih ilism ‘, b ecause auth o rs such  as R ich ard W righ t an d R alp h  E lliso n  
ap p ro p riate n ih ilism  fo r b lack so ciety. W righ t‘s w o rks, in cludin g The Outsider (1953) and the 
n o vella ‗T h e M an  W h o  L ived U n dergro un d‘ (1944), sh o w  th e im p licit n ih ilism  o f b lack 
culture. W h ereas A lb ert C am us‘ ‗o utsider‘ o f The Stranger (1942) epitomises existential 
p h ilo so p h y an d rejects th e co n cep t o f so ciety, W righ t‘s ‗o utsider‘ is do ub ly o utside, alread y 
outside the dominant (white) culture and further exteriorised by his distance from his own 
o p p ressed (b lack) culture. C ro ss D am o n , th e ep o n ym o us ‗O utsid er‘, h as ‗n o  p arty, n o  m yth s, 
no tradition, no race, no soil, no culture, and no ideas –  except perhaps the idea that ideas in 
th em selves w ere, at b est, dub io us‘.8 Such  ‗Ideas‘, as N ick D e G en o va realises, are p art o f th e 
larger ‗in stitutio n  o f co n strain t an d rep ressio n ‘ –  white culture –  that Damon is trying to 
avo id, an d so  D am o n ‘s sub versio n  o f th e w h ite h egem o n y is n ih ilistic.9 The idea of a black 
n ih ilism  is also  seen  in  ‗T h e M an  W h o  L ived U n dergro un d‘, w h ere a w h ite p o licem an  says 
‗Y o u‘ve go t to  sh o o t h is kin d. T h ey‘d w reck th in gs‘, w h ere ‗th in gs‘ m ean s th e edifice o f 
                                                 
8 Richard Wright, The Outsider (New York: Harper and Row, 1953), p. 377. 
9 Nick De Genova , ‗G an gster R ap  an d N ih ilism  in  B lack A m erica: So m e Q uestio n s o f L ife an d D eath ‘, Social 
Text, 13:2 (1995), 89-132 (p. 100). 
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w h ite so ciety, w h at Y o sh in o b u H akutan i calls ‗th e system  o f o p p ressio n ‘.10 This means that, 
by acting as an apocalypse on white culture, black activism is seen as a form of nihilism. 
Such a perception marginalises the problem of nihilism in relation to black culture, however, 
because it unproblematically categorises political activism as nihilism. This is seen clearly in 
E lliso n ‘s Invisible Man (1952), where the shift of the character of Ras, fro m  ‗E xh o rter‘ to  
‗D estro yer‘ is th e result o f m an ip ulatio n  b y th e Stalin ist ‗B ro th erh o o d‘. R as‘ destructive 
nihilism actually supports the dominant (white) ideology by reinforcing the perception of 
black culture as violent, savage, and destructive, rather than subverting it. The Brotherhood 
is n o t ab o ut em an cip atio n  b ut co n tro l, as th e ‗in visib le m an ‘ realises: ‗T h e co m m ittee 
planned it. And I had helped, had been a tool. A tool just at the very moment I had thought 
m yself free‘.11 
B lack fictio n ‘s dep ictio n  o f n ih ilism  is th erefo re am b ivalen t. W righ t‘s n ih ilism , fo r 
example, is not intrinsically destructive, because it is the overcoming of an earlier nihilism 
p erp etrated b y w h ite culture, co rresp o n din g to  th e idea th at ‗ap o calyp ses o f lib eratio n ‘ n o t 
only act apocalyptically but also act from an earlier apocalypse. Fred Daniels, the protagonist 
o f ‗T h e M an  W h o  L ived U n dergro un d‘, reveals th is asp ect o f b lack n ih ilism : ‗M ayb e 
anyth in g‘s righ t, h e m um b led. Y es, if th e w o rld as m en  h ad m ade it w as righ t, th en anything 
else w as righ t, an y act m an  to o k to  satisfy h im self, m urder, th eft, to rture‘.12 Although this 
fo rm ulatio n  suggests n ih ilism  (in  th e sen se th at ‗if n o th in g is justified, th en  everyth in g is 
p erm itted‘), it sh o w s th at th is attitude is itself a result o f ‗th e w o rld as m en  h ad m ade it‘ o r, 
more specifically, dominant white ideologies. Hakutani argues: 
                                                 
10 R ich ard W right, ‗T h e M an  W h o  L ived U n dergroun d‘, in  Eight Stories (Cleveland: World, 1963), pp. 27-92 (p. 
92); Y o sh in o b u H akutan i, ‗R ich ard W righ t‘s The Man Who Lived Underground, N ih ilism , an d Z en ‘, Mississippi 
Quarterly, 47:2 (1994), 201-13 (p. 203). 
11 Ralph Ellison, Invisible Man (London: Penguin, 1965), p. 445. 
12 W righ t, ‗T h e M an  W h o  L ived U n dergroun d‘, p. 64. 
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For Daniels, at least, a human action, whether it is well intended or not, has no meaning. 
For a person to find values in his act or in the society which has victimized the person is 
sheer futility. If such values should exist, Daniels argues, they should be annihilated.13 
 
 ‗W h ite‘ n ih ilism  created ‗b lack‘ n ih ilism  an d b lack n ih ilism  is m erely th e an n ih ilatio n  o f 
(acting as an apocalypse upon) the earlier ‗w h ite‘ n ih ilism . A lth o ugh  b o th  H akutan i an d D e 
Genova feel that this is a positive form of nihilism, critics such as Cornel West argue that 
th is creates a fun dam en tal p ro b lem  w ith in  b lack culture itself. F o r W est, n ih ilism  is ‗th e 
monumental eclipse of hope, the unprecedented collapse of meaning, the incredible 
disregard fo r h um an  (esp ecially b lack) life an d p ro p erty‘ th at co m es fro m  ‗th e p ro fo un d 
sense of psychological depression, personal worthlessness, and despair so widespread in 
b lack A m erica‘.14 This results in  ‗a n um b in g detach m en t fro m  o th ers an d a self-destructive 
disp o sitio n  to w ards th e w o rld‘.15 Black nihilism –  seen in the gang violence and misogyny of 
‗gan gsta rap ‘ –  is perceived negatively by West because it perpetuates the ghettoisation of 
black society through its own self-destructive tendencies, however much this may be the 
fault of white society as a whole. 
W h ilst th is is m o stly accurate, W est is m istaken  in  assum in g ‗b lack‘ n ih ilism  to  b e so lely 
destructive, especially in relation to Wright an d E lliso n . A lth o ugh  E lliso n ‘s ch aracter o f R as 
in deed sym b o lises ‗a self-destructive disp o sitio n  to w ards th e w o rld‘, E lliso n ‘s p rim ary 
ch aracter, th e ‗in visib le m an ‘, like W righ t‘s C ro ss D am o n  an d F red D an iels, m o ves aw ay 
fro m  ‗n egative‘ n ih ilism  w h en  h e begins to avoid the simplistic opposition between black 
an d w h ite. In  co n trast to  th e destructive n ih ilism  o f R as (w h ich  ep ito m ises W est‘s p ercep tio n  
                                                 
13 Hakutani, p. 206. 
14 Cornel West, Race Matters (New York: Vintage, 1994), pp. 19-20. 
15 West, p. 23. 
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o f b lack n ih ilism ), th e ‗in visib le m an ‘, D am o n , an d D an iels dem o n strate an  altern ative fo rm  
of nihilism. T h e ‗o utside‘ o r ‗un dergro un d‘ n atures o f th ese ch aracters illustrate th e refusal to  
simply react, to be a black shadow to the white-m an ‘s ligh t (as ‗b lack‘ n ih ilism  fo llo w in g 
‗w h ite‘ n ih ilism  in dicates). 
T h e ‗in visib le m an ‘ rem o ves h im self fro m  th e co n flict between black and white, living 
alo n e un dergro un d in  a ro o m  full o f ligh ts w ith  p o w er sto len  fro m  ‗M o n o p o lated L igh t an d 
P o w er‘. T h is allego ry fo r th e E n ligh ten m en t is n o t sim p ly an  in versio n  o f ligh t/darkn ess b ut 
a deco n structive ‗gen eral displacement o f th e structure itself‘.16 As with the 
slavery/em an cip atio n  dyad sym b o lised b y B ro th er T arp ‘s leg iro n s, it is im p o ssib le ‗to  th in k 
of it in terms of but two words, yes and no‘ b ecause it sign ifies ‗a h eap  m o re‘.17 Although the 
‗in visib le m an ‘ can  see ‗th e darkn ess o f ligh tn ess‘ an d says th at ‗th e w o rld m o ves‘ b y 
‗co n tradictio n ‘ (im p licitly in dicatin g a lin k b etw een  n ih ilism  an d th e sub lim e w ith in  th e 
Enlightenment), his decision to become invisible, rather than be made invisible by cultural 
forces, indicates his refusal to exist in a world of light and dark, white and black: the system 
is inverted and then displaced.18 Sim ilarly, F red D an iels m o ves ‗un dergro un d‘, w h ich  fo r 
H akutan i sym b o lises a differen t kin d o f ‗en ligh ten m en t‘. R ath er th an  n ih ilism  per se, Hakutani 
sees a form of Buddhist satori [self-enlightenment] through mu [n o th in gn ess] in  D an iels‘ 
descent: 
 
To Daniels, forgetting the past and alienating himself from the activities of the world 
becomes a kind of self-reliance. It is ironic that by blinding himself to the facts of 
                                                 
16 Jacques Derrida, Margins of Philosophy, trans. by Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), p. 
329. 
17 Ellison, p. 313. 
18 E lliso n , p . 10. T h is also  suggests th at th e ‗tran sp aren t so ciety‘ is o n e in  w h ich  B eing itself b eco m es 
tran sp aren t, suggestin g a p o sitive turn  o f V irilio ‘s ‗aesth etics o f disap p earance‘, w h ere in visib ility b eco m es an  
em ancip ato ry co n ditio n  rath er th an  an  exp ressio n  o f ‗p ure w ar‘. See p ages 142 -43 of this thesis. 
 165 
society above, he seizes on a new vision of life. Living in a cave has taught him how 
chaotic and meaningless life on earth really is.19 
 
It is sign ifican t th at it is ‗b y b lin din g h im self‘ th at D an iels reach es a n ew  stage o f aw areness. 
A lth o ugh  h e is driven  un dergro un d, h e ceases to  see in  ‗b lack an d w h ite‘ w h en  rem o ved  
fro m  th e so ciety th at p erp etuates such  reificatio n s. ‗C o lo ur-b lin dn ess‘ –  a fo rm  o f Jay‘s 
‗eth ics o f b lin dn ess‘ –  is also the solution for Cross Damon, where his exteriority from his 
o w n  culture leads h im  to  th e co n clusio n  th at ‗M ayb e m an  is n o th in g in  p articular‘.20 Here, 
‗M an ‘ is ‗n o th in g in  p articular‘, n o t ‗b lack‘ o r ‗w h ite‘. T h e sh ift aw ay fro m  in terp ellatio n  to  
independence is achieved not through passive or active demonstration and protest, but 
through the removal/displacement of the system that perpetuates the conflict. This is 
apocalyptic because although it does not actively destroy the system, it, in effect, makes it 
nothing: a strategic use of nihilism. 
Although West often miscategorises black nihilism, it does present problems, especially 
in  relatio n  to  fem in ism . ‗G an gsta‘ rap , fo r exam p le, ‗serves up  w h ite A m erica‘s m o st 
cherished gun-slinging mythologies (heroic American dreams) in the form of its worst and 
b lackest n igh tm ares‘.21 W h ilst th is ‗em p o w ers B lack im agin atio n s to  n egate th e existen tial 
terro r o f gh etto  life‘, it also  ‗to o  co m m o n ly asp ires to  th e to tal do m in atio n  an d b rutalizatio n  
o f w o m en ‘.22 T h e ap o calyp se o f ‗b lack‘ n ih ilism  is such  th at it n egates n o t o n ly ‗w h ite‘ 
ideo lo gies, b ut also  ‗fem ale‘ ideo lo gies. P atriarch y is as eviden t in  th e ‗p o stco lo n ial 
ap o calyp se‘ as it is in  th e do m in an t h egem o n y again st w h ich  such  ‗ap o calyp ses o f lib eratio n ‘ 
are striving. In relation to an apocalyptic femininity, for example, there is a comparison to be 
                                                 
19 Hakutani, p. 212. 
20 Wright, The Outsider, p. 135. See page 92, n. 35 of this thesis. 
21 De Genova, p. 107. 
22 De Genova, pp. 107, 109. 
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m ade b etw een  texts such  as A n gela C arter‘s The Passion of New Eve (1977), Margaret 
A tw o o d‘s T he H an dm aid’s T ale (1986), an d T o n i M o rriso n ‘s Beloved (1987). The Passion of New 
Eve demonstrates femininity acting in an apocalyptic manner, with a female character 
dan cin g ‗a d an ce called th e E n d o f th e W o rld‘.23 T he H an dm aid’s T ale, however, shows a 
different apocalypse, after which patriarchy is reinstated as the primary form of control. 
Where femininity is actively apocalyptic in The Passion of New Eve, in T he H an dm aid’s T ale it is 
acted upon apocalyptically and remains passive, with only a small percentage of women 
being able to conceive and then only under the auspices of a patriarchal system of control. 
Whilst the rebellion indicates a desire to destroy patriarchy (act as an apocalypse upon it), 
this is never fully realised within T he H an dm aid’s T ale. Beloved, in comparison to both these 
texts, struggles to even perform itself as a text. It is haunted by both misogyny and racism, 
and the ghost symbolises the difficulty in reconciling the past with the future. Without 
creatin g an  artificial ‗h ierarch y o f sufferin g‘, it is fair to  say th at even  n o w , Beloved is a difficult 
text with which to deal because of the conflation of two opposing forms of repression. It is a 
text h aun ted b y th e ab sen t figure o f th e ‗b elo ved‘ w h ere freedo m  can n o t b e realised w ith o ut 
laying the ghosts to rest. 
R eturn in g to  B erger‘s ap o calyp tic schema, h e justifies ‗ap o calyp tic‘ p o stm o dern ity in  a 
similar fashion to both feminism and postcolonialism, because postmodern literature and 
th eo ry ‗co n sisten tly refer to  sh atterin g an d rup tures o f fo rm s o f th o ugh t, an d to  th e ab so lute 
alterities o n  th e far side, o r w ith in , th ese rup tures‘.24 This deals with postmodernity 
uncritically, giving it a uniqueness that is not altogether valid. Although postmodernity is an 
attempt at a radical break with previous discourses, it is still trapped within an historical 
                                                 
23 Angela Carter, The Passion of New Eve (London: Virago, 1996), pp. 173-74. The apocalyptic nature of 
fem in in ity an d its relatio n  to  n ih ilism  is dealt w ith  m o re fully in  th e seven th  ch ap ter of th is th esis, ‗B ein g 
―A b sent-M in ded‖‘, p p. 257-60. 
24 Berger, p. 392. 
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dialectic. Postmodernism may refer to ruptures, as Berger argues, but this referral does not 
necessarily indicate that postmodernism is a rupture. Whilst postmodernism argues against 
Enlightenment modernity, the referral to this discourse acts as a reminder of the historical 
origins of postmodernism: it is not a break in the chain, but another link. Postmodernism 
becomes the logical conclusion of the Enlightenment, the Nietzschean point at which 
Enlightenment values begin to devalue themselves, rather than the overcoming of 
modernity. Although Berger argues that p o stm o dern ism  ‗m ay sign al a fo rgettin g o f h isto rical 
traum a‘ it do es so  o n ly b ecause B erger h im self do es n o t h isto ricise th e p o stm o dern .25 The 
apocalyptic postmodern does not destroy the values of modernity, but is in fact haunted by 
an apocalyptic modernity, and thus does not forget historical trauma, but writes from it. 
T h ere is a sign ifican t o m issio n  in  B erger‘s list o f ap o calyp tic n arratives, alth o ugh  to  
justify this, the prevalence of this has only just become clear. In the last decade, a number of 
cinematic releases have been concerned with the apocalypse and the most common theme in 
th ese is p estilen ce, an  idea th at run s th ro ugh o ut ap o calyp tic disco urse fro m  D an iel D efo e‘s 
A Journal of the Plague Year (1722) to  A lb ert C am us‘ The Plague (1947). What is significant 
about contemporary appearances of the fourth horseman, from Twelve Monkeys (1995) to 
Resident Evil and 28 Days Later (both 2002), is that such appearances represent the incursion 
of man-made viruses into the world. The fear of a GM (Genetically-Modified) apocalypse is 
b ased up o n  h um an ity‘s ab ility to  rew rite th e lan guage o f life –  the genetic code –  without 
fully understanding the implications. There are two strands to this form of apocalyptic 
discourse: the fear of terrorism and the fear of misguided genetic experimentation, one an 
in ten tio n al ap o calyp se, th e o th er in adverten t (w h at M artin  R ees calls ‗b io erro r o r 
                                                 
25 Berger, p. 392. 
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b io terro r‘).26 The prevalence of such narratives indicates the current fear of a GM apocalypse 
and, more importantly, signifies the rise in awareness of the imbalance between technological 
advancement and moral or ecological awareness. 
The significance of this form of apocalypse to literary studies is seen in the rise of 
eco criticism , a fo rm  o f criticism  th at studies ‗th e relatio n sh ip  b etween literature and the 
p h ysical en viro n m en t‘.27 This broad description of ecocriticism can be related to literature in 
a number of ways, from the landscape in which the author wrote his or her work to the 
representation of the physical environment within the text itself. Ecocriticism is significant in 
a study of apocalyptic literature because the rise of this form of criticism is predicated upon 
th e sen se th at th e ap o calyp se is im m in en t: ‗E ith er w e ch an ge o ur w ays o r w e face glo b al 
catastrophe, destroying much beauty and exterminating countless fellow species in our 
h eadlo n g race to  ap o calyp se‘.28 Ecocriticism is therefore a form of criticism that responds to 
the literature of the apocalypse, arguing against the current industrial and military activities 
that pollute the planet. It also seeks to recuperate a meaning in a postmodern artefact, 
moving away from the text towards its placement and representation within a physical 
environment. In relation to postmodern literature, however, ecocriticism is of most use in 
studying the representation of the environment within the text rather than the authorial 
en viro n m en t in  w h ich  a text w as w ritten , allo w in g th e fo cus to  rem ain  o n  th e ‗text‘, n o t th e 
‗w o rk‘. E co criticism  is an  in valuab le to o l in  assessin g th e figure of the postmodern 
apocalypse because the horizon for postmodern apocalypse is fundamentally spatial –  if the 
                                                 
26 See Martin Rees, Our Final Century: Will the Human Race Survive the 21st Century? (London: Heinemann, 2003). 
27 C h eryll G lo tfelty, ‗In tro ductio n : L iterary Studies in  an  A ge o f E n viro nm en tal C risis‘, in  The Ecocriticism Reader: 
Landmarks in Literary Ecology, ed. by Cheryll Glotfelty and Harold Fromm (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 
1996), pp. xv-xxxvi (p. xviii). 
28 Glotfelty, p. xx. 
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apocalypse has already happened, then time does not exist anymore and place is the only 
significant aspect to apocalyptic narratives.  
Another significant factor in the development of postmodern apocalyptic narratives is 
that apocalypse no longer acts as a signifier of a utopia to come. Traditionally, whether the 
apocalypse comes in the form of flood, plague, or the Antichrist, it signals a moment where 
one kind of world ends and the other begins, where everybody dies except for those chosen. 
The widespread destruction of the apocalypse is adumbrated into utopian discourse, which 
justifies suffering under the auspices of a future paradise. Postmodern literature, however, 
demonstrates a fear of the utopian rather than indicating a utopian moment following an 
apocalypse. This is because postmodernism uses Levinasian ethics and any utopian 
sentiment is automatically unethical towards the Other. The search for utopia is equivalent 
to  ‗th e usurp atio n  o f sp aces b elo n gin g to  th e o th er m an  w h o m  I h ave alread y o p p ressed an d 
starved‘, w h ere th e Self‘s ideal sp ace –  B laise P ascal‘s ‗m y p lace is th e sun ‘ –  exiles the Other 
from the utopian space.29 Despite the fact that there are certainly post-war texts that 
dem o n strate th e ‗clean  slate‘ h yp o th esis o f a w o rld p urged o f w h at is un n ecessary, th ese are 
not postmodern texts in anything but a chronological sense.30 
Such utopian apocalypses, although they may sometimes be ‗late cap italist‘ disco urse, 
cannot be postmodern. They do not demonstrate a postmodern aesthetic or ethic because 
they are seeking a transcendental moment in the apocalypse, whether this is an idyllic 
historical moment or some as yet unrealised paradise. There is no longer any transcendental 
                                                 
29 E m m an uel L evin as, ‗E th ics as F irst P h ilo so p h y‘, tran s. b y Seán Hand and Michael Temple, in The Levinas 
Reader, ed. by Seán Hand (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989), pp. 75-87 (p . 82). P ascal‘s statem en t ap p ears in  Pensées, 
tran s. b y A . J. K railsh eim er (L o n do n : P en guin , 1995): ‗―T hat is m y p lace in  th e sun .‖ T here is th e o rigin and 
im age o f un iversal usurp atio n ‘ (§ 295 (p . 18)). 
30 It is important to understand here that traditional forms of utopia advocated one thing over another. 
Although postmodernism does this, it is an attempt to introduce diversity into the idea of utopia. 
Postmodernism is therefore utopian in the sense that it argues for an idealised world, but anti-utopian in that it 
disagrees with promoting the Self over the Other. 
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meaning in the apocalypse because of the form the apocalypse takes. There is no longer a rationale 
b eh in d th e ap o calyp se (such  as ‗th e w ill o f G o d‘) b ecause th e tw en tieth -century apocalypse 
signifies an irrational, meaningless destruction that can occur at any time, as Steve Erickson 
writes in The Sea Came in at Midnight (1999): 
 
So m etim e in  th e last h alf cen tury [… ] m o dern  ap o calyp se o utgrew  G o d. M o dern  
apocalypse was no longer about cataclysmic upheaval as related to divine revelation; 
m o dern  ap o calyp se [… ] w as an  exp lo sio n  o f tim e in  a vo id  o f m ean in g, w h en  
apocalypse lost nothing less than its very faith.31 
 
The postmodern apocalypse is man-made. It is not ordained by any transcendental idea, but 
purely by the capacity of humanity to have created the means for its own destruction that 
will, because the means exists, come to be realised. Postmodern literature, although haunted 
by apocalypse, is not the promised land of literature, but rather a response to the problem of 
the apocalypse. It is not a paradise, but a land built from the ruins of previous disasters, as 
Pynchon writes in G ravity’s R ain bow  (1973): ‗O ur h isto ry is an  aggregate o f last m o m en ts‘.32 
Similarly, we do not live after the apocalypse, or before it, but within it: it is not imminent, but 
immanent. Blanchot asks in The Writing of the Disaster, ‗C an  o n e m ain tain  an y distan ce at all 
w h en  A usch w itz h ap p en s? H o w  is it p o ssib le to  say: A usch w itz h as h ap p en ed?‘.33 This is 
because it remains with us as a feeling of apocalypse from which we cannot escape, a feeling 
of continued disaster. 
                                                 
31 Steve Erickson, The Sea Came in at Midnight (New York: Perennial, 2000), p. 49. Internal quotation marks have 
been omitted. 
32 Thomas Pynchon, G ravity’s R ain bow  (London: Vintage, 1995), p. 149. 
33 Maurice Blanchot, The Writing of the Disaster, trans. by Ann Smock (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 
1995), p. 143. 
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This demonstrates the implicit nihilism of postmodern apocalyptic narratives, which 
narrate not only the complete erasure of life but also the complete lack of meaning behind 
this erasure. T h ese tw o  asp ects o f n ih ilism , w h ich  m igh t b e term ed ‗auth o ritarian ‘ an d 
‗existen tial‘ n ih ilism , are jo in ed b y an o th er fo rm : sem an tic n ih ilism . T h is ap p ears b ecause 
such narratives face a unique challenge in that although they act as commentator, witnessing 
th e disaster, th ey are im p licated w ith in  th at ap o calyp tic p ro cess an d th us can n o t ‗w itn ess‘, in  
th e sen se o f eith er ‗o b servin g‘ o r ‗attestin g to ‘, th e ap o calyp se at all. A s a result o f th is, w h en  
postmodern literature deals with apocalyptic premises, it can only do so in a fragmentary 
m an n er, b reakin g ap art distin ctio n s o f n arrative fo rm  an d tech n ique in  o rder to  ‗tell th e 
sto ry‘ o f th e en d. T h is aw aren ess o f b ein g sim ultan eo usly b o th  w itn ess an d victim  is an  
aspect of postmodernism that comes from Holocaust literature. 
 
The Writing of the (Postmodern) Disaster 
Postmodern literature faces many of the problems associated with Holocaust literature and 
those features of postmodern literature that appear in this chapter originate in the field of 
Holocaust writing. Postmodern literature, as that which writes the unwritable, writes in 
fragments, a literary form that is a result of the Holocaust. Ann Smock argues: 
 
T h e ‗w ritin g o f th e disaster‘ m ean s n o t sim p ly th e p ro cess w h ereb y so m eth in g called th e 
disaster is written –  communicated, attested to, or prophesied. It also means the writing 
done by the disaster –  b y th e disaster th at ruin s b o o ks an d w recks lan guage. ‗T h e w ritin g 
o f th e disaster‘ m ean s th e w ritin g th at th e disaster –  which liquidates writing –  is, just as 
‗kn o w ledge o f th e disaster‘ m ean s kn o w ledge as disaster.34 
 
                                                 
34 Blanchot, p. ix. 
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T h is reveals th e clo se co n n ectio n  b etw een  H o lo caust literature an d ‗p o stm o dern ‘ fictio n . 
B lan ch o t‘s ‗w ritin g o f th e disaster‘ m ean s w ritin g ab o ut th e H o lo caust, as a result o f th e 
etymo lo gical sign ifican ce o f disaster as th e ‗un favo urab le asp ect o f a star‘ an d th e 
requirement, under National Socialism, that all of Jewish descent wear yellow stars. 
Furthermore, it also refers to the possibility of writing after the disaster, and the way in which 
th is is m ade difficult, if n o t im p o ssib le. T h us, ‗th e w ritin g o f th e disaster‘ is also  ‗th e disaster 
o f w ritin g‘. P o stm o dern  ap o calyp tic fictio n s m ust deal sim ultan eo usly w ith  th e act o f 
witnessing the disaster and its aftermath, and with the impossibility of doing so. The 
emergence of postmodern narratives from the Holocaust is directly indicative of the way in 
which the Holocaust informs postmodern literature of the apocalypse. 
O n e such  exam p le is P aul A uster‘s In The Country of Last Things (1987), in which the 
reader fo llo w s A n n a B lum e‘s jo urn ey to  fin d h er b ro th er, W illiam . T h e ep o n ym o us co un try 
is both foreign and familiar to Anna. Concepts of rich and poor, kindness and greed, still 
exist in this place, and the difference is only in magnitude –  the gap between dichotomies is 
b o th  in surm o un tab le an d fin er th an  in  th e ‗real‘ w o rld. T h is co un try is an  exam p le o f th at 
which is unheimlich [uncanny] –  strange yet familiar, infinitely disturbing –  an d A n n a‘s jo urn ey 
through the city is simultaneously a journey through a foreign city, an exploration of the 
‗un derside‘ o f an y m etro p o lis, an d a jo urn ey th ro ugh  h er o w n  co n scio usn ess. T h e relatio n  o f 
In The Country of Last Things to the Holocaust is emphasised when we see how Auster himself 
intended this text: 
 
M y p rivate w o rkin g sub title fo r th e b o o k w as ‗A n n a B lum e W alks T h ro ugh  th e 20th  
C en tury.‘ I feel th at it‘s very m uch  a b o o k ab o ut o ur o w n  m o m en t, o ur o w n  era [… ] 
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The country Anna goes to might not be immediately recognizable, but I feel that this is 
where we live.35  
 
T h e H o lo caust, th at ‗disaster o f w ritin g‘, did n o t en d w ith  th e lib eratio n  o f th e cam p s, b ut 
remained in spirit throughout the twentieth century. It is the feeling o f co n tin ued ‗disaster‘ 
that informs In The Country of Last Things, and seein g it as a ‗H o lo caust‘ text len ds a n ew  ligh t 
to  certain  p assages, such  as th e m etap h o r o f th e ‗T ran sfo rm atio n  C en ters‘, th e o rgan ised 
p ersecutio n  o f religio us gro up s, an d th e rum o urs o f ‗h um an  slaugh terh o uses‘.36 As Anna 
tries to escape from the city, she w rites: ‗E n tran ces do  n o t b eco m e exits‘.37 This entrance to 
th e city co uld alm o st read ‗Arbeit Macht Frei‘ [W o rk b rin gs F reedo m ], th e legen d ab o ve th e 
entrance to the Auschwitz concentration camp, which is true in only the most perverted 
way.38 
The parallels b etw een  A uster‘s p o stm o dern  city an d co n cen tratio n  cam p s are also  seen  
in  th e ‗grey zo n e‘ th at, acco rdin g to  P rim o  L evi, defin ed life in  th e cam p s: ‗It is a grey zo n e, 
with ill-defined outlines which both separate and join the two camps of masters and 
servants. It possesses an incredibly complicated internal structure, and contains within itself 
en o ugh  to  co n fuse o ur n eed to  judge‘.39 T h e ‗grey zo n e‘ is th e lo catio n  o f m o ral am b iguity in  
which those who survive are not the most morally pure, and we hear considerable guilt in 
L evi‘s vo ice w h en  h e w rites th at ‗T h e w o rst survived –  th at is, th e fittest; th e b est all died‘.40 
                                                 
35 Paul A uster, ‗In terview  w ith  Jo sep h  M allia‘, in  The Art of Hunger: Essays, Prefaces, Interviews & The Red Notebook 
(London: Faber and Faber, 1998), pp. 274-86 (pp. 284-85). 
36 Paul Auster, In The Country of Last Things (London: Faber and Faber, 1989), pp. 17, 125. 
37 Auster, In The Country of Last Things, p. 85. 
38 Primo Levi, If This is a Man, collected in If This is a Man·The Truce, trans. by Stuart Woolf (London: Abacus, 
2000), p. 28. 
39 Primo Levi, The Drowned and the Saved, trans. by Raymond Rosenthal (London: Abacus, 1988), p. 27. 
40 Levi, The Drowned and the Saved, p. 63. 
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A n n a‘s in h ab itatio n  o f th is zo n e is revealed w h en  sh e states th at ‗W e h ave all b eco m e 
m o n sters‘, ap p ro ach in g w h at Sven  B irkerts calls ‗m o ral extin ctio n ‘.41 
The act of bearing witness, an element of most texts concerned with the Holocaust, is 
also  an  im p licit asp ect o f A n n a‘s jo urn ey th ro ugh  th e city. Sh e w rites th at ‗Slo w ly an d  
steadily, the city seems to be consuming itself, even as it remains. There is no way to explain 
it. I can  o n ly reco rd, I can n o t p reten d to  un derstan d‘.42 This act of witnessing is one of the 
most significant aspects of In The Country of Last Things because it reveals the way in which 
this disaster is to be communicated. T h e text en ds w ith  th e clo se o f A n n a‘s letter, a 
co m m un icatio n  th at is deep ly am b iguo us, desp ite D en n is B aro n e‘s ‗redem p tive‘ readin g: 
 
Anna does succeed, her message does get through. We know that it has because the 
novel is actually told in a third-person  n arratio n . So m eo n e h as received A n n a‘s sto ry-as-
letter, h ad read it, an d, in  turn , is n o w  tellin g A n n a‘s sto ry to  us. T h is is a sto ry o f 
triumph, not of disintegration.43 
 
This is remarkably naïve, for in this respect Holocaust literature is redemptive because it is 
read whether the author died or not. This is troubling because it suggests that, just as the 
H o lo caust can  b e ‗justified‘ in  th e sen se o f th e H egelian  ‗sp irit o f h isto ry‘ (it even tually 
brought about the United Nations and international conventions on human rights), there is 
some meaning to be gained from the Holocaust, some hidden value that justifies its 
occurrence. This is a dangerous path to tread and in relation to In the Country of Last Things 
misses elements of the text. Firstly, there is the case of the desert that surrounds the city, 
                                                 
41 Auster, In The Country of Last Things, p . 20; Sven  B irkerts, ‗R eality, F ictio n , an d In the Country of Last Things‘, 
Review of Contemporary Fiction, 14:1 (1994), 66-69 (p. 68). This aspect of moral decline is important in relation to 
the literature of the Holocaust, but in relation to postmodern fiction will be dealt with in the seventh chapter of 
th is th esis, ‗B ein g ―A b sen t-M in ded‖‘. 
42 Auster, In The Country of Last Things, pp. 21-22. 
43 Den n is B aro ne, ‗In tro ductio n : A uster an d th e P o stm o dern  N o vel‘, in  Beyond the Red Notebook: Essays on Paul 
Auster, ed. by Dennis Barone (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1995), pp. 1-26 (p. 8). 
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reminding the reader that Anna is leaving one form of blankness for another.44 Secondly, 
there is also the fact that this letter symbolises not the triumph of communication but its 
failure: we read the words but we do not understand (a prefix attached to all Holocaust 
literature); the letter has arrived but its meaning, evidently, has not.  
In the novel, it is a trace of Anna that reaches us, not Anna herself. It is a letter that has 
no sequel, despite the closin g p ro m ise th at, ‗O n ce w e get w h ere w e‘re go in g, I w ill w rite to  
yo u again , I p ro m ise‘.45 She has deserted us by entering the desert, entered the silence where 
we cannot follow, and we cannot understand. She may be dead, or may only have 
disappeared, but sh e h as go n e b eyo n d w h ere th e ‗I‘ m ay go : ‗th e disaster w o uld b e b eyo n d  
what we understand by death or abyss, or in any case by my death, since there is no more 
p lace fo r ―m e‖: in  th e disaster I disap p ear w ith o ut dyin g (o r die w ith o ut disap p earin g)‘.46 
This is made more disturbing by the fact that we may soon understand all too well what this 
m ean s: sh e w rites th at tryin g to  co m m un icate w ith  th e recip ien t o f th e letter feels like ‗callin g 
in to  b lan kn ess, like scream in g in to  a vast an d terrib le b lan kn ess‘.47 It is a cry from one form 
o f em p tin ess to  an o th er, an d th is p o in ts to  th e co n flatio n  o f ‗o utside‘ an d ‗in side‘ th at is so  
emblematic of the fact that this text is an allegory for the world as it is. If the city is merely an 
altered New York City, then she is crying from our world, not one separated from ours, and 
w e in h ab it th at b lan kn ess w ith  h er. T h e text rep resen ts a ‗do m estic h o lo caust‘ b ecause it 
shows the unbridgeable gap between two inhabitants of the same reality, as Auster writes: 
‗w e all sp eak o ur o w n  lan guage o f gh o sts, I‘m  afraid‘.48 Thus, the text does not have a 
                                                 
44 See Auster, In The Country of Last Things, pp. 39-40. This also alludes to the desert/city corollary of 
B audrillard‘s ‗desertificatio n ‘, discussed later in  th is ch ap ter. 
45 Auster, In The Country of Last Things, p. 188. 
46 Blanchot, The Writing of the Disaster, p. 119. 
47 Auster, In The Country of Last Things, p. 183. 
48 James R. Giles, Violence in the Contemporary American Novel: An End to Innocence (Columbia: University of South 
Carolina Press, 2000), p. 133; Auster, In The Country of Last Things, p. 155. 
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triumphant ending, but an ambiguous one, even more disturbing because we never fully 
incorporate it into our consciousness. 
Although In The Country of Last Things deals primarily with the Holocaust, it is not the 
only postmodern text to do so. Adorno, for example, sees in the works of Samuel Beckett a 
form of Holocaust literature: 
 
Beckett has given us the only fitting reaction to the situation of the concentration camps 
–  a situation he never calls by name, as if it were subject to an image ban. What is, he 
says, is like a concentration camp.49 
 
B eckett‘s w o rks n ever exp licitly m en tio n  th e H o lo caust, desp ite th e fact th at th ey are 
im p licitly co n cern ed w ith  w ritin g ‗after‘ it. A do rn o ‘s argum ent indicates the extent to which 
postmodern literature is indebted to the Holocaust (in the sense of a Levinasian mauvaise 
conscience), b ecause everyth in g th at is ‗is like a co n cen tratio n  cam p ‘. T h ere is n o  ‗after‘ th e 
Holocaust, but only a living around it. Pynchon, in V (1963), refers to this aspect of 
Holocaust: 
 
Now remember, right after the war, the Nuremberg war trials? Remember the 
photographs of Auschwitz? Thousands of Jewish corpses, stacked up like those poor 
car b o dies. Sch lem ih l: It‘s already started. [… ] H as it o ccurred to  yo u th ere m ay b e n o  
m o re stan dards fo r crazy o r san e, n o w  th at it‘s started?50 
 
W h ere th e H o lo caust ‗h as started‘, it h as n o t fin ish ed, an d b ecause o f it ‗th ere m ay b e n o  
m o re stan dards fo r crazy o r san e‘. T h is sign ifies an  im plicit response to the Holocaust within 
                                                 
49 Theodor W. Adorno, Negative Dialectics (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973), p. 380. 
50 Thomas Pynchon, V (London: Vintage, 1995), p. 295. 
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postmodern literature, where the feeling of continued apocalypse, in the guise of the 
H o lo caust, b leeds in to  o th er disco urses. F o r exam p le, in  relatio n  to  th e gen re o f ‗b lan k 
fictio n ‘, T am a Jan o w itz describ es a ch aracter as ‗a n ervo us little th in g, w ith  th o se 
concentration-cam p  eyes p o p p in g o ut o f a rich  A m erican  face‘.51 Similarly, in Jay 
M cIn ern ey‘s Model Behaviour (1998), so m eo n e w ith  an o rexia is describ ed as lo o kin g ‗like 
yo u‘ve b een  at A usch w itz‘.52 Jan o w itz‘s juxtaposition of these two disparate adjectives, 
‗co n cen tratio n -cam p ‘ an d ‗rich  A m erican ‘, an d M cIn ern ey‘s use o f A usch w itz as an  adjective 
to describe anorexia, demonstrates the continued feeling of the Holocaust as a defining 
moment of twentieth-century existence. Although its use as an adjective may offend, this 
sh o w s th e exten t to  w h ich  th e H o lo caust is cen tral to  th e gen re o f ‗b lan k fictio n ‘. 
The Holocaust also serves as a metaphor within other formulations of the apocalypse, 
where the events of the Holocaust are sublimated within another variety of apocalyptic 
disco urse. In  A tw o o d‘s T he H an dm aid’s T ale, for example, the narrator talks about watching 
old television interviews: 
 
The one I remember best was with a woman who had been the mistress of a man who 
had supervised one of the camps where they put the Jews, before they killed them. In 
o ven s, m y m o th er said; b ut th ere w eren ‘t an y p ictures o f th e o ven s, so  I go t so m e 
confused notion that these deaths had taken place in kitchens. There is something 
especially terrifying to a child in that idea. Ovens mean cooking, and cooking comes 
before eating. I thought that these people had been eaten. Which in a way I suppose 
they had been.53 
 
H ere, th e H o lo caust is co n figured in  term s o f th e do m estic sp h ere, w ith  th e ‗o ven s‘ co o kin g 
people to be eaten (the idea of being eaten also indicating the Roma term for the Holocaust 
                                                 
51 T am a Jan o w itz, ‗T urkey T alk‘, in  Slaves of New York (London: Bloomsbury, 2002), pp. 102-18 (p. 114). 
52 Jay McInerney, Model Behaviour (London: Bloomsbury, 1999), p. 149. 
53 Margaret Atwood, T he H an dm aid’s T ale (London: Vintage, 1996), p. 155. 
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–  Porraimos [Devouring]).54 T h is p refigures th e ‗do m estic h o lo caust‘ at th e h eart o f The 
H an dm aid’s T ale, where all prior freedoms of women are subverted by the apocalypse. 
Similarly, just as Atwood uses the Holocaust as an allegory for the connection between 
fem in in ity an d ap o calyp se, J. G . B allard uses it as an  allego ry fo r n uclear w ar in  ‗T h e 
T erm in al B each ‘ (1964), w h en  co n crete m o n o lith s used to  m o nitor nuclear explosions evoke 
‗an  A usch w itz o f th e so ul‘.55 Thus, the Holocaust is not only a strict historical term, but also 
a generic adjective for apocalypse within the postmodern world. 
P o stm o dern ism ‘s p reo ccup atio n  w ith  th e H o lo caust is n o t a m o rb id fascination with 
death, but a result of its own ethical preoccupations. This ethical concern (one might say 
mauvaise conscience) is seen  in  texts such  as E rickso n ‘s Tours of the Black Clock (1989). In this 
text, Erickson addresses the issue of evil in the twentieth century through the standpoint of 
potential realities. Two realities exist in Tours of the Black Clock, o n e th e n arrato r‘s an d th e 
second our own. The point of the divergence is Operation Barbarossa (the planned invasion 
of Russia), which in the n arrato r‘s reality w as sto p p ed, leadin g to  th e do m in io n  o f N atio n al 
Socialism around the world. Our reality is initially proposed as the triumph of good, as the 
narrator says: 
 
T h is T w en tieth  C en tury I saw  fro m  m y o w n  w in do w  to day w as th e o n e in  w h ich  [… ] 
no evil mind was ever distracted by the reincarnation of a past obsession, no 
Barbarossas were suspended and therefore evil came to rule the world; or else such 
suspended invasions were the catastrophe Holtz predicted, and therefore evil collapsed 
altogether. I longed for this century, seeing it from my window, because I was absolved 
in it of some of my monstrousness.56 
 
                                                 
54 See Inga Clendinnen, Reading the Holocaust (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 8. 
55 J. G . B allard, ‗T h e T erm in al B each‘, in  The Complete Short Stories (London: Flamingo, 2002), pp. 589-604 (p. 
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56 Steve Erickson, Tours of the Black Clock (London: Futura, 1990), p. 168. 
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E vil did n o t w in  th e w ar, b ut ‗co llap sed alto geth er‘. T h is do es n o t ch an ge th e fact th at th e 
Holocaust occurred in our reality and does not absolve us from responsibility: it does not 
m ean  th at o ur C en tury is ‗b etter‘. R ath er, o ur T w en tieth  C en tury is just as b ad. W e h ave less 
guilt and less understanding of what we have done than the narrator of Tours of the Black 
Clock does. We live in the cen tury o f altern ate atro cities ‗fro m  W arsaw  to  L o n do n , fro m  
T reb lin ka to  M auth ausen ‘, an d w e w ere all p erp etrato rs, n o t just o n e m an .57 Evil does not 
have to take the form of the devil to be evil and can be cloaked in a number of guises: 
 
I struck down his evil no matter what name it took for itself, no matter that it called 
itself history or revolution, America or the Son of God, no matter that it called itself 
righteous, a righteousness that presumed the license to bind the free word and 
thought.58 
 
Erickso n ‘s n arrative en ab les us to  p erceive th e in h eren t am b iguity o f o ur o w n  cen tury, o n e 
in which in the name of righteousness millions have died, when this righteousness is merely 
an o th er n am e fo r co n tro l, fo r do m in io n , fo r determ in ism . E rickso n ‘s ap o calyp tic narrative 
tells us that despite the defeat of National Socialism, evil is not eradicated in our century, 
because other evils were committed in the name of righteousness, most notably the 
destructio n  o f H iro sh im a an d N agasaki b y ato m ic w eap o n ry. E rickso n ‘s summary of the 
latter stages of the Second World War is telling, as he covers the war and its aftermath in 
four separate chapters: 
 
1943. 
1944. 
                                                 
57 Erickson, Tours of the Black Clock, p. 256. 
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1945. I can see the smoke. 
1946.59 
 
T h e o n ly year w o rth y o f atten tio n  h ere is 1945 an d th is ‗sm o ke‘ co uld refer to the lingering 
sm o ke fro m  th e cam p  ch im n eys o r, in  E rickso n ‘s usually am b ivalen t m an n er, th e fire-
bombing of Dresden by the Allies on the 13-14 F eb ruary, visib le fro m  th e n arrato r‘s o w n  
Century. However, it is more likely to refer to both of these and the smoke from the 
‗m ush ro o m  clo uds‘ o ver H iro sh im a (6 A ugust) an d N agasaki (9 A ugust). 1945 w as, in  m an y 
ways, the Year of Smoke. The very fact that the narrator can see this smoke from his 
Century suggests the cataclysmic importance of the event, and suggests th at th e ‗n uclear‘ is 
an important element in the writing of the postmodern apocalypse. 
 
Nuclear Criticism and Nuclear Writing 
One of the most significant developments in twentieth-century warfare was the ability to 
instantaneously vaporise entire cities using atomic bombs. This stands as one of the most 
significant events in human history purely because it demonstrates the ability of humanity to 
instantly wipe itself, and a significant proportion of other species, from the face of the planet 
–  something th at h ad n ever b een  ‗ach ieved‘ b efo re. T h is un iquen ess is realised b y D errida, 
who argues: 
 
Unlike the other wars, which have all been preceded by wars of more or less the same 
type in human memory (and gunpowder did not mark a radical break in this respect), 
nuclear war has no precedent. It has never occurred, itself; it is a non-event. The 
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exp lo sio n  o f A m erican  b o m b s in  1945 en ded a ‗classical,‘ co n ven tio n al w ar; it did n o t 
set off a nuclear war.60 
 
‗N uclear w arfare‘ can n o t b e catego rised as ‗w arfare‘, b ecause o f th e sh eer scale o f ‗co llateral 
dam age‘ p o ssib le. It also  do es n o t n ecessarily m atter w h o  dro p s th e b o m b , b ecause if it 
triggers a reactio n  fro m  an o th er n atio n  w ith  a ‗n uclear cap ab ility‘, th e resultin g ‗n uclear 
w in ter‘ h as th e p o ten tial to  eradicate all life on earth. Just as Blanchot argues that the 
Holocaust cannot happen to people (because they cease to be people during the Holocaust), 
Derrida argues that nuclear war cannot happen because to do so would annihilate its very 
reason for existence –  you cannot win a war if you are dead. Nuclear catastrophe is 
significant in terms of nihilism because the Nuclear Age symbolises the possibility of 
complete destruction, the absolute reduction of everything to zero, as well as the fact that 
writing about a ‗n o n -even t‘ is w ritin g ab o ut an  ab sen ce th at can n o t b e realised w ith o ut 
destroying literature itself, as Derrida continues: 
 
T h e o n ly ‗sub ject‘ o f all p o ssib le literature, o f all p o ssib le criticism , its o n ly ultim ate an d 
a-symbolic referent, unsymbolizable, even unsignifiable; this is, if not the nuclear age, if 
not the nuclear catastrophe, at least that toward which nuclear discourse and the nuclear 
symbolic are still beckoning: the remainderless and a-symbolic destruction of literature.61 
 
Nuclear writing is concerned not only with the destruction of the human race, but also with 
the destruction of writing itself. The fields of literature and criticism, as the network of 
interlinked nodes of textual consciousness, disappear. With no field, there are only those few 
discrete nodes (individual texts and criticism) that may remain, although without referents, 
                                                 
60 Jacques D errida, ‗N o A p o calyp se, N o t N o w  (full sp eed ahead, seven  m issiles, seven m issives)‘, Diacritics, 14:2 
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61 Derrida, p. 28. 
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these texts are meaningless. Nuclear criticism breaks the chain of signification, seen in 
P yn ch o n ‘s G ravity’s R ain bow , w h ere a n ew sp ap er declares: ‗M B  D R O  / R O SH I‘.62 Although 
th is p ro b ab ly m ean s ‗A T O M  B O M B  D R O P P E D  O N  H IR O SH IM A ‘, th e reader can  n ever 
be sure. The network that enables the creation of plausible meaning (the sentence) has been 
removed, and the discrete elements (the letters) no longer make any kind of sense.  
According to Ballard, this nuclear potential signifies a new stage of human existence, 
ep ito m ised b y ‗th e to m b  o f th e un kn o w n  civilian , Homo hydrogenensis, E n iw eto k M an ‘.63 This 
encapsulates the idea of the destruction of society, highlightin g th e ‗un kn o w n ‘ asp ect o f 
m o dern  w arfare, b ecause th ere are to o  m an y ‗civilian ‘, n o t just m ilitary, casualties to  iden tify. 
T h e em p h asis is p laced very m uch  up o n  th e ‗un kn o w n ‘, in  th e sen se o f ‗w ith o ut n am e‘: 
 
As it is in the name of something whose name, in this logic of total destruction, can no 
longer be borne, transmitted, inherited by anything living, that name in the name of 
which total war would take place would be the name of nothing, it would be pure name, 
th e ‗n aked n am e.‘ T h at w ar w o uld b e th e first and last war in the name of the name, 
with only the non-n am e o f ‗n am e.‘ [… ] T h at w o uld b e th e E n d an d th e R evelatio n  o f 
the name itself, the Apocalypse of the Name.64 
 
A lth o ugh  D errida refers to  th e fact th at n uclear w ar can n o t h ap p en  in  an yo n e‘s n am e, it does 
h igh ligh t th e fact th at ‗n uclear h o lo caust‘ is essen tially th e ‗A p o calyp se o f th e N am e‘. A ll 
names are obliterated, even the name that instigates the nuclear catastrophe. The only 
p o ssib le n am e fo r th at even t w o uld b e ‗n ih ilism ‘; th e o n ly n am e in which complete 
destruction could be carried out and the only name that undermines its own name-ness. 
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In  E rickso n ‘s Tours of the Black Clock, the revelation of the nuclear is the destruction of 
p lace an d tim e. T h e ‗B lack C lo ck‘, th e tim ekeep er o f th e tw en tieth century in the text, is 
itself destroyed: 
 
Neither the rule of evil nor its collapse could be anything but an aberration in such a 
century, because this is the century in which another German, small with wild white 
hair, has written away with his new wild poetry every Absolute; in which the black clock 
of the century is stripped of hands and numbers. A time in which there is no measure of 
time that God understands: in such a time memories mean nothing but the fever that 
invents them.65 
 
This is our Century, in which the bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. This 
atrocity of our Century recurs throughout Tours of the Black Clock, such as when the narrator 
describes the negligible feeling of guilt at killing his father: 
 
It‘s like a m an  ato m izin g into nothingness hundreds of thousands of men and women 
and children, maybe in a little city somewhere, maybe in Japan, maybe two little cities in 
Japan, maybe in the name of something righteous, maybe in the name of ending some 
larger barbarism, but then claiming he never h as a m o m en t‘s do ub t ab o ut it, n ever lo ses a 
m o m en t‘s sleep . N ever in  th e dark do es h e see a face o r h ear a vo ice callin g h im . B ut 
then, that happened in your Twentieth Century. Not mine.66 
 
In the name of righteousness –  in the name of stopping the war early –  the bombs were 
dropped. This harks back to the ethical dilemma that Erickson places before us throughout 
Tours of the Black Clock: what is right? what is justified? Such questions illustrate the dangers 
involved in the destructive potential of nuclear weapons. The fact that they may be perceived 
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as an  ‗easy‘ so lutio n  to  dip lo m acy b y so m e in dicates th e exten t to  w h ich  n uclear ap o calyp se 
is implicit in late-twentieth-century fiction. 
The demonstration of this nuclear destruction delineates the differences between 
modernist and postmodern versions of the apocalypse, typified by the relation between 
Jo sep h  C o n rad‘s Heart of Darkness (1902) an d F ran cis F o rd C o p p o la‘s Apocalypse Now (1979). 
In Heart of Darkness, K urtz w rites ‗E xterm in ate all th e b rutes!‘, sign ifyin g a w h ite co lo n ial 
approach to apocalypse, a utopian ideal of colonising Africa and exterminating the savages.67 
In Apocalypse Now, however, the presentation of destruction is not extermination in the name 
of capitalism, but complete eradicatio n  o f th e O th er (an d th e Self) fo r n o  reaso n : ‗D ro p  th e 
B o m b !‘.68 T h ere is n o  in ten ded target h ere, n o  ‗b rutes‘ to  b e exterm in ated, b ut m erely th e 
fact o f destructio n , th e act o f usin g tech n o lo gy b ecause it exists. A lth o ugh  C o p p o la‘s versio n  
highligh ts th e co lo n ial asp ects o f th e V ietn am  ‗w ar‘, it is n o t clear fro m  th is statem en t 
whether the bomb should be dropped on the jungle or on Washington, and indicates an 
ambivalence about its use. Some films go further than merely the threat of the nuclear, 
h o w ever, in to  its revelatio n , such  as Stan ley K ub rick‘s Dr Strangelove, or How I Learned to Stop 
Worrying and Love the Bomb (1963), which goes so far as to actually drop the bomb. Such 
representations demonstrate that potential itself can lead to revelation (in the sense of an 
apocalyptic unveiling of potential). 
For the moment, however, nuclear apocalypse remains only a potential. As a potential, 
its field is predominantly textual, as William Chaloupka argues. He notes that, for some 
critics ‗T h e n uke im p lies a p ro sp ect fo r such  th o ro ugh  an n ih ilatio n  th at it is ―un sp eakab le,‖ 
an image of future negation so total as to illuminate a sort of new, negative totality on which 
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to  b ase p o litical actio n ‘.69 B arry C o o p er, fo r exam p le, o b serves th at ‗N uclear w eap o n s do not 
simply destroy things, they destroy the boundaries between destruction and non-
destructio n ‘.70 D esp ite th is, n uclear criticism  fun ctio n s b ecause th e n uclear is ‗fab ulo usly 
textual‘ an d n o t a reality. R evelatio n s o f th e n uclear w ith in  disco urse (such  as Dr Strangelove) 
actually expose its textuality because its true revelation would destroy textuality itself. The 
nuclear exposes our inability to understand the nuclear, because although we can understand 
the code (the text), we cannot understand what that code accomplishes (the reality). It is a 
modulation of the sublime: we can rationally understand, through mathematics, the logistics 
o f th e b o m b ‘s m ake-up, but we can never imagine its effects. We can begin to calculate 
damage, working out who will die and who will not, who has a high probability of radiation 
sickness, who will probably survive. What we cannot comprehend is the scale of destruction 
or the sheer amounts of energy released –  it is beyond our rational ability to imagine the 
nuclear. This presentation of the nuclear is equivalent to the connection between nihilism 
an d th e sub lim e. T h e eup h em istic ‗G ro un d Z ero ‘ o f a n uclear exp lo sio n  is as m uch  ab o ut 
nihilism as it is a mathematical measure of range; the splitting of the unitary atom is 
equivalent to its reduction to nothingness. Just as nuclear apocalypse is nihilistic, it is also 
sublime: 
 
The notion of the sublime is continuous with the notion of nuclear holocaust: to think 
th e sub lim e w o uld b e to  th in k th e un th in kab le an d to  exist in  o n e‘s own non-existence 
[… T h e] effo rt to  th in k th e n uclear sub lim e in  term s o f its ab so luten ess dw in dles fro m  
the effort to imagine total annihilation to something very much like the calculations of 
exactly how horrible daily life would be after a significant nuclear explosion.71 
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In this analysis, we can see the manner in which nihilism and the sublime are again conflated 
within postmodernism. Nihilism, seen here as the complete meaningless destruction of the 
to tality, b eco m es th e feelin g o f existin g ‗in  o n e‘s o w n  non-existen ce‘ w ith in  th e sub lim e. T h e 
nuclear also indicates another feature of the postmodern apocalypse at this point, because it 
forces us to imagine how we locate ourselves in our own non-existence –  where we are when 
there is no longer anywhere to live. The most common feature of this sense of apocalypse is 
seen in postmodern representations of the desert –  the place where we cannot live. 
 
The Apocalyptic Desert 
T h e im age o f th e b lan k desert p ervades m o st o f th e p o stm o dern  ‗literature o f th e en d‘ in  a 
number of different ways, from the desert that is created as a result of nuclear holocaust or 
pollution, to the desert that appears in conjunction with the disappearance of the human and 
th e destructio n  o f m ean in g. T h e ‗m ean in g‘ o f th e desert h as th us sh ifted from the benign 
image of a place of introspection towards a more malign environment in which the 
apocalypse has already happened. The use of the desert in The Passion of New Eve is indicative 
of this, as Carter uses the desert as a place of introspection: 
 
I would go to the desert, to the waste heart of that vast country, the desert on which 
they turned their backs for fear it would remind them of emptiness –  the desert, the arid 
zone, there to find, chimera of chimeras, there, in the ocean of sand, among the 
bleached rocks of the untenanted part of the world, I thought I might find that most 
elusive of all chimeras, myself.72 
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T h is in itial aim  o f ‗fin din g yo urself‘ in  th e desert –  as w ith  C h rist‘s fo rty days an d  fo rty 
nights –  is subverted by the inability of life to survive there: 
 
I am helplessly lost in the middle of the desert, without map or guide or compass. The 
landscape unfurls around me like an old fan that has lost all its painted silk and left only 
the bare, yellowed sticks of antique ivory in a world which, since I am alive, I have no 
business. The earth has been scalped, flayed; it is peopled only with echoes. The world 
shines and glistens, reeks and swelters till its skin peels, flakes, cracks, blisters.73 
 
Although Evelyn attempts to find himself, he begins to die (and indeed symbolically dies 
later in the text) –  the desert is apocalyptic. It is a landscape at the end of the world, at the 
extremes of human existence and throughout postmodern fiction can be either the result of 
the apocalypse or its cause. 
The first representation of the desert is the appearance of the desert because of an 
apocalypse. This apocalypse is normally configured as a result of pollution or nuclear 
w arfare. B allard‘s The Drought (1965), for example, deals explicitly with the desert-ed 
landscape, although what is most significant is the cause of this drought: 
 
Covering the off-sh o re w aters o f th e w o rld‘s o cean s, to  a distan ce o f ab o ut a th o usan d  
miles off the coast, was a thin but resilient mono-molecular film formed from a 
complex of saturated long-chain polymers, generated within the sea from the vast 
quantities of industrial wastes discharged into the ocean basins during the previous fifty 
years. This tough, oxygen-permeable membrane lay on the air-water interface and 
prevented almost all evaporation of surface water into the air space above.74 
 
The alteration of the planet into a global desert is a direct result of environmental pollution, 
although there are a number of separate elements that comprise this apocalyptic drought. 
                                                 
73 Carter, p. 41. 
74 J. G. Ballard, The Drought (London: Flamingo, 2002), p. 36. 
 188 
Firstly, water molecules cannot move into the atmosphere, suggesting an enforced cessation 
of ecosystem activity, as the movement integral to a successful biosphere is halted. The 
drought is created by the shift from eco-system to eco-stasis. Secondly, the scientific terminology 
–  ‗m o n o -m o lecular film ‘, ‗saturated lo n g-ch ain  p o lym ers‘, ‗o xygen -p erm eab le m em b ran e‘ –  
suggests th e ‗lan guage‘ o f o rgan ic ch em istry, alth o ugh  th is lan guage can n o t effectively 
control that which it explains. Thirdly, this drought is caused by human interference, as the 
film  is gen erated b y ‗vast quan tities o f in dustrial w aste‘. B allard suggests th at scien ce created 
the problem and science understands the problem, but that science cannot solve the 
problem: the desert is primarily a man-m ade ap o calyp se. A tw o o d‘s T he H an dm aid’s T ale also 
features this representation of the desert, with mass infertility being caused by environmental 
pollution: 
 
The air got too full, once, of chemicals, rays, radiation, the water swarmed with toxic 
molecules, all of that takes years to clean up, and meanwhile they creep into your body, 
camp out in your fatty cells. Who knows, your very flesh may be polluted, dirty as an 
oily beach, sure death to shore birds and unborn babies.75 
 
Here, the (female) body is implicitly compared to the (deserted) landscape. Throughout The 
H an dm aid’s T ale, th ere is a direct co ro llary b etw een  th e h um an  b o dy an d th e earth , a ‗M o th er 
E arth ‘ h yp o th esis, w h ere th e w o rld -body is made infertile by pollution. We can also note the 
o ccurren ce o f th e w o rd ‗b each ‘ h ere, suggestin g in fertility, w h ich  is m irro red w h en  A tw o o d  
w rites th at ‗T h e b o dy is so  easily dam aged, so  easily disp o sed o f, w ater an d ch em icals is all it 
is, h ardly m o re to  it th an  a jellyfish , dryin g o n  san d‘.76 Not only is th e ‗b o dy‘ o f th e w o rld  
                                                 
75 Atwood, p. 122. 
76 Atwood, p. 115. 
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easily damaged, but it is the sand upon which the body dies –  the world is the sand under the 
human-jellyfish, and yet also that jellyfish dying on the sand. 
Such representations are nihilistic because they conflate two formulations of the 
apocalypse in terms of nihilism. The first is the desert-ed landscape, which demonstrates the 
complete absence of all life. This –  the eradication of all planetary life –  is an apocalyptic 
nihilism in which everything is made nothing. The second aspect of nihilism that appears 
here is technological nihilism, in which Nature and Technology are opposed to one another, 
an d T ech n o lo gy seeks to  an n ih ilate N ature: ‗tech n o lo gy do es n o th in g. T o  b e m o re p recise, it 
dissolves the world while understanding the dissolution of the world as its transformation. 
So m etim es th is is called p ro gress‘.77 T h ese asp ects o f n ih ilism  sign ify ‗eco lo gical n ih ilism ‘ o r 
‗eco cide‘ –  the complete destruction of an ecosystem. This term is especially ironic given that 
humanity is committing ecocide on its own planet (and therefore itself) in both The Drought 
and T he H an dm aid’s T ale. 
These formulations of nihilism also appear in another representation of the desert that 
is fundamentally similar to the creation of the desert by pollution: the nuclear desert. This 
desert is created by nuclear detonations, and can be categorised as ecological nihilism 
because it annihilates all life and is created by the application of Technology at the expense 
of Nature.78 The nuclear desert is represented in two ways, one by habit, the second by 
causality. To explain this distinction, it must be realised that the majority of nuclear testing 
was conducted on remote island atolls such as Eniwetok and Bikini. These atolls are 
essentially torus-shaped beach es, an d w ere felt to  b e ‗safe‘ n uclear testin g gro un ds b ecause 
                                                 
77 B arry C o o p er, ‗N ih ilism  an d T ech n o lo gy‘, in  Nietzsche and the Rhetoric of Nihilism: Essays on Interpretation, 
Language and Politics, ed. by Tom Darby, Béla Egyed, and Ben Jones (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1989), 
pp. 165-81 (p. 166).  
78 T he H an dm aid’s T ale also indicates the nuclear (although as pollution, not warfare) as the cause of the desert: 
‗th e exp lo din g ato m ic p o w er plan ts, alo n g th e San  A n dreas fault‘ (A tw o o d, p . 122). 
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they were far removed from the majority of human activity on Earth. This is an habitual 
association between the desert and the nuclear. Furthermore, in the aftermath of a nuclear 
test, radiation kills all surrounding living things that survive the immediate blast. Flora and 
fauna turn into desert and so the desert comes to represent the nuclear through a metonymic 
association in which the attribute (the result of the detonation) stands for the whole (the 
n uclear). B allard‘s use o f th e n uclear d esert em p h asises n o t o n ly eco lo gical n ih ilism , b ut also  
th e difficulty o f readin g th is en viro n m en t: ‗A b o ve h im , alo n g th e crests o f th e dun es, th e tall 
palms leaned into the dim air like the symbols of some cryptic alphabet. The landscape of 
th e islan d w as co vered b y stran ge cip h ers‘.79 Humanity cannot understand the nuclear desert 
b ecause it is an  an ath em a to  th em . T h e tall p alm s, later revealed to  b e ‗an aem ic‘ as a result o f 
the testing, symbolise the impossibility of attributing meaning or sense in this desert.80 
The second representation of the desert indicates that the desert itself is an apocalypse. 
Rather than being a result of an apocalypse, this desert acts apocalyptically, mirroring or even 
instigatin g th e ap o calyp se. T h is ap o calyp tic n ature o f th e lan dscap e is clear in  E rickso n ‘s 
Days Between Stations (1985), where dense sandstorms slowly cover Los Angeles. These 
sandstorms get steadily worse as the text progresses and, with each weather front, a little 
more of the city is eroded: 
 
T h e seco n d san dsto rm  arrived. It w as clo ser to  th e gro un d, an d w h ile it w asn ‘t as lo n g 
as the first it bombarded everything violently; the next morning, in its aftermath, the 
streets were ranges of sand, sloped against doorways and all but burying the first levels 
of buildings.81 
 
                                                 
79 B allard, ‗T he T erm in al B each ‘, p . 589. 
80 B allard, ‗T he T erm in al B each ‘, p . 590. 
81 Steve Erickson, Days Between Stations (London: Quartet, 1997), pp. 68-69. 
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T h is is n o t th e gradual ero din g o f th e city fro m  w ith in , as is seen  in  A uster‘s In the Country of 
Last Things, but a complete onslaught of nature against human occupation. Where Los 
Angeles has sandstorms, Paris has extreme cold: 
 
All across the city, as seen from her balcony, structures jutted up before her like jagged 
canyon peaks, honeycombed with caverns where fire burned. Fires burned in the streets; 
every once in a while she would catch the sight of some flames flickering around some 
corner or from beyond some rooftop. Primordial Paris: empty, frozen, infernal, 
undetermined inhabitants scurrying through its subterranean passages, the increasingly 
panicked sounds of more furniture broken to feed the fires, the crackling of more pages 
igniting, more incinerated momentos.82 
 
These extreme weather conditions affect the structures of buildings and human civilisation. 
Los Angeles sees the destruction of law and order as the façade of civilisation is encroached 
up o n  b y th e san d, ‗b uryin g th e first levels o f b uildin gs‘. In  P aris, th e co ld fo rces th e 
architecture of the city to change and humanity scurries underground, burning its heritage to 
survive: ‗C ertain  structures w ere deem ed exp en d ab le an d un n ecessary, including theaters, 
monuments, museums, certain very fashionable shops, synagogues, and, for some, the 
h o m es o f th e rich ‘.83 Those structures that exemplify communal culture and history, the very 
founding stones of civilisation, are the first things to disappear when civilisation is under 
duress. B y sp ecifyin g ‗syn ago gues‘ (an d n o t religio us sites m o re gen erally), E rickso n  also  
dem o n strates th at th e ‗Jew s‘, th o se so m eh o w  ‗o utside‘ so ciety, are also  targeted, w h ich  again  
emphasises the continued feeling of the Holocaust in the apocalyptic desert. 
These extreme forces of nature show us the order in which identity (being) is lost. 
First, the structures exemplifying society are destroyed; second, the structure of society itself 
                                                 
82 Erickson, Days Between Stations, p. 173. 
83 Erickson, Days Between Stations, p. 176. 
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is lost; finally, as typified by Lauren walking through the dried-up Mediterranean seabed 
naked, it is our own identities.84 T h e ‗desert‘ is th erefo re sym b o lic o f th e traditio n al 
fo rm atio n  o f a desert (h eat, san d, an d th e ‗ab sen ce‘ o r h arsh n ess o f life) as w ell as sym b o lises 
‗B ein g-deserted‘. P aris is as m uch  o f a desert as L o s A n geles in  E rickso n ‘s estim atio n , b ut it 
is the mental construction of a desert rather than its physical reality, as Lee Spinks observes: 
‗E rickso n  suggests th at A m erican  iden tity is alw ays in vo lved in  a recip ro cal relationship with 
apocalypse, death, or an experience of the limit th at th ese term s rep resen t‘.85 Although 
Sp in ks‘ o b servatio n  is restricted to  th e ‗A m erican  iden tity‘), it sh o w s th e exten t to  w h ich  th e 
human psyche is conditioned by the apocalyptic desert. 
T h ese fo rm ulatio n s o f th e desert suggest B audrillard‘s America, in which a desert is an 
environment in which no meaning exists. Although he (over)emphasises the psychological 
impact of the desert upon American culture, he demonstrates a comparable experience 
between the desert and the urban landscape: there is no meaning in either. Baudrillard writes: 
 
No desire: the desert. Desire is still something deeply natural, we live off its vestiges in 
Europe, and off the vestiges of a moribund critical culture. Here the cities are mobile 
deserts. No monuments and no history: the exaltation of mobile deserts and simulation. 
There is the same wildness in the endless, indifferent cities as in the intact silence of the 
Badlands. Why is LA, why are deserts so fascinating? It is because you are delivered 
from all depth there –  a brilliant, mobile, superficial neutrality, a challenge to meaning 
and profundity, a challenge to nature and culture, an outer hyperspace, with no origin, 
no reference points.86 
 
Cities, like the desert, deliver yo u ‗fro m  all dep th ‘. A lth o ugh  w e co uld assum e in  relatio n  to  
texts such  as A uster‘s In the Country of Last Things that the city is contrasted with the desert, 
                                                 
84 See Erickson, Days Between Stations, p. 205. 
85 L ee Sp in ks, ‗Jefferso n  at th e M illen n ial G ates: H isto ry an d A p o calyp se in th e F ictio n  o f Steve E rickson ‘, 
Contemporary Literature, 40:2 (1999), 214-39 (p. 220). 
86 Jean Baudrillard, America, trans. by Chris Turner (London: Verso, 1991), pp. 123-24. 
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this is not the case: the desert is the city and the city is the desert. Both symbolise the 
apocalypse in terms of a desertion of meaning. The image of the desert is not merely the 
absence of the human or the absence of life (which would be false as deserts have their own 
eco system s), ‗a ch allen ge to  n ature an d culture‘, b ut is also  the absence of any potential for 
m ean in g, ‗a b rillian t, m o b ile, sup erficial n eutrality‘ an d ‗a ch allen ge to  m ean in g an d  
p ro fun dity‘. 
T h is p ro cess o f ‗desertificatio n ‘, as B audrillard defin es it, im p lies th e lo ss o f m ean in g 
within cities and the natural environment. This is nihilism in the sense that there is no 
meaning to be found –  meaning has deserted us and there is no longer any reality. It is an 
exam p le B audrillard‘s ‗h yp erreal‘. H o w ever, as B audrillard n o tes, th e desert is also  sub lim e: 
 
The desert is a sublime form that banishes all sociality, all sentimentality, all sexuality. 
W o rds, even  w h en  th ey sp eak o f th e desert, are alw ays un w elco m e [… ] Nothing dreams 
here, nothing talks in its sleep. Each night the earth plunges into perfectly calm darkness, 
into the blackness of its alkaline gestation, into the happy depression of its birth.87 (My 
emphasis) 
 
The desert is sublime because of nihilism –  the puckish nothingness that sleeps within the 
desert. It is a sublime hyperreal, but it is also nihilistic because o f th e ab sen ce ‗p resen t‘ w ith in  
it. This perception of the desert as a nihilistic form of the sublime indicates again the 
conflation of nihilism and the sublime within postmodern literature, although it is no longer 
in the sense of destruction (as was the case with the nuclear sublime) but with lack, more 
specifically, the lack of meaning. 
                                                 
87 Baudrillard, America, p. 71. 
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The absence of meaning in the desert is one that forces humanity to create meaning 
w h en  in  th e desert. P yn ch o n ‘s an alysis o f th is h um an  resp o n se is tellin g: ‗W e are obsessed 
with building labyrinths, where before there was open plain and sky. To draw ever more 
complex patterns on the blank sheet. We cannot abide that openness: it is terror to us. Look at 
B o rges‘.88 The response to the desert is to construct meaning: in the face of absence, we desire 
presence. T h e act o f draw in g ‗ever m o re co m p lex p attern s o n  a b lan k sh eet‘ is tan tam o un t to  
p lacin g a m ean in g o n  th at w h ich  h as n o  m ean in g. If w e fo llo w  P yn ch o n ‘s im p erative, th is 
suggests sto ries such  as ‗T h e C ircular R uin s‘ o r ‗T h e G arden  o f F o rkin g P ath s‘ (b o th  1941). 
H ere, w e see th at B o rges‘ sto ries are artificial, in  th e sen se th at th ey are th e p ro duct o f 
literary artifice. The reason for this artifice is to construct meaning where there is none. For 
exam p le, ‗T h e C ircular R uin s‘ co n cludes w ith  th e auth o r b ein g ‗b ut ap p earan ce‘ an d realisin g 
‗th at an o th er m an  w as dream in g h im ‘, suggestin g th at everyb o dy is actually a dream  o f 
somebody else.89 T h ere is n o th in g ‗true‘ an d everyth in g is dream t. P yn ch o n ‘s resp o n se to  th is 
is seen in V: 
 
But the desert, or the row of false shop fronts; a forge where fires are banked, these and 
the street and the dreamer, only an inconsequential shadow himself in the landscape, 
partaking of the soullessness of these other masses and shadows; this is the 20th 
Century nightmare.90 
 
B o rges‘ p layful dream  m utates w ith in  P yn ch o n ‘s fictio n  as a surreal n igh tm are. L ikew ise, o n e 
o f B o rges‘ m o st fam o us sto ries, ‗T h e G arden  o f F o rkin g P ath s‘, is ab o ut a text o f th at n am e 
that represents the entire universe. A s a result, th e text is ‗a lab yrin th  in  w h ich  all m en  w o uld 
                                                 
88 Pynchon, G ravity’s R ain bow , p. 264. 
89 Jo rge L uis B orges, ‗T h e C ircular R uin s‘, in  Collected Fictions, trans. by Andrew Hurley (London: Penguin, 
1998), pp. 96-100 (p. 100). 
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lo se th eir w ay‘, a kin d o f sup er-Arabian Nights.91 This is comparable to the search for the 
‗ultim ate text‘ seen  th ro ugh o ut P yn ch o n ‘s fictio n . T h e dan ger o f such  a search , fo r P yn ch o n , 
is in the mistaken assumption that we may have found it: 
 
We assumed –  natürlich! –  th at th is h o ly T ext h ad to  b e th e R o cket [… ] o ur T o rah . 
What else? Its symmetries, its latencies, the cuteness of it enchanted and seduced us 
while the real Text persisted, somewhere else, in  its darkn ess, o ur d arkn ess… even  th is 
far from Südwest, we are not spared the ancient tragedy of lost messages, a curse that 
will never leave us.92 
 
W h ile B o rges‘ ‗sym m etries‘ an d ‗laten cies‘ m ay en ch an t an d seduce, th ey are n o t th e ‗real 
T ext‘, w h ich  ‗p ersisted, so m ew h ere else, in  its darkn ess, in  o ur darkn ess‘. B o rges‘ sto ries 
frequently feature an association between textuality and infinity, and Pynchon derides this 
idea in  favo ur o f a m o re ‗h um an ‘ ap p ro ach  to  un derstan din g th e w o rld. In  fact, b y  the time 
Pynchon wrote Vineland (1990), B o rges is a p arro t called L uis, w h o , w h ilst h e ‗co uld tell full-
len gth  sto ries‘, ‗can  n ever get m uch  clo ser th an  th e edge o f th e jun gle‘, th e ‗jun gle‘ 
symbolising here the complexity of human existence.93 
Whilst this o b servatio n  is true o f m o st o f B o rges‘ sto ries, P yn ch o n  p erh ap s n eglects 
‗T h e T w o  K in gs an d th e T w o  L ab yrin th s‘ (1949). T h e sto ry co n cern s tw o  kin gs w h o  p lace 
each other in a labyrinth within their kingdom. The first king constructs a labyrinth of brass 
from which the second king escapes. However, when the first king arrives to meet the 
challenge, the second king says: 
 
                                                 
91 Jo rge L uis B o rges, ‗T h e G arden  o f F o rkin g P ath s‘, in  Collected Fictions, trans. by Andrew Hurley, pp. 119-28 
(p. 122). 
92 Pynchon, G ravity’s R ain bow , p. 520. 
93 Thomas Pynchon, Vineland (London: Minerva, 1997), p. 223. 
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In Babylonia didst thou attempt to make me lose my way in a labyrinth of brass with 
many stairways, doors, and walls; now the Powerful One has seen fit to allow me to 
show thee mine, which has no stairways to climb, nor doors to force, nor wearying 
galleries to wander through, nor walls to impede thy passage.94 
 
The labyrinth of the second king is the desert, in which the first king dies. The idea of both 
desert (absence) and construction (presence) being labyrinths is the point to which 
Baudrillard, not Pynchon, alludes. Borges suggests a labyrinth within blankness, as well as over 
blankness. The desert is both the site of the apocalypse and the site of origin, as Virilio 
suggests: 
 
The Hebraic tradition manifests two kinds of lack, expressed by two deserts, emerging 
one from the other, heart of everything, in its heart everything. One is named Shemama, despair 
and destruction, and the other is Midbar, which is a desert not of dereliction but instead 
a field of uncertainty and effort. The shemama is, rather, polarity of the City-State (City of 
Ur –  Our, light), its desert is the tragical one of laws, ideology, order, as opposed to what 
could have resulted from wandering.95 
 
Just as B o rges‘ lab yrin th  suggests a dual fo rm  o f p resen ce an d ab sen ce, th e d esert to o  h as its 
pre-apocalyptic and post-apocalyptic forms. It is where meaning is destroyed and yet also 
where meaning originates, the end and the beginning. Jonathan Benison also notes this, 
alth o ugh  in  relatio n  to  B allard‘s ‗T h e C o n cen tratio n  C ity‘ (1957): 
 
J. G. Ballard is forcing the reader to take note that the choice –  if choice there be –  is 
n o t b etw een  th e ‗safety‘ o f th e curren t state o f n ih ilism  (th e ‗desert o f listlessn ess‘ an d 
‗p ure in differen ce‘ w h ich  h o lds decisive n um b ers o f p eo p le fascin ated at p resen t) as 
opposed to so m e destructive, dram atic N ih ilism ; n o , th is state, seem in gly a ‗p arado xical 
desert, without catastrophe, with nothing o f th e tragic o r vertigin o us‘ ab o ut it w h ich  
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would induce us to scratch our private ciphers in its sands, wandering their vast 
homogeneous expanses like nomads waiting for rain, could equally drive so split a being 
as the human one to acts of self-annihilation.96 
 
Here, the nihilism of human society –  th e ‗state o f n ih ilism ‘ –  is shifted to the blank desert of 
nihilism, in which we scratch our ciphers over nothingness. This is essentially an absurd 
world, in which language no longer functions. Thus, although the desert holds a key role in 
the determination of nihilism within postmodern fiction, as the desertion of meaning, it also 
evokes absurdity. For this reason, this thesis shall now turn to study the form of the absurd 
within postmodern literature. 
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6. 
There is Nothing at which to Laugh: Nihilism and the Absurd 
 
 
A ll‘s ch eerless, dark, an d deadly. 
 –  William Shakespeare, King Lear.1 
 
VLADIMIR:  Suppose we repented. 
ESTRAGON:  Repented what? 
VLADIMIR:  O h … (He reflects.) W e w o uldn ‘t h ave to  go  in to  th e d etails. 
ESTRAGON:  Our being born? 
 Vladimir breaks into a hearty laugh which he immediately stifles. 
 –  Samuel Beckett, Waiting for Godot. 2 
 
Both King Lear (1605) and Waiting for Godot (1956) reveal a different attitude towards nihilism 
separated by three hundred and fifty years. King Lear suggests a tragic response to nihilism, 
w h ere th e attitude th at ‗n o th in g w ill co m e o f n o th in g‘ leads to  L ear dividin g h is kin gdo m  
b etw een  tw o  o f h is daugh ters an d m akin g it n o th in g, as th e F o o l tells L ear: ‗th o u h ast p ared 
th y w it o ‘b o th  sides, an d left n o th in g i‘th ‘m iddle‘.3 Waiting for Godot, in contrast, suggests a 
co m ic resp o n se, alb eit tin ged b y tragedy. A lth o ugh  n o th in g h ap p en s, th e ‗n o th in g‘ th at 
happens is humorous, not tragic. These two responses differ primarily in their affective 
response to nothingness –  o n e cries, th e o th er laugh s. T h is in dicates th at ‗th ere is n o th in g at 
w h ich  to  laugh ‘, b ecause in  o n e sen se ‗th ere is n o th in g at w h ich  to  laugh  –  and therefore we 
must not laugh, w h ilst in  an o th er ‗th ere is n o thing at which to laugh –  and therefore we may laugh 
                                                 
1 William Shakespeare, King Lear, ed. by Kenneth Muir (London: Routledge, 1994), V. 3. 289 (p. 204). 
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at nothing‘.4 King Lear and Waiting for Godot demonstrate the historical development of 
Western tragedy from what was originally Classically-derived dramaturgy towards the 
twentieth-cen tury ‗T h eatre o f th e A b surd‘. T h e T h eatre o f th e A b surd, in asm uch  as it is p art 
of the postmodern preoccupation with nihilism, therefore suggests a distinct turn away from 
tragedy towards farce. 
The absurd, like the apocalypse, is not a solely postmodern concept. It emerges 
throughout late-nineteenth- and twentieth-century literature, from the plays of Alfred Jarry 
and Eugène Ionesco to the prose of John Barth and Kurt Vonnegut. Absurdity itself entails 
two possible responses to nihilism –  a comic laughter in the face of meaninglessness or a 
tragic cry for meaning –  an d th is suggests th at ‗th e ab surd‘ em erges as m uch  fro m  classical 
definitions of tragedy as it does from twentieth-century preoccupations with 
meaninglessness. This chapter will therefore study the form that tragedy and the absurd take 
within the twentieth century, showing how twentieth-century literature engages with the 
tragic and the extent to which this connects to the postmodern absurd. Finally, it will 
demonstrate how the absurd is actually a form of the postmodern sublime and hence its 
relationship with a postmodern nihilism. 
 
Twentieth-Century Tragedy and Existential Absurdity 
A s w ith  th e co n cep t o f ‗ap o calyp se‘, th e develo p m en t o f th e ab surd w ith in  th e tw en tieth  
century is closely linked to the Holocaust and the Second World War. At this historical 
juncture, classical definitions of tragedy cease to encompass the apocalyptic capability of 
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h um an ity. T o  call th e H o lo caust ‗tragic‘ lessen s its im p o rtan ce w ritin g a tragedy ab o ut (o r 
in deed ‗after‘) th e H o lo caust aestheticises the event to the extent that Adorno would 
p ro b ab ly fin d it ‗b arb aric‘.5 Sim ilarly, B lan ch o t argues th at ‗T h ere is a lim it at w h ich  th e 
p ractice o f art b eco m es an  affro n t to  afflictio n ‘.6 Tragedy is an unsuitable way of 
representing the Holocaust because it often acts to recuperate meaning in tragic events, as 
T erry E agleto n  argues in  relatio n  to  ‗descrip tive‘ an d ‗n o rm ative‘ tragedy: 
 
T h ere is o n e sign ifican t co n trast b etw een  ‗descrip tive‘ an d ‗n o rm ative‘ tragedy. T h e 
former type of art tends to be sombre, gloomy, even at times nihilistic, and this, for its 
more normative counterpart, is exactly what tragedy cannot allow. It is a curious irony 
that for much traditional tragic theory, wretchedness and despondency threaten to 
subvert tragedy rather than enhance it. The more cheerless the drama, the less tragic its 
status. This is because tragedy must embody value; but it is odd, even so, that an art 
form which portrays human anguish and affliction should have been so often 
brandished as a weapon to  co m b at a typ ically ‗m o dern ‘ p essim ism  an d p assivity.7 
 
‗D escrip tive‘ tragedy can n o t serve to  defin e a ‗tragic‘ w ritin g o f th e H o lo caust b ecause 
E agleto n ‘s defin itio n  o f ‗descrip tive‘ tragedy is so  b ro ad th at an y artw o rk vaguely n egative 
can be tragic. F o r exam p le, E agleto n  w rites ‗In  th is th eatre o f th e gro tesque [descrip tive 
tragedy], action takes precedence over meaning, rather as it does when comedy tilts into 
farce‘.8 Although he refers to Seneca, the implication remains that any work of art in which 
so m eth in g b ad h ap p en s m ay b e view ed as tragic in  th is ‗descrip tive‘ sen se. W h ere 
‗descrip tive‘ tragedy w o uld suit th e to n e o f th e H o lo caust if it w ere valid, ‗n o rm ative‘ tragedy 
would not –  it seeks to reintegrate the tragic experience with some value that can be gained 
                                                 
5 Theodor Adorno, Prisms, trans. by Samuel Weber and Shierry Weber (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997), p. 34. 
6 Maurice Blanchot, The Writing of the Disaster, trans. by Ann Smock (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 
1995), p. 83. 
7 Terry Eagleton, Sweet Violence: The Idea of the Tragic (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003), p. 9. 
8 Eagleton, p. 9. 
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from it. This essentialises the Holocaust into a cathartic, redemptive experience that does not 
reflect the actuality of the event. 
The main problem for tragedy in the twentieth century is meaninglessness. Although 
the Holocaust is an aspect of this, meaninglessness is an aspect of modernity itself. This is a 
Nietzschean hypothesis, arguing that twentieth-century meaninglessness is the culmination 
of a sense of alienation that has been developing since the Renaissance. The rise of 
Enlightenment modernity –  w h at N ietzsch e calls th e C o p ern ican  m o vem en t o f m an  ‗aw ay 
fro m  th e cen tre to w ards X ‘ – indicates a shift towards abstraction.9 T h is ab stractin g o f ‗th e 
h um an ‘ results in  th e m ean in glessn ess o f th e tw en tieth  cen tury. Such  alien atio n  (existen tial 
or otherwise) is incommensurable with the tragic, as Eagleton writes: 
 
Tragedy needs meaning and value if only to violate them. It disrupts the symmetry of 
our moral universe with its excess and iniquity, but its power depends upon a faith in 
that even-h an dedn ess. O th erw ise w o rds like ‗excess‘ an d ‗in iquity‘ w o uld h ave n o  
meaning. It makes no sense to claim that things are going badly if there is no conception 
of them going well. To this extent, the tragic can be a negative image of utopia: it 
reminds us of what we cherish in the act of seeing it destroyed.10 
 
A lth o ugh  E agleto n  o ften  rem ain s am b ivalen t ab o ut th e ‗value‘ th at tragedy h as, m o vin g 
b etw een  seein g it as a co n servative fo rm  o f disco urse an d as ‗th e lim its o f an  existen t regim e 
o f kn o w ledge‘, this problem is a serious barrier to the performance of tragedy in the 
twentieth century.11 If tragedy needs meaning and value, then the twentieth century presents 
tragedy with a unique problem because that is the century in which meaning and value 
disappear. As the previous chapter demonstrated, the dominant feeling of the twentieth 
                                                 
9 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power, trans. by Walter Kaufman and R. J. Hollingdale, ed. by R. J. Hollingdale 
(New York: Vintage, 1968), §1 (p. 8). 
10 Eagleton, p. 26. 
11 Eagleton, p. 19. 
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century is one of dissolution, of living within the apocalypse. If there is a sense of living 
w ith in  th e ap o calyp se, th en  w e already live in  a ‗n egative im age o f uto p ia‘, an d w h at we 
cherish has already been destroyed. After the atrocities perpetrated under the guise of 
‗reaso n ‘ (an d th is is n o t just an  E n ligh ten m en t issue), tw en tieth -century man can no longer 
p o ssess an y ‗faith  in  even -h an dedn ess‘. T ragedy can  n o  lo n ger vio late either meaning or 
value because they have both already been violated. 
F o r th ese reaso n s, D avid M o rgan  lo cates ‗th e V o id‘ at th e h eart o f tw en tieth -century 
tragedy. H e w rites th at ‗th e tragedy o f tw en tieth  cen tury m an  is th at th ere is n o th in g to  
express, nothing with which to express, no power to express, together with the obligation to 
exp ress‘.12 Hence, communication fails to reveal its meaning and the artwork is doomed to 
failure. In  such  cases, alth o ugh  ‗th e o b ligatio n  to  exp ress‘ rem ain s, th ere is n o  m eth od by 
which to do so. This is again an aspect of Holocaust literature (the obligation to express 
what cannot be expressed), although Morgan finds a particular brand of nihilism within 
‗m o dern  tragedy‘: 
 
The bleak view of the holistic individual can be shown in the three factors which create 
the new tragedy: firstly, that nothing is; secondly, that if anything is, it cannot be known, 
and thirdly, if anything is and can be known, it cannot be expressed in speech or 
communication to others.13 
 
This view epitomises an extreme metaphysical nihilism –  nothing exists, if something exists 
it cannot be known, and even if it can be known it cannot be communicated. Morgan does 
n o t argue th at ‗tragic art‘ exists b ut th at th e ‗tragedy‘ is life itself. T h e tragedy is o f ‗twentieth 
                                                 
12 D avid R . M organ , ‗A n d N ow  th e V o id: T w en tieth  C en tury M an‘s P lace in  M o dern  T ragedy‘, Contemporary 
Review, 234 (1979), 315-20 (p. 316). 
13 Morgan, p. 320. 
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cen tury m an ‘ an d is a ‗n ew ‘ o n to lo gical tragedy in  w h ich  existen ce itself is tragic: tragedy is 
no longer art, but how we live. 
This defines the shift between traditional forms of tragedy and the twentieth-century 
develo p m en t o f ‗th e ab surd‘. T ragedy n o  lo n ger fun ctio n s artistically, an d so  ‗tragic‘ art 
reflects th e tragedy o f life w h ilst n o t n ecessarily b ein g a ‗tragedy‘. H ere, th e ab surd co m es 
in to  p lay as ‗th e b elief th at h um an s exist in  a p urp o seless ch ao tic un iverse‘ (OED). The 
etymology of the word indicates two useful interpretations. The first, ab-surdus [‗fro m , after, 
sin ce‘ –  ‗deaf, silen t‘], suggests th at th e ab surd o rigin ates w h en  th e p o ssib ility o f lin guistic 
meaning is lost. The second, based upon the mathematical sense of the term (in w h ich  ‗surd‘ 
indicates an irrational number), is based upon a mistranslation from the Greek alogos 
[irrational] from the Arabic jadr aṣa̙m m  [deaf ro o t]. U n itin g th ese tw o  m ean in gs, th e ‗ab surd‘ 
th erefo re co m es fro m  ‗th e silen ce o f irratio n ality‘: w h en  m eaning is lost, tragic art mutates 
in to  ab surd art. Io n esco ‘s defin itio n  o f th e ab surd, fo r exam p le, suggests th at th e rem o val o f 
m an ‘s h isto rical ro o ts causes ab surdity: ‗A b surd is th at w h ich  is devo id o f p urp o se… C ut o ff 
from his religious, metaphysical, and transcendental roots, man is lost; all his actions become 
sen seless, ab surd, useless‘.14 
This signifies a movement between crying in the face of meaninglessness –  tragic art –  
and laughing at it –  ab surd art, a sh ift in dicated b y U m b erto  E co ‘s The Name of the Rose 
(1980). Jorge, the monk in part responsible for the crimes in the text, commits them to cover 
up  th e existen ce o f a lo st treatise b y A risto tle o n  co m edy, b ecause ‗laugh ter is w eakn ess, 
co rrup tio n , th e fo o lish n ess o f o ur flesh ‘.15 In contrast to the seriousness of tragedy, whose 
                                                 
14 Quoted in Martin Esslin, The Theatre of the Absurd (New York: Penguin, 1982), p. 23. The original source is 
E ugène Io n esco , ‗D an s les arm es de la ville‘, Cahiers de la Compagnie Madeleine Renaud –  Jean-Louis Barrult, 20 
(1957), [n.pag]. E sslin ‘s tran slatio n  an d ellip ses. 
15 Umberto Eco, The Name of the Rose, trans. by William Weaver (London: Vintage, 1998), p. 474. 
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purpose is to predicate law, the laughter brought about by comedy is the apotheosis of the 
lack of regulation. Jorge fears this because it is heretical to his perception of Christian 
doctrine. Where tragedy requires value, absurdity requires its lack; where tragedy 
incorporates the audience into a given value system, absurdity forces the audience to laugh at 
such  system s. Jo rge‘s resp o n se is equivalen t to  th e desire to  retain  m ean in g an d value –  the 
rejection of a comic absurdity.  
Absurd art is not purely a comic form, however, because there are tragic elements to 
ab surdity. A b surdity is m o re accurately defin ed as ‗n ih ilistic farce‘, p ro vin g K arl M arx‘s p o in t 
th at h isto ry ap p ears th e ‗first tim e as tragedy, th e seco n d as farce‘.16 Morgan demonstrates 
this when he discusses the shift between twentieth-century tragedy and what came before it: 
 
The dramatists before our time showed the sands of time running out on such as Dr. 
Faustus, and Hell approaching. In the twentieth century Beckett and other 
contemporary writers became anti-dramatist, showing time stretching endlessly, and 
Godot not coming!17 
 
Where pre-twentieth-cen tury tragedy dem o n strates a p o ten tial teleo lo gy o f ‗H ell 
ap p ro ach in g‘, ‗ab surd‘ artists such  as B eckett dem o n strate ‗tim e stretch in g en dlessly‘. 
Although two men waiting for somebody who will never arrive is partly comic, it is also 
p artly tragic. Sim o n  C ritch ley w rites th at, ‗H um o ur do es n o t evap o rate in  B eckett; rath er 
laughter is the sound of language trying to commit suicide but being unable to do so, which 
is w h at is so  tragically co m ic‘.18 The eternal waiting is, as the subtitle of Waiting for Godot 
in dicates, a ‗tragico m edy‘. W allace K ay argues in  relatio n  to  B eckett‘s p ro tago n ists th at 
                                                 
16 Karl Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, trans. by C. P. Dutt (New York: International Publishers, 
1975), p. 15. 
17 Morgan, p. 316. 
18 Simon Critchley, Very Little, almost Nothing: Death, Philosophy, Literature (London: Routledge, 1997), p. 157. 
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‗F ro m  o utside w e m igh t wail at their absurd attempts and reflect that our own attempts at 
meaning might be just as absurd, but instead we laugh, we become suffused with the 
p ro fo un d o p tim ism  w h ich  em erges fro m  th eir ab surd situatio n ‘.19 The decision whether to 
laugh or cry at absurdity is fundamentally about the position we take in response to the 
absurd artwork. Although we laugh at the antics of absurd characters, if we include ourselves 
in  th is ‗ab surd w o rld‘, th en  w e see th e tragic elem en ts o f th e ab surd. A b surd art m ay 
emphasise the farcical quality of nihilism, but it is nihilism nevertheless.  
Alfred Jarry is one such dramatist engaged in the production of absurd art who revels 
in its nihilistic traits. Although the majority of his output emerged before 1900, Jarry is 
influential in the development of the twentieth-cen tury ‗T h eatre o f th e A b surd‘, co m p risin g 
of artists such as Beckett, Ionesco, Jean Genet, and Harold Pinter. Best known for King Ubu 
(1896), part of the Ubu cycle of plays (which include Ubu Cuckolded (1944) and Ubu Enchained 
(1900)), Jarry‘s in ten t w as to  sub vert traditio n al system s o f th o ugh t. T h e destructio n  o f 
outdated concepts –  th e ‗sacred co w s‘ o f W estern  so ciety –  is of fundamental importance to 
Jarry: ‗W e w o n ‘t h ave destro yed a th in g un less w e dem o lish  even  th e ruin s‘.20 Such 
iconoclasm evokes the feeling of a Promethean nihilism, the form of nihilism exemplified by 
the Russian Nihilists: 
 
King Ubu, then, is a stentorian call for the overthrow of accepted assumptions of man, 
society, and cosmos; new forces were operating which necessitated new definitions and 
attitudes. Jarry saw that dramatists must break the chains of the past and seek a new 
                                                 
19 W allace G . K ay, ‗B lake, B audelaire, B eckett: T he R om an tics o f N ih ilism ‘, Southern Quarterly: A Journal of the 
Arts in the South, 9 (1971), 253-59 (p. 258). 
20 Quoted in Maurice Marc LaBelle, Alfred Jarry: Nihilism and the Theater of the Absurd (New York: New York 
University Press, 1980), p. 1. The original source is Alfred Jarry, Ubu Enchained, trans. by Simon Watson Taylor, 
compiled in The Ubu Plays, trans. by Cyril Connolly and Simon Watson Taylor (London: Methuen, 2002), p. 90. 
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dramaturgy to express the transformations of man and of the forces which operate 
upon him.21 
 
T h e rh eto ric o f ‗th e tran sfo rm atio n s o f m an  an d o f th e fo rces w h ich  o p erate up o n  h im ‘ 
suggests a similar rhetoric to the extreme Hegelianism of the Russian Nihilists. However, 
whereas the Russian Nihilists sought to impose another order on the world, Jarry was 
devoted to merely destroying what was already there. Maurice LaBelle, when discussing 
Jarry‘s co n cep t o f ‗p atap h ysics‘, o b serves th at ‗h is w o rk is dedicated to  destro yin g 
n o n realistic co n cep ts, n ever to  creatin g o n e‘, suggestin g th at Jarry w as in deed m o re n ih ilistic 
than Russian Nihilism.22 F urth erm o re, Jarry‘s ab surd n ih ilism  results in  co m edy, n o t tragedy: 
 
Jarry saw that the expression of the absurdity of life required new forms, and one of 
them was the establishment of black humor as a viable dramatic technique. Its caustic 
and nihilistic quality not only exposes the nature of the bourgeoisie, optimism, and 
Christianity, but it also shows that these concepts result in the tragedy of life, which is 
so grievous men can only laugh at it.23 
 
T h e fact th at o n e o f Jarry‘s targets is Christianity indicates a certain amount of theological 
n ih ilism  o n  Jarry‘s p art. Jarry, like N ietzsch e, saw  C h ristian ity as th e tragedy, to  w h ich  th e 
comic absurd –  Dionysian laughter –  was the solution. There is a confusion of the meaning 
of nihilism here, because on the one hand Christianity is equivalent to (tragic) nihilism –  the 
‗real‘ E uro p ean  n ih ilism , as N ietzsch e m igh t say –  w h ereas in  L aB elle‘s in terp retatio n  o f 
Jarry, (comic) nihilism is the solution to Christianity. Although it is evident that Jarry is 
associated with nihilism (especially Russian Nihilism), it is anachronistic to argue that Jarry 
                                                 
21 LaBelle, p. 168. 
22 LaBelle, pp. 136-37. 
23 LaBelle, p. 96. 
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was himself nihilistic, unless one is willing to argue that existentialism –  or at least the early 
form of existentialism that Jarry demonstrates –  is nihilistic. 
Epitomised by the works of Jean-Paul Sartre and Camus, existentialism summarised 
the dislocation felt by man: humanity was no longer at home in the world, or even in itself. 
W h ere Jarry‘s dram a m ay b e seen  as an  early fo rm  o f existen tialism , it is only with the rise of 
Sartre and Camus that this can truly be seen as a definite philosophical approach, with a 
co n co m itan t series o f artw o rks lin ked w ith  it. C am us‘ The Stranger an d Sartre‘s Nausea (1938), 
for example, are novelistic versions of existentialism, exploring how to live in the absurd 
w o rld o f th e tw en tieth  cen tury. L ikew ise, th e ‗T h eatre o f th e A b surd‘ is an  exten sio n  o f 
Jarry‘s th eatre to w ards th e p o stm o dern . A lth o ugh  C am us an d Sartre sh are m an y sim ilarities 
with authors such as Beckett an d Io n esco , th ey can n o t b e co n sidered p art o f th e ‗true‘ 
Theatre of the Absurd: 
 
They [Sartre and Camus] present their sense of irrationality of the human condition in 
the form of highly lucid and logically constructed reasoning, while the Theatre of the 
Absurd strives to express its sense of the senselessness of the human condition and the 
inadequacy of the rational approach by the open abandonment of rational devices and 
discursive thought.24 (My emphasis) 
 
Martin Esslin argues that the primary distinguishing characteristic between existentialism and 
absurdity is the extent to which rationality is used. Although existential art may seem 
nihilistic, it is a rational performance of existential philosophy; in contrast, as Esslin later 
w rites, ‗T h e T h eatre of the Absurd has renounced arguing about the absurdity of the human 
condition; it merely presents it in  b ein g‘.25 Absurd art is therefore more akin to early 
                                                 
24 Esslin, p. 24. 
25 Esslin, p. 25. 
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postmodernism than it is to existentialism because it concentrates on the abandonment of 
rational artistic devices, despite the fact that postmodernism and existentialism share 
ontological doubts, configured as either an external instability (postmodernism) or an 
internal insecurity (existentialism). 
The partial links between postmodernism and existentialism confuse the issue of 
n ih ilism  to  such  an  exten t th at th e term  ‗n ih ilism ‘ is a veritab le m in efield o f asso ciatio n s. 
E xisten tialism  is frequen tly p erceived as n ih ilistic b ecause o f th e ‗m iserab le‘ quality o f a 
featureless existentialist world (seen in readin gs such  as C arr‘s). T h us, as E n glish  Sh o w alter 
argues, C am us w as regarded ‗as a n ih ilist w h o  b elieved th at h um an  life w as ab surd an d  
futile‘.26 However, in a demonstration of the historical context of The Stranger, Showalter 
o b serves th at ‗The Stranger had no apparent relevance to contemporary political problems, 
but in a broader moral sense it explored the seemingly insoluble dilemma of the individual in 
an  ab surd un iverse an d p ro vided an  an tido te to  n ih ilism  an d desp air‘.27 Eagleton observes a 
similar fact w h en  h e w rites th at ‗F o r A lb ert C am us in  The Rebel, every act of rebellion implies 
a tragic value, w h ich  is w h at distin guish es th e reb el fro m  th e n ih ilist‘.28 Camus therefore 
in dicates a p o in t o f divergen ce b etw een  an  ‗ab surd‘ n ih ilism  an d a ‗tragic‘ existentialism. The 
Theatre of the Absurd, as epitomised by writers such as Ionesco and Beckett, is quite distinct 
from existentialism, and much more akin to postmodern pluralism or nihilism, inasmuch as 
it ‗exp resses th e ab sen ce o f an y gen erally accep ted  co sm ic system  o f values‘.29 
L ike Jarry, b o th  Io n esco  an d B eckett exp lo re th e ‗m ean in glessn ess‘ o f th e tw en tieth  
century, although their understanding of the absurd differs because of the fifty years that 
                                                 
26 English Showalter, Jr, The Stranger: Humanity and the Absurd (Boston: G. K. Hall, 1989), p. 7. 
27 Showalter, p. 10. 
28 Eagleton, p. 63. 
29 Esslin, p. 402. 
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separate them from Jarry. It is no longer about the destruction of concepts, for destruction, 
when they were writing in the 1950s, was just too close. Rather, their concept of absurdity 
in dicates am b ivalen ce w ith in  ‗th e h um an ‘, as revealed in  Io n esco ‘s discussio n  o f th e ab surd: 
 
T h e ‗ab surd‘ is a very vague n o tio n . M ayb e it‘s a failure to  un derstan d so m eth in g, so m e 
un iversal law s. It [… ] is b o rn  o f th e co n flict b etw een  m e an d m yself, b etw een  m y 
different wills, my contradictory impulses: I want simultaneously to live and to die, or 
rather I have within me a movement both towards death and towards life. Eros and 
th an ato s, lo ve an d h atred, lo ve an d destructiven ess, it‘s a sufficien tly vio len t an tith esis, 
isn ‘t it, to  give m e a feelin g o f ‗ab surdity‘?30 
 
T h e ab surd ‗is b o rn  o f th e co n flict b etw een  m e an d m yself‘. Following on from Sartrean 
ideas of consciousness, Ionesco suggests that the absurd is found in the internal oppositions 
within consciousness, in the middle ground between binary oppositions. Ionesco moved 
away from the metaphysics espoused by Nietzsche and Jarry, in which man is pitted against 
the realm of ideas, towards an understanding that man himself is an unresolved contraction, 
an absurd animal. Where Jarry destroyed unified concepts, Ionesco realised that this was 
merely an indicator of another problem, not a solution: when you are living on scorched 
earth, it is difficult to be positive about fire. Indeed, Ionesco is not even sure what nihilism 
m ay m ean . W h en  resp o n din g to  a ‗lo aded‘ questio n  o n  th e n ih ilistic asp ect o f h is p lays, 
Ionesco responded, ‗A n d w h at do  yo u un derstan d ab o ut n ih ilism ? F o r m yself, I do  n o t 
kn o w  very w ell w h at th at m ean s‘.31 T h is suggests a p un  o n  Io n esco ‘s p art –  ‗n ih ilism  m ean s 
n o th in g to  m e‘ –  implying both that he does not understand it, but also that he understands 
it very well. 
                                                 
30 Quoted in Charles Glicksberg, The Literature of Nihilism (Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 1975), p. 222. 
The original source is Claude Bonnefoy, Conversations with Ionesco, trans. by Jan Dawson (New York: Holt, 
Reinehart and Winston, 1971), p. 120. 
31 Quoted in Glicksberg, p. 222. The original source is the New York Times, 21 March 1960, [n.pag.]. 
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B eckett is sim ilar to  Io n esco  in  th is resp ect. A do rn o  w rites th at ‗B eckett‘s p lays are 
absurd not because of the absence of meaning –  then they would be irrelevant –  but because 
th ey deb ate m ean in g‘.32 To call Beckett nihilistic is inaccurate because, like Ionesco, Beckett 
is saying that a meaningless world is not a blank world, but one in which meaning is 
indeterminate. Kay argues: 
 
The recognition by his characters of the lack of value may result in the frantic verbal 
activity of Watt, the incessant self-critical babbling of the Unnameable, the philosophical 
idiocy of Lucky, or the insanely rational manipulations of Molloy. All these are attempts 
to infuse the world with meaning, to fight against emptiness, to refuse to accept a 
meaningless void.33 
 
Whilst K ay‘s descrip tio n s o f th e ch aracters are accurate, h is co n clusio n  is flaw ed. B eckett 
do es n o t ‗refuse to  accep t a m ean in gless vo id‘ b ut rath er refuses to  accep t th e vo id b ecause 
that would in some way incorporate meaning (even the absence of meaning is a meaning). In 
fact, B eckett‘s ch aracters are terrified o f n o th in gn ess b ecause it is an  en d, as V ladim ir says in  
Waiting for Godot: ‗In  an  in stan t all w ill van ish  an d w e‘ll b e alo n e o n ce m o re, in  th e m idst o f 
n o th in gn ess!‘.34 F o r Ih ab  H assan , B eckett‘s w ritin gs th erefo re in dicate th at ‗If G o d is dead, 
then nothing is permitted, and man is superfluous. A universe drained entirely of life or 
consciousness, drifting ever slower into empty spaces –  such may be his vision of 
ap o calyp se‘.35 
                                                 
32 Quoted in Critchley, p. 149. The original source is Theodor Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, trans. by Christian 
Lenhardt (Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984), pp. 220-21. 
33 Kay, pp. 257-58. 
34 Beckett, Waiting for Godot, II, p. 81. 
35 Ihab Hassan, The Literature of Silence (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967), p. 131. Hassan repeats this first 
statement in The Dismemberment of Orpheus: Toward a Postmodern Literature (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1971), p. 218. 
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From this, it is clear th at B eckett w rites ‗o ver‘ n o th in gn ess, like M o llo y, W att, an d th e 
Unnameable: his absurd language writes over the absence of the meaningful world. William 
H an ey‘s in terp retatio n  o f Waiting for Godot as a p lay co n cern ed w ith  ‗a co -existence of 
o p p o sites‘ is useful h ere, even  if it is so m ew h at relian t up o n  G o do t‘s n am e b ein g p erceived 
as ‗death -do g‘ reversed (to d -dog).36 H an ey‘s readin g is ultim ately defin ed b y th e statem en t, 
‗A s a co -existence of opposites, the sacred is immanent in pure awareness, the ground 
b etw een  lan guage an d  th o ugh t‘, alth o ugh  th is in terp retatio n  suggests m o re th an  just ‗th e 
sacred‘.37 The oppositions at work within Waiting for Godot (an d B eckett‘s w o rks as a w h o le) 
cannot be as narrowly defined as mortality and immortality. Beckett is concerned rather with 
a w h o le h o st o f co n cep ts th at revo lve aro un d th e ‗ab surd‘: m ean in g an d m ean in glessn ess, life 
and death, presence and absence. Beckett is, in fact, writing about a sublime form of the 
ab surd, ‗sacred‘ o n ly in asm uch  as th is is a p o stm o dern spirituality. 
This appears in Molloy (1950), w h ere after th e fadin g o f ‗w aves an d p articles‘ (th e 
N ietzsch ean  ab stractio n  already m en tio n ed), ‗th ere w o uld b e n o  th in gs b ut n am eless th in gs, 
n o  n am es b ut th in gless n am es‘.38 This absurd world of Beckett exists in a balance between 
o p p o sitio n s such  as life an d death . A lth o ugh  V ladim ir o b serves th at ‗W e alw ays fin d 
so m eth in g, eh  D idi, to  give us th e im p ressio n  w e exist?‘, it is also  th e case th at ‗W h at are w e 
doing here, that is th e questio n ?‘.39 It is no longer a questio n  o f ‗to  b e o r n o t to  b e‘, b ut th e 
‗w aitin g‘ b etw een  th e tw o . T h is is also  seen  w h ere M o llo y says, ‗M y life, m y life, n o w  I sp eak 
of it as of something over, now as of a joke which still goes on, and it is neither, for at the 
                                                 
36 W illiam  S. H aney, II, ‗B eckett O ut o f H is M in d: T he T heatre o f th e A b surd‘, Studies in the Literary Imagination‘, 
34:2 (2001), 39-53 (p . 44). T h e p ro b lem  w ith  in terp retin g ‗G o do t‘ is th at G o do t, as co n cep t, in dicates an  
inability to interpret and to conceptualise: it is the end for which we are waiting, but which never arrives. Of 
course, this in itself is a conceptualisation of the word. 
37 Haney, p. 45. 
38 Samuel Beckett, Molloy, collected in Molloy/Malone Dies/The Unnameable (London: Calder, 1994), p. 31. 
39 Beckett, Waiting for Godot, II, pp. 69, 80. 
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same time it is over an d it go es o n , an d is th ere an y ten se fo r th at?‘.40 L ife is b o th  ‗o ver‘ an d  
o n go in g, an d alth o ugh  p eo p le are alive, th ey are also  dead: ‗did sh e o n ly die later? I m ean  
en o ugh  to  b ury‘.41 This superimposition of life and death within the same state –  ‗quan tum 
b ein g‘ –  is absurd. We are not dead and we have no recourse to the absolute silence of death, 
but we are dying, almost dead, just not quite, not quite. We are alive and thus are not 
‗n o th in g‘, b ut rath er, in  C ritch ley‘s w o rds, ‗very little… alm o st n o th in g‘.42 There is a 
co n n ectio n  h ere w ith  a sen se o f duratio n , as P o zzo ‘s descrip tio n  o f life in dicates: ‗T h ey give 
b irth  astride th e grave, th e ligh t gleam s an  in stan t, th en  it‘s n igh t o n ce m o re‘.43 T h is ‗ligh t‘ o f 
life –  p erh ap s th e ‗ab surd ligh ts‘ o f Malone Dies (1951) –  situates life within the duration of a 
day.44 Life is trapped in a zone between morning and night, locked in an absurd world, as 
B eckett w rites in  ‗T h e E xp elled‘ (1955): ‗I w h o se so ul w rith ed fro m  m o rn in g to  n igh t, in  th e 
m ere quest o f itself‘.45 The image of life-in-a-day suggests that there is no escape from the 
ab surdity b ecause it in dicates a cycle o f rep etitio n , an  alm o st N ietzsch ean  ‗etern al 
recurren ce‘. Just as Waiting for Godot reprises the first act in the second, and Endgame (1958) 
repeats H am m ‘s sto ry en dlessly, th e days turn  b ut n o th in g ever ch an ges.  
 
Postmodern Absurdity 
The postmodern absurd shares many of the same characteristics as the Theatre of the 
Absurd although, with certain notable exceptions, it is predominantly more cheerful. 
                                                 
40 Beckett, Molloy, p. 36. 
41 Beckett, Molloy, p. 7. 
42 Critchley, p. 175. 
43 Beckett, Waiting for Godot, II, p. 89. 
44 Samuel Beckett, Malone Dies, collected in collected in Molloy/Malone Dies/The Unnameable, p. 289. 
45 Sam uel B eckett, ‗T he E xp elled‘, tran s. by R ich ard Seaver an d Sam uel B eckett, in  The Complete Short Prose, ed. 
by S. E. Gontarski (New York: Grove Press, 1995), pp. 46-60 (p . 48). T ran slatio n s are B eckett‘s o w n  un less 
otherwise noted. 
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E agleto n  n o tes in  relatio n  to  p o stm o dern ism  an d tragedy th at ‗T h ere is an  o n to lo gical dep th  
and high seriousness about the genre [tragedy] which grates on the postmodern sensibility, 
w ith  its un b earab le ligh tn ess o f b ein g‘.46 Although Eagleton criticises the fact that 
postmodernism does not deal with tragedy, ultimately, it seems, because postmodernism 
co n tain s n o  ‗o n to lo gical dep th ‘, tragedy do es in d eed grate o n  th e p o stm o dern  sen sib ility. 
P o stm o dern ism  do es n o t ‗do ‘ tragedy; it is fo r th e m o st p art a celebration of the absurd 
world: 
 
Postmodern man has stopped waiting for Godot. The absurd is not met with despair; 
rather it is a living with what is, a making of the best of it, a relief from the burden of 
finding yourself as the goal of life; what remains may be a happy nihilism.47 
 
T h is ‗h ap p y n ih ilism ‘ is seen  in  E agleto n ‘s referen ce to  ‗un b earab le ligh tn ess o f b ein g‘ –  
M ilan  K un dera‘s The Unbearable Lightness of Being (1984). This text opens with a discussion of 
N ietzsch e‘s th eo ry o f etern al recurren ce, a m editatio n  o f b ein g ‗w ith in ‘ h isto ry. It p ro p o ses 
th at b ein g is ‗h eavy‘ if etern al return  exists an d th at h um an ity is w eigh ed do w n  b y th e b urden  
o f th e p ast. In  co n trast, b ein g is ‗ligh t‘ if etern al return  do es n o t exist, again  in dicatin g th e 
shift from tragedy to farce. Kundera writes, however, that lightness is not farcical but a 
sym p to m  o f ‗p ro fo un d m o ral p erversity‘: ‗in  th is w o rld everyth in g is p ardo n ed in  advan ce 
an d th erefo re everyth in g cyn ically p erm itted‘.48 R ath er th an  p ro p o sin g th at b ein g is ‗ligh t‘ (as 
Eagleton suggests), Kundera remains non-p artisan , askin g ‗w h ich  o n e is p o sitive, w eigh t o r 
                                                 
46 Eagleton, p. ix. 
47 Stein ar K vale, ‗P o stm o dern  P sych o lo gy: A  C o n tradictio n  in  T erm s?‘, in  Psychology and Postmodernism, ed. by 
Steiner Kvale (London: SAGE, 1992), pp. 31-57 (p. 38). 
48 Milan Kundera, The Unbearable Lightness of Being, trans. by Michael Henry Helm (London: Faber and Faber, 
1984), p. 4. 
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ligh tn ess?‘.49 T h e ‗un b earab le ligh tn ess o f b ein g‘ th erefo re in dicates n o t o n ly th at b ein g in  th e 
p o stm o dern  w o rld m igh t b e ‗un b earab ly ligh t‘ b ut also  th at such  ligh tn ess is ‗un b earab le‘ 
b ecause everyth in g is ‗cyn ically p erm itted‘. E agleto n ‘s in terp retatio n  o f th e p o stm o dern  is 
overly simplistic because postmodernism, although it may seem dismissive of trauma, is 
actually the result of trauma. The postmodern  ab surd is th erefo re ‗p o sitive‘ ab surdity th at is a 
result o f ‗n egative‘ tragedy, alth o ugh  to  say th at p o stm o dern ism  is ‗ligh t‘ as a result is o n ly 
part of the explanation. 
Absurd situations are common in postmodern fiction, although they can be separated 
into two distinct forms. The first is the absurd perspective; the second is the absurd 
situatio n . T h e ‗ab surd p ersp ective‘ is seen  w h en  th e reader is p resen ted w ith  a w ay o f seein g 
the world that they will (probably) have never considered. Texts such as Julian  B arn es‘ A 
History of the World in 10½ Chapters (1989) an d B arth ‘s Lost in the Funhouse (1968) epitomise 
this aspect of absurdity. A History of the World has a chapter about a stowaway on the ark, the 
stowaway revealed at the end to be a woodworm. Likew ise, B arth ‘s ‗N igh t-Sea Jo urn ey‘ is a 
co n tem p latio n  o f a sp erm ato zo a‘s jo urn ey durin g sex. Such  p ersp ectives fo rce th e reader to  
re-exam in e th eir o w n  p revio us p ercep tio n s. T h e ‗ab surd situatio n ‘ n o vel, in  co n trast, p laces 
the reader in a world that mirrors their own, but in a funhouse of mirrors, twisting and 
disto rtin g th e im age (an d th us B arth ‘s Lost in the Funhouse operates in both ways). In such 
novels, narrative action revolves around an irrational series of events. Rather than forcing a 
different local p ercep tio n  o n  th e reader (as an  ‗ab surd p ersp ective‘ w o uld do ), th is fo rm  o f 
absurd novel forces them to reappraise their global perception of events. Thus, the absurd 
demonstrated by Carter, Pynchon, and Vonnegut, for example, are examples of placing the 
reader in  ab surd situatio n s. T h is is seen  also  in  T o dd W iggin s‘ Zeitgeist (1996), where, as a 
                                                 
49 Kundera, p. 5. 
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zeitgeist [spirit of an age], the absurd characters (including a black cyberpunk terrorist, a 
lesbian martial artist, and an over-sexed Jewish priest) are placed in the absurd situation of 
everyo n e in  A m erica b ein g ‗o ut to  get th em ‘, fro m  n eo -Nazis to journalists, all the while 
discussing the relative merits of pornography, logical positivism, and the fate of the 
American novel. 
It is clear that the postmodern absurd functions in order to force readers to question 
th eir o w n  aw aren ess, to  questio n  th e w o rld in  w h ich  th ey live. A s M arat says in  P eter W eiss‘ 
Marat/Sade (1964): 
 
The important thing 
is to pull yourself up by your own hair 
to turn yourself inside out 
and to see the whole world with fresh eyes.50 
 
This is an extension of the Theatre of the Absurd inasmuch as Marat/Sade epitomises, for 
E sslin , ‗a deb ate b etw een  th e B rech tian  an d A b surdist w o rld view ‘, b etw een  a vio len t so cial 
revolution through terror (a social approach to humanity) and an introspective exploration 
o f m an ‘s b ase desires (an  in dividual ap p ro ach  to  h um an ity).51 Postmodern absurdity, as the 
result o f th is deb ate, seem s to  co m e do w n  o n  th e in tro sp ective b y d estab ilisin g th e reader‘s 
ontological p o sitio n : th e ‗im p o rtan t th in g‘ is to  ‗turn  yo urself in side o ut‘, th at is, to  exam in e 
yo ur o w n  p reco n cep tio n s, un til yo u can  ‗see th e w h o le w o rld w ith  fresh  eyes‘. U n like Jarry‘s 
fo rm ulatio n  o f th e ab surd, th e p o stm o dern  ab surd fo rces us to  b e ‗in credulo u s‘ to w ards, 
rather than destroy, metanarratives, including those that we propagate ourselves. 
                                                 
50 Peter Weiss, The Persecution and Assassination of Marat as Performed by the Inmates of the Asylum of Charenton under the 
Direction of the Marquis de Sade, trans. by Geoffrey Skelton (London: Marion Boyars, 1999), I. 12 (p. 35). 
51 Esslin, p. 433. 
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In  relatio n  to  n ih ilism , o n e o f th e clearest ‗ab surd‘ exp lo ratio n s o f th e p h ilo so p h y is 
B arth ‘s ‗o p p o site-tw in  n o vels‘, The Floating Opera (1956) and The End of the Road (1958). Barth 
called th ese ‗o p p o site-tw in  n o vels‘ b ecause th ey study differen t kin ds o f n ih ilistic im p ulse: 
‗T h e Opera I regarded as a nihilist comedy, Road as a nihilist catastrophe: the same melody 
reorchestrated in a grimmer key and sung by a lean er vo ice‘.52 Barth therefore represents two 
varieties of nihilism –  comedy and tragedy –  although the texts do not offer different 
representations of nihilism but rather different responses to  n ih ilism , an d it is B arth ‘s treatm en t 
of nihilism that differs w ith in  th e n o vels, n o t ‗n ih ilism ‘ itself: 
 
Andrews and Horner are not only paralyzed by a complete and oddly cold sense of the 
futility of all human effort, but they carry this cosmic weariness into an absurd 
concatenation of relationships, infecting those around them not only with their sense of 
futility, but with their own tendency to verbalize that futility in a joking, allusive, self-
critical patois of nihilism.53 
 
The very ability of critics to observe similar attributes for both major protagonists in these 
texts suggests th at th e ‗jo kin g‘ o f T o dd A n drew s (in  The Floating Opera) an d th e ‗futility‘ o f 
Jacob Horner (in The End of the Road) are actually adumbrated within one discourse of 
nihilism –  a ‗ten den cy to  verb alize th at futility in  a jo kin g, self-critical p ato is‘. A lth o ugh  each  
protagonist responds differently to the problem of meaninglessness, they share a certain 
attitude and it is that attitude which is nihilistic. 
The Floating Opera is o sten sib ly a n o vel ab o ut co m ic n ih ilism , alth o ugh  ‗co m ic‘ do es not 
mean humorous, but a cavalier approach to life. The Floating Opera explores the 
p sych o p ath o lo gy o f A n drew s‘ turn  to w ards n ih ilism , seen  in  a series o f ‗lo gical‘ p ro gressio n s 
                                                 
52 John Barth, The Floating Opera and The End of the Road (New York: Anchor Press, 1988), pp. vii-viii. 
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made by Andrews throughout the text. These are continually being revised and updated as 
he comes closer to an understanding of what nihilism is: 
 
I. Nothing has intrinsic value. 
II. The reasons for which people attribute value to things are always ultimately irrational. 
III. T here is, therefore, n o u ltim ate ‘reason ’ for valu in g anything.54 
 
Later in the text, this is modified: 
 
III. T here is, therefore, n o u ltim ate ‘reason ’ for valu in g an ythin g. 
Now I added including life, and at once the next proposition was clear: 
IV . L ivin g is action . T here’s n o fin al reason  for action . 
V. There’s n o fin al reason  for livin g.55 
 
F in ally, after th e ‗an ticlim actic clim ax‘ o f th e n o vel, th is fifth  ten et is itself m o dified, as ‗T h e 
F lo atin g O p era‘ (th e sh ip  and the text) is not destroyed: 
 
V . T here’s n o fin al reason  for livin g (or for su icide).56 
 
These defin itio n s sh o w  a ch ain  o f reaso n in g fro m  th e in itial p ro p o sitio n  ‗N o th in g h as 
in trin sic value‘ to  ‗T h ere‘s n o  fin al reaso n  fo r livin g (o r fo r suicide)‘. A n drew s w an ts to  p ro ve 
that nothing is intrinsically valuable, and uses logic to justify his actions, although he fails to 
take in to  acco un t th at if ‗N o th in g h as in trin sic value‘, th en  n eith er do es h is in itial 
                                                 
54 Barth, The Floating Opera, collected in The Floating Opera and The End of the Road, p. 223. 
55 Barth, The Floating Opera, p. 228. 
56 Barth, The Floating Opera, p. 250. 
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proposition, or the logic with which he reaches his conclusions. Logic becomes sophistry, 
words semantics –  he is merely justifying himself to himself. Andrews reaches a partial 
aw aren ess o f th is w h en  h e says th at ‗Nothing is valuable in itself. Not even truth; not even this 
truth ‘.57 If not even this truth is valuable, then there is nothing to do or say –  in which case 
the reader is forced to question why Andrews then proceeds in the way he does in the novel. 
In  fact, A n drew s‘ aw aren ess o f th e in h eren t m ean in glessn ess o f existen ce fo rces h im  to  fall 
back upon his own desires: the realisation that there is no value to this truth precedes this 
use of logic to justify his actions. Andrews begins the text as a nihilist, but from that point 
on begins to construct the world as he sees fit. He does not question his own assumptions, 
and thus, whilst he thinks he is a comic nihilist, an absurd anti-hero, he is in reality just 
another aimless anarchist in an absurd world. 
This also occurs in the second novel, End of the Road, when the character of Jake –  
Jacob Horner –  frequently has mild fugues, in which Jake seems to absent himself from Jake, 
merely leaving an automata in his place: 
 
My mind was empty. All the way to the restaurant, all through the meal, all the way 
h o m e, it w as as th o ugh  th ere w as n o  Jaco b  H o rn er to day. A fter I‘d eaten  I return ed to  
my room, sat in my rocker, and rocked, barely sentient, for a long time, thinking of 
nothing.58 
 
Jake is ‗em p ty‘, w ith  m en tal p ro cesses th at are ‗b arely sen tien t‘. H e do es n o t, h o w ever, state 
that he does not exist in any empirical sense, only that he becomes a biological construct, 
unaware of being Jake: 
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58 Barth, The End of the Road, collected in The Floating Opera and The End of the Road, p. 286. 
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A day without weather is unthinkable, but for me at least there were frequently days 
without any mood at all. On these days, Jacob Horner, except in a meaningless 
metabolic sense, ceased to exist, for I was without a personality. Like those microscopic 
specimens that biologists must dye in order to make them visible at all, I had to be 
coloured with some mood or other if there was to be a recognisable self to me. The fact 
that my successive and discontinuous selves were linked to one another by the two 
unstable threads of body and memory; the fact that in the nature of Western languages 
the word change presupposes something upon which the changes operate; the fact that 
although the specimen is invisible without the dye, the dye is not the specimen –  these 
are considerations of which I was aware, but in which I had no interest.59 
 
According to Jake, Jacob Horner ceases to be Jacob Horner during these times, although the 
comparison to the weather is telling, as this reveals that there is a Jacob Horner. Jake says 
th at ‗A  day without weather is unthinkable, but for me at least there were frequently days 
w ith o ut an y m o o d at all‘. T h ere are d ays w h en  th ere seem s to  b e n o  w eath er, alth o ugh  th is is 
not the case –  it is merely that there is no defined or signified weather. It has not gone away, it 
is just quiescen t fo r a tim e. In  relatio n  to  Jake‘s p erso n a, th e fact th at his m o o d is b lan k 
defin es h is m o o d; th is is n o t th e ‗ab sen ce o f m o o d‘, b ut th e ‗m o o d o f ab sen ce‘. T h e 
specimen may be invisible but it still exists and the absence of a dye does not indicate the 
absence of a specimen. Seeing Jake as an exemplar of nihilism indicates that nihilism is not 
the absence of belief (atheism), but the belief of absence (theological nihilism). Jake can still 
be considered a nihilist, but only within narrowly defined parameters. 
Jake does not consider that perhaps there may only two identifying features of identity 
–  body and memory –  and that it is only his persona that seems to disappear. This recreates 
the problem faced by Jake as plurality, n o t ab sen ce, o f th e self. A s R en n ie, Jake‘s lo ver, 
observes of Jake: 
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W h en ever h is argum en ts w ere ready to  catch  yo u, yo u w eren ‘t th ere an ym o re, an d  
worse than that, even when he destroyed a position of yours it seemed to me that he 
h adn ‘t really to uch ed you –  th ere w asn ‘t m uch  o f yo u in  an y o f yo ur p o sitio n s [… ] I 
th in k yo u do n ‘t exist at all. T h ere‘s to o  m an y o f yo u. It‘s m o re th an  just m asks th at yo u 
put on and take off –  w e all h ave m asks. B ut yo u‘re differen t all th e w ay th ro ugh , every 
time. You can cel yo urself o ut. Y o u‘re m o re like so m eb o dy in  a dream . Y o u‘re n o t 
stro n g an d yo u‘re n o t w eak. Y o u‘re n o th in g.60 
 
T h e fact th at R en n ie says, ‗I th in k yo u do n ‘t exist at all. T h ere‘s to o  m an y o f yo u‘ is tellin g, as 
it suggests th at Jake‘s ‗ab sen ce‘ m ay b e the product of pluralism. Barth presents a character 
that is confronted with the possibility of too many choices. This is closely allied to the 
debates that surround the relationship between postmodernism and relativism/pluralism, 
taking the form of Goudsblo m ‘s ‗n ih ilist p ro b lem atic‘. A s w e h ave seen , th is states th at 
nihilism occurs because of the legitimacy of any number of mutually exclusive judgements. 
Thus, if pluralism allows everything to be equally valid, the nihilist begins to suspect that if 
all are equally valid, then all must be equally invalid as they begin to cancel each other out. 
Jake is an  exam p le o f th is b ecause, as h e states, ‗I h o n estly h ave a n um b er o f o p in io n s‘.61 
This sheer number of opinions, each valid, leads to a paralysis: because of the plurality of 
choices before him, Jake is sometimes unable to decide anything. Jake himself realises that 
th is p aralysis is n o t th e ab sen ce o f a decisio n , b ut a decisio n  in  itself: ‗N o t to  ch o o se at all is 
unthinkable: what I had done before was simply choose not to act, since I had been at rest 
w h en  th e situatio n  aro se‘.62 T h us, alth o ugh  it can  b e declared  an  exam p le o f th e ‗n ih ilist 
p ro b lem atic‘, th e reader b egin s to  see th at th is in ab ility to  act is rath er th e refusal to  act. 
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Rather than nihilism, Jake actually portrays Sartrean existentialism, as Thomas Schaub 
o b serves: ‗H o rn er en acts, to  th e farcical extrem e, th e dialectical co n tradictio n s o f Sartre‘s 
th o ugh t‘.63 A lth o ugh  n ih ilism  is p resen t in  Jake, in  th e ‗n o th in gn ess‘ th at ‗lies co iled in  th e 
heart o f b ein g‘, th is is m erely p art o f th e ‗sh eer p erfo rm an ce‘ o f th e self, rath er th an  an y 
n ih ilistic attrib ute th at m ay b e ap p en d ed to  Jake‘s ch aracter in  itself: like C age‘s 4 ’3 3 ”, Jake‘s 
persona depends upon the environment in which it is performed.64 For Sch aub , Jake‘s 
ab surdity o rigin ates in  B arth ‘s desire to  ‗sh o w  th e un w o rkab ility o f a value system  b ased 
up o n  arb itrary acts o f reaso n ‘.65 A lth o ugh  Sch aub  argues th at ‗Sartre‘s ratio n alism  un do es 
itself in  th e struggle b etw een  Jake [th e ‗n ih ilist‘] an d Jo e [th e ‗ratio n alist‘]‘, The End of the Road 
seems rather to allude to Sartrean consciousness itself.66 Schaub ignores the importance of 
h is o w n  argum en t w h en  h e co n cludes th e p revio us statem en t w ith  ‗an d th e b o dy o f th e text, 
R en n ie, is th e m o rb id result‘. In  such a reading, the very conflict between Jake and Joe seems 
to  in dicate th e ‗I‘ an d th e w atch in g ‗I‘, w h ereas R en n ie –  the dead body –  is the absented 
nothingness that causes these two poles to continue circling indefinitely. Thus, rather than 
disproving Sartrean  co n scio usn ess, B arth ‘s n o vel actually validates it as ‗th e w ay th e w o rld  
w o rks‘, o r at least, ‗th e w ay th e ab surd w o rld w o rks‘. 
Where Barth presents an absurd world in his early fiction, it is concerned with 
philosophy, rather than politics. Thus, The Floating Opera and The End of the Road function as 
narrative expositions on nihilism, but say little about the historical context that gave rise to 
the absurd world. The novels of Kurt Vonnegut, however, explore the fact that the absurdity 
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of postmodern life is rooted in the trauma of the twentieth century. Slaughterhouse Five (1969), 
V o n n egut‘s m o st fam o us n o vel, is b ased up o n  th e in fam o us A llied b o m b in g o f D resden . 
N o t o n ly do es V o n n egut deal w ith  traum a (disp utin g E agleto n ‘s p ercep tio n  o f th e 
postmodern), but he deals with it in such a way as to indicate that the Second World War 
was an absurd conflict between competing ideologies, not a conflict of good versus evil at all. 
V o n n egut‘s n o vels are ab surd am algam atio n s o f everyday life an d p resen t a ch ildlike 
simplicity that counteracts the hypocrisy of civilised society –  what might be termed, in 
V o n n egut‘s w o rld, an  ‗alien ‘s-eye view ‘ o f h um an ity. In  Breakfast of Champions (1973), Dwayne 
H o o ver, b ecause o f so m e ‗b ad ch em icals‘ in  h is h ead, go es m ad an d  starts assaulting people. 
T h ese ‗b ad ch em icals‘ –  or faulty wiring –  are found the world over. Vonnegut suggests, for 
in stan ce, th at th e Seco n d W o rld W ar is th e result o f ‗b ad ch em icals‘: ‗T h e p eo p le in  a 
country called Germany were so full of bad chemicals for a while that they actually built 
facto ries w h o se o n ly p urp o se w as to  kill p eo p le b y th e m illio n s‘.67 Such  ‗b ad  ch em icals‘ are 
an  exam p le o f K un dera‘s ‗ligh t‘ p o stm o dern  w o rld in  w h ich  ‗everyth in g is p ardo n ed in  
advance and therefore everything cynically p erm itted‘.68 It removes the blame from 
p erp etrato rs o f atro cities b ecause it is n o t th eir fault, b ut th e fault o f ‗b ad ch em icals‘. 
Vonnegut reveals such objective fatalism (as opposed to subjective responsibility) when, in 
response to such events, he ten ds to w ards th e b lan kn ess o f eith er ‗etc.‘ o r, in  Slaughterhouse 
Five, ‗So  it go es‘.69 
T h is is alm o st a recup eratio n  o f N ietzsch e‘s amor fati, where the blind acceptance of 
destiny disallows any perception of human action, although the irony with which Vonnegut 
                                                 
67 Kurt Vonnegut, Breakfast of Champions (London: Vintage, 2000), p. 133. 
68 Kundera, p. 4. 
69 Vonnegut, Breakfast of Champions, p. 228; Kurt Vonnegut, S lau ghterhou se F ive, or T he C hildren ’s C ru sade: A  D u ty-
Dance with Death (L o n do n : V in tage, 1991). ‗So  it go es‘ is used th ro ugh o ut Slaughterhouse Five when bad things 
happen, although the explanation for its use is made in relation to Tralfamadorian perceptions of time (p. 20), 
discussed later in this chapter. 
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uses th ese suggests th at ‗b ad ch em icals‘ are m erely a sym p to m  o f a larger eth ical p ro b lem  
facin g h um an ity. F o r th is reaso n , ‗b ad ch em icals‘ are n o t th e o n ly reaso n  th at b ad th in gs 
h ap p en , as V o n n egut disclo ses w h en  h e discusses h o w  th e ‗creatio n ‘ o f America is taught: 
 
                          1492 
The teachers told the children that this was when their continent was discovered by 
human beings. Actually, millions of people were already living full and imaginative lives 
on the continent in 1492. That was simply the year in which sea pirates began to cheat 
and rob and kill them.70 
 
V o n n egut‘s fictio n s exp o se th e ab surd w o rld in  w h ich  w e live, th e iro n ies an d  
in co n sisten cies, th e lies w e tell o urselves to  justify o ur existen ce. C o n tin uin g th e ‗lesso n ‘ o n  
th e ‗creatio n ‘ o f A m erica, V o n n egut w rites: 
 
Here was another piece of evil nonsense which children were taught: that the sea pirates 
eventually created a government which became a beacon of freedom to human beings 
everyw h ere else. [… ] A ctually th e sea p irates who had most to do with the creation of 
the new government owned human slaves. They used human beings for machinery, and, 
even after slavery was eliminated, because it was so embarrassing, they and their 
descendants continued to think of ordinary human beings as machines.71 
 
When humans are equated with machines, bad things happen. This is exactly what happens 
to  D w ayn e H o o ver, w h o  felt th at ‗E veryb o dy else w as a fully auto m atic m ach in e, w h o se 
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71 Vonnegut, Breakfast of Champions, pp, 10-11. 
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purpose was to stimulate Dwayne. Dwayne was a new type of creature being tested by the 
C reato r o f th e U n iverse. O n ly D w ayn e H o o ver h ad free w ill‘.72 
T h is is o n ly o n e elem en t o f ‗th e h um an ‘ in  V o n n egut‘s fictio n . V o n n egut w rites later in  
Breakfast of Champions th at ‗H is situatio n , in so far as h e w as a m ach in e, w as co m plex, tragic, 
and laughable. But the sacred part of him, his awareness, remained an unwavering band of 
ligh t‘.73 W h ilst th e b io lo gical an im al is ‗co m p lex, tragic, an d laugh ab le‘ –  that is, absurd –  
th ere is a ‗sacred p art‘, ‗an  un w averin g b an d o f ligh t‘ th at is our consciousness. Within the 
novel, this is symbolised by the painting of a fictional artist, Rabo Karabekian, called The 
Temptation of Saint Anthony: 
 
 
74 
 
This picture is similar to the paintings of Barnett Newman, especially Be I (1970). It suggests 
th at (ab surd) b ein g exists w ith in  a m o n o ch ro m e field, o n e th in  ‗zip ‘ o f b ein g existin g w ith in  
a darker background.75 It also  in dicates P yn ch o n ‘s co n cep t o f ‗tem p o ral b an dw idth ‘: 
 
‗T em p o ral b an dw idth ‘ is th e w idth  o f yo ur p resen t, yo ur n o w . It is th e fam iliar ‗Δ t‘ 
considered as a dependent variable. The more you dwell in the past and in the future, 
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the thicker your bandwidth, the more solid your persona. But the narrower your sense 
of Now, the more tenuous you are.76 
 
Vonnegut seems to agree with this, as seen in the postmodern concept of Tralfamadorian 
time from Slaughterhouse Five. In Slaughterhouse Five, Billy Pilgrim is abducted by aliens and the 
first questio n  h e asks is ‗w h y m e?‘. T h eir resp o n se to  th is ‗very Earthling questio n ‘ is ‗h ere w e 
are, Mr. Pilgrim, trapped in the amber of the moment. There is no why‘.77 Tralfamadorian 
time is therefore a perception of temporality in which every moment is now, an eternal 
p resen t (an d th us w h y w h en  p eo p le die, a T ralfam ado rian  says, ‗So  it go es‘ –  they are still 
alive at so m e p o in t in  th e etern al p resen t). T h is itself suggests N ew m an ‘s statem en t th at ‗T h e 
Sub lim e is N o w ‘.78 T h ere is n o  ‗w h y‘ an ym o re, o n ly o ur aw aren ess o f iden tity in  th e N o w  –  
the world is absurd and time is meaningless. This feeling is an absurd form of sublimity. 
 
The Quotidian and the Quixotic: Writing Postmodern Fictions 
The absurd sublime is important to postmodern fiction because it is where the sublime 
‗p o stm o dern ‘ o rigin ates. T h e p o stm o dern  w o rld is a co n flict b etw een  th e quotidian –  what is 
gen erally term ed ‗everyd ay life‘, b ut w h ich  can  also  m ean  life th at is m easured an d co n tro lled  
–  and the quixotic –  life without rules.79 Although postmodern fiction shows that life is 
absurd, there is still a political motive behind this strategy. Lyotard‘s p ro p o sitio n  o f ‗sub lim e‘ 
p o stm o dern ism  is to  escap e th e strictures o f m etan arratives, a quixo tic gesture. B audrillard‘s 
sublime, however, is a world in which quixoticism has died, to be replaced with a purely 
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78 See B arnett N ew m an, ‗T h e Sub lim e is N o w ‘, in  Art in Theory: 1900-1990, ed. by Charles Harrison and Paul 
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quotidian world, a world in which oppositions are resolved in a synthetic hyperreal. This 
explains numerous aspects of postmodern fiction and theory. It explains why the 
postmodern is simultaneously seen in the heterogeneous fragmentation of structures and the 
homogenisation of a global marketplace, as well as why postmodern fiction is a genre of 
literature concerned with both liberation and paranoia. These are terms in the creation of a 
‗p o stm o dern  n ih ilism ‘ –  th e distin ctio n  b etw een  a m o dern ist ‗to talitarian ‘ n ih ilism , an d a 
p o stm o dern  ‗an ti-totalitarian ‘ n ih ilism . 
T h e ‗quixo tic‘ im p ulse can  b e ch aracterised, in  p o stm o dern  literature, b y th e p erio d o f 
‗sub stan tial exp erim en tatio n ‘ w ith in  tw en tieth -century literature.80 This period encompasses 
authors such as Borges, Pynchon, Carter, Barth, as well as those involved in the OuLiPo, 
such as Italo Calvino, Alain Robbé-Grillet, and Georges Perec.81 The quixotic impulse 
reflects the rise of postmodernism within literature when traditional narrative structure was 
abandoned in favour of new forms and genres. The heterogeneous utopia created by this 
characterises an opposition between the quixotic and the quotidian in that period. Where 
early postmodern literature was characterised by genres such as magic realism and absurdity, 
other forms of literature were remaining within strictly defined parameters. New Journalism 
an d testim o n ial literature, ep ito m ised b y w o rks such  as T rum an  C ap o te‘s In Cold Blood 
(1965), Jo h n  H ersey‘s Hiroshima (1946), an d P rim o  L evi‘s If This is a Man (originally published 
in 1947, although its reception was so poor that it was withdrawn and republished in 1958), 
were produced under the realist desire for factuality.82 T h is o ften  iro n ic desire fo r ‗truth ‘ in  
fictio n , o r fo r th e co m p lete lack o f fictio n , is a result o f th e requirem en t ‗n o t to hide reality 
b eh in d verb al fen ces‘ w h en  rep resen tin g traum atic even ts –  as w e h ave seen , art ‗after 
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82 See Ian Thomson, Primo Levi (London: Hutchinson, 2002), pp. 252, 274-75. Again, this suggests the idea of 
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A usch w itz‘ w as deem ed  to  b e ‗b arb aric‘.83 Magic realism –  addin g a to uch  o f ‗m agic‘ to  
realism –  w as in ten ded to  b e an  an tido te to  th e drab  an d dan gero us ‗quo tidian ‘ w o rld th at 
such genres epitomised. 
‗Q uixo tic‘ p o stm o dern ism  w as still eth ical to w ards traum as, alth o ugh  in  a very 
different way to that which testimonial literatures proposed; it sought to undo the quotidian 
impulse that caused them. If totalitarianism, that which gave rise to the Holocaust, was a 
result of defining reality, then the promulgation of new realities –  the postmodern extension 
o f Jarry‘s ‗p atap h ysics‘ –  was a way in which ontological totalitarianism could be avoided. In 
contrast, postm o dern  auth o rs m ay say, as B eckett do es, th at ‗I h ave alw ays sp o ken , n o  do ub t 
alw ays sh all, o f th in gs th at n ever existed‘.84 W h en  V o n n egut describ es ‗o ld -fashioned 
sto rytellers‘, fo r exam p le, h e o b serves th at th ey ‗m ake p eo p le b elieve th at life h as leadin g  
characters, minor characters, significant details, insignificant details, that it had lessons to be 
learn ed, tests to  b e p assed, an d a b egin n in g, a m iddle, an d an  en d‘.85 Postmodernism rebelled 
against the modernist perception of the world that, whilst somewhat fragmented, was still 
o vertly co n cern ed w ith  th e p ro p o sitio n  o f ‗go o d‘ art an d ‗b ad‘ art. M o dern ism  w as a 
quotidian problem to which a quixotic postmodernism was the solution. Postmodern 
literature h en ce reflects V o n n egut‘s descrip tio n  o f T ralfam ado rian  literature: ‗T h ere is n o  
beginning, no middle, no end, no suspense, no moral, no causes, no effects. What we love in 
o ur b o o ks are th e dep th s o f m an y m arvelo us m o m en ts seen  all in  o n e tim e‘.86 This 
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counteracts the fact that so many characters are often ‗th e listless p layth in gs o f en o rm o us 
fo rces‘.87 
T h is is clearly seen  A n gela C arter‘s Heroes and Villains (1969) and The Infernal Desire 
Machines of Doctor Hoffman (1972), which both explore the ways in which reality is controlled. 
Heroes and Villains presents a conflict between the Barbarians and the Professors. Where the 
B arb arian s w ear ‗furs an d b rillian t rags‘, w ith  ‗flesh  o f m an y co lo urs an d great m an es o f h air‘, 
th e So ldiers (th o se w h o  defen d th e P ro fesso rs) w ear ‗un ifo rm s o f b lack leath er an d p lastic 
helm ets‘.88 There is an implicit indication here of quixotic versus quotidian reality, where the 
multi-coloured, multi-textured clothes of the barbarians are opposed to the drab, almost SS 
or Gestapo-like uniforms of the Soldiers. These city-dwelling Professors –  who call 
themselves homo faber [‗skilful m an  o r ‗artisan ‘] –  are contrasted to those called homo praedatrix 
[plundering man] and homo silvestris [pastoral man].89 This indicates an almost Heideggerian 
techne at the heart of the city, where knowledge and technology are united in a codification of 
reality, as o p p o sed to  th e ‗b ein g-n atural‘ o f th e B arb arian s. Sim ilarly, in  The Infernal Desire 
Machines of Doctor Hoffman, the conflict is between Doctor Hoffman and the Minister of 
Determination. The Minister is ‗th e m o st ratio n al m an  in  th e w o rld‘ w h ilst D o cto r H o ffm an  
is co n cern ed w ith  ‗th e lib eratio n  o f th e un co n scio us‘.90 There is a psychological allegory here, 
where the quotidian Super-Ego and the quixotic Id clash. However, in another gesture 
towards the Seco n d W o rld W ar, th e M in ister‘s D eterm in atio n  P o lice, like th e So ldiers o f 
Heroes and Villains, lo o k ‗as if th ey h ad b een  recruited w h o lesale fro m  a Jew ish  n igh tm are‘.91 
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These readings simplify the complex discussions revolving around the opposition 
between quixotic and quotidian perceptions of reality in these texts. Heroes and Villains 
reveals a fundamental ambivalence about which is the positive term in the oppositional 
hierarchy because whilst the civilised Professors are staid and controlling, the Barbarians are 
excessively savage within their own hierarchy. In The Infernal Desire Machines of Doctor Hoffman, 
alth o ugh  th e M in ister is a dictato r w h o  ‗ruled th e city sin gle-h an ded‘, H o ffm an  h im self 
‗w an ted to  estab lish  a dictato rsh ip  o f desire‘.92 Whilst the M in ister is describ ed as ‗a th eo rem , 
clear, h ard, un ified an d h arm o n io us‘, H o ffm an  h im self is ‗co ld, grey, still an d fath o m less‘.93 
There is little difference between the two. Although the Doctor wishes to liberate the 
unconscious, he is intent upon forcing such freedom, just as the Minister is intent upon forcing 
its rep ressio n . In  th is resp ect, b o th  th e B arb arian s an d th e D o cto r are also  ‗quo tidian ‘. 
The relationship with nihilism in these texts becomes clear when considering the 
co n cep t o f ‗o rder‘. A lth ough the Barbarians differ from the Professors, there is still a 
fun dam en tal o rder at w o rk w ith in  th eir so ciety, even  if it as b rutal as ‗M igh t m akes righ t‘. 
They have not abandoned order but accepted a different one; it may be a counter-ideology 
to that of the Professors, but it is an ideology nevertheless. Likewise, the distinction between 
the Doctor and the Minister can be placed in terms of the Cartesian cogito: th e M in ister‘s is ‗I 
am  in  p ain , th erefo re I exist‘, w h ereas th e D o cto r‘s is ‗I D E SIR E  T H E R E F O R E  I E X IST ‘.94 
B o th  are fun dam en tally p redicated up o n  ‗ergo sum‘ –  ‗th erefo re I am ‘ an d b o th  m ust use a 
verb  to  defin e th em selves, an  actio n  to  determ in e ‗h o w ‘ th ey exist. T h is is a self-justification 
of being, enforcing the rule of presence over absence. R ath er th an  allo w  ‗a p ure, un diluted 
essen ce o f b ein g‘, th e D o cto r seeks to  ch an n el Das Unform –  that form of non-existence 
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b efo re ‗b eco m in g‘ b eco m es ‗B ein g‘ –  into something else that is still within the realm of 
Being.95 
P yn ch o n ‘s G ravity’s R ain bow  also explores the conflict between quotidian and quixotic 
co n flict in  term s o f o rder, alth o ugh  a m o re co rrect term  w o uld b e ‗co n tro l‘. G ravity’s R ain bow  
rep resen ts th ese tw o  p o les in  th e ‗quo tidian ‘ P o in tsm an  an d th e ‗quixo tic‘ Slo th ro p . 
Pointsman is a psychologist w o rkin g at ‗St. V ero n ica‘s H o sp ital o f th e T rue Im age fo r 
C o lo n ic an d R esp irato ry D iseases‘ (th e n am e itself in dicates ‗true im age‘ –  vera ikon) studying 
Pavlovian-conditioned responses, and is the part-tim e o w n er o f ‗T h e B o o k‘ (o f P avlo v‘s ‗first 
Forty-o n e L ectures‘).96 Slothrop, in comparison, is a test-subject, formerly under the control 
of Laszlo Jamf (another Pavlovian), and now Pointsman. Slothrop is tied to the V-2 rocket 
project because whenever he has sex, it is only a few days until a bomb drops in that 
lo catio n . Slo th ro p ‘s p reco gn itive ab ility to  fo retell a ro cket‘s lan din g site is determ in ed as ‗a 
silent extinction beyond the zero‘, w h ere th e co n ditio n ed reflex –  ‗h ave an  erectio n  w h en  a b o m b  
is dro p p ed‘ h as b een  reduced p ast th e zero  m ark un til he is now conditioned to have an 
erection before a bomb drops.97 T h is duality o f ‗co n tro l‘ –  b o th  ‗test-sub ject‘ an d ‗p o w er‘ –  is 
P yn ch o n ‘s am b ivalen t term  fo r th e divisio n  b etw een  quixo tic an d quo tidian , an d suggest a 
divisio n  b etw een  ‗p o stm o dern  n ih ilism ‘ an d ‗m o dern ist n ih ilism ‘. 
G ravity’s R ain bow  can in fact be read as portraying a series of competing nihilisms, an 
exp lo ratio n  o f ‗th e ideo lo gy o f th e Z ero ‘.98 Nora Dodson-T ruck, a m edium  w h o  ‗has turned 
her face, more than once, to the Outer radiance and simply seen nothing there. And so each 
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tim e h as taken  a little m o re o f th e Z ero  in side h erself‘ sym b o lises ‗ero tic‘ n ih ilism .99 Roger 
M exico , ‗w h o ‘s n ever quite b een  to  h ell b ut sp eaks as if h e‘s o n e o f th e m o st fallen ‘, 
sym b o lises ‗ch eap  n ih ilism ‘.100 The fundamental distinction, however, is between Slothrop 
an d P o in tsm an . A s P yn ch o n  w rites: ‗T h e E tern al C en tre can  b e seen  as th e F in al Z ero . 
N am es an d m eth o ds vary b ut th e m o vem en t to w ards stilln ess is th e sam e‘.101 Pointsman 
ep ito m ises th e ‗F in al Z ero ‘, th e teleological end of a nihilism bent on destruction –  the 
‗F ascist ideal o f A ctio n , A ctio n , A ctio n ‘.102 H e is p art o f th e ‗n egatio n  o f th e Z ero ‘, as 
D w igh t E ddin s h as n o ted: ‗T h ey are th e co de o f a m align  in sp iritin g th at results fro m  th e 
process of extinction (in this case, of negation) beyond the Zero, badges of a life-defying 
p resen ce in  ab sen ce th at en tails its o w n  th eo lo gy an d religio us culture‘.103 Sloth-rop, however, 
sym b o lises th e ‗E tern al C en tre‘, th e p assivity th at is o p p o sed to  th is ‗F ascist ideal‘. P ynchon 
th erefo re suggests th at th ere are tw o  fo rm ulatio n s o f n ih ilism , ‗M ean in g th in gs to  T h em  it 
n ever m ean t to  us. N ever. T w o  o rders o f b ein g, lo o kin g iden tical… b ut, b ut… ‘.104 Where 
modernist nihilism seeks to reduce everything to nothingness, postmodern nihilism 
demonstrates that nothingness cannot be brought into being, or being that desires its return 
to nothingness. 
It is clear that there is an opposition between quotidian, modernist nihilism and 
quixotic, postmodern nihilism. The former aspect of nihilism is implicitly part of those 
‗structures favo rin g death ‘ ep ito m ised b y P o in tsm an .105 These are structures that subvert the 
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quixo tic im p ulse, th at fo cus up o n  an n ih ilatio n . Slo th ro p  ‗escap es‘ fro m  th ese structures b y 
disappearing within the novel, rather than dying: 
 
Well here he is skidded out onto the Zone like a planchette on a Ouija board, and what 
shows up inside the empty circle of his brain might string together into a message, 
m igh t n o t, h e‘ll just h ave to  see.106 
 
A lth o ugh  Slo th ro p  ‗revisits‘ o ccasio n ally, ‗M o st o f th e o th ers gave up  lo n g ago  tryin g to  h o ld  
h im  to geth er, even  as a co n cep t‘.107 Slo th ro p ‘s disso lutio n  is in dicative o f th e n ih ilism  th at h e 
symbolises –  a dissolution of concepts rather than their destruction. Where Pointsman hunts 
for the zero point, Slothrop becomes the zero, dissolving his own sense of self, only to be 
fo un d ‗am o n g th e H um ility, am o n g th e gray an d p reterite so uls‘.108 
As with Carter, such oppositions demonstrate a false sense of simplicity for Pynchon 
because binary oppositions are the antithesis of the absurd world that these authors create. 
In The Crying of Lot 49 (1966), in  a p assage rem in iscen t o f B eckett, O edip a talks o f ‗w aitin g‘: 
 
The waiting above all; if not for another set of possibilities to replace those that had 
con ditio n ed th e lan d [… ], th en , at least, w aitin g fo r th e sym m etry o f ch o ices to  b reak 
down, to go skew. She had heard about excluded middles; they were bad shit, to be 
avoided.109 
 
‗E xcluded m iddles‘ are created b y b in ary o p p o sitio n s w h en  th e m iddle gro un d b etween the 
oppositions is excluded from thought. This is the result of Enlightenment rationality, which 
                                                 
106 Pynchon, G ravity’s R ain bow , p. 283. 
107 Pynchon, G ravity’s R ain bow , p. 740. 
108 Pynchon, G ravity’s R ain bow , p. 742. 
109 Thomas Pynchon, The Crying of Lot 49 (London: Picador, 1979), p. 125. 
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p ro m o tes a ‗strictly defin ed clin ical versio n  o f T ruth ‘.110 A s E lain e Safer w rites, ‗th e read er 
begins to realise that this situation is a lot bigger than sim p ly eith er/o r‘.111 We cannot talk of 
either ‗quo tidian ‘ or ‗quixo tic‘, either ‗m o dern ist n ih ilism ‘ or ‗p o stm o dern  n ih ilism ‘, w ith o ut 
excluding something between them. As with deconstructive practice, it is not enough to 
simply invert the hierarchy of the o p p o sitio n , as C h am b ers argues: ‗a reversal o f b in ary 
o p p o sitio n s th reaten s to  p erp etuate th e very o p p o sitio n al structure it rejects‘.112 Rather, this 
‗first p h ase‘ m ust also  b e fo llo w ed b y a seco n d p h ase th at is th e ‗gen eral displacement of the 
system ‘.113 It is th is ‗gen eral displacement‘ th at p o stm o dern ism  p ro p o ses as th e sub lim e fo rm , 
w h at W illiam  G leaso n  h as called ‗b o th /an d m ultip licity‘.114  
T h is ‗b o th /an d‘ is co m p lex in  itself, as P yn ch o n  in dicates in  G ravity’s R ain bow : ‗Y o u 
must ask two questions. First, what is the real nature of synthesis? And then: what is the real 
n ature o f co n tro l?‘.115 Synthesis –  th e H egelian  versio n  o f th e ‗b o th /an d‘ in  w h ich  
differences are resolved –  is fundamentally concerned with control. Similarly, another 
versio n  o f th e ‗b o th / an d‘ is in validated in  The Infernal Desire Machines of Doctor Hoffman, where 
D o cto r H o ffm an  says, ‗I do  n o t ackn o w ledge an y essen tial differen ce in  th e 
phenomenological bases of the two modes of thought. All things co-exist in pairs but mine 
is not an either/o r w o rld‘.116 A lth o ugh  H o ffm an  seem s in itially to  in dicate a ‗b o th /an d ‘ 
w o rld, th e sexual en ergy required b y th e D o cto r‘s ‗desire m ach in es‘ in dicates a ‗static jo urn ey 
                                                 
110 Pynchon, G ravity’s R ain bow , p. 272. 
111 E lain  Safer, ‗D ream s an d N igh tm ares: ‗H igh -T ech  P aran o ia‘ an d th e Jam eson ian  Sub lim e - An Approach to 
T h o m as P yn cho n ‘s P o stm o dern ism ‘, in  Traditions, Voices, and Dreams: The American Novel since the 1960s, ed. by 
Melvin J. Friedman and Ben Siegel (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1995), pp. 279-97 (p. 289). 
112 Judith  C h am b ers, ‗P arab o las an d P arab les: T h e R adical E th ics o f P yn ch on ‘s V. and G ravity’s R ain bow ‘, in  
Powerless Fictions: Ethics, Cultural Critique, and American Fiction in the Age of Postmodernism, ed. by Ricardo Miguel 
Alfonso (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1996), pp. 1-23 (p. 6). 
113 Jacques Derrida, Margins of Philosophy, trans. by Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), p. 
329. 
114 W illiam  G leaso n , ‗T h e P o stm o dern  L ab yrin th s o f Lot 49‘, Critique, 34:2 (1993), 83-99 (p. 93). 
115 Pynchon, G ravity’s R ain bow , p. 167. 
116 Carter, The Infernal Desire Machines of Doctor Hoffman, p. 206. 
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to w ards w illed, m utual an n ih ilatio n ‘.117 T h is ‗w illed, m utual an n ih ilatio n ‘ is sim ilar to  
P o in tsm an ‘s n ih ilism  –  it lo cates th e reso lutio n  o f th e ‗b o th /an d‘ in  th e destructio n  o f b o th . 
Postmodernism, in contrast to both of these, does not seek to resolve the differences 
between mutually exclusive concepts: 
 
       Both                 And               Both                    And                            Both 
      (Thesis)          (Antithesis)            (+)                       (-) 
 
                                                                                                                  Absurd / 
                                                                                                               Postmodern 
                                                                                                                 Sublime 
 
 
 
       Dialectical Resolution                Modernist Nihilism                              And 
                (Synthesis)                                     (Zero) 
 
                   Hegel                                     Hoffman                              Postmodernism 
6.1 T h e ‘B oth / A n d ’ 
 
Hegel resolves the differences between thesis and antithesis and Doctor Hoffman annihilates 
them, both leading to the eradication of the previous terms. Postmodernism, however, keeps 
both concepts and explores the ground between them. As Pynchon writes in G ravity’s 
Rainbow: ‗W h at h ap p en s w h en  p aran o id m eets p aran o id? A  cro ssin g o f so lip sism s. C learly. 
The two patterns create a third: a moiré, a new world of flowing shadows, 
in terferen ces… ‘.118 When so lip sism  m eets so lip sism  ‗tw o  p attern s create a th ird‘, a ‗m o iré‘. In  
relatio n  to  th e creatio n  o f a text, th is m o iré o r ‗p attern ed ap p earan ce o f w atered silk‘, is a 
fo rm  o f quixo tic p o stm o dern ism  in  w h ich  th e p attern  o f th e ‗w o ven ‘ text (fro m  textus, 
meanin g ‗w eb ‘ o r ‗fab ric‘) is alw ays sh iftin g. In  a sim ilar m an n er to  Io n esco ‘s defin itio n  o f 
                                                 
117 Carter, The Infernal Desire Machines of Doctor Hoffman, p. 215. 
118 Pynchon, G ravity’s R ain bow , p. 395. 
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in tern al co n tradictio n s in  h um an ity, B eckett‘s in h ab itatio n  o f th e zo n e b etw een  n igh t an d  
day, B arth ‘s n ih ilism  b etw een  co m ed y an d traged y, an d V o n n egut‘s sacred ‗un w avering band 
o f ligh t‘, P yn ch o n  an d C arter suggest th at it is in  th e m iddle o f such  distin ctio n s th at th e 
quixo tic arises. In  th is resp ect, th e zip  o f N ew m an ‘s Be I can indicate an absurd, sublime 
form of being trapped between the darkness of binary oppositions. Perhaps this is also what 
‗p o stm o dern ‘ n ih ilism  m ean s –  a fo rm  o f n ih ilism  th at is ‗a n ew  w o rld o f flo atin g sh ado w s‘ 
between the modernist and postmodern conception of nihilism. Between the binary 
o p p o sitio n  o f tw o  ‗p resen t‘ co n cep ts lies th e ‗exclu ded m iddle‘ o f th e ab sen t. T h is w o uld b e 
a nihilism that stands outside the possibility of representation itself, absented from even the 
opposition between absence and presence: 
[… ] 
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7. 
B ein g ‘A b sen t-M in ded ’: T ow ard s an  ‘E th ical’ N ihilism  
 
 
If the world is ‗p o stm o dern ‘, th en  w e sh o uld b e n o  lo n ger livin g in  th e m o d ern ist, quo tidian  
world. However, as Pynchon suggests in Vineland, th is is o b vio usly n o t th e case: ‗Sp ace 
devoted to make-believe had, it was thought, been reclaimed by the serious activities of the 
W o rld o f R eality‘.1 The space devoted to quixotic enterprises has followed a more 
Baudrillardian path –  it h as b een  trap p ed in  th e glo b al n etw o rk o f cap italism , th e ‗W o rld o f 
R eality‘. T h is is a sh ift fro m  L yo tard‘s postmodern to  Jam eso n ‘s postmodernity, th e ‗lo gic o f late 
cap italism ‘.2 P yn ch o n  p redicts th is sh ift fro m  ‗m ake-b elieve‘ to  ‗R eality‘ in  V, where he 
w rites th at ‗T h e arran gin g an d rearran gin g w as D ecaden ce, b ut th e exh austio n  o f all p o ssib le 
p erm utatio n s an d co m b in atio n s w as death ‘.3 This suggests that postmodern ethics –  the 
ethics of difference and différance, th e ‗arran gin g an d rearran gin g‘ o f p revio us fo rm s an d 
genres –  h as b een  rep laced w ith  th e ‗death ‘ an d ‗exh austio n ‘ o f such  rep resen tatio n al eth ics –  
ethical nihilism. 
Many have argued that ethical nihilism pervades the postmodern age, although few see 
nihilism as the only future possibility for human emancipation. Throughout postmodern 
literature, whether in the form of the desert, or in the lack of rules and regulations, absence 
plays a key role in the determination of a postmodern nihilism. This absence is far from 
being the destruction implicit in modernist nihilism, however, because postmodern nihilism, 
rath er th an  suggestin g destructio n , in dicates th e n eed to  b e eth ically ‗ab sen t-min ded‘. T h is 
                                                 
1 Thomas Pynchon, Vineland (London: Minerva, 1997), p. 192. 
2 Fredric Jameson, Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism (London: Verso, 1991), p. 45. 
3 Pynchon, V (London: Vintage, 1995), p. 298. 
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does not mean that we must forget ethics, but that we must be ethically-minded toward 
ab sen ce: a sh ift fro m  ‗eth ical n ih ilism ‘ to  an  ‗eth ical‘ n ih ilism . P o stm o dern  n ih ilism  is, in  fact, 
the antidote to a modernist, ethical nihilism. 
The process by which the quixotic impulse of the postmodern was in-corporated into 
the larger structure of global capitalism was the rise of consumer society. This is the 
‗n ih ilism ‘ o f cap italism  realised in  A lan  Sillito e‘s Travels in Nihilon (1971). ‗N ih ilo n ‘ is th e 
ultimate capitalist state where everything is a commodity, including life: the highway code 
enforces drink-drivin g in  o rder to  curb  th e ‗excessive p ro ductio n ‘ o f h um an  life an d p o in ts 
are rewarded for the most casualties –  ‗W e‘ve go t to  keep  death  o n  th e ro ads. It‘s th e o n ly 
w ay o f h o ldin g th e p o p ulatio n  do w n ‘ –  and geriatrics are sent to the war front because 
‗T h ey‘re to o  b usy w o rkin g fo r N ih ilo n , b uildin g it up  an d b reedin g ch ildren ‘.4 Sillito e‘s 
allegory for the rise of capitalism in Britain (and Western society as a whole) is evident 
th ro ugh o ut th e text: ‗T h e L an d  o f H o p eless G o re‘ rath er th an  ‗T h e L an d o f H o p e an d 
G lo ry‘; o r th e N ih ilo n ian  statio n m aster sayin g, ‗W e are all w ell p aid, h ap p y, p ro sp ero us, 
patriotic, sober, and hardworking British –  I mean Nihilonian –  o fficials‘.5 
T h e ‗ab so lute ch ao s m eticulo usly o rgan ised‘ o f N ih ilo n  in dicates th e asso ciatio n  
b etw een  p o stm o dern ity, n ih ilism , an d cap italism  th at V irilio  calls ‗th e aesth etics o f 
disappearance.6 Technology subverted the quixotic postmodern, in the guise of television 
and mass media, and computers: ironically, an anti-humanist postmodern was undone by an 
anti-human technology. Warfare –  economic and informatic –  is merely the result of the 
technological abstraction of the human. In Vineland, for example, we see signs of mass media 
en cro ach in g up o n  h um an ity. Set in  1984, w ith  an  o b vio us referen ce to  G eo rge O rw ell‘s 
                                                 
4 Alan Sillitoe, Travels in Nihilon (London: Grafton, 1986), pp. 84, 25-26. 
5 Sillitoe, pp. 47, 33. 
6 Sillitoe, p. 75. 
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Nineteen Eighty-Four (1949), P yn ch o n  d irects th e reader‘s atten tio n  to  th e ‗failed‘ revo lutio n  o f 
the 1960s and the measure of social control now enjoyed by the government. Pynchon 
locates this control in the birth of the Tube (television), which subverts the revolution and 
causes those involved in it to forget what they learned: 
 
They just let us forget. Give us too much to process, fill up every minute, keep us 
distracted, it‘s w h at th e T ub e is fo r [… ] –  just another way to claim our attention, so 
that beautiful certainty we have starts to fade, and after a while they have us convinced 
all over again that we really are going to die. An d th ey‘ve go t us again .7 
 
B y ‗b uyin g in to ‘ th e m yth  o f th e T ub e, th e quixo tic im p ulse th at defin ed a gen eratio n  is 
h arn essed: ‗M in ute th e T ub e go t h o ld o f yo u fo lks th at w as it, th at w h o le altern ative 
A m erica, el deado  m eato , just like th ‘ In dian s, so ld it to your real enemies, and even in 1970s 
dollars –  it w as w ay to o  ch eap … ‘.8 W h at n o w  rules is th e ‗24 -frame-per-seco n d truth ‘ o f 
th o se w h o  w ield ‗R eagan o m ic ax b lad es‘.9 The Thanatoids, who watch television all day, are 
the walking dead and reprise the zom b ies o f G eo rge R o m ero ‘s Dead series –  ‗W h at do  yo u 
call a T h an ato id w ith  ‗Sir‘ in  fro n t o f h is n am e? K n igh t o f th e L ivin g D ead‘ –  and especially 
the consumer zombies of Dawn of the Dead (1978).10 ‗M ass m edia‘ co n structs h um an ity as 
‗m ass‘, n o t as in dividuals, and is a media-ted form of reality: the reel, not the Real. 
The second form of technological control is seen in the rise of computers. The 
computer defines the logic of the controlled world, a simulated world in which binary 
                                                 
7 Pynchon, Vineland, p. 314. 
8 Pynchon, Vineland, p. 373. 
9 Pynchon, Vineland, p p . 241, 90. T h is ‗24-frame-per-seco n d truth ‘ reprises the director Jean-L uc G o dard‘s 
statem en t th at ‗F ilm  is truth  24 tim es a seco nd‘. See P aul V irilio , The Aesthetics of Disappearance, trans. by Philip 
Beitchman (New York: Semiotext(e), 1991), p. 50. 
10 Pynchon, Vineland, p. 219. 
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oppositions –  zeroes and ones –  are converted into the information-processing power that 
defin es th e W o rld W ide ‗W eb ‘. T h is is also  seen  in  Vineland, where Pynchon writes: 
 
If p attern s o f o n es an d zero s w ere ‗like‘ h um an  lives an d death s, if everyth in g ab o ut an  
individual could be represented in a computer record by a long string of ones and zeros, 
then what kind of creature would be represented by a long string of lives and deaths? 
[… ] It w o uld  take eigh t h um an  lives an d death s just to  fo rm  o n e ch aracter in  th is 
b ein g‘s n am e –  its complete dossier might take up a considerable piece of the history of 
th e w o rld. W e are all digits in  G o d‘s co m p uter.11 
 
God does not define the control of human lives or deaths any longer –  h e is ‗dead‘. T h e n ew  
God is the computer, which explains the paranoia that postmodern literature feels towards 
the binary world of computers –  such paranoia is concerned with control, as we see in Don 
D eL illo ‘s White Noise (1984). After the ATE (Airborne Toxic Event), to which Jack Gladney 
has been exposed, his data is en tered in to  a co m p uter: ‗It‘s n o t just th at yo u w ere o ut th ere 
so  m an y seco n ds. It‘s yo ur w h o le data p ro file. I tap p ed in to  yo ur h isto ry. I‘m  gettin g 
b racketed n um b ers w ith  p ulsin g stars‘.12 Gladney is never told what these mean, merely 
reinforcing the paran o ia th at co m p uters m ay ‗kn o w ‘ m o re ab o ut yo u th an  yo u do . 
Furthermore, the binary logic of computers excludes the sublime form of the postmodern. 
A s w e saw  in  th e p revio us ch ap ter, th e sub lim e o rigin ates in  ‗th e flo atin g sh ado w s‘ b etw een  
opposing binary concepts, and in binary logic there is no middle ground.13 
The quixotic revolution of postmodernism was brought into the capitalist fold through 
tech n o lo gical m ean s. T h e h um an  elem en t b o w ed b efo re tech n o lo gy ‗as if so m e C o sm ic 
Fascist had spliced in a DNA sequence requiring this form of seduction and initiation into 
                                                 
11 Pynchon, Vineland, pp. 90-91. 
12 Don DeLillo, White Noise (London: Picador, 1986), p. 140. 
13 Thomas Pynchon, G ravity’s R ain bow  (London: Vintage, 1995), p. 395. 
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th e dark jo ys o f so cial co n tro l‘.14 T h is b eco m es clear in  relatio n  to  ‗b lan k fictio n ‘ w h ere 
capitalism runs riot and people behave as if members of an insect hive-mind: 
 
On the streets crowds of people were staggering this way and that, newly released from 
their office tombs. Grim faces, worn down like cobblestones, never to make anything of 
their lives. These were worker bees and drones, who had been imprisoned in American 
thought-patterns since birth, with no hope for escape but the weekly million-dollar 
lottery.15 
 
Blank fiction, as a genre within the field of postmodern literature, is often epitomised by the 
realisation that there are no longer guidelines to living, that surface has taken over depth, 
resultin g in  a co n sum er so ciety w ith  n o  m o ral o r eth ical fram ew o rk. W o rds such  as ‗m o rality‘ 
an d ‗eth ics‘ do  n o t ap p ear in  th e vo cab ulary o f b lan k fictio n  an d th us it is th e lo gical 
p ro gressio n  o f ‗eth ical n ih ilism ‘ in  literature: th eir absence is indicative of the nature of blank 
fiction. 
 
B lan k F iction : T h e ‘E th ical N ih ilism ’ of P ostm od ern ity 
‗B lan k fictio n ‘ is n o t a n ew  idea, an d certain ly n o t a p urely p o stm o dern  co n cep t. T h e 
traditio n  o f ‗b lan k fictio n ‘ h as its ro o ts in  texts such  as N ietzsch e‘s Beyond Good and Evil 
(1886) an d A n dré G ide‘s The Immoralist (1902). Nietzsche observed morality to be irrelevant 
w h en  m o vin g b eyo n d so cial values: ‗T o  reco gn ise un truth  as a co n ditio n  o f life: th at, to  b e 
sure, means to resist customary value-sentiments in a dangerous fashion; and a philosophy 
                                                 
14 Pynchon, Vineland, p. 83. 
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w h ich  ven tures to  do  so  p laces itself, b y th at act alo n e, b eyo n d go o d an d evil‘.16 T h is ‗b eyo n d  
go o d an d  evil‘ is a m o rality b ased in  lived exp erien ce, n o t up o n  so m e so cial sen se o f righ t 
and wrong. Like Nietzsche, Gide also explored immorality in the context of a cultural, as 
o p p o sed to  tran scen den t, m o rality. H o w ever, un like N ietzsch e‘s ‗p o sitive‘ rem o val o f so cial 
m o rality, G ide‘s p ro tago n ist, M ich el, is m o re n egative, w ritin g at th e en d o f th e text th at ‗I 
live for next to  n o th in g in  th is p lace‘.17 M ich el go es ‗b eyo n d go o d  an d evil‘ an d fin ds n o th in g 
for which to live. This indicates a distinction between morality and ethics, where morality is a 
w ay o f livin g in  so ciety, an d eth ics are a w ay o f livin g ‗in  yo urself‘. W h ere Nietzsche finds an 
ethic in rejecting social morality, Gide shows the problems of lacking both morality and 
eth ics. T h ere is th us a distin ctio n  b etw een  ‗im m o rality‘ an d ‗am o rality‘, w h ere th e fo rm er is 
the rejection of a specific social compact and the latter is the rejection (or lack) of any form 
o f m o rality. T h is realisatio n  suggests texts such  as H ub ert Selb y Jr‘s Last Exit to Brooklyn 
(1957), w h ich  is so  relen tlessly n egative th at is arguab ly o n e o f th e first texts o f ‗b lan k 
fictio n ‘.18 
James Annesley n o tes th at w h ilst b lan k fictio n  dem o n strates ‗relen tless em p h asis o n  
brand names, popular culture and commodities, coupled with detailed descriptions of 
co n sum erism , th e reificatio n s o f vio len ce, decad en ce an d extrem e sexuality‘, it also  rem ain s 
‗elusive‘.19 A n n esley p refers in stead to  lab el literature th at exh ib its such  ch aracteristics ‗blank 
fictions‘ b ecause such  a term  articulates ‗b o th  reservatio n s ab o ut th e n ature o f literary 
catego ries‘ an d ‗th e p ro ductio n  o f a kin d o f m o dern  fictio n  th at is flat, am b iguous and 
                                                 
16 Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future, trans. by R. J. Hollingdale 
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18 A lth o ugh  it w o uld b e equally valid to  argue th at th e first ‗true‘ in carn atio n  o f b lan k fictio n  is th e existen tial 
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p ro b lem atically b lan k‘.20 To offer a theoretical concept that unites the entire corpus of blank 
fiction is indeed difficult, although Annesley neglects the fact that authors such as Bret 
Easton Ellis, Tama Janowitz, and Denis Johnson predicate their novels upon the absence of 
morality and ethics. Whether this is because of excessive consumption (Ellis), the 
fragmentation of society (Janowitz), or the inability of man to step out of the absurd 
condition and into some form of meaning (Johnson), each of these authors (and others, such 
as McInerney, Douglas Coupland, and Dennis Cooper) all tend to demonstrate what might 
b e term ed ‗eth ical n ih ilism ‘ in  its p urest sen se. R ath er th an  dw ell o n  eth ical p ro b lem s th at 
can have no lasting solutions, each of these authors show that morality, for better or worse, 
is absent.  
Blank fiction is postmodern because it demonstrates the Jamesonian conception of 
p o stm o dern ism  as th e ‗cultural lo gic o f late cap italism ‘. A lth o ugh  th is argum en t co uld b e 
applied to any artwork produced under the auspices of post-w ar ‗late cap italism ‘, b lan k 
fiction, like cyberpunk fiction, is inherently connected with economics. Although Marxist 
critics argue that all texts exhibit economic characteristics, subsumed or otherwise, blank 
fiction is overtly concerned with the value-economy of consumption, and the ways in which 
this absents ethics. This appears in terms of actual monetary affluence (Ellis) and poverty 
(Johnson), but also in the consumption of art –  th e b uyin g an d  sellin g o f ‗cultu re‘ (Jan o w itz). 
F urth erm o re, w h ilst b lan k fictio n  is frequen tly deem ed ‗distasteful‘ in  its co n cern s, it m ay 
also be perceived as exemplifying the classic Marxist diatribe of the rich abusing the poor. 
Blank fiction, however, is silent on this point: whether it condemns consumer society (and is 
therefore ironic in its glorification of violence) or revels in it (celebrating the freedom from 
ethical concerns) is ambiguous. In fact, this ambivalence situates blank fiction within the 
                                                 
20 Annesley, p. 137. 
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disco urse o f b o th  ‗eth ical n ih ilism ‘ an d ‗p o stm o dern ism ‘. T h e ‗silen ce‘ o f b lan k fictio n  is 
neither complicit with capitalism nor condemning it because it cannot judge ethical values. It is 
thus nihilistic in the sense that there is no valid ethical system from which it can determine a 
value judgem en t, an d p o stm o dern  b ecause th e O th er (h o w ever ‗distasteful‘) m ust b e allo w ed 
to remain Other. 
E llis‘ ‗b lan kn ess‘, fo r exam p le, is co n cern ed w ith  th e n ature o f co n sum p tio n  in  
contemporary America and, as such, affluence is an important facto r in  E llis‘ fictio n . In  
American Psycho (1991), the protagonist, Patrick Bateman, is a city executive whose bouts of 
casual violence mark him as both a psychopath and a sociopath although wealth and gender, 
to  a certain  exten t, determ in es ‗victim o lo gy‘. H is targets are animals, the homeless, and 
women –  those deemed weaker both economically and physically. Indolent wealth is also a 
feature o f Jan o w itz‘s Slaves of New York (1987), where she compares ancient Greece to 
contemporary New York: 
 
In ancient Greece the first race of men was made of gold, and they lived like gods 
without labor or pain, and did not suffer from old age, but they fell asleep in death. But 
I‘m  referrin g n o w  to  m y sister. T h e race o f m en  o f go ld w ere h o llo w  in side an d easily 
bent and melted.21 
 
Jan o w itz do es n o t n o stalgically sum m o n  th e p ast to  criticise th e p resen t (as E lio t‘s ‗T h e 
H o llo w  M en ‘ suggests), b ut argues th at go ld is just a surface an d always has been: ‗th e race o f 
men of gold were h o llo w  in side‘. T h ere is n o  tran sferen ce to  th e present tense here, as 
Janowitz would do were she criticising contemporary New York. There is instead a sense 
that the original ‗race o f m en  o f go ld‘ w ere as h o llo w  as co n tem p o rary so ciety an d th erefo re 
                                                 
21 T am a Jan o w itz, ‗O de to  H ero in e o f th e F uture‘, in  Slaves of New York, pp. 245-59 (p. 245). 
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that all society is hollow. The connection with wealth is evident in the association between 
hollowness and gold, where surface value does not equate to depth. 
This hollowness also translates into the language used within blank fiction novels. For 
example, in American Psycho, Ellis presents the reader with a distinct lack of emotional 
empathy after describing a particularly gruesome murder: 
 
Her head sits on the kitchen table and its blood-soaked face –  even with eyes scooped 
out and a pair of Alain Mikli sunglasses over the holes –  looks like its frowning. I get 
very tired lo o kin g at it an d th o ugh  I didn ‘t get an y sleep  last n igh t an d I‘m  utterly sp en t, 
I still have a lunch appointment at Odeon with Jem Davies and Alana Burton at one. 
T h at‘s very im p o rtan t to  m e an d I h ave to  deb ate w h eth er I sh o uld can cel it or not.22 
 
A decapitated head merits as much attention as a lunch appointment, and the prose reflects 
this with only a blank reportage of how Bateman acts. Thus, murder and torture are dealt 
with in exactly the same narrative tone as a five-page discussion on the relative merits of 
brands of bottled water.23 Similarly, Janowitz emphasises this blankness at the heart of death 
in  ‗O de to  H ero in e o f th e F uture‘, w h ere th e n arrato r relates th e last tim e sh e saw  h er sister 
before her sister died. She meets her sister and two male friends in a bar and the sister relates 
a story. Afterwards, the sister goes home, takes some drugs, and falls out of her apartment 
window. There is no causality in the story, as it is not because of the meeting, the story, or, 
arguably, th e drugs, th at th e sister dies. Sh e just dies. A fter th e sister‘s death , th e reader is 
p resen ted w ith  th e n arrato r‘s th o ugh ts o n  th e death : 
 
                                                 
22 Bret Easton Ellis, American Psycho (London: Picador, 1991), p. 291. 
23 Ellis, American Psycho, pp. 247-52. 
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W ell, th ere aren ‘t m an y m o re th o ugh ts in  m y h ead. O n ly a few , like so m eth in g quite 
defunct and forgotten in the closet: an old cheese sandwich, perhaps, or a half-empty 
bottle of rootbeer. Or worse still, old socks green with lichen and mold. It might have 
h urt m e less if th ey h adn ‘t p ub lish ed th o se p ictures in  th e p ap er, th e kin d o f p icture th at 
should be outlawed: my sister like a broken cup, flecked with dust and pencil shavings 
on the pavement.24 
 
T h ere is n o  em o tio n  in  th e descrip tio n  an d alth o ugh  th e n arrato r is affected b y h er sister‘s 
death, the prose style is not. There is a gap between the experience of the death and its 
representation in the story. Rather than being able to think about her sister, the narrator 
thinks about decaying domestic artefacts, an archaeology of urban living revealed in cheese 
sandwiches, half-empty (not half-full) bottles of beer, and old socks. The photograph of her 
sister‘s b o dy, sen satio n ally p ub lish ed b y th e p ap er, is also  co n figured in  th ese do m estic 
term s: a b o dy like ‗a b ro ken  cup ‘ th at is co vered in  ‗p en cil sh avin gs‘. 
Such  ‗b lan k‘ descrip tio n s evo ke th e alien atio n  felt b y ch aracters in a broken world. 
Johnson, in Angels (1977) examines the extent to which contemporary society –  as a result of 
th e ‗lo gic o f late cap italism ‘ –  is made up of broken fragments. Living in this society is akin 
to being homeless, because there is no sense of being at home within oneself, as Bill 
Houston realises: 
 
The street out there was a mess of things –  trash and rust and grease –  all holding still 
for a minute. In his mind he was wordless, knowing what the street was and who he 
was, the man with the fingerprints looking out at the street, one bare foot resting on a 
shoe and the other flat on the chilly linoleum, a drunk and deluded man, without a 
chance. It was all right to be who he was, but others would probably think it was 
terrible. A couple of tim es in  th e p ast h e‘d reach ed th is ab so lute zero  o f th e truth , an d 
without fear or bitterness he realized now that somewhere inside it there was a move he 
co uld m ake to  ch an ge h is life, to  b eco m e an o th er p erso n , b ut h e‘d n ever b e ab le to  
guess what it was.25 
                                                 
24 Jan o w itz, ‗O de to  H ero in e o f th e F uture‘, p . 259 . 
25 Denis Johnson, Angels (London: Faber and Faber, 1984), pp. 41-42. 
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Although Johnson presents the potential for salvation, this potential is tragic because Bill is 
un ab le to  reach  it. T h e ‗ab so lute zero  o f truth ‘ is rem in iscen t o f N ietzsch e‘s state o f ‗b eyo n d 
go o d an d evil‘, alth o ugh  it is p resen ted in  a far less p o sitive light. Here, although salvation 
m ay exist (an d Jo h n so n , o ut o f all th e ‗b lan k fictio n ‘ w riters, is alo n e in  th is p o ssib ility fo r 
redemption), Bill has no way of knowing what it is, or what path to take to be redeemed. 
Instead, the future is presented in solely negative terms: 
 
Its easy to talk about the future being so good and all, because it never comes, dear. But 
all yo u go tta do  is lo o k aro un d yo u fo r h alf a m in ute. N o b o dy‘s keep in g it secret fro m  
us th at w e‘re all in  th e sam e to ilet. W e‘re in  th e sewer. Forecast tomorrow is more of the 
same.26 
 
Thus, blankness is also realised in pessimism about the future. Leonard English, the 
ep o n ym o us ‗h an ged m an ‘ o f Jo h n so n ‘s Resuscitation of a Hanged Man (1991), cannot quite 
bring himself to believe what he must in order to be redeemed: 
 
H e didn ‘t p ray an ym o re fo r faith , b ecause h e‘d fo un d  th at a gro w in g certain ty o f th e 
Presence was accompanied by a terrifying absence of any sign or feeling or 
manifestation of it. He was afraid that what he prayed to was nothing, only this limitless 
absence.27 
 
E n glish ‘s ‗th eo lo gical n ih ilism ‘ leads to  th e ‗eth ical n ih ilism ‘ at th e h eart o f th e text. T h is 
suggests a distin ctio n  b etw een  eth ical n ih ilism  th at is th e result o f th e ‗lo gic o f late 
cap italism ‘ (seen  in  E llis an d Jan o w itz) and ethical nihilism that is the result of the absence of 
                                                 
26 Johnson, Angels, p. 71. 
27 Denis Johnson, Resuscitation of a Hanged Man (London: Faber and Faber, 1992), p. 119. 
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God or transcendent meaning (seen in Johnson). Whilst all these authors demonstrate ethical 
nihilism, the mechanism by which it comes to be realised differs.  
Responses to such nihilistic blankness also  differ w ith in  b lan k fictio n . W h ere E llis‘ 
B atem an  an d Jan o w itz‘s n arrato rs just accep t b lan kn ess as p art o f everyday life, o th er 
p ro tago n ists, like Jo h n so n ‘s ch aracters, search  fo r so m e fo rm  o f m ean in g. C lay, th e 
protagonist of Less Than Zero (1985), says ‗I realize th at th e m o n ey do esn ‘t m atter. T h at all 
th at do es is th at I w an t to  see th e w o rst‘.28 Clay wants to see the worst because he is so jaded 
that normal experiences mean little to him, although he is still searching for feeling. As 
Virilio argues, economic capitalism is thereby subordinated to the feeling of continued 
warfare, of living within the disaster. One of the most traumatic scenes in Less Than Zero is 
the gang rape of a twelve-year-old girl. After all the drugs and snuff movies, Clay reaches the 
lim its o f h is jaded m o rals an d can n o t w atch , sayin g th at ‗I do n ‘t th in k it‘s righ t‘, alth o ugh  h e 
still does not help the girl in any way –  moral blankness means that he does not care about 
th e girl, o n ly th at th is ‗exp erien ce‘ is n o t fo r h im .29 H is frien d, R ip , resp o n ds: ‗W h at‘s righ t? 
If you want something, you have the right to take it. If you want to do something, you have 
th e righ t to  do  it‘. W h en  C lay o b serves th at R ip  h as everyth in g, R ip  disagrees: ‗I do n ‘t h ave 
an yth in g to  lo se‘.30 This attitude defines blank fiction, because however much the characters 
have, they never have anything to lose –th ey h ave ‗n o th in g‘ w ith  w h ich  to  b egin . T h is is a 
result of the ethical nihilism implicit to such fiction, even if the hedonism itself is not 
nihilistic. There is no escape from this, as even Patrick Bateman realises when, at the end of 
                                                 
28 Bret Easton Ellis, Less Than Zero (London: Picador, 1986), p. 160. 
29 Ellis, Less Than Zero, pp. 176. 
30 Ellis, Less Than Zero, pp. 176-77. 
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American Psycho, w e see a do o r sayin g ‗T h is is n o t an  exit‘.31 There is no escape from here, 
only the eternal search for an absent meaning, the eternal waiting for Godot. 
How do blank fiction characters find meaning where there is none? Most just muddle 
through life, going about their routines, although those that actively search for some 
p rin cip le fo r actio n  gen erally use vio len ce, an d are sated b y ‗n egative‘ exp erien ces such as 
murder and torture. However, whereas Ellis portrays the predators and victimisers of the 
blank world, Johnson inverts the casual violence so that his characters are preyed-upon 
victims: 
 
They started calling it The Rape, and it came to stand for everything: for coming 
together while falling apart; for loving each other and hating everybody else; for moving 
at a breakneck speed and getting nowhere; for freezing in the streets and melting in the 
rooms of love. The Rape was major and useless, like a knife stuck in the midst of things. 
They could hate it and arrange their picture of themselves around it.32 
 
W h en  B ill visits Jam ie after sh e is rap ed, th ey b eco m e lo vers, an d ‗T h e R ap e‘ b eco m es 
defin ed as th e cen tre o f th e w o rld. It is ‗m ajo r an d  useless, like a knife stuck in the midst of 
th in gs‘. Iro n ically, w ith o ut th e kn ife staun ch in g th e w o un d it h as caused , m ean in g w o uld  
bleed out of the world. Whatever causes emotion is necessary for a sense of meaning to be 
preserved, and yet the meaning found through pain is solely negative. Trauma, here, is not an 
indicator of absence –  what might be termed the repression of a negative experience –  but 
an indicator of presence, a badge to wear to keep blankness at bay. 
In the world of blank fiction –  a world that mirrors our own – the absence of rules and 
regulations defines the ethical nihilism pervading it. This indicates a link between nihilism 
                                                 
31 Ellis, American Psycho, p. 399. 
32 Johnson, Angels, p. 64. 
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an d th e sub lim e b ecause ‗T h e retreat o f rules an d regulatio n s is th e cause o f th e feelin g o n  
th e sub lim e‘ an d yet also  th e cause of the feeling of blankness –  nihilism.33 The blankness of 
th e w o rld w ith o ut m o rals, w h at h as co m e to  b e kn o w n  as ‗eth ical n ih ilism ‘, defin es a sub lim e 
world. Although Lyotard would disagree with this use of his statement, blank fiction uses 
this absen ce o f eth ical regulatio n , w h eth er resultin g fro m  th e ‗th e death  o f G o d‘ o r th e 
distrust towards metanarratives shown by postmodernism, to indicate the moral void at the 
heart of late-twentieth-century Western society. This link between violence and the sublime 
is n o t co m p letely arb itrary, h o w ever, as B arry T aylo r o b serves w h en  readin g T h o m as H arris‘ 
Red Dragon (1989) and The Silence of the Lambs (1990): ‗L ecter, th en , m ay serve as a m yth ical 
in stan ce o f L yo tard‘s sub lim e o b ject, a rep resen tatio n  o f th e vio lence of the event in which 
th is terro ristic p o ten tial is n o t rep ressed‘.34 T h is ‗terro ristic p o ten tial‘ em erges w h en  
p o stm o dern ism  is ‗in sufficien tly deco n structive‘ an d falls in to  ‗a terro rism  n o t o n ly o f 
co n sen sus b ut o f dissen sus‘.35 In  th is sen se, ‗b lan k fictio n ‘ utilises an  incomplete 
p o stm o dern ism , usin g th e cen tral co n cep ts o f ab sen ce an d  ‗in credulity to w ards 
m etan arratives‘ to  in dicate b lan kn ess, w ith o ut ever ach ievin g th e ‗eth ical‘ b alan ce o f a w o rld 
accep tin g o f differen ce. H en ce, th e ‗eth ical n ih ilism ‘ o f b lan k fictio n  is en tw in ed w ith  its 
postmodern nature, and suggests a fundamental link between the postmodern sublime and 
th e ab sen ce o f m o rals th at is called ‗eth ical n ih ilism ‘. 
 
                                                 
33 Jean-F ranço is L yo tard, ‗C om p lexity an d th e Sub lim e‘, in  Postmodernism: ICA Documents 4 & 5, ed. by Lisa 
Appignanesi (London: Free Association Books, 1986), pp. 10-12 (p. 11). 
34 B arry T aylo r, ‗T h e V io len ce o f th e E vent: H an n ib al L ecter in th e L yo tardian  Sub lim e‘, in  Postmodern 
Surroundings, ed. by Steven Earnshaw (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1994), pp. 215-30 (p. 224). 
35 Taylor, p. 224. 
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(En)Gendering Absence 
The common link between violence and sex indicated in the previous section defines 
an o th er step  in  th e directio n  o f an  ‗eth ical‘ n ih ilism . B lan k fictio n  in dicates an  asso ciatio n  
between sex and violence that is predicated upon masculine control of the female body. 
Hence, when looking at the representation of women within certain postmodern texts, we 
o b serve w h at M ary A llen  h as called  ‗th e n ecessary b lan kn ess‘. Sh e argues th at ‗T h e m o st 
noticeable quality of women in the literature of the [nineteen-] sixties is th eir b lan kn ess‘.36 
Their blankness is not an inherent quality, but one that is appended to them by men, 
indicating that femininity functions as a monstrous Other within certain postmodern texts: 
‗M en  n o w  p ro ject a kin d o f h o rrib le b lan kn ess o f th e age o n to  th e im age o f w o m en ‘.37 
A lth o ugh  A llen ‘s ap p ro ach  in dicates th at w o m en  are equivalen t to  b lan kn ess, th is ‗b lan kn ess‘ 
can  b e catego rised as ‗ab sen ce‘, m ean in g th at certain  texts dem o n strate absented femininity. 
Placing this in a larger context than just American fiction of the 1960s reveals not only an 
‗ab sen ted fem in in ity‘ b ut also  a feminised absence. Rather than the discursive construction of 
femininity as absent, this inversion suggests that absence is itself feminised. Thus, two 
dominant modes exist in the juxtaposition of femininity and absence. 
T h is juxtap o sitio n  o f fem in in ity an d ab sen ce, w h eth er as ‗ab sen ted fem in in ity‘ o r 
‗fem in ised ab sen ce‘, is ch aracterised in  fo ur w ays th ro ugh o ut p o stm o dern  literature. T h e first 
is the representation of women as somehow absent within a male-dominated world, seen in 
the works of authors such as Carter and Barth. The second is connected with blank fiction in 
the sense that it locates violence and sex in a masculine discourse of power, seen in the 
works of authors such as Erickson. This mutates into the third formulation, in which an 
                                                 
36 Mary Allen, The Necessary Blankness: Women in Major American Fiction of the Sixties (Urbana: University of Illinois 
Press, 1976), p. 7. 
37 Allen, p. 7. 
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apocalyptic form of femininity has the potential to destroy masculinity, seen in Erickson and 
Carter, where absence and passivity act as a positive measure of worth, rather than the 
negative lack of identity. This demonstrates the extent to which absence, passivity, and 
silence are more ethical than their respective reversals. The fourth, concerning the 
postmodern appropriation of the Eurydice myth, configures femininity as a sense of absent 
meaning that must be discovered, and is seen in the works of authors such as Pynchon, Italo 
Calvino, and Kathy Acker.38 
C arter‘s Love (1971) is an example of the ways in which women are configured as 
absent within patriarchal society. The text is constructed through a triumvirate of characters: 
Lee, h is b ro th er B uzz, an d A n n ab el, L ee‘s w ife. A n n ab el, th e o n ly p rim ary fem ale ch aracter, 
is ‗ab sen ted‘ fro m  th e actio n  o f th e text b y L ee an d B uzz, w h o  use h er to  determ in e th eir 
o w n  relative p o w er. B uzz h as ‗n eith er talen ts n o r ap titudes, o n ly a disco n certingly sharp 
intelligence and a merciless self-ab so rp tio n ‘.39 Lee, in contrast, seems open and friendly, 
although his description indicates egocentricity: 
 
Like most people who happen to be born with a degree of physical beauty, he had become 
self-conscious very young in life and so profoundly aware of the effect his remarkable 
appearance on other people that, by the age, of twenty, he gave the impression of perfect 
naturalness, utter spontaneity and entire warmth of heart.40 (My emphasis) 
 
                                                 
38 There is actually a fifth formulation within postmodern fiction, although it is only partially associated with 
‗ab sen ted fem in in ity‘. T h is occurs w h en  p o stm o dern ism  attem p ts to  reco ver th o se fem inin e n arratives th at 
w ere p revio usly m ade ab sen t, such  as in  Jean R h ys‘ Wide Sargasso Sea (1966) where the absent woman of Jane 
Eyre –  the madwoman in the attic –  is brought into presence. Thus, the absented femininity of the earlier novel 
is undone and there is an aspect of the juxtaposition between absence and femininity, although it is more 
properly a presenting, rather than absenting, of femininity. 
39 Angela Carter, Love (London: Vintage, 1997), p. 12. 
40 Carter, Love, p. 12. 
 252 
Lee and Buzz are the egocentric poles of the text between which Annabel is pulled. Annabel, 
w ith  ‗n o  in stin ct fo r self-p reservatio n  if sh e w as co n fro n ted b y am b iguities‘, even tually 
commits suicide.41 Although Carter ensures that each character is given the same amount of 
detail, A n n ab el is still ‗ab sen t‘. F o r exam p le, th e first tim e A n n ab el an d L ee h ave sex, 
A n n ab el dresses in  B uzz‘s clo th es an d is ‗extrao rdin arily ero tic‘ b ecause o f ‗h er p assivity, h er 
silen ce‘.42 Sh e h as a rin g (b elo n gin g to  B uzz‘s fath er) th at m akes h er ‗in visib le‘, w h ich  sh e 
wears alongside the wedding band given to her by Lee.43 Other women in the text are also 
ab sen t, in cludin g L ee‘s n um ero us ‗o th er w o m en ‘ (itself suggestin g a deferral o f iden tity an d 
p o w er) an d h is ‗in san e‘ m o th er w h o  w as taken  fro m  h im when he was a child. 
Like Love, B arth ‘s The End of the Road presents the reader with a domestic scenario in 
w h ich  tw o  p o w erful m en  o versh ado w  th e fem ale ch aracter. D esp ite Jake‘s ‗n ih ilism ‘, R en n ie 
is a ‗co m p lete zero ‘, th e true ab sen t figure o f th e n o vel.44 When she first met her husband, 
Jo e, sh e h ad  to  co m p letely rein ven t h erself: ‗I th rew  o ut every o p in io n  I o w n ed b ecause I 
co uldn ‘t defen d th em . I th in k I co m p letely erased m yself, [… ] righ t do w n  to  n o th in g, so  I 
co uld start o ver‘.45 Sh e ‗p eered deep ly inside herself and found nothing‘.46 A s Jo e‘s w ife an d  
Jake‘s lo ver, sh e is ‗caugh t b etw een  th e ideo lo gies o f M o rgan  [Jo e] an d H o rn er [Jake], an d is 
crucified b etw een  th o se ren din g ab stractio n s‘.47 R en n ie‘s dream  o f G o d (Jo e) an d th e D evil 
(Jake), in which she is caugh t b etw een  th em , is in dicative o f th e th em e o f ‗p assio n ‘ th at 
defin es R en n ie‘s ch aracter.48 Sh e en co m p asses th e ‗an im al life‘ an d ‗vitality‘ o f th e text, w h at 
                                                 
41 Carter, Love, p. 1. 
42 Carter, Love, p. 33. 
43 Carter, Love, p. 54. 
44 John Barth, The End of the Road, collected in The Floating Opera and The End of the Road (New York: Anchor 
Press, 1988), p. 306. 
45 Barth, p. 311. 
46 Barth, p. 316. 
47 Frank D. McConnell, Four Postwar American Novelists: Bellow, Mailer, Barth and Pynchon (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1977), p. 130. 
48 See Barth, p. 317. 
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Sch aub  h as called a ‗dram atic reb uke to  th e in h um an  th eo rizin g o f th e tw o  m en  w h o  co m p el 
h er to  divided lo yalty‘.49 T h e dream  in dicates th at R en n ie m ay b e sym b o lic o f ‗th e w o rld‘ in  
which the conflict between meaning and meaninglessness occurs, and her will for life –  her 
‗p assio n ‘ –  is echoed in the juxtaposition of suffering and love that is caused by Jake and Joe. 
U ltim ately, as F ran k M cC o n n ell o b serves, sh e is ‗crucified‘, alth o ugh  th e reader m ust b e w ary 
o f ‗in h um an  th eo rizin g‘ at R en n ie‘s exp en se, fo r in  n o velistic term s th ere is a h um an  co st to  
pay. The abortion at the heart of the text, an d w h ich  causes R en n ie‘s death , is a direct 
allego ry fo r th e ab o rted n ature o f life in  th e face o f th is ‗in h um an  th eo rizin g‘, an d to  use 
Rennie to justify a reading is to be as complicit in her death as Jake and Joe. 
Both Love and The End of the Road demon strate th e w ay in  w h ich  w o m en  are ‗w ritten  
o ver‘ b y m en . T h is is n o t an  in n o cen t h erm en eutic gam e, b ut o n e th at is in delib ly m arked b y 
th e vio len ce o f rep resen tatio n . T h is is th e seco n d fo rm ulatio n  o f ‗ab sen ted fem in in ity‘, 
because it reveals the violence at th e h eart o f such  rep resen tatio n s. E rickso n ‘s rep resen tatio n  
o f w o m en  m ay rep resen t w o m en  as ‗ab sen t‘, b ut h e an alyses th e m asculin e desire to  co n tain  
this absence in terms of rape. In A rc d’X  (1993), he describes Wade, an obsessive black 
police officer, looking at a white stripper called Mona: 
 
Looking into her was like descending concentrically through a maze to a door in the 
center, where you expect to find a confessional and instead step onto a veldt that 
stretches as far as the eye can see. A hysteria of nothingness, inviting him to mount it, 
empty himself into it.50 
 
This description quite obviously describes women in terms of absence, as the masculine gaze 
exp lo res a m aze to  fin d a co n fessio n al (a sexual ‗release‘ fro m  sin ) b ut fin ds a ‗veldt th at 
                                                 
49 Thomas Hill Schaub, American Fiction in the Cold War (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1991), p. 166. 
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stretch es as far as th e eye can  see‘ –  an association between the female body and the natural 
lan dscap e. It also  suggests, h o w ever, a ‗fem in in e‘ ab sen ce w ith  th e p h rase ‗h ysteria o f 
n o th in gn ess‘. T h e p assage describ es fem ale gen italia an d th e m asculin e attempt to control 
th is ‗o th er‘ sexuality o f p assivity an d ab sen ce b y ‗w ritin g o ver‘ th at ab sen ce. T h is o b vio usly 
h as co n n ectio n s w ith  th e co n trast b etw een  ‗m aze‘ an d ‗veldt‘ (as tw o  fo rm s o f lab yrin th ) an d  
because of the (masculine) desire to write over this (feminine) absence, as discussed 
previously.51 The representation of Wade suggests control, because of both his membership 
of an Althusserian repressive Ideological State Apparatus (ISA) and his masculinity: this 
union of gender and ideology is an important elem en t o f E rickso n ‘s w o rks. E rickso n  argues 
th at ‗P o litics is a m an ifestatio n  o f p sych o lo gy an d sexuality, rath er th an  sexuality b ein g a 
m an ifestatio n  o f p o litics‘, suggestin g th at W ade‘s career w ith in  an  ISA  is in dicative of h is 
gen der‘s desire to  co n trol femininity.52 
T h e p ercep tio n  o f p o litics as ‗a m an ifestatio n  o f sexuality‘ is esp ecially relevan t in  
terms of the creation of America within A rc d’X . Erickson suggests that Thomas Jefferson 
o n ly ‗creates‘ A m erica after th e rap e o f o n e o f h is slaves, Sally Hemings: 
 
It‘s a th in g to  b e co n fro n ted every m o m en t o f every day b y everyo n e w h o  h ears even  its 
rum o r: it w ill test m o st th o se w h o  p resum e to o  glib ly to  b elieve in  it. B ut I kn o w  it‘s a 
flawed thing, and I know the flaw is of me. Just as the white ink of my loins has fired 
the inspiration that made it, so the same ink is scrawled across the order of its 
extin ctio n . T h e sign ature is m y o w n . I‘ve w ritten  its n am e. I‘ve called  it A m erica.53 
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Again, we see the union between politics and sexuality, but we also see that sex is still 
represented as the act of writing male doctrine on the absent female page, as America is 
created b y ‗th e w h ite in k‘ o f Jefferso n ‘s lo in s. T h is (m asculin e) w ritin g o ver (fem in in e) 
ab sen ce is seen  th ro ugh o ut E rickso n ‘s n o vels, an d it signifies the beginnings of totalitarian 
control by men. In Tours of the Black Clock, for example, Banning Jainlight, an author of 
p o rn o grap h y fo r Z  (H itler), b elieves ‗th e cen tre o f o ur cen tury‘ is h is cro tch .54 Jainlight 
defines the active control of the Twentieth Century with what is essentially 
phallogocentricism, in which the male control of language defines reality. 
Erickson could be accused of perpetuating this reification of masculine power 
throughout his literature because the bizarre, and often twisted, unions between his 
characters almost inevitably involve some form of control; control of the environment in 
which sex takes place or control during the sexual act itself, in the use of bondage. However, 
these portrayals are present in order to demonstrate the ways in which women may use their 
assumed passivity against masculine discourse. In Tours of the Black Clock, for instance, Dania 
is the centre of the text, not Banning Jainlight, because all of the male characters are in some 
way associated with her (whether as son, lover, father, beau, or imaginary uncle). Dania 
defines the passive hub of the Twentieth Century through her connections to all the men in 
th e text w h o , alth o ugh  th ey w ish  to  un derstan d h er (in  L evin as‘ sen se o f th e w o rd as 
‗p o ssessio n ‘), can n o t b egin  to  un derstan d. D urin g a dan ce auditio n , sh e co n fuses th e judges 
because they cannot understand her: 
 
‗B ut th ere‘s n o  structure to  h er fo rm ,‘ o n e o f th em  said, o r p erh ap s h e said th ere w as n o  
form to her structure. Young [one of the other dan cers] laugh ed, ‗Sh e‘s in ven tin g h er 
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o w n  structures, can ‘t yo u see?‘ H e detested th e w ay th ey sup p o sed th at th e structures 
th ey didn ‘t reco gn ize w eren ‘t structures at all.55 
 
She is dancing according to her own internal structure, but because the judges do not 
understand this structure, they assume there is no structure; because they cannot 
‗un derstan d‘ h er, th ey assum e th at th ere is n o th in g to  un derstan d. Sh o rtly b efo re th is 
p assage, h er dan ce is defin ed as a dan ce ‗again st h isto ry‘ an d D an ia‘s dan ce is thus politically 
en gaged w ith  ideas o f fem in in e freedo m  fro m  th e strictures o f p atriarch al so ciety: ‗Sh e 
dan ced th e m o m en ts so  as to  o w n  th em  fo r h erself‘.56 
Men frequently try to control Dania, and in some way incorporate her into the world 
they understand. Blaine, a detective, begins following Dania and discovers a trail of death 
b eh in d h er: ‗T h e m o re h e in vestigated th e m o re h e fo un d m en  dyin g every tim e sh e dan ced; 
they had signs of being poisoned right down to the wine glasses in their hands, and that odd 
lo o k p o iso n  leaves in  th e eyes‘.57 The question of causality comes to the fore here, however, 
as Dania observes when he confronts her: 
 
‗D o n ‘t yo u see,‘ sh e said w ith  so m e exasp eratio n , ‗it co uld just as easily h ave h ad 
nothing to do with me. It could just as easily h ave h ad everyth in g to  do  w ith  yo u [… ] 
Y o u th o ugh t so m eo n e w as dyin g every tim e I dan ced. B ut m ayb e th at w asn ‘t it at all,‘ 
sh e said. ‗M ayb e,‘ sh e said, b efo re disap p earin g, ‗so m eo n e w as dyin g every tim e yo u 
w atch ed  m e d an ce‘.58 
 
This inversion reveals the extent to which the male characters in the text force their own 
co n clusio n s o n to  h er an d h er b o dy: ‗I go t tired o f b ein g m en ‘s dream s. [… ] I n ever m ean t to  
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b e an yo n e‘s dream  b ut m y o w n ‘.59 A s E rickso n  h im self says, ‗T h e real p o in t o f D an ia‘s 
dancing has to do with voyeurism and obsession and men transforming women into their 
fan tasies‘.60 
If Dania can free herself from masculine control and history by dancing, then the 
m eth o ds em p lo yed b y E rickso n ‘s o th er fem ale ch aracters are m o re o vertly th reatening to 
m asculin e p o w er, dem o n stratin g th e th ird fo rm ulatio n  o f ‗fem in ised ab sen ce‘. In  
Amnesiascope (1996), Jasper talks about a ménage à trois in which two women tie up a man: 
 
I kn o w  w h at yo u‘re th in kin g. Y o u‘re th in kin g it‘s every m an ‘s fan tasy. E very man thinks 
it‘s h is fan tasy. B ut w h en  I h eld h is face b etw een  m y th igh s an d p ut m yself in  h is m o uth  
to  m ake m yself co m e, I co uld tell h e realized it w asn ‘t h is fan tasy, it w as my fantasy.61 
 
Jasp er‘s act destab ilises th e m ale p o ssessio n  o f th e fem ale b o dy b y inverting the power 
structure w ith in  th e sexual act. T h is also  in verts th e p o w er struggles seen  in  C arter‘s Love and 
B arth ‘s The End of the Road with two women controlling one man. The man is tied down, 
passive, and Jasper takes the active role –  the use o f th e verb s ‗h eld‘, ‗p ut m yself‘, ‗m ake 
m yself‘ each  determ in e a sexual ro le th at is n o t co n cern ed w ith  th e m an , b ut w ith  h er o w n  
pleasure. In doing this, Jasper inverts a masculine fantasy and transforms it into a feminine 
one, recreating women as the active partner in the sexual act. Jasper is a sexual predator, and 
th is un n erves m en  w h o  see h er. Sh e is ‗ab so lutely crazy, th e A b yss W alkin g like a W o m an , 
m adn ess so  gen eric it p ractically h ad a b ar co de o n  it‘.62 By undermining male domination, 
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she has beco m e ‗th e A b yss W alkin g like a W o m an ‘ –  a nihilistic destroyer of masculine 
control. This is, of course, what is meant by an apocalyptic feminist discourse. 
T h e w o m en  in  E rickso n ‘s texts free th em selves fro m  m asculin e co n tro l, in  effect, b y 
absenting themselves from it. By embracing the absence and passivity that they have been 
interpreted as having, they empower themselves. Sally and Mona both invert the masculine 
fantasy of colonising the female body by turning a rape of them into a rape of the male: 
when W ade rap es M o n a, sh e in verts th is un til ‗h er o w n  b lackn ess ravish ed h is‘.63 Similarly, 
th e m asculin e o rgasm  is ‗th e sm all death s o f th o se m en ‘ b ecause it is th e p o in t at w h ich  th ey 
lose their purported control.64 During a mysterious encounter in the hotel room, Georgie, a 
neo-Nazi with a control complex, is completely disarmed during sex by the mention of the 
w o rd ‗A m erica‘: 
 
What had it meant, that at the height of his power over her and in the depths of his 
h um iliatio n  o f h er, sh e h ad said it an d h e‘d lo st everyth in g? Sh e‘d said it like a m agic 
word and immediately it had broken his power over her.65 
 
T h is use o f th e w o rd ‗A m erica‘ is in dicative o f th e duality th at exists w ith in  E rickso n ‘s 
conception of America. One aspect is concerned with control, domination, and the 
masculine drive to interpret and codify reality. In contrast, the second is the side of freedom, 
love, and the feminine ability to create something new. Thus, Erickson always presents a 
duality within his texts; Rubicon Beach (1986) presents America One and America Two, Tours 
of the Black Clock presents two different centuries, and Amnesiacope presents the distinction 
between remembering and forgetting as aspects of memory. In A rc d’X , Erickson writes 
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about two different conceptions of time –  ‗the gravity of authority versus the entropy of 
freedo m ‘ –  in which authority is configured as masculine and freedom as feminine.66 
Although Erickson reinforces the truism that femininity is passive, by associating men with 
‗gravity‘ an d w o m en  w ith  ‗en tro p y‘, he makes this absence positive. 
Carter also configures women in terms of entropy and absence throughout her fiction. 
The Passion of New Eve is a text primarily informed by early postmodern theory and French 
F em in ism , an d features E velyn ‘s tran sfo rm atio n  in to  E ve. W ith in  th e text, ‗O ur L ady o f 
D isso lutio n ‘, C arter‘s versio n  o f E rickso n ‘s ‗th e A b yss W alkin g like a W o m an ‘, p resides o ver 
a city of chaos.67 C h ao s is defin ed as ‗th e p rim o rdial sub stan ce‘ an d ‗th e earliest state o f 
disorganised creation, blindly impelled towards the creation of a new order of phenomena of 
hidden meanings. The fructifying chaos of anteriority, the state before the beginning of the 
b egin n in g‘.68 This definition is in many ways similar to the construction of nihilism presented 
by this th esis b ecause it is ‗th e earliest state o f diso rgan ised creatio n ‘, ‗th e state b efo re th e 
b egin n in g o f th e b egin n in g‘. C h ao s, as th e cen tral th em e in  The Passion of New Eve, is that 
w h ich  un ites n ih ilism  an d th e sub lim e w ith in  th e p o stm o dern : it ‗em b races a ll opposing 
fo rm s in  a state o f un differen tiated disso lutio n ‘ in  an  ‗in to xicatin g rh eto ric‘.69 The embracing 
o f ‗all o p p o sin g fo rm s‘ is fun dam en tally p o stm o dern . H o w ever, it also  suggests th e sen ten tial 
paradoxes upon which a postmodern nihilism is predicated. This chaos is also sublime, 
‗in to xicatin g‘ in  its rh eto ric. M o st im p o rtan tly, it is fem ale. W h en  E velyn  arrives at B eulah  –  
the matriarchal city –  h e o b serves th at ‗I am  in  B eulah , th e p lace w h ere co n traries exist 
to geth er‘.70 T h e ‗fem in ised ab sen ce‘ is also  fo un d w h en  C arter talks ab o ut th e ‗m in eral 
                                                 
66 Erickson, A rc d’X , p. 216. 
67 Carter, The Passion of New Eve (London: Virago, 1996), p. 15. 
68 Carter, The Passion of New Eve, p. 14. 
69 Carter, The Passion of New Eve, p. 14. 
70 Carter, The Passion of New Eve, p. 48. 
 260 
eradicatio n  o f b ein g‘.71 Although it seems as if she is referring to the desert (again locating it 
as th e site o f th e destructio n  o f b ein g), th e text m o ves o n  to  describ e a ‗m o n um en tal‘ b ro ken  
penis, which can  also  suggest th at th e ‗m in eral eradicatio n  o f b ein g‘ actually refers to  th is 
stone structure, and not to the desert at all. This returns us to the idea of feminised chaos, 
w h ere ‗o rdered‘ b ein g is equivalen t to  m asculin e ‗p resen ce‘ an d  th e eradicatio n  o r dissolution 
o f b ein g is a fem in in e ‗ab sen ce‘. 
The final representation of femininity as absence is the postmodern appropriation of 
the Eurydice myth. Eurydice and Orpheus, according to classical mythology, were lovers 
until Eurydice died. Orpheus was allowed to journey to the Underworld to get her back, but 
only on the condition that he did not look back at Eurydice following him. He looked back, 
an d E urydice w as co n dem n ed to  stay in  th e U n derw o rld. T h is m yth  is ap p aren tly ‗m istaken ly 
deduced from the pictures w h ich  sh o w  O rp h eus‘s w elco m e in  T artarus‘, an d so  o n ly ap p ears 
late in classical mythology, although this apparent lack of basis does not devalue the power 
that this myth exercises in the postmodern world.72 Hassan, for example, finds the origins of 
a p o stm o dern  literature in  ‗th e dism em b erm en t o f O rp h eus‘, in dicatin g O rp h eus‘ 
p un ish m en t fo r p referrin g yo un g m en  to  w o m en  (in  O vid‘s versio n  o f th e m yth ), an d 
interprets authors from Sade to Beckett through the trope of this dismemberment.73 This 
‗dism em b erm en t‘, in  a certain  sen se, m ay b e in terp reted as C arter‘s ‗eradicatio n  o f b ein g‘, 
indicating an apocalyptic feminism at work within postmodernism. 
More generally, the postmodern search for absent meaning is configured within its 
fictions as variations on th e E urydice m yth : O rp h eus h un tin g fo r E urydice. P yn ch o n ‘s V, for 
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exam p le, reveals th at th e search  fo r ‗V ‘ is essen tially a search  fo r th e fem in in e O th er. ‗V ‘ is 
vario usly in carn ated as V ero n ica (also  th e ‗true im age‘ o f G ravity’s R ain bow ) Manganese, 
Vheissu, Venus, Vera Meroving, and Victoria Wren. Although the text suggests other 
in carn atio n s, th e iden tity o f ‗V ‘ is p redo m in an tly fem in ised.74 Chambers notes this 
juxtap o sitio n  o f fem in in ity an d ab sen ce th ro ugh o ut P yn ch o n ‘s fictio n  in  relatio n  to  ‗th e 
ancient White Goddess whose destruction symbolizes the impoverishment of language, the 
ap p ro p riatio n  o f m ystery an d p arado x, an d th e dim in ish m en t o f th e O th er‘.75 
C alvin o ‘s o vert use o f th e E urydice m yth  is o f p articular in terest, b ecause th ro ugh o ut 
his texts the female is always the absent object of male desire, as Marilyn Schneider argues: 
‗W o m an  as h idden  sign ifier, a sym b o l o f desire an d ab sen ce, rep resen ts th e etern al 
p o ten tial‘.76 T h is idea recurs th ro ugh o ut C alvin o ‘s w o rks, fro m  Cosmicomics (1965) to If on a 
w in ter’s n ight a traveller (1979). In Cosmicomics, for example, the stories generally feature 
C alvin o ‘s p ro tago n ist, Q fw fq, b ein g th w arted in  h is desire fo r th e cen tral fem ale ch aracter. 
In  ‗T h e D istan ce o f th e M o o n ‘, th is is due to  h er ab sen ce fro m  earth , as she desires to live 
on the moon. In other stories, Qfwfq is separated from the desired woman by universal 
circumstance –  in  ‗A ll at O n e P o in t‘ b ecause o f th e B ig B an g, in  ‗W ith o ut C o lo urs‘ b ecause 
o f co lo ur co m in g in to  th e w o rld, an d in  ‗T h e F o rm  o f Sp ace‘ b ecause p arallel lin es n ever 
intersect. 
Masculine desire for the unattainable female body is also a significant part of If on a 
w in ter’s n ight a traveller, w h ere th e search  fo r th e real ‗If o n  a w in ter‘s n igh t a traveller‘ text is 
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subsumed by the desire of the Lettore [male reader] for the Lettrice [female reader] symbolic of 
the search for meaning in what is Other. Here, women are compared to textual meaning and 
sexual fulfilment (jouissance by a Lettore), an d th e frustratio n  o f h avin g th e ‗w ro n g‘ reading is 
co m p ared to  an  act o f sexual un io n  w ith  th e ‗w ro n g‘ w o m an . T h is is seen  in  th e 
m icro n arrative, ‗O n  th e carp et o f leaves illum in ated b y th e m o o n ‘, in  w h ich  th e p ro tago n ist 
becomes sexually involved with the mother of the woman he wants, rather than the woman 
herself. This relationship between gender and meaning is observed by Teresa de Lauretis in 
relation to If on  a w in ter’s night a traveller: 
 
T h e p ursuit o f th e b o o ks‘ en din g co rresp o n ds to  th e p ursuit o f th e un attain ab le lo ve 
object, narrative closure is impeded by écriture, the dispersal of meaning, writing as 
différance; and the pleasure of the text is infiltrated or intercut with the jouissance of the 
text.77  
 
Jouissance arises because meaning is forever deferred, an argument that recurs frequently in 
co n tem p o rary literary th eo ry, alth o ugh  de L auretis‘ argues th at th is deferral o ccurs b ecause 
o f th e w ay w o m en  an d  text in teract w ith in  C alvin o ‘s sto ries. In  If on  a w in ter’s n ight a traveller, 
the Lettore is frustrated by the blank pages in the act of opening them with a knife, which 
suggests that the physical act of reading is an allegory of the sexual act.78 C alvin o ‘s n o vel 
states: 
 
The pleasures derived from the paper knife are tactile, auditory, visual, and especially 
mental. Progress in reading is preceded by an act that traverses the material solidity of 
the book to allow you access to its incorporeal substance. Penetrating among the pages 
from below, the blade vehemently moves upward, opening a vertical cut in a flowing 
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successio n  o f slash es. [… ] O p en in g a p ath  fo r yo urself, w ith  a sw o rd‘s b lade, in  th e 
barrier of pages, becomes linked with the thought of how much the word contains and 
conceals: you cut your way through your reading as if it were a dense forest.79 
 
This sexual act of reading evokes the idea that the Female, as Other, is also that which is 
blank, unreadable, and passive. We are thus left with a situation in which the deferment of 
reading is the jouissance of the frustrated sexual act, which suggests that this representation of 
absent femininity is not a result of différance, but its cause. Were absent femininity to be the 
result of différance, then it becomes emblematic and the oppositions between masculine and 
feminine, and meaning and deferral, break down under its very construction. It is rather the 
case th at, as de L auretis o b serves, ‗D esire is fo un ded in  ab sen ce, in  th e ten sio n -toward rather 
th an  th e attain m en t o f th e o b ject o f lo ve, in  th e delays, th e disp lacem en ts, th e deferrals‘.80 It 
is because women are absent that they are desired, and it is this absence brought into 
existence within the text that creates the problems of interpreting it. Eurydice, the emblem 
of absence, is hunted by Orpheus, but never found. 
Acker sees the entire matter differently and suggests that Orpheus deliberately 
ab an do n s E urydice. In  A cker‘s versio n  o f th e m yth , E urydice (Y o u) is sufferin g fro m  can cer, 
and Orpheus (Or) is the bohemian musician who sleeps with her. She summarises the 
p o sitio n s o f b o th  P lato  (w h o  argues th at O rp h eus ‗h adn ‘t th e co urage to  die fo r lo ve‘) an d 
B lan ch o t (w h o  argues th at O rp h eus n ever saw  E urydice at all b ecause ‗h e do esn ‘t w an t h er 
to  b e‘) an d th en  argues th at O rp h eus ab an do n ed  E urydice b ecause sh e lo ved h im .81 Orpheus 
w rites to  E urydice th at ‗Y o u lo ved m e to o  m uch ‘ an d in  a typically noncommittal male 
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gesture, abandons her to her fate.82 A cker‘s in versio n  o f th is n arrative suggests th at w o m en  
are ab sen t n o t b ecause th ey ch o o se to  b e (as C alvin o ‘s sto ries suggest), o r b ecause th ey are 
truly Other to masculine discourse (as Pynchon suggests in V), but because they are made 
ab sen t b y th e do m in an t p o w er o f m asculin e disco urse. T h is return s us to  A llen ‘s co n cep t o f 
‗th e n ecessary b lan kn ess‘. W o m en  m ust b e ab sen t fo r m en  to  h ave p resen ce –  it is necessary to 
masculine discourse for femininity to be blank –  and so, in a manner similar to Love, The End 
of the Road, an d E rickso n ‘s fictio n , w o m en  are w ritten  o ver to  legitim ate m asculin e disco urse, 
w h ich  is, in  th e en d, a ‗phallus-y‘. 
M asculin e disco urse is a ‗phallus-y‘ b ecause it can n o t co n tain  o r un derstan d th e ‗true‘ 
n ature o f w o m en . F o r exam p le, D errida, w h en  studyin g N ietzsch e‘s rep resen tatio n  o f 
women, argues: 
 
There is no essence of woman because she averts and is averted from herself. Out of 
the depths, endless and unfathomable, she devours, enveils all essentiality, all identity, all 
propriety. Here philosophical discourse, blinded, founders and allows itself to be hurled 
down to its ruin. There is no truth of woman, but it is because of this abyssal fault of 
truth, because this non-truth  is th e ‗truth .‘ W o m an  is th e n am e o f th is n o n -truth of 
truth.83 
 
‗W o m an ‘ can n o t b e co n tain ed w ith in  m asculin e disco urse b ecause sh e sym b o lises th e 
destruction of masculine discourse, the point at which it is devalued. This is precisely 
K risteva‘s p o in t o f th e ‗ab ject‘, w h ich  is ‗neither subject nor object‘ b ut so m eth in g else, existin g 
somewhere in the linguistic underworld that can never be brought in Orphic presence. The 
ab ject is ‗a defian ce o r ch allen ge to  sym b o lizatio n ‘ an d sym b o lises ‗a vo id th at is not 
                                                 
82 Acker, p. 24. 
83 Jacques Derrida, S pu rs: N ietzsche’s S tyles, trans. by Barbara Harlow (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1979), p. 49. 
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n o th in g‘.84 The Kristevan abject, as characterised by Mark Taylor, defines the impossibility of 
communication because it cannot be grasped, only approached, although this also indicates 
an  ab sen ted fo rm  o f n ih ilism : ‗T h e n o th in g th at ap p ro ach es w ith out being present can only 
b e ap p ro ach ed in directly. In  th is un can n y do m ain , co m m un icatio n  in evitab ly is ―in direct 
co m m un icatio n .‖ A lw ays en tan gled in  th e p lay o f veilin g an d un veilin g, th e auth o r can , at 
best, skirt ab jectio n ‘.85 The violence of representation is always configured as a concrete 
m asculin e p resen ce th at ‗w rites o ver‘ fem in in e ab sen ce. T o  allo w  fem in in e ab sen ce to  rem ain  
ab sen t, w ith o ut b ein g ch aracterised n egatively, is th erefo re to  b e ‗ab sen t-m in ded‘. 
 
B ein g ‘A b sen t-M in d ed ’: Silen ce in  P ostm odern Literature 
If postmodernism seeks to redress the balance between presence and absence, then silence 
plays a special role in postmodern literature because it marks the point at which language 
ceases to function. It is a specific form of absence in which communication is absent. Thus, 
blank fiction is silent on the matter of ethics, and feminine absence is silent within male-
dominated discourse. There are two political aspects to silence, however: complicit silence 
an d ‗true‘ silen ce. M artin  N iem ö ller w rote a famous condemnation of the silence that 
acco m p an ied  N atio n al So cialism ‘s rise to  p o w er: 
 
First they came for the Communists, but I was not a Communist –  so I said nothing. 
Then they came for the Social Democrats, but I was not a Social Democrat –  so I did 
nothing. Then came the trade unionists, but I was not a trade unionist. And then they 
                                                 
84 Julia Kristeva, Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection, trans. by Leon S. Roudiez (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1982), pp. 51, 1. 
85 Mark C. Taylor, Altarity (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), p. 160. 
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came for the Jews, but I was not a Jew –  so I did little. Then when they came for me, 
there was no one left who could stand up for me.86 
 
In  N iem ö ller‘s eyes, silen ce is complicit with a dominant ideology. However, within the same 
period, there is also a demand for silence. Blanchot calls for a silence that is ethical toward 
th e ‗disaster‘, sayin g ‗It is n o t yo u w h o  w ill sp eak; let th e disaster sp eak in  yo u, even  if it is by 
yo ur fo rgetfuln ess o r silen ce‘.87 Lawrence Langer agrees with this, because although there is a 
n eed to  sp eak ab o ut th e H o lo caust, h e later adm its th at ‗W e lack th e term s o f disco urse fo r 
such  h um an  situatio n s‘.88 There is thus a demand for speech where speech is impossible. The 
result o f th is is seen  in  L evin as‘ critique o f p h ilo so p h y w h ere th e H o lo caust is n o t 
rep resen ted w ith in  h is w o rks exp licitly b ecause it is a ‗h o le in  h isto ry‘.89 Instead, Levinas 
emphasises the ethics that originate in the Holocaust. His concept of intrasubjective Being is 
the product, not the representation, of the Holocaust, and thus the non-representation of 
th e H o lo caust w ith in  L evin as‘ w o rks resp o n ds to  an  eth ical d em an d b y th e O th er fo r it n o t 
to be presented. 
This ambivalen ce to w ards silen ce is clearly seen  in  C alvin o ‘s fin al w o rk, Mr Palomar 
(1983). This text encompasses many aspects of his previous writing, exploring philosophical 
concepts within a semi-auto b io grap h ical fram ew o rk. In  th e ch ap ter, ‗Serp en ts an d skulls‘, 
Palomar is guided around Tula, an ancient Toltec city. His guide continually expounds 
                                                 
86 Quoted in Peter Novick, The Holocaust and Collective Memory (London: Bloomsbury, 2000), p. 221. The original 
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87 Maurice Blanchot, The Writing of the Disaster, trans. by Ann Smock (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 
1995), p. 4. 
88 Lawrence Langer, Holocaust Testimonies: The Ruins of Memory (New York: Yale University Press, 1991), p. 118. 
89 Q uo ted in  R o b ert E aglesto n e, ‗F rom  B eh in d th e B ars o f Q uo tatio n  M arks: E m m anuel L evin as‘s (N o n)-
R epresen tatio n  o f th e H o lo caust‘, in  The Holocaust and the Text: Speaking the Unspeakable, ed. by Andrew Leak and 
George Paizis (London: Macmillan Press, 2000), pp. 97-108 (p. 104). The original source is Emmanuel Levinas, 
‗M ean in g an d Sen se‘, in  Collected Philosophical Papers, trans. by Alphonso Lingis (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1987), pp. 
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theories on what the carvings mean, how they came about, and why they were carved. At the 
sam e tim e, a yo un g teach er is guidin g h is class aro un d th e ruin s, sayin g, ‗W e do n ‘t kn o w  
w h at it m ean s‘.90 E ven tually, th e tw o  guides disagree, w ith  P alo m ar‘s guide tellin g th e class a 
th eo ry o f w h at a statue m ean s. A s th e yo un g teach er w alks aw ay, h e says, ‗No es verdad, it is 
not true, what that señor said. W e do n ‘t kn o w  w h at th ey m ean ‘.91 P alo m ar‘s idea ab o ut th is 
illustrates p recisely h o w  ‗silen ce‘ is th e o n ly eth ical resp o n se to  such  situatio n s: 
 
What had first seemed only a brisk lack of interest is being revealed to him as a scholarly 
and pedagogical position, a methodical choice by this serious and conscientious young 
man, a rule from which he will not swerve. A stone, a figure, a sign, a word that reach us 
isolated from its context is only a stone, figure, sign or word: we can try to define them, 
to describe them as they are, and no more than that; whether, beside the face they show 
us, they also have a hidden face, it is not for us to know. The refusal to comprehend 
more than what the stones show us is perhaps the only way to evince respect for their 
secret; trying to guess is a presumption, a betrayal of that true, lost meaning.92 
 
T o  attem p t to  ‗kn o w ‘ so m eth in g is to  co n tain  it, an d so  ‗th e refusal to  co m p reh en d‘ is ‗th e 
o n ly w ay to  evin ce resp ect fo r th eir secret‘. A lth o ugh  C alvin o  realises th at ‗N o t to  in terp ret is 
impossible, as refrain in g fro m  th in kin g is im p o ssib le‘, h e also  accep ts th at ‗all in terp retatio n  
is a use o f vio len ce an d cap rice again st a text‘.93 This demonstrates two possible formulations 
of silence: an ethical silence, which refuses to represent the Other, and one that is complicit 
in  its do w n fall, b ecause ‗In  tim es o f gen eral silen ce, co n fo rm in g to  th e silen ce o f th e m ajo rity 
is certain ly culp ab le‘.94 The decision as to which is the most important aspect of silence, 
however, is left blank by Calvino –  demonstrating the ethical demand not to interpret. His 
                                                 
90 Italo Calvino, Mr Palomar, trans. by William Weaver (London: Vintage, 1999), p. 87. 
91 Calvino, Mr Palomar, p. 89. 
92 Calvino, Mr Palomar, p. 88. 
93 Calvino, Mr Palomar, p. 89; Calvino, If on  a w in ter’s n ight, p. 69. 
94 Calvino, Mr Palomar, p. 94. 
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final word on the subject of silence is perhaps the most eloquent of all because, despite 
P alo m ar‘s th eo risatio n  o f th e n ature o f silen ce, ‗h e b ites h is to n gue an d rem ain s silen t‘.95 
This reveals that silence in the postmodern world is perhaps the only ethical response 
to  th e O th er. If, as L evin as suggests, w e are co n structed b y th e O th er an d exist as ‗b ein g -
guilty‘, th en  th e O th er fo rces us to  silen ce o urselves. W e can n o t sp eak w ith o ut silen cin g th e 
Other and therefore we do not speak: the performative act of communication partakes of 
the violence of representation. Where such a phrase –  ‗th e vio len ce o f rep resen tatio n ‘ –  is 
generally used to define how representation veils an object, the signifier masking the 
signified, there is an implicit aspect of this in the speech act itself. This is because we exist 
over the absence of being, or the being of absence, and in our desire to ignore this fact –  and 
even Levinas is guilty of this –  w e sp eak, as B eckett‘s The Unnamable (1952) suggests, in  ‗th e 
terror-stricken  b ab b le o f th e co n dem n ed to  silen ce‘.96 Speech is thus the sentence of the 
sen ten ce, n o t in  th e sen se o f D errida‘s ‗p riso n  h o use o f lan guage‘, b ut b ecause w e are 
condemned to speak: we cannot bear to look at the abyss that yawns beneath us. 
Communication is accomplished at the expense of silence, and so the very act of 
communicating is unethical towards silence and absence.97 
Of course, it is possible to ask why we should care about absence, why there is a need 
to be ethical towards it through silence. The fact that without absence there is no presence –  
th at if w e are silen t fo r to o  lo n g, ‗th e w h o le fab ricatio n  m igh t co llap se‘ –  is insufficient to 
justify an ethical argument of this kind.98 This justifies why we should continue to speak 
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rather than be silent. However, what we ignore through our speech is what we eradicate 
through language: the silence in which to listen. There is an aspect of this in Waiting for Godot: 
 
ESTRAGON: [… W e] are in cap ab le o f keep in g silen t. 
VLADIMIR: Y o u‘re righ t, w e‘re in exh austib le. 
ESTRAGON: It‘s so  w e w o n ‘t th in k. 
VLADIMIR: We have that excuse. 
ESTRAGON: It‘s so  w e w o n ‘t h ear. 
VLADIMIR: We have our reasons. 
ESTRAGON: All the dead voices. 
VLADMIR: They make a noise like wings. 
ESTRAGON: Like leaves. 
VLADIMIR: Like sand. 
ESTRAGON: Like leaves. 
 Silence.99 
 
Vladimir and Estragon do not want to hear the silence beneath discourse because this silence 
is ‗all th e dead vo ices‘ th at are ‗like leaves‘. T h is suggests th e sp ectre o f ab sen ce, ‗like leaves‘ 
implying that the dead voices are all those already absent. Although both Vladimir and 
E strago n  realise th is, th ey can n o t face th is silen ce, as V ladim ir cries o ut ‗Say so m eth in g!‘ an d  
E strago n  rep lies ‗I‘m  tryin g‘.100 
Instead of the incessant prattle of V ladim ir an d E strago n , in  ‗T exts fo r N o th in g‘ (1955) 
B eckett w rites ab o ut ‗o ur p h an to m s, th o se o f th e dead, th o se o f th e livin g, th o se o f th o se 
w h o  are n o t b o rn ‘. B ein g un ab le to  face such  p h an to m s, h e co n tin ues, ‗N o w  I‘m  h aun ted, let 
                                                 
99 Samuel Beckett, Waiting for Godot: A Tragicomedy in Two Acts (London: Faber and Faber, 1965), II (p. 62). 
100 Beckett, Waiting for Godot, p. 63. 
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them go, one by one, let th e last desert m e an d leave m e em p ty, em p ty an d silen t‘.101 This 
suggests that there are two ways of perceiving silence within Beckett. Where the first 
emphasises the inability of the living to listen to the dead, seen in Waiting for Godot, the 
second emphasises the desire to leave behind the phantoms of life (the once living, the 
living, and the to-be-livin g) in  favo ur o f ab sen ce. ‗T exts fo r N o th in g‘ th erefo re in dicates th e 
desire to  b eco m e ab sen t o n eself: ‗O n ly th e w o rds b reak th e silen ce, all o th er sounds have 
ceased. If I w ere silen t, I‘d h ear n o th in g‘.102 When speech ceases, it is possible to hear 
absence. 
A do rn o  fam o usly w ro te th at ‗T o  w rite p o etry after A usch w itz is b arb aric‘, arguin g th at 
it was impossible to represent the Holocaust in aesthetic terms and that silence is the only 
eth ical resp o n se ‗after A usch w itz‘.103 A do rn o  later ch an ged th e sen tim en t b ecause ‗P eren n ial 
suffering has as much right to expression as a tortured man has to scream; hence it may have 
been wrong to say that after Auschwitz yo u co uld n o  lo n ger w rite p o em s‘.104 This could 
indicate that silence is now no longer required and that the mourning period has passed, 
although this is not the case. Rather, Adorno extends the embargo to existence itself, and the 
questio n  b eco m es w h eth er ‗after A usch w itz yo u can  go  o n  livin g‘ w ith  ‗th e drastic guilt o f 
h im  w h o  w as sp ared‘.105 W h ilst A do rn o  m ean s th is in  relatio n  to  survivo rs, all w h o  ‗co m e 
after‘ h ave b een  sp ared. T h is is an  exten sio n  o f th e dem an d  fo r silen ce in to  a dem an d to  feel 
guilty for not being absent. We are present, and those that died are not –  we live while they 
died. Such  ‗drastic guilt‘ is th erefo re n o t o n ly th e rem it o f survivo rs, b ut all th o se w h o  live 
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‗after A usch w itz‘. T h e eth ical asp ect o f n ih ilism  is th erefo re n o t o n ly in  a silence that avoids 
the violence of representation, but also in an absence that avoids the violence of existence 
itself. 
T h is radical versio n  o f an  eth ic o f ab sen ce do es n o t dem an d th at w e all ‗b eco m e 
ab sen t‘ b ut th at w e sh o uld realise th at w e exist at th e expense of the Other (not only the 
present Other, but also the absent Other). Silence becomes our only method of doing so, as 
th e ‗un n am ab le‘ suggests: 
 
I w an t it to  go  silen t, it w an ts to  go  silen t, it can ‘t, it do es fo r a seco n d, th en  it starts 
again, it says th at‘s n o t th e real silen ce, w h at can  b e said o f th e real silen ce, I do n ‘t kn o w , 
th at I do n ‘t kn o w  w h at it is, th at th ere is n o  such  th in g, th at p erh ap s th ere is such  a 
th in g, yes, th at p erh ap s th ere is, so m ew h ere, I‘ll n ever kn o w .106 
 
Although we can  n ever kn o w  w h at th e ‗real silen ce‘ is, b ecause it is an ath em a to  us, th e 
desire to  fin d th e p lace o f ab so lute silen ce is vital. T h is is n o t N iem ö ller‘s culp ab le silen ce, in  
which we are complicit with ideologies through our silence, but a refusal to speak, to 
p ro p o se, to  b uy, an d h en ce ‗b uy in to ‘, th e cap italist ideo lo gy, as B audrillard w rites: ‗T h e 
so cial o rder teach es yo u to  keep  quiet, it do es n o t teach  yo u silen ce‘.107 Niemöller suggests 
silen ce is ‗keep in g quiet‘ an d alth o ugh  at tim es it m ay b e, ‗true‘ silence is absolutely Other to 
ideological control. 
A lth o ugh  it is uto p ian , if everyo n e w ere silen t th en  th e ‗vio len ce o f rep resen tatio n ‘ 
co uld n o t o ccur. B y ch o o sin g to  w ith h o ld o urselves, to  rem ain  ab sen t, w e are b ein g ‗ab sen t-
m in ded‘. In  p erh ap s th e o n ly quixotic gesture left open to us, the desire to absent ourselves 
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from quotidian control is only viable through our silence and our absence, as DeLillo writes 
in Mao II (1991): ‗th e w ith h eld w o rk o f art is th e o n ly elo quen ce left‘.108 This is passivity 
raised to the level of terrorism, where terrorism is not the active rebellion against control 
(which Baudrillard argues cannot occur) but the passive resistance to being controlled, a 
p lace in  w h ich  ‗n o th in g m o re th an  n o th in g can  b e said‘, th e ‗great seren ity‘ o f ‗th e p ure, 
in fo rm atio n less state o f sign al zero ‘.109 A s H assan  w rites, silen ce is ‗an  autistic co n scio usn ess, 
imperial in its isolation, avid for the void; a corresponding language, cunning in the arts of 
self-abolition; and an erotic retreat from existence, from the flesh of reality, a dark prayer of 
tran scen den ce un der‘.110 B ein g ‗ab sen t-m in ded‘ is th erefo re an  eth ical resp o n se to w ards b o th  
th e p ro b lem  o f existin g ‗o ver‘ n o th in gn ess an d  to  th e p ro b lem  o f quo tidian  co n tro l. 
Postmodern literature responds to  th is an d ‗m o ves, th ro ugh  n ih ilist p lay o r m ystic 
tran scen den ce, to w ard th e van ish in g p o in t‘: a ‗p o stm o dern ‘ n ih ilism .111 
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8. 
‘N everlan d ’: T h e Space of N ih ilism  
 
 
The more enlightened our houses are, the more their walls ooze ghosts. Dreams of 
progress and reason are haunted by nightmares. 
 –  Italo  C alvin o , ‗C yb ern etics an d G h o sts‘.1 
 
I imagined a clean, hard, bright city where towers reared towards the sky in a paradigm 
o f tech n o lo gical asp iratio n  [… ] –  a finite and succinct city where the ghosts who haunt 
the cities of Europe could have found no cobweb corners to roost in. But in New York 
I found, instead of hard edges and clean colours, a lurid Gothic darkness. 
 –  Angela Carter, The Passion of New Eve.2 
 
As we have seen throughout this thesis, Kant, Nietzsche, and Lyotard all formulate the same 
questio n  o f ‗w h at is… ?‘; K an t ab o ut th e ‗E n ligh ten m en t‘, N ietzsch e ab o ut ‗n ih ilism ‘, an d  
L yo tard ab o ut ‗p o stm o dern ism ‘. A t th is stage, it is p o ssib le to  an sw er all th ree questio n s: th e 
Enlightenment is rationality, nihilism is values devaluing themselves, and postmodernism is 
th e den ial o f teleo lo gical fo rm s. ‗E n ligh ten m en t m o dern ity‘ is seen  in  C alvin o ‘s dream  o f 
‗p ro gress an d reaso n ‘ an d ep ito m ised b y C arter‘s ‗p aradigm  o f tech n o lo gical asp iratio n ‘. 
Postmodernism, in  co n trast to  th ese, is a ‗lurid G o th ic darkn ess‘ o f ‗n igh tm ares‘. 
Postmodernism is a gothic form, where long-repressed ghosts emerge to haunt the system of 
rationality and order. In comparison to the light, ordered world of the Enlightenment, 
postmodernism is dark, lurid, and chaotic. 
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T h e ab sen ce o f N ietzsch e‘s defin itio n  o f ‗n ih ilism ‘ is sign ifican t in  th is in stan ce, 
although he does in fact appear in both quotations. As we have seen throughout this thesis, 
nihilism is significant to both Enlightenment modernity and postmodernism, and yet Carter 
an d C alvin o  seem  to  b e sayin g ‗n o th in g‘ ab o ut n ih ilism . N ih ilism  is th at w h ich  b o th  
Enlightenment modernity and postmodernism seek to repress and their silence, about 
nihilism, is telling. Nihilism emerges from values devaluing themselves, and an ideology 
cannot allow its own destruction. Nihilism appears, however, when we consider how Kant, 
Nietzsche, and Lyotard answer the questions they set themselves. Their answers, although 
accurate, omit to question themselves an d th eir o w n  fo rm s. W e can n o t an sw er ‗w h at‘ 
so m eth in g ‗is‘ w ith o ut relyin g up o n  a certain  fram ew o rk fo r co n structin g th e questio n  an d  
the answer. This framework is historico-linguistic because such questions are asked within a 
discourse that is both diachronic and significatory. The only way of answering these 
questions is to accept the framework within which they are placed. 
What emerges in relation to Calvino and Carter is therefore the principle of 
‗co n structio n ‘. C alvin o  suggests an  arch itectural p aradigm  w h en  h e says th at ‗th e m o re 
enlightened our houses are, th e m o re th eir w alls o o ze gh o sts‘ an d C arter suggests th at th e 
city is the locus for the shift between modernity and postmodernism. These constructions are 
built over something, just as the questions posed by Kant, Nietzsche, and Lyotard are 
constructed within discourse. That something is absence, silence, and nothingness: in short, 
the space of nihilism. In contrast to the perception of nihilism as the exhaustion of all 
possible forms, nihilism can  also  b e un dersto o d as th at w h ich  is ‗w ritten  o ver‘, w h eth er th e 
blank page or the vacant lot. In metaphysical terms, this is the construction of Being over 
non-B ein g, th e p ro p o sitio n  o f ‗m etap h ysics‘ o ver ‗n ih ilism ‘, th e devaluatio n  o f th e 
 275 
unthinkable by thought itself, and the production of meaning at the expense of non-
meaning. 
This chapter will therefore address the issue of construction of space in relation to 
nihilism and postmodern literature. In fact, it is the sum of the three previous literary 
ch ap ters an d reveals th e ‗co n structio n ‘ o f th is th esis. W h ere th e ap o calyp se is th e 
foundations upon which the postmodern house is built and the absurd is the postmodern 
house in  w h ich  w e live, ‗eth ical‘ ab sen ce determ in es h o w  w e live in  th is p o stm o dern  house 
(an  exten sio n  o f Jen cks‘ arch itectural p aradigm  fo r p o stm o dern ism  fro m  ‗N ih ilism  an d th e 
Sub lim e P o stm o dern ‘). T h is ch ap ter is th erefo re as m uch  an  exp lo ratio n  o f th e structure o f 
nihilism and postmodernism presented by this thesis as it is an exploration of postmodern 
space itself. 
 
Everything is Constructed: From Time to Space 
Within postmodernism, space has usurped time as the measure of narratives. Although these 
claims are somewhat grandiose –  ‗T im e is o b so lete. H isto ry h as en ded‘ –  they do suggest 
why space has become so important in the construction of postmodern narratives.3 Ursula 
Heise argues: 
 
Postmodernist novels focus on the moment or the narrative present at the expense of 
larger tem p o ral develo p m en ts [… T h e] m o m en t is n o t en visio n ed as th e  self-identical 
instant of presence, but as partaking of or leading to an indefinite number of different, 
alternative, and sometimes mutually exclusive temporalities.4 
 
                                                 
3 Ursula K. Heise, Chronoschisms: Time, Narrative, and Postmodernism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1997), p. 11. 
4 Heise, p. 64. 
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Such narrative techniques reflect the perception of time as a series of rooms in an infinite 
house. The postmodern author merely chooses which rooms he wishes to visit. Another 
aspect of spatiality is seen in Baudrillard, where the near-instantaneous transmission of data 
–  the global communications network –  means that time is no longer a factor. Baudrillard 
w rites ‗T h e fact th at w e are leavin g h isto ry to  m o ve in to  th e realm  o f sim ulatio n  is m erely a 
consequence of the fact that history itself has always, deep down, been an immense 
sim ulatio n  m o del‘.5 T h is ‗m o del‘ o f h isto ry is m erely an o th er expression of its spatial 
construction. It is a structure appended to the human flow of time, a series of interlinked 
nodes within a consciousness of time passing. The postmodern author, according to this 
allegory, functions as a circuit, connecting nodes in an order that comes to represent the 
n arrative p ro gressio n  o f a sto ry. T h is is also  seen  in  V irilio ‘s defin itio n  o f ‗ch ro n o -p o litics‘, 
w h ere sp eed, alth o ugh  a fun ctio n  o f tim e, h as altered geo grap h y to  such  an  exten t th at ‗T h e 
city o f th e b eyo n d [th e ‗p o stm o dern ‘ city] is th e C ity o f D ead T im e‘.6 The question is 
therefore no longer in what chronological order narrative events occur, but how this 
narrative space is constructed. Within postmodern fictions, time is subordinate to space, as 
Erickson suggests in Tours of the Black Clock w ith  a ‗m ap  o f th e T w en tieth  C en tury‘; in  Days 
Between Stations, w ith  ‗th e b luep rin t o f destin y‘; an d in  The Sea Came in at Midnight, where the 
‗vario us co n n ectin g tim elin es‘ o f th e ‗A p o calyp tic C alen dar‘ ‗w ere secret tun n els running 
th ro ugh  th e m an sio n  o f m em o ry, in  w h ich  h isto ry w as o n ly a flo o r p lan ‘.7 T h is in dicates ‗a 
sp ace in  w h ich  tim e o ccurs‘ rath er th an  ‗a tim e in  w h ich  sp ace o ccurs‘, design atin g a sub ject-
to-object shift between spatiality and temporality within postmodern literature, and 
demonstrating that time is now a function of space. 
                                                 
5 Jean Baudrillard, The Illusion of the End, trans. by Chris Turner (Oxford: Polity Press, 1994), p. 7. 
6 Paul Virilio and Sylvère Lotringer, Pure War, trans. by Mark Polizzotti (New York: Semiotext(e), 1997), p. 15. 
7 Steve Erickson, Tours of the Black Clock (London: Futura, 1990), p. 203; Steve Erickson, Days Between Stations 
(London: Quartet, 1997), p. 170; Steve Erickson, The Sea Came in at Midnight (New York: Perennial, 2000), p. 51. 
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The OuLiPo group is an example of this proliferation of space within postmodern 
literature. The Ouvroir de Littérature Potentialle [Workshop of Potential Literature] was founded 
in Paris in 1960 by Raymond Queneau and François Le Lionnais, and included authors such 
as Alain Robbé-Grillet, Georges Perec, and Italo Calvino. Warren Motte argues that the 
OuLiPo p laced ‗th e n o tio n  o f fo rm al co n strain t at th e cen ter o f its aesth etic, arguin g that the 
literary text m ust b e a p ro duct o f system atic artifice‘.8 T h is ‗system atic artifice‘ is itself a 
p ro duct o f ‗sp atialisin g‘ a text. R o b b é-G rillet‘s Jealousy (1957), for example, places the text 
within the space of a plantation house, including a floor plan of the house itself. Similarly, 
P erec‘s L ife: A  U ser’s M an u al (1978) deals with space, occurring within a hotel and, like 
Jealousy, in cludes a flo o r p lan . C alvin o ‘s ‗artifice‘ is seen  in  texts such  as If on  a w in ter’s n ight a 
traveller and The Castle of Crossed Destinies (1969). If on  a w in ter’s n ight a traveller incorporates the 
beginning of ten different novels within its structure, and The Castle of Crossed Destinies uses 
the figure of a pack of tarot cards to place a formal structure upon the text. Each of these 
structures refutes the idea of proposing a linear chronology for the text. Unlike the 
‗traditio n al‘ fo rm  o f th e n o vel, w h ere th e n arrative p ro ceeds th ro ugh  ch ap ters in  a 
chronological manner, these novels impose a spatial structure on the narrative. 
In Jealousy, for example, even when the house is empty, the novel continues because 
the action of the characters is not as important as an examination of the dwelling space of 
th e ch aracters: ‗T h e stain  h as disap p eared alto geth er. T h ere n o w  remains only a vaguely 
outlined paler area, without any apparent depression of the surface, which might pass for an 
in sign ifican t defect in  th e fin ish , o r w o rse‘.9 T h is atten tio n  to  th e ‗in sign ifican t‘ defin es th e 
text as it aims to detail the minutiae of everyday life, the space that the characters inhabit, and 
                                                 
8 W arren  F . M otte Jr., ‗T ellin g G am es‘, in  Calvino Revisited, ed. by Franco Ricci (Ottawa: Dovehouse, 1989), pp. 
117-30 (p. 120). 
9 Alain Robbé-Grillet, Jealousy, trans. by Richard Howard (Canada: Calder, 1987), p. 64. 
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not the characters at all. Similarly, in Life, P erec describ es a ‗sp ace‘ th at rem ain s after its 
occupant has died: 
 
N o w  in  th e little lo un ge w h at is left is w h at rem ain s w h en  th ere‘s n o th in g left: flies, for 
instance, or advertising bumph slipped under the door by students, proclaiming the 
benefits of a new toothpaste or offering twenty-five cen tim es‘ red uctio n  to  every b uyer 
of three packets of washing powder, or old issues of Le Jouet Français, the review he took 
all h is life an d to  w h ich  h is sub scrip tio n  didn ‘t run  o ut un til a few  m o n th s after h is 
death, or those things without meaning that lie around on floors and in cupboard 
corners.10 
 
This description deals with the detritus that remains in a space when the occupant has left: 
again , it is th e sp ace, n o t th e in h ab itan t, th at is im p o rtan t. P erec sh o w s th at ‗th o se th in gs 
w ith o ut m ean in g‘ actually h ave a m ean in g b ased  up o n  th eir relatio n  to  th e sp ace in  w h ich  
they reside, instead of to the character that owned them. There is still something left, 
so m eth in g th at is deem ed in sign ifican t. A lth o ugh  ‗w h at is left is w h at rem ain s w h en  th ere‘s 
n o th in g left‘, th is is ‗n o th in g‘ o n ly in  relatio n  to  p erso n al sign ifican ce, n o t to  sp ace. 
Calvino, in contrast to both Robbé-G rillet an d P erec, ch o o ses n o t to  deal w ith  ‗real‘ o r 
‗do m estic‘ sp ace an d in stead co n cen trates up o n  ‗textual‘ sp ace. If on  a w in ter’s n ight a traveller is 
a metatext which contains ten microtexts, and is concerned with how the reader reads a text, 
an d h o w  a text is co n structed, rath er th an  w ith  eith er ‗real‘ sp ace o r n arrative actio n . T h e 
predominant verb within If on  a w in ter’s n ight a traveller is ‗to  read‘ an d th us n arrative actio n  is 
th e ‗actio n ‘ o f readin g th e ‗n arratio n ‘: th is suggests reflexivity at the heart of the text, the 
‗actio n ‘ o f a text readin g itself. L ikew ise, The Castle of Crossed Destinies is also about the 
construction of meaning through reading. Travellers who arrive in the castle must relate their 
stories in tarot readings, because all are made mute upon entry to the castle. This is 
                                                 
10 Georges Perec, L ife: A  U ser’s M an u al, trans. by David Bellos (London: Harvill Press, 1996), p. 27. 
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obviously connected with reading because the audience cannot listen, but only read the story 
in the tarot cards, and suggests a spatial element inasmuch as the process of reading is the act 
o f ‗travellin g‘ th ro ugh  a n arrative. T h e p o ten tial fo r n arrative p ro liferatio n  w ith in  b o th  o f 
these texts demonstrates that the reading of the story is merely a path chosen from all those 
possible. 
The connection between reading and travelling suggests another spatial element in the 
creation of postmodern texts. It is not just domestic space that is important, but the space of 
the text itself. This is a common characteristic of postmodern texts. For example, Paul 
A uster‘s The New York Trilogy (1987) writes the story over the detritus of urban life whilst 
w alkin g th ro ugh  th e city. R eadin g is also  akin  to  th e ‗detectio n ‘ o f m ean in g, w h ich  exp lain s 
the prevalence of detective stories within postmodern fiction. For example, Borges, Calvino, 
Eco, Pynchon, Auster, and Haruki Murakami, all use the trope of the detection as an allegory 
fo r readin g. T h e fact th at th e ‗so lutio n ‘ is n ever ‗truly‘ un co vered w ith in  th e w o rks o f th ese 
authors demonstrates that postmodern fiction is concerned with narrative proliferation at 
the expen se o f an y o n e ‗tran scen den t‘ m ean in g o f th e text. T h e reader w alks th e sto ry like a 
detective, although a secure reading –  the object of the detection –  is lost amongst the 
narrative choices the reader makes along the way. Time is measured only in relation to how 
far along a path the reader/detective is: it is not measured in hours, but in page numbers, 
an d is th us a fun ctio n  o f th e ‗sp ace‘ o f th e text. 
Narrative space, as with space generally, is constructed within certain ideological 
parameters. The author is the ideological lynchpin of the space of narrative, and it is 
therefore possible to see an ideological construction of space. Henri Lefebvre argues that 
space functions in an Althusserian manner, interpellating the individual into the ideology 
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inscribed in the space. When Lefebvre writes about monuments, we see that the immersion 
into the space of the cathedral reinforces a certain ideology: 
 
Visitors are bound to become aware of their own footsteps, and listen to the noises, the 
singing; they must breathe the incense laden air, and plunge into a particular world, that 
of sin and redemption; they will partake of an ideology; they will contemplate and 
decipher the symbols around them; and they will thus, on the basis of their own bodies, 
experience a total being in total space.11 
 
Lefebvre describes the mechanism by which space replicates ideology –  space is merely a 
sym b o lic rep resen tatio n  o f th e ideo lo gy th at co n structed it. H e th erefo re exten ds A lth usser‘s 
concept of ISAs from the field of social relatio n s to  th e p h ysical ‗sp ace‘ o f an  ideo lo gy. T h e 
p o lice, A lth usser‘s exam p le o f a ‗rep ressive‘ ISA , h ave a p o lice statio n , w h o se sp ace 
fun ctio n s to  ‗h ail‘ th e in dividual w ith in  th e b o un ds o f legal ideo lo gy as ‗tran gresso r‘, 
‗w itn ess‘, o r ‗p lain tiff‘, an d each civilian who enters that space immediately takes on one of 
these functions. 
T h is h o lds true fo r a ‗p o stm o dern ‘ sp ace. If o n e w ere to  im agin e th e arch etyp al 
(aesthetic) postmodern space, it would be the discontinuous art gallery, a showcase for 
postmodern art in which a heterogeneous series of spaces are presented to the audience, 
whose movement through each stage of an exhibition would be accompanied by a shift in 
the construction of space.12 Sim ilarly, each  ‗stage‘ o f an  exh ib itio n  w o uld b e availab le from 
any other, refuting beginning and ending, and forcing the audience to construct their own 
pathways, the space itself curving, straightening, raising or lowering depending upon where 
                                                 
11 Henri Lefebvre, The Production of Space, trans. by Donald Nicholson-Smith (Cambridge: Basil Blackwell, 1991), 
p. 220. 
12 Although the shopping mall is often referred to as an archetypal postmodern space, this suggests an economic 
perception of postmodernism, that is, postmodernity. In Lyotardian terms, an aesthetic postmodern space would 
be an art gallery, although this must not be museal (and thus a reification of culture), but a gallery that explores 
the limits of art itself. 
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you were. Furthermore, the artworks displayed would be discontinuous, incongruent with 
each other, installation art and video art presented alongside text, sculpture, and painting. 
Finally, and most importantly, such a space would be temporary, a nomadic structure that is 
tran sito ry an d m o b ile. T h is ‗aesth eticisatio n ‘ o f sp ace would still reinforce the very real 
political ideology behind it: it would construct the observer in such a way as to destabilise his traditional 
perceptions of space –  L efeb vre‘s ‗to tal b ein g in  to tal sp ace‘. 
The Pompidou Centre was conceived in just this way: a house for postmodern 
artw o rks th at w as suggestive o f a ‗p o lyvalen t in terio r sp ace‘.13 H o w ever, as B audrillard‘s 
an alysis o f th e ‗B eaub o rg effect‘ suggests, th is sp ace is itself ideo lo gically p atro lled: ‗a m o b ile 
exterior, commuting, cool and modern –  an interior shrivelled by the same old cultural 
values‘.14 T h e ‗B eaub o rg effect‘ is, fo r B audrillard, o n e o f cultural declin e: 
 
Beauborg is a monument to cultural deterrence. Within a museal scenario that only serves to 
keep up the humanist fiction of culture, it is a veritable fashioning of the death of 
culture that takes place, and it is a veritable cultural mourning for which the masses are 
joyously gathered.15 
 
T h e very fact th at B eaub o rg is a ‗m o n um en t‘ is suggestive o f a co n cretisatio n  o f culture, 
rein fo rced b y th e fact th at ‗B eaub o rg can n o t even  b urn , everyth in g is fo reseen ‘.16 It is a 
p erm an en t m useum  to  a dead culture, rein fo rcin g its ideo lo gy (itself suggestin g L efeb vre‘s 
an alysis o f sp ace), an d th erefo re ‗the perfect circulatory operator‘.17 
                                                 
13 Jean Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation, trans. by Sheila Faria Glaser (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan 
Press, 1997), p. 62. 
14 Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation, p. 62. 
15 Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation, p. 65. 
16 Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation, p. 70. 
17 Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation, p. 68. 
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Altho ugh  L efeb vre‘s un derstan din g o f sp ace ap p lies to  p h ysical sp ace, it can  also  ap p ly 
to narrative space, as postmodern literature focuses upon a certain construction of the novel 
in order to achieve its aims. As a general rule, postmodern literature attempts to destabilise 
the reader by the use of narrative devices that confuse both the linear chronology and 
ontological horizon of a text. Multiple (or no) beginnings; multiple (or no) endings; shifts 
b etw een  n arrative m o des; ‗im p o ssib le‘ even ts, o r n o  even ts at all; metalepsis; and fragmented 
sentence, paragraph, and chapter construction, are all features of postmodern narrative 
space. Such features are common to postmodern novels, replicating the ideology of the 
p o stm o dern . T h e reader ‗in h ab itin g‘ such  a text is forced into the position of being unable to 
read th e text in  an y defin ed w ay, w h ere th e textual ‗m etan arratives‘ (n arratives o f n arratives) 
frustrate an y o th er ideo lo gical ‗m etan arrative‘ (L yo tard‘s grande histoire). By this mechanism, 
the reader becomes h ailed as a disco n tin uo us sub ject w ith in  ‗a lab yrin th in e p ractice o f sign s‘ 
that is both allegorical (for postmodern culture) and literal (a text).18 
In fact, space and the process of construction is an implicit aspect of any system of 
thought. C. F. Munro , w h en  discussin g E co ‘s co n cep t o f a ‗G lo b al Sem an tic Sp ace‘, n o tes 
th at E co  ‗attem p ts to  ap p ly sem io tics to  arch itecture‘.19 Although he concludes that this is 
n o t en tirely successful, h e do es m en tio n  a ‗recen t w o rk o f The Architecture Studio in  P aris‘: 
 
One might say that not only does the building employ a mixture of real and false 
elements which playfully disrupt our normal architectural expectations, but it also effects 
a self-parodying cancellation of the illusion which its own regularities, like those of any 
b uildin g, succeed in  p ro jectin g. B y its ‗self-fo cusin g‘ it m akes us aw are o f its o w n  fo rm  
and at the same time the limits of that form.20 
                                                 
18 Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation, p. 65. 
19 C . F . M un ro, ‗Sem io tics, A esth etics, an d A rch itecture‘, British Journal of Aesthetics, 27:2 (1987), 115-28 (pp. 
119-20). Munro quotes from Umberto Eco, A Theory of Semiotics (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1976), 
p. 13. 
20 Munro, pp. 126-27. 
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Here, architecture reflects postmodern theory, replicating a postmodern space. Thus, 
alth o ugh  in  M un ro ‘s view a semiotic allegory for architecture fails, an architectural paradigm 
for conceptual thought emerges. Such constructions, both theoretical and actual, suggest an 
arch itectural p aradigm  fo r th e un derstan din g o f lan guage. In  ‗Is Sp ace P o litical?‘, Jam eso n  
w rites th at ‗arch itecture can  so m eh o w  n ever get o ut o f p o litics‘, im p lyin g th at arch itecture is 
bound up in political discourse, representing ideological struggle through the medium of 
space.21 T h is is, o f co urse, sim ilar in  ap p ro ach  to  L efeb vre‘s ‗m o n um en tal‘ sp ace. U n like 
Lefebvre, however, Jameson extends the analogy towards semantics: 
 
The words of built space, or at least its substantives, would seem to be rooms, 
categories which are syntactically or syncategorematically related and articulated by the 
various spatial verbs and adverbs –  corridors, doorways, and staircases, for example, 
modified in turn by adjectives in the form of paint or furnishings, decoration and 
ornament (whose puritanical denunciation by Adolf Loos offers some interesting 
linguistic an d literary p arallels). M ean w h ile, th ese ‗sen ten ces‘ –  if that is indeed is what a 
b uildin g can  b e said to  ‗b e‘ –  are read by readers whose bodies fill the various shifter-
plots and subject-positions; while the larger text into which such units are inserted can 
be assigned to the text-grammar of the urban as such.22 
 
Jameson converts architecture into sentences, and by analogy, sentences into architecture. 
Thus, any form of linguistically-based reasoning (by extension, any form of mental process) 
is thereb y p redicated up o n  th e p rin cip les o f co n structio n . T h is is seen  clearly in  W igley‘s 
definition of deconstruction, where an architectural analogy again emerges: 
 
                                                 
21 F redric Jam eso n , ‗Is Sp ace P o litical?‘, in  Rethinking Architecture: A Reader in Cultural Theory, ed. by Neil Leach 
(London: Routledge, 1998), pp. 255-69 (p. 255). This is reprinted from Anyplace, ed. by Cynthia Davidson 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1995), pp. 192-205. 
22 Jameson, p. 261. 
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D eco n structio n  is [… ] un dersto o d as an  affirm ative ap p ro p riatio n  o f structures th at 
identifies structural flaws, cracks in the construction that have been systematically 
disguised, not in order to collapse those structures but, on the contrary, to demonstrate 
the extent to which the structures depend on both these flaws and the way in which 
they are disguised.23 
 
Deconstruction –  as its very name implies –  is ‗b uilt up o n ‘ th e p rin cip le o f co n structio n . It is 
co n cern ed w ith  ‗structures‘ o f m ean in g an d th e w ay in  w h ich  th ey are ‗co n structed‘. 
D eco n structio n  lo o ks fo r w eak p o in ts in  th e structure ‗n o t in  order to collapse those 
structures‘ b ut to  ‗dem o n strate th e exten t to  w h ich  th e structures dep en d o n  [… ] th ese flaw s 
[flo o rs?]‘, an d is th us n o t ab o ut dem o lish in g structures b ut in h ab itin g th em . B y p layin g o n  
th e H eideggerian  co n cep t o f ‗dw ellin g‘, deco n structio n  seeks to  in h ab it th e ‗house‘ o f th e 
text. Deconstruction reveals that the reader is always partially within the text and partially 
outside it –  ‗p artial‘ in  th e sen se o f in co m p lete –  and that the interpretation that the reader 
brings forth is also alw ays ‗p artial‘ –  in the sense that the reader prefers one reading to 
another. 
 
Nothing is Constructed: From Space to Non-Space 
If, as th e p revio us sectio n  argues, ‗everyth in g is co n structed‘, th en  n ih ilism  m ust also  b e 
constructed. Throughout this thesis, it has been argued that nihilism is what Pynchon calls 
‗th e ideo lo gy o f th e Z ero ‘ –  the interpellation or reification of nothingness within a given 
ideological system.24 T h is co rresp o n ds to  L efeb vre‘s co n cep t o f ‗ideo lo gical sp ace‘ b ecause a 
non-constructed space is impossible to conceive –  it is radically different from the way we think. 
                                                 
23 M ark W igley, ‗T h e D o m esticatio n  o f th e H o use: D eco n structio n  after A rch itecture‘, in  Deconstruction and the 
Visual Arts, ed. by Peter Brunette and David Wells (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 203-27 
(p. 207). 
24 Thomas Pynchon, G ravity’s R ain bow  (London: Vintage, 1995), p. 149. 
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Because we exist, we cannot conceive of that which does not exist without somehow 
in co rp o ratin g it in to  B ein g. P erec, fo r exam p le, tries to  co n cep tualise ‗A  sp ace w ith o u t a use‘: 
 
I have tried several times to think of an apartment in which there would be a useless 
ro o m , ab so lutely an d in ten tio n ally useless. It w o uldn ‘t b e a jun kro o m , it w o uldn ‘t b e an  
extra bedroom, or a corridor, or a cubby-hole, or a corner. It would be a functionless 
space. It would serve for nothing, relate to nothing. 
For all my efforts, I found it impossible to follow this idea through to the end. 
Language itself, seemingly, proved unsuited to describing this nothing, this void, as if we 
could only speak of what is full, useful and functional. 
A  sp ace w ith o ut a fun ctio n . N o t ‗w ith o ut an y p recise fun ctio n ‘ b ut p recisely w ith o ut 
any function; not pluri-functional (everyone knows how to do that), but a-functional. It 
w o uldn ‘t o b vio usly b e a sp ace in ten d ed so lely to  ‗release‘ th e o th ers (lum b er-room, 
cupboard, hanging space, storage space, etc.) but a space, I repeat, that would serve no 
purpose at all.25 
 
P erec tries to  im agin e a sp ace ‗w ith o ut a fun ctio n ‘, a sp ace un like an y o th er p revio usly 
conceived because space is functionalist: not a domestic space, co-opted into the principle of 
‗dw ellin g‘, b ut a p urely h etero to p ian  sp ace. F o r exam p le, P erec w rites th at a staircase is a 
‗n eutral p lace th at b elo n gs to  all an d to  n o n e‘ an d is ‗an  an o n ym o us, co ld, an d almost hostile 
p lace‘, b ut even  th is is a sp ace o f tran sit, n o t a n ull-space.26 Although a staircase and landing 
are utterly distin ct fro m  w h ere th e in h ab itan ts o f th e h o tel ‗en tren ch  th em selves in  th eir 
do m estic dw ellin g sp ace‘, it is still a sp ace w ith  a function.27 
Nihilism is therefore a space of presence, a space in which absence is brought into 
fun ctio n alist, ideo lo gical sp ace. A s such  th en , a ‗p o stm o dern ‘ n ih ilism  w o uld rep licate th e 
use that postmodernism finds for nothingness. In terms of postmodern narrative space, 
th ere are tw o  p o ssib ilities p resen t fo r th is ‗p o stm o dern  n ih ilism ‘, b o th  o f w h ich  are 
                                                 
25 G eorges P erec, ‗Species o f Sp aces‘, in  Species of Spaces and Other Pieces, trans. by John Sturrock (London: 
Penguin, 1999), pp. 1-96 (p. 33). 
26 Perec, Life, p. 3. 
27 Perec, Life, p. 3. 
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unknowingly alluded to by Calvino, when he writes about the possible development of 
literature in the twenty-first century: 
 
Will the literature of the fantastic be possible in the twenty-first century, with the 
growing inflation of prefabricated images? Two paths seem to open from now on. (1) 
We could recycle used images in a new context that changes their meaning. 
Postmodernism may be seen as the tendency to make ironic use of the stock images of 
the mass media, or to inject the taste for the marvelous inherited from literary tradition 
into narrative mechanisms that accentuate its alienation. (2) We could wipe the slate 
clean and start from scratch. Samuel Beckett has obtained the most extraordinary results 
by reducing visual and linguistic elements to a minimum, as if in a world after the end of 
the world.28 
 
This signifies a dichotomy within postmodernism itself. On the one hand, postmodernism 
recycles old images in new formulations (it may be ecocritically friendly, after all), while on 
th e o th er, it reduces ‗visual an d lin guistic elem en ts to  a m in im um ‘. B o th  are p o st-apocalyptic 
scenarios because one recycles the ruins of literary texts, and the other sho w s ‗a w o rld after 
th e en d o f th e w o rld‘. 
This duality of postmodern literature is also seen in the debate, within OuLiPo writing, 
b etw een  co n strain t an d o p en n ess. In  co n trast to  M o tte‘s p rio r p ercep tio n  o f th e ‗fo rm al 
co n strain t‘ at th e h eart o f th e OuLiPo, A lb ert Sb ragia n o tes a ‗n ih ilistic ten den cy‘ in  R o b b é-
G rillet‘s n arrative ab an do n m en t to  o b jectivity an d diso rder.29 This debate is fundamentally 
co n cern ed w ith  th e arch itecture. ‗C o n strain t‘, Sb ragia‘s in terp retatio n  o f C alvin o ‘s w ritin g, 
suggests Bachelard‘s co n cep tio n  o f an  ‗inner immensity‘ in  w h ich  ‗im m en sity is th e m o vem en t 
o f m o tio n less m an ‘, th at is, m an  ‗at h o m e‘ in  h is house perceiving vast images of space.30 It 
suggests a house with infinite rooms because although infinity is present, it is represented 
                                                 
28 Italo Calvino, Six Memos for the Next Millennium, trans. by Patrick Creagh (London: Jonathan Cape, 1992), p. 
95. 
29 A lb ert Sbragia, ‗Italo  C alvin o ‘s O rderin g o f C h ao s‘, MFS, 39:2 (1993), 283-306 (p. 292). 
30 Gaston Bachelard, The Poetics of Space, trans. by Maria Jolas (Boston: Beacon Press, 1994), pp. 184-85. 
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w ith in  tigh tly defin ed b o un daries. In  co n trast, Sb ragia‘s view  o f R o b b é-G rillet‘s w ritin g is 
‗o p en n ess‘, an  in fin ity th at exists w ith o ut co n strain t, an  in fin ite b lan kn ess in  w h ich  n o  
meaning is ever found.31 Although there are numerous problems with Sb ragia‘s argum en t (it 
is not entirely accurate to argue that Robbé-G rillet dem o n strates th is ‗n ih ilistic ten den cy‘ an d  
Calvino is himself prone to this), the distinction is clear: constraint leading to proliferation of 
meaning is non-nihilistic, while openness suggests a nihilistic narrative dissolution. 
This debate between constraint and openness can therefore be reformulated into a 
distinction between excess and absence. C o n strain t leads to w ards an  ‗excess‘ o f n arratives 
w h ereas o p en n ess leads to  an  ‗ab sen ce‘ o f n arrative. F urth erm o re, ab sen ce an d excess are 
th em selves term s in  th e argum en t o ver p o stm o dern  literature as ‗th e literature o f 
exh austio n ‘, esp ecially in  relatio n  to  a p o st-apocalyptic understanding of postmodernism.32 
T h us, w h ilst ‗o p en n ess‘ an d ‗ab sen ce‘ are n ih ilistic, so  to o  are ‗co n strain t‘ an d ‗excess‘. T h is 
‗excessive‘ n ih ilism  is seen  in  M assim o  C acciari‘s defin itio n  o f ‗th e arch itecture o f n ih ilism ‘: 
‗W ith in  its o w n  lan guage, its o rigin ality, th e arch itecture o f n ih ilism , in  sh o rt, b elieves every 
ro o t, fo rm , an d traditio n al sym b o lic m easure to  b e to tally exh austed‘.33 This nihilistic 
exhaustion, similar to that identified by Barth, is found in postmodern literature in the 
recyclin g o f used im ages. C acciari un in ten tio n ally iden tifies th e ‗arch itecture‘ o f p o stm o dern  
literature w h en  h e reveals th at ‗It is as th o ugh  th e city w ere tran sfo rm ed in to  a ch an ce o f th e 
ro ad, a co n text o f ro utes, a lab yrin th  w ith o ut cen ter, an  ab surd lab yrin th ‘.34 This is directly 
                                                 
31 T h o se o f a m ath em atical b en t w ill ap p reciate th is ‗b o un ded‘ in fin ity. It is equivalen t to  th e set o f p rim e 
n um b ers, w h ich  is a ‗sm aller‘ in fin ity th an  o f all w h o le n um b ers. T h us, th e in teger sequence (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 
9, 10, … ) carries o n  fo r in fin ity, as do  p rim e n um b ers, b ut th ey occur m o re rarely (1, 2, 3, 5, 7, … ). A lth o ugh  
the boundary that defines the occurrence of prime numbers (the general formula for all primes) has yet to be 
fo un d, in  th eo ry th is suggests a ‗b o un ded‘ in fin ity in  co n trast to  th e ‗o p en‘ infin ity o f in tegers. 
32 See Jo h n  B arth , ‗T he L iterature o f E xh austio n ‘, in  S u rfiction : F iction  N ow … A n d T om orrow , ed. by Raymond 
Federman (Chicago: Swallow Press, 1975), pp. 19-33. 
33 Massimo Cacciari, Architecture and Nihilism: On the Philosophy of Modern Architecture, trans. by Stephen Sartarelli 
(New York: Yale University Press, 1993), p. 204. 
34 Cacciari, p. 200. 
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applicable to postmodern literature –  postmodern narratives tend towards meaninglessness 
b ecause o f th e p ro liferatio n  o f ‗readerly‘ ro utes th ro ugh  th e text. 
Such  a readin g rein fo rces th e idea th at n arrative p ro liferatio n  leads to  th e ‗n ih ilist 
p ro b lem atic‘ th at recurs th ro ugh o ut th is th esis –  too many choices and not enough direction 
–  although this is only one formulation of nihilism within postmodern literature. As the 
previous chapter examined, silence is also an important part of literature. It is the means by 
which meaning is communicated, that which gives structure to the whole because 
‗ifw o rdsrun th en to geth erth ereaderm ustcreateh iso w n sp acesin o rderto un derstan dth esen ten ce‘. 
Furthermore, silence is that which exists before a text, the blank page over which the house 
of the text is constructed. As Calvino writes in The Castle of Crossed Destinies: ‗T h e kern el o f 
the world is empty, the beginning of what moves the universe is the space of nothingness, 
aro un d ab sen ce is co n structed w h at exists‘.35 T h us, un like C acciari‘s defin itio n  o f th e 
‗arch itecture o f n ih ilism ‘ as exh austio n , it is also  p o ssib le to  see n ih ilism  as th e (lack o f) 
architecture before construction. The literary text follows a similar process, uniting many of 
th e co n cep ts in  th is th esis. L ater in  th e text, C alvin o  w rites: ‗N o , th e M o o n  is a desert. [… ] 
From this arid sphere every discourse and every poem sets forth; and every journey through 
forests, battles, treasures, banquets, bedchambers, brings us back here, to the center of an 
em p ty h o rizo n ‘.36 This suggests the blank desert about w h ich  P yn ch o n  w rites: ‗W e are 
obsessed with building labyrinths, where before there was open plain and sky. To draw ever 
more complex patterns on the blank sheet. We cannot abide that openness: it is terro r to  us‘.37 
It also suggests the passive, absent fem in in ity o f C arter: ‗Sh e w as a p erfect w o m an ; like th e 
                                                 
35 Italo Calvino, The Castle of Crossed Destinies, trans. by William Weaver (London: Vintage, 1997), p. 97. 
36 Calvino, Castle of Crossed Destinies, p. 39. 
37 Thomas Pynchon, G ravity’s R ain bow  (London: Vintage, 1995), p. 264. 
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m o o n , sh e o n ly gave o ff reflected ligh t‘.38 There are thus two potential formulations of 
nihilism within postmodern literature, both of which are predicated upon the construction of 
the postmodern text: 
 
8.1 Nihilism and Narrative Proliferation 
 
Each panel shows the formation of narrative strands within a text. The first page is blank –  
‗n ih ilism ‘ in  th e sen se th at it is th at w h ich  exists b efo re th e co n structio n  o f textual sp ace 
‗o ver‘ it. T h is is, o f co urse, co m m o n  to  all n arratives. A s th e n arrative p ro gresses, h o w ever, 
                                                 
38 Angela Carter, The Passion of New Eve (London: Virago, 1996), p. 34. 
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w e see a divergen ce b etw een  ‗p o stm o dern ‘ an d ‗m o dern ist‘ texts.39 ‗M o dern ist‘ texts are 
those that form only one narrative, and no matter what originality they develop within that 
narrative, remain trapped within one narrative –  they are monographic. In contrast, 
postmodern narratives promote the proliferation of narratives within a text –  they are 
polygraphic. T h is ‗p o lygrap h y‘ leads to  n ih ilism  in  th e sen se th at m ean ing is indeterminate 
because of the sheer multiplicity of paths through a narrative –  G o udsb lo m ‘s ‗n ih ilist 
p ro b lem atic‘. T h e first fo rm ulatio n  o f n ih ilism  is ‗ab sen t‘, b ecause it is th e sp ace b efo re 
co n structio n ; th e seco n d is ‗excessive‘, an d arises fro m  the proliferation of narratives. Where 
the excessive formulation leads to an apocalyptic nihilism, a form of nihilism that is already 
‗p o st-B ein g‘ an d co n cern ed w ith  its destructio n , th e ab sen t fo rm ulatio n  suggests n ih ilism  
th at is ‗p re-b eco m in g‘, b efo re even becoming becomes Being. 
 
N ih ilism  ‘at th e D oor’ of th e T extual House 
Nihilism –  as silence –  is that which exists before the text. Continuing the architectural 
paradigm, silence is therefore that which the textual house ‗w rites o ver‘: th e text-as-house is 
constructed over nothingness, the verbal edifice covering silence. The textual house is a 
common occurrence within postmodern fiction. Postmodern narrative proliferation, for 
exam p le, is revealed in  B arth ‘s Lost in the Funhouse, where each story is a room in the house of 
the text in which the reader is lost. This is part of the American tradition of writing about 
houses within the figure of a house: 
 
                                                 
39 T h is use o f th e term  ‗m o dern ist‘ refers to  th e fo urth  ch ap ter o f th is th esis, w h ere ‗m o dern ist n ih ilism ‘ w as 
co n trasted to  ‗po stm o dern  n ih ilism ‘, an d n o t to  th e sch o o l o f m o dern ism , alth o ugh  th is readin g is in some ways 
ap p licab le to  tho se w o rks th at h ave been  called ‗m o dern ist‘. 
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Houses [… ] reflect n o t o n ly th e p sych o lo gical structure o f th e m ain  ch aracter o r th e 
social structures in which he is entrapped but the structure of the text itself, thereby 
setting up a four-way, and ultimately self-referential analogy among writer, text, 
character, and house. The same architectural habit of mind that designs and builds a 
house both to reflect patterns within it and to configure life in certain patterns may 
design a narrative to reflect and recast what the author conceives to be the essential 
structures of our lives.40 
 
This differs from the tradition identified by Arnold Weinstein in N obody’s Home, in which 
‗N o b o dy‘s H o m e‘ is to  b e un dersto o d b o th  as ‗N o b o dy is H o m e‘, ‗a fo rm ula fo r th e em p ty 
sh ell called self‘ an d as ‗T h e H o m e o f N o b o dy‘, in  w h ich  A m erica is, ‗th e gh o st lan d, th e 
h o m e th at gh o sts b uild to  b eco m e real‘.41 We can thus identify that the house (as text) is an 
ideological construction that the architect-auth o r creates in  o rder to  ‗co n figure life in  certain  
p attern s‘ in  o rder fo r such  desires ‗to  b eco m e real‘. Houses thus reflect the psychological 
desires of their architects and, ultimately, their inhabitants.  
The house co n cretises th e in dividual, in  m an y w ays fo llo w in g L efeb vre‘s ideo lo gical 
space, but in a more muted manner. Although the architect designs the house (in effect 
acting as a filter for a given ideology of the construction of the house, in much the same way 
as an author acts as a filter for a given ideology of literature), the inhabitants re-write the 
space of the house. Thus, whilst they are interpellated within a given ideological space of the 
house, they are allowed to interpellate themselves within this space, reflexively allowing them 
to create and reflect their own identity as they wish to see it. As Bachelard suggests, the 
house is p rim arily a sp ace o f sh elter: ‗th e house shelters day-dreaming, the house protects the 
dreamer, the house allo w s o n e to  dream  in  p eace‘.42 He continues:  
                                                 
40 Marilyn R. Chandler, Dwelling in the Text: Houses in American Fiction (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1991), p. 3. 
41 Arnold Weinstein, N obody’s H om e: S peech, S elf, an d P lace in  A m erican  F iction  from  H aw thorn e to D eL illo  (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 4. 
42 Bachelard, p. 6. 
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Without it, man would be a dispersed being. It maintains him through the storms of the 
h eaven s an d th o se o f life. It is b o dy an d so ul. It is th e h um an  b ein g‘s first w o rld. L ife 
begins well, it begins enclosed, protected.43 
 
Being is protected within the space of the house, its walls defending interiority from 
exteriority. The metaphysical house th ereb y p ro tects us fro m  th e n ih ilistic ‗o utside‘, a 
hermetic shell in which Being can flourish, although there is a problem involved in the space 
of the house (both as house and text-as-house): how to live within this space. Wigley 
observes: 
 
What we unproblematically take to be the space of the house (as the paradigm of space 
itself) is seen both to emerge from and veil a prior and more fundamental condition 
fro m  w h ich  w e h ave b eco m e alien ated [… ] T h e alien atin g sp ace o f th e h o m e veils a 
more fundamental and primordial homelessness. To be at home in such a space is 
precisely to be homeless.44 
 
This highlights the problem of why we construct our houses. The reason is, quite simply, in 
order to escape homelessness. However, the very act of building a house builds over 
something else, and so the very act of its construction admits the fundamental homelessness 
fro m  w h ich  w e try to  escap e. W h en  H eidegger w rites th at ‗T h e h isto ry o f B ein g b egin s, 
indeed necessarily, with the forgetting of Being‘, it is th is very asp ect o f th e house to which he is 
referring.45 The Unheimlich [uncanny] is that which is repressed by the construction of Being, 
and resurfaces to come and knock at the door. 
                                                 
43 Bachelard, p. 7. 
44 Wigley, p. 208. 
45 M artin  H eidegger, ‗T he W o rd o f N ietzsch e: ―G o d is D ead‖‘ in  The Question Concerning Technology and Other 
Essays, trans. by William Lovitt (New York: Garland Press, 1978), pp. 53-112 (p. 109). 
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Indeed, this becomes clear when a certain guest visits the house. Nietzsche, in The Will 
to Power, w ro te ‗N ih ilism  stan ds at th e do o r: w h en ce co m es th is un can n iest o f all guests?‘.46 
Nietzsche was speaking of nihilism waiting to enter European culture, but this very 
formulation suggests an architectural paradigm, a space in which, as Jean-Michel Rey has 
observed, nihilism is an hôte, a p arado xical term  in vo kin g b o th  ‗guest‘ an d ‗h o st‘, b ut w h ich  is 
also , ‗th e m o st unheimlich –  the most uncanny, the most disquieting, the most frightening –  of 
all hôtes‘.47 Nihilism, as the guest at the door of Being, destabilises the house that Being has 
constructed. The significant architectural figure for nihilism is therefore the figure of (at?) 
the door, as Rey writes: 
 
The door is the site –  the topos –  where meaning is prepared, in a moment when nothing 
is yet, strictly speaking, fixed or determined: the very space of indetermination which is 
capable of becoming (on a mere sign) determination; perhaps also the site of what is 
insane.48 
 
Nihilism-as-hôte ap p ears at th e do o r in  R ey‘s essay, w h ere h e w rites th at, ‗A t th e do o r th ere is 
so m eo n e w h o m  w e kn o w  an d yet w h o  is disquietin g [… ] A t th e do o r th ere is someone with 
w h o m , desp ite th e sign s, w e h ave a co n tradicto ry relatio n ‘.49 The very fact that the door 
signifies the site where meaning is decided demonstrates that the door is the point at which 
nihilism enters into conflict with meaning (metaphysics). 
This hôte, th e etym o lo gical p redecesso r o f ‗h o tel‘ as th e sp ace fo r hôtes, suggests a dual 
fun ctio n  o f n ih ilism . T h e first is th e n ih ilism  w ith in  th e structure itself: th e text as ‗h o tel‘ 
                                                 
46 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power, trans. by Walter Kaufman and R. J. Hollingdale (New York: Vintage, 
1968), §1 (p. 7) 
47 Jean-M ich el R ey, ‗N ih ilism  and A uto b io grap h y‘, in  Nietzsche and the Rhetoric of Nihilism: Essays on Interpretation, 
Language and Politics, ed. by Tom Darby, Béla Egyed, and Ben Jones (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1989), 
pp. 23-36 (p. 29). 
48 Rey, p. 29. 
49 Rey, p. 30. 
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contains the hôte of nihilism as a guest who is both strange and familiar, and shows that 
n ih ilism  is a visito r to  P erec‘s Life. Every text somehow contains nihilism within it –  nihilism 
is ‗in terio r‘ to  th e very in terio rity o f th e textual house. This is what deconstruction calls the 
‗n ih ilism ‘ im p licit to  an y m etap h ysical structure –  the point at which the structure 
undermines itself –  an d w h at Sartre m ean s w h en  h e w rites th at n o th in gn ess ‗lies co iled at th e 
h eart o f b ein g‘: in side o f B ein g, in  th e in terio r o f th e in terio r, lies n o th in gn ess.50 The second 
function of nihilism-as-hôte is the exteriority denied by the interiority of the structure –  that 
against which the house is built to protect.51 This interpretation reveals nihilism to be 
‗o th erw ise‘ to  th e text, o r th at w h ich  th e text ign o res in  an  attem p t to  p ro duce m eaning. 
When what is ignored comes knocking at the door, when exteriority meets interiority, a 
conflict occurs: 
 
W e ab so rb  a m ixture o f b ein g an d n o th in gn ess. T h e cen ter o f ‗b ein g -th ere‘ w avers an d 
trembles. Intimate space loses its clarity, while exterior space loses its void, void being 
the raw material of being. We are banished from the realm of possibility.52 
 
T h e ap p earan ce o f n ih ilism  at th e do o r b an ish es B ein g ‗fro m  th e realm  o f p o ssib ility‘ an d  
dissolves the structure of the house. When our interiority is ‗in vaded‘ b y th e O th er, w e lash  
o ut an d attem p t to  co n tain  th e ‗o utsider‘. M urakam i‘s ‗L ittle G reen  M o n ster‘ (1993) is an  
example of this, when a little green monster invades the home of a housewife. In response, 
                                                 
50 Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology, trans. by Hazel E. Barnes 
(London: Routledge, 2000), p. 21. Hassan ‘s use o f th is p h rasin g in  The Dismemberment of Orpheus: Toward a 
Postmodern Literature (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971) indicates the connection between 
p o stm o dern ism  an d n ih ilism : ‗T h e p o stm o dern  sp irit lies co iled w ith in  th e great co rpus o f m o dern ism ‘ (p . 139). 
P o stm o dern ism  is th erefo re equivalen t to  th e ‗n o th in gn ess‘ im p licit in  th e ‗b ein g‘ o f m o dern ism . 
51 T h is sup p orts th e p ercep tio n  o f n ih ilism  as an  ‗O th er‘ m ore stro n gly th an  ab so lute in terio rity can, fo r as 
Blanchot writes, the Other is ‗alw ays co m ing fro m  th e outside‘ –  Maurice Blanchot, The Infinite Conversation, 
trans. by Susan Hanson (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993), p. 56. 
52 Bachelard, p. 218. 
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she mentally torments the creature until ‗th e eyes disso lved in to  em p tin ess, an d th e ro o m  
filled w ith  th e darkn ess o f n igh t‘.53 This unethical treatment of the Other epitomises how 
B ein g treats th e n ih ilistic O th er: w e jealo usly (w ith  o ur o w n  ‗little green  m o n ster‘) guard o ur 
own existence. Nihilism is that which Being must always repress in order to maintain its 
co h esio n  an d w h en  th e ‗excluded‘ n ih ilism  co m es kn o ckin g at th e do o r, ‗b ad sh it‘ h ap p en s.54 
T h is is seen  clearly in  M ark D an ielew ski‘s House of Leaves (2000). Within House of Leaves, 
the p rim ary n arrative o f th e th ree w ith in  th e text is th at o f ‗T h e N avidso n  R eco rd‘. T h is 
n arrative is a tran scrip t o f video  fo o tage o f exp lo ratio n s ‗in to ‘ th e house on Ash Tree Lane 
that arise because of strange alterations to the house when the Navidson family go away for 
a weekend (the creation of a house-within-a-house). One of the major mysteries of the text 
is the appearance of a mysterious door inside the house. Behind the door is a room in which 
‗th e w alls are p erfectly sm o o th  an d alm o st p ure b lack –  ―alm o st‖ b ecause th ere is a sligh t 
grey quality to the surface. The space cannot be more than five feet wide and at most four 
feet lo n g‘.55 This blank space, indicative of nihilism, goes on to expand throughout the text 
to  im p o ssib le dim en sio n s, ‗im p o ssib le‘ because it does not fit within the structural space of 
the house. One of the most significant aspects of the creation of this door is the fact that, 
according to motion-sen sitive cam eras, n o th in g h ad altered sin ce th e N avidso n  fam ily‘s 
departure and so the do o r seem s ‗alm o st as if it h ad b een  th ere all alo n g‘.56 
The creation of the door in House of Leaves is the opening of nihilism into the text; it is 
th ro ugh  th is do o r, as b o th  ‗m o vem en t th ro ugh ‘ an d as ‗m ech an ism  b y w h ich ‘, n o th in gn ess 
(nihilism) comes into  co n flict w ith  B ein g (m etap h ysics). It is, in  N avidso n ‘s b ro th er‘s w o rds, 
                                                 
53 H aruki M urakam i, ‗T he L ittle G reen  M o n ster‘, tran s. b y Jay R ub in, in  The Elephant Vanishes, trans. by Alfred 
Birnbaum and Jay Rubin (London: Harvill, 2001), pp. 151-56 (p. 156). 
54 Thomas Pynchon, The Crying of Lot 49 (London: Picador, 1979), p. 125. 
55 Mark Z. Danielewski, House of Leaves (Bath: Anchor Press, 2000), p. 28. 
56 Danielewski, p. 28. 
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‗a go ddam n  sp atial rap e‘.57 R ey‘s do o r, at w h ich  n ih ilism  is kn o ckin g, co uld in deed b e th e 
very same door that appears at the Navidson house, provoking the disastrous clash between 
Being (the world in which Navidson lives) and Non-Being (the space upon which the House 
resides). Within the space of nihilism (interior to the house itself), there is a desire for 
exteriority, as if within an absolute interiority, beneath even the interiority of presence: 
 
This desire for exteriority is no doubt further amplified by the utter blankness found 
within. Nothing there provides reason to linger. In part because not one object, let alone 
fixture or other manner of finish work has ever been discovered there.58 
 
This absolute interiority is also realised by Johnny Truant (the author of the third narrative 
layer), w h ere h e w rites th at w h en  faced w ith  n ih ilism  yo u are ‗figh tin g w ith  everyth in g yo u‘ve 
got not to face the thing you most dread, what is now, what will be, what has always come before, 
the creature you truly are, the creature we all are, buried in the nameless black of the name‘ (m y 
emphasis).59  
T h e th ree n arratives (an d ‗edito rial‘ alteratio n s) th at create House of Leaves form 
different levels of the figure of a house (basement, ground floor, first floor, loft).60 Such a 
trope means that House of Leaves is b o th  ab o ut a ‗House o f L eaves‘ (a house in which there 
are multiple absences, or a fragile figure of a house b uilt o ut o f leaves) an d is a ‗house of 
leaves‘ (a text).61 In this respect, it is part of the American tradition of writing about houses: 
                                                 
57 Danielewski, p. 55. 
58 Danielewski, p. 119. 
59 Danielewski, p. xxiii. 
60 Within House of Leaves, every o ccurrence o f th e w o rd ‗house‘, in  w h atever lan guage, ap p ears in  a differen t 
colour, which has been repeated here throughout the body of the chapter to demonstrate the absent-presence 
of the house. 
61 T h e text also  p resen ts th e idea th at th e w o rld is in  so m e w ay th is fragile ‗house o f leaves‘ in  th e Z am p an ò  
(th e w riter o f th e seco n d n arrative layer) ap pen dix to  th e text: ‗th is great b lue w orld of ours / seems a house of 
leaves / m om en ts b efo re a w in d‘ (D an ielew ski, p . 563). 
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in  all o th er resp ects, h o w ever, it differs sign ifican tly. It differs fro m  th e ‗h o m elessn ess o r 
ro o tlessn ess‘ th at C h an dler o b serves in  recen t A m erican  fictio n , w h ere ‗th e ab sen ce o f house 
an d h o m e b eco m es a sign ifican t, defin in g situatio n  o f th e sto ry‘ b ecause w ith in  House of 
Leaves it is the absence of the house within the house that is important.62 Similarly, despite the 
fact that Weinstein admits a susp icio n  ‗th at n o th in gn ess is p rim al, th at N o b o dy lurks w ith in  
all selves‘, h e is co n cern ed w ith  th e w ay in  w h ich  gh o sts h ave b uilt a traditio n , an d n o t w ith  
the fact that the tradition may have actually built over some ghosts in the process.63 
House of Leaves does not therefore formulate an architectural reality with the goal of 
reifying that reality (as seen in prior discussions of the space of the house). Rather, 
Danielewski seeks to undermine this process of reification, the very process implicit in the 
creation of the House, and reintroduce the space that existed prior to its creation: the 
absence within the text. Danielewski writes: 
 
The walls are endlessly bare. Nothing hangs on them, nothing defines them. They are 
without texture. Even to the keenest eye or most sentient fingertip, they remain 
unreadable. You will never find a mark there. No trace survives. The walls obliterate 
everything. They are permanently absolved of all record. Oblique, forever obscure and 
unwritten. Behold the perfect pantheon of absence.64 
 
Although the entire process of narration is as much about constructing a house as it is 
constructing a narrative (a house of leaves), so too is the act of reading. We begin to 
un derstan d th at b y readin g an d ‗in h ab itin g‘ th e text w e are co m p licit with the construction of 
the house‘s ‗m ean in g‘. T h e in h ab itatio n  o f th e House by the reader of House of Leaves is not 
                                                 
62 Chandler, p. 19. 
63 Weinstein, p. 5. 
64 Danielewski, p. 423. 
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the nostalgic harmony of the domestic sphere, but the experience of being both a stranger 
and a friend to this space of the House. 
Structurally, both the text and the House realise the extent to which they are founded 
upon a blank space and complicit with the notion of containing, destroying, and eradicating, 
through their presence, any sense of the nothingness that existed before. This is the intent of 
all Being, all presence: to eradicate the trace of non-Being, of non-presence. Being overwrites 
non-Being in order to justify its own existence, realising as it does so that it eradicates that 
w h ich  justifies it. N avidso n ‘s desire to  re-enter the House, despite the tragedies that have 
o ccurred, is th e desire to  ‗read‘ th e House an d ‗un derstan d‘ it, to  ap p ro p riate an d co n tain  th e 
radical Otherness that exists within the House.65 This conflation of representation and 
presence, combined with Navidso n ‘s desire to  film  th is ultim ate in terio rity suggests th at ‗T h e 
rational study of the real is just like the movies; the tabula rasa is only a trick whose purpose 
is to  den y p articular ab sen ces an y active value‘.66 Navidson is attempting to make this 
absence more concrete by the act of filming it, placing it into what Baudrillard would call the 
‗o rders o f th e im age‘. H e is den yin g ab sen ce th e righ t to  actively rem ain  ab sen t b y fo rcin g it 
into a measure of passivity in relation to the Real (reel?). 
This is transferable to our reading of the House, in which we desire to read 
‗so m eth in g‘ in to  th e House because we cannot tolerate its absence. Our desire to enter the 
textual ‗House‘ is m uch  th e sam e as N avidso n ‘s, b ecause it is th ro ugh  in terp retatio n  th at w e 
bring this House into Being. The House continually resists such readings, however, through 
                                                 
65 This corresponds mainly to the faux-critical Kellog-Antwerk Claim (within the text) that Navidson wishes to 
possess the House, although there are two other dominant theories present; the Bister-Freiden-Josephson 
C riteria in  w h ich  N avidso n  ‗sough t n o th in g less th an  to  see th e house exact its annihilating effects on his own 
b ein g‘ (D an ielew ski, p . 387), an d th e Haven-Slocum theory, which assesses the psychological impact of the 
House upon Navidson (see Danielewski, pp. 385-407). In this respect, perhaps this interpretation of the House 
sh o uld b e called th e Slo co m be ‗H aven‘ T h eo ry, as it p ro po ses th at w ith in  th e House there is a haven for 
nothingness. 
66 Paul Virilio, The Aesthetics of Disappearance, trans. by Philip Beitchman (New York: Semiotext(e), 1991), p. 31. 
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the appearance of deconstructive elements within the text, stopping our reading before it 
starts. It is impossible to live in this House an d th ere is n o  ‗dw ellin g in  th e text‘ b y th e 
reader: 
 
And therein lies the lesson of the house, spoken in syllables of absolute silence, 
reso un din g w ith in  h im  like a fain t an d un certain  ech o  …  If we desire to live, we can only do so 
in the margins of that place.67 
 
T h e idea th at ‗If we desire to live, we can only do so in the margins of that place‘ reveals th at life 
(Being) is untenable within the House. It is not conditional upon the House –  in which case 
D an ielew ski w o uld h ave w ritten , ‗If we desire to live [in the House]‘ –  but solely upon existence 
itself –  ‗If we desire to live [at all]‘. W e can n o t ap p ro ach  w h at th is house means as inhabitant-
readers, as with previous House-texts, but only from the outside, looking in, as House of 
Leaves invites us in only to show us that we cannot live within its walls and then repels us 
again. We cannot dwell within this text, but only dwell upon it, building up our own 
interpretation of what it means. We haunt the House, just as ‗nothingness haunts being‘.68 
 
Haunting the Textual House: The Space of Nihilism 
Not only do we haunt the textual house, but so too does nihilism. It stands outside discourse 
(or interior to the structure of discourse itself) and can never be brought into being. The use 
and description of nothingness within postmodern texts therefore implies the inability of 
language to approach nothing and that nothingness can only haunt the literary text. Donald 
B arth elm e‘s sh o rt sto ry ‗N o th in g: A  P relim in ary A cco un t‘ (1974) dem o n strates th e 
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68 Sartre, p. 16. 
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impossibility of ever achieving an understanding of nothingness, arguing that even if we 
cannot know what nothingness is, we can at least argue what it is not. The narrative opens: 
 
It‘s n o t th e yello w  curtain s. N o r curtain  rin gs. N o r is it th e b ran  in  a b ucket, n o t b ran , 
nor is it the large, reddish farm animal eating the bran from the bucket, his wife, or the 
raisin-faced b an ker w h o ‘s ab o ut to  fo reclo se o n  th e farm . N o n e o f th ese is n o th in g.69 
 
The reader immediately comes to realise that these things are not nothing but something, 
and are arguably someth in g im p o rtan t. T o  say dism issively, ‗It‘s n o th in g‘ do es n o t th erefo re 
do justice to any of these things and is incorrect. Barthelme also rejects linguistic accounts of 
n o th in gn ess, sayin g th at, ‗It‘s n o t an  ―O ‖ o r an  asterisk o r w h at R ich ard is th in kin g o r that 
th in g w e can ‘t n am e at th e m o m en t b ut w h ich  w e use to  clip  p ap ers to geth er‘.70 ‗N o th in g‘ is 
here neither the replacement of language, nor any particular absence. Furthermore: 
  
A n d it is n o t w h at is un der th e b ed b ecause even  if yo u tell us ‗T h ere is nothing under 
th e b ed‘ an d w e th in k, At last! Finally! Pinned to the specimen board! still you are only 
informing us of a local, only temporarily stable situation, you have not delivered nothing 
itself.71 
 
Barthelme argues that nothing cannot be found in the aporiae of language. When language 
cannot deliver a concept, or indicates the absence of something not really present, these are 
o n ly ‗little‘ n o th in gs, n o t n o th in gn ess itself. E ven  th o ugh  th ese in dicate an  ab sen ce o f 
something (else), they are not accounts of nothing. 
                                                 
69 D o n ald B arth elm e, ‗N o th in g: A  P relim in ary A ccoun t‘, in  Sixty Stories (New York: Penguin, 1993), pp. 245-48 
(p. 245). 
70 Barthelme, p. 246. 
71 Barthelme, p. 247. 
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Likewise, Barthelme rejects traditional scientific and philosophical accounts of 
n o th in gn ess, o r at least p o p ular un derstan din gs o f th ese co n cep ts. H e co n tin ues, ‗N o th in g is 
not a telephone number or any number whatsoever including zero. It‘s n o t scien ce an d in  
p articular it‘s n o t b lack -h o le p h ysics, w h ich  is n o t n o th in g b ut p h ysics‘.72 Here we see that 
even  th e n o tio n  o f ab sen ce w ith in  scien ce an d m ath em atics (‗th e zero ‘) o r th e 
absence/destruction of physical matter within a black hole is n o t ‗n o th in g‘ eith er (b lack 
h o les are, in  fact, ‗sin gularities‘). H e also  in terestin gly rejects th e n o tio n  o f n ih ilism  as 
n o th in gn ess: ‗It is n o t th e n ih ilism  o f G o rgias, w h o  asserts th at n o th in g exists an d even  if 
something did not exist it could not be known and even if it could be known that knowledge 
co uld n o t b e co m m un icated, n o , it‘s n o t th at alth o ugh  th e tun e is quite a p retty o n e‘.73 When 
B arth elm e m o ves o n  to  H eidegger an d Sartre, ab o ut argum en ts in  w h ich  th e, ‗N o th in g 
n o th in gs‘, o r n o t, as th e case m ay b e, B arth elm e p o in ts o ut th at, ‗W h at H eidegger th in ks 
ab o ut n o th in g is n o t n o th in g‘, dem o n stratin g th at th e very act o f H eidegger th in kin g ab o ut 
nothing in no way delineates what nothing may be.74 
T h ro ugh o ut ‗N o th in g‘, in  fact, B arth elm e rejects th e n o tion of thinking about 
n o th in g an d p refers in stead th e ‗h o m elier task‘ o f ‗m akin g a list‘.75 This list, which is the 
story, is merely a preliminary task to the grand task of listing everything that nothing is not. 
However, as Barthelme points out, no matter how many people are helping, there remains 
the problem of completion: 
 
And even if we were able, with much labor, to exhaust the possibilities, get it all 
inscribed, name everything nothing is not, down to the last rogue atom, the one that 
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74 Barthelme, p. 247. 
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rolled behind the door, and had thoughtfully included ourselves, the makers of the list, 
on the list –  th e list itself w o uld rem ain . W h o ‘s go t a m atch ?76 
 
B arth elm e raises th e sp ectre o f R ussell‘s P arado x h ere, a p arado x co n n ected w ith  set th eo ry 
where there is a set that should both include itself in itself, and should not. Nothingness is 
this paradox, that which cannot be brought into Being and yet is, and Barthelme finally 
co n cludes th at ‗N o th in g m ust b e ch aracterized in  term s o f its n o n -appearances, no shows, 
incorrigib le tardin ess. N o th in g is w h at keep s us w aitin g (fo rever)‘.77  
T h is co m p lete failure to  ever grasp  ‗n o th in g‘ is realised in  M ark T aylo r‘s w o rk o n  th e 
‗n o t‘, w h ich  is co n cern ed w ith  th e ‗ap p earan ce‘ o f ‗n o th in g‘ w ith in  disco urse. T aylo r suggests 
that there is a fun dam en tal gap  b etw een  th e ‗n o t‘ (n o th in gn ess) an d o ur ab ility to  rep resen t 
this linguistically, whether in thought, speech, or writing. He argues: 
 
To think the not is not, however, to think not as such. The elusive complexity of the not 
can only be thought when reflection bends back on itself and becomes reflexive. 
Through this inward turn, which is intended to bring reflection full circle, thought 
in adverten tly b etrays itself b y in directly so licitin g so m eth in g it can n o t co m p reh en d. [… ] 
To think not is to linger with a negative, which, though it can never be negated is not 
merely negative. The not is something like a non-negative negative that nonetheless is 
not positive. So understood, the not does not exist. Neither something nor nothing, the 
not falls between being and nonbeing.78 
 
T h e ‗n o t‘ is a ‗kn o t‘ th at can n o t b e co m p reh en ded  b y th o ugh t. In  th e m an n er o f a Z en  koan 
(a riddle th at reaso n  can n o t so lve, such  as ‗W h at is th e so un d o f o n e h an d clap p in g?‘), T aylo r 
proposes a riddle to the reader –  how do we conceptualise that which is impossible to 
co n cep tualise? A n y fo rm  o f rep resen tatio n  auto m atically fo rces th e ‗n o t‘ in to  a fo rm  o f 
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78 Mark C. Taylor, nOts (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), p. 1. 
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p resen ce w h ich  it do es n o t, o n  its o w n , p o ssess. W e are left w ith  th e ‗in co rrigib le tardin ess‘ 
of nothing, merely waiting for Godot. 
It is possible to show where to start such the process of understanding the knot of the 
not, although not where it finishes. Alongside those presented by Taylor, the not can also be 
ap p ro ach ed (b ut n ever reach ed) b y th in kin g o f th e ‗eith er/o r‘ an d ‗b o th /an d‘ co n structio n s 
that have previously been examined. Modernist nihilism –  that which is concerned with 
negation of existing concepts –  can be understood as the negative of the either/or: 
neither/nor. This formulation demonstrates that where modernism, for example, proposes a 
work of art to be either good or bad, modernist nihilism would argue that art is neither good nor 
b ad an d th at th ere is n o  such  th in g as ‗art‘ an yw ay. It is w ith  th e case o f ‗p o stm o dern  
n ih ilism ‘, h o w ever, th at p ro b lem s start. Where postmodernism proposes a both/and world, 
th e sub lim e b ein g created ‗b etw een ‘ th e tw o  o p p o sitio n s en tailed b y such  a fo rm ulatio n , th e 
‗n o n -n egative n egative th at n o n eth eless is n o t p o sitive‘ p ro p o sed b y T aylo r w o uld n egate 
each term in the both/an d w ith o ut b ein g th e straigh tfo rw ard ‗n eith er/n o r‘. B o th  term s 
rem ain  in  a n egated ‗b o th /an d‘ w ith  o n ly a residual p resen ce, n eith er p o sitive, n o r n egative. 
T h is residual fo rm ulatio n  o f n ih ilism  is B audrillard‘s ‗rem ain der o f th e rem ain der‘, a 
formulation th at leads to  a ‗trace‘ o f n ih ilism .79 T h is is rem in iscen t o f th e L evin asian  ‗trace‘, 
which again suggests a link between Levinasian ethics and nihilism: 
 
As it [the trace] is a mark of the effacement of a mark that was already the mark of an 
absence (or if you will, the effacement of the mark of effacement), it is a double 
effacement, a double erasure, a re-mark and a re-tracing (un re-trait). [… ] B elo n gin g to  an  
immemorial past and accessible to no present, this trace is outside the presence/absence 
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dyad. It is, as L evin as p uts it, ‗th e p resen ce o f th at w h ich  p ro p erly sp eakin g h as n ever 
b een  th ere‘.80 
 
T h is trace is th e trace o f n ih ilism , o r, th at w h ich  ‗p ro p erly sp eakin g, h as n ever b een  th ere‘, 
th at w h ich  b elo n gs ‗to  an  im m em o rial p ast‘ an d is accessib le ‗to  n o  p resen t‘. A s w ith  
N avidso n ‘s excursio n  in to  th e ‗H o use o f L eaves‘, in  w h ich  ‗h e w ill van ish  co m p letely in  th e 
w in gs o f h is o w n  w o rdless stan za‘, th e trace o f n ih ilism  un do es itself even  as it is w ritten .81 
This is not a purely abstract discussion, because W illiam  L ittle fin ds T aylo r‘s ‗n o t‘ 
w h en  readin g A uster‘s New York Trilogy. F o r h im , th e ‗n o t‘ en tails, rath er like B arth elm e, an  
acco un t th at is alw ays ‗p relim in ary‘: 
 
Any account of nothing is inevitably preliminary or incomplete because nothing is the 
always improper name for that which, in philosophical terms, resists being appropriated 
or apprehended by thought. Always lying at the limit of absolute knowledge, nothing is 
wholly Other –  a radical heterogeneity, an irreducible difference, an unreclaimable 
remainder. Neither presence nor absence, neither being nor nonbeing, neither identity 
nor difference, neither inside nor outside, nothing is (yet is not) utter (yet unutterable) 
waste. As refuse refusing to be re-fused into the productive economy of the known, 
nothing remains the unnameable residue at the margins of any field of representation.82 
 
T h is ap p earan ce o f th e ‗n o t‘ in  A uster‘s w o rks is m o st sign ifican t in  th e ch aracter o f Q uin n . 
Quinn appears in The New York Trilogy as the detective who assum es th e iden tity o f ‗P aul 
A uster‘, n o t a n arrato rial avatar o f th e auth o r, b ut a ch aracter disguised as th e auth o r w ith in  
th e text. H e also  ap p ears th ro ugh o ut A uster‘s o th er b o o ks. In  Moon Palace (1989), there is a 
                                                 
80 Jill Robbins, Altered Reading: Levinas and Literature (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1999), p. 28. The 
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‗Q uin n ‘s B ar &  G rill‘; in  Mr Vertigo (1994), ‗D an iel Q uin n ‘ is th e n arrato r‘s n ep h ew ; an d in  In 
the Country of Last Things, the passport of a man named Quinn is found.83 The reader can 
n ever b e sure w h eth er th is is th e sam e ‗Q uin n ‘ o r n o t. If it is th e sam e ‗Q uin n ‘, th is suggests 
an internal narrative co h esio n  o f ‗A uster‘s A m erica‘, alth o ugh  ‗Q uin n ‘ co uld also  just b e a 
co in ciden tal n am e w ith in  A uster‘s fictio n . A s such , th e ap p earan ce o f ‗Q uin n ‘ suggests a 
point of rupture in these texts in which it is an empty signifier, an indication or trace of the 
O th er w ith in  th e text itself: th e ‗n o t‘.  
This emerges clearly when Quinn is compared to the character of Fanshawe within The 
New York Trilogy. F an sh aw e ap p ears in  th e fin al sto ry, ‗T h e L o cked R o o m ‘, an d sign ifies 
complete authorial control over the text: th e very first p h rase in  ‗T h e L o cked R o o m ‘ states 
‗It seem ed to  m e th at F an sh aw e w as alw ays th ere‘.84 F an sh aw e is th e quest o b ject w ith in  ‗T h e 
L o cked R o o m ‘, th e ‗m issin g p erso n ‘ fo r w h o m  th e detective is search in g, alth o ugh  F an sh aw e 
is significant thoughout the Trilogy b ecause ‗T h ese th ree sto ries are fin ally th e sam e sto ry‘.85 
T h e n arrato r o f ‗T h e L o cked R o o m ‘ dram atises th e co n flict b etw een  p rey (F an sh aw e) an d  
predator (Quinn) in the two previous stories within the Trilogy: in  ‗C ity o f G lass‘, F an sh aw e is 
th e m ysterio us P eter Stillm an  (sen io r) an d in  ‗G h o sts‘, h e is th e ch aracter o f B lack/W h ite. 
The division between Fanshawe and Quinn is significant because Fanshawe, despite 
b ein g th e alleged p rey, is in  co m p lete co n tro l o f Q uin n ‘s actio n s. H e is an  author who 
‗auth o rises‘ Q uin n ‘s descen t, th ereb y in vertin g th e traditio n al co n ven tio n s o f th e detective 
story –  th e fascistic ‗co n tro llin g artist‘ o f th e Trilogy.86 The fact that both appear throughout 
the Trilogy in  th is w ay suggests th at b o th  fun ctio n  as ‗gh o sts‘, h aun tin g th e edges o f A uster‘s 
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novel. However, whereas Fanshawe is the power behind-the-scenes, the manipulative ghost 
of the literary text (ideology, language, or authorial intention), Quinn signifies a blank space, 
the true ghost in the sense that he impotently haunts A uster‘s texts. T h is creates a h ierarch y 
within the Trilogy w h ere ‗P aul A uster‘ is th e ‗auth o r‘ relegated to  ‗ch aracter‘, F an sh aw e is th e 
‗ch aracter‘ elevated th e ‗auth o r‘, an d ‗Q uin n ‘ is left as a do ub led ch aracter, th e p ro duct b o th  
of Auster and Fanshawe, having no existence or experience past that which is chosen for 
h im . F an sh aw e exists in  th e auth o rial sp ace ‗ab o ve‘ th e text; Q uin n , in  co m p ariso n , is ‗b elo w ‘ 
th e text, alw ays w ritten  up o n , dictated to , in  effect, ‗auth o red‘ –  the absent presence (or 
present absence) of nihilism. 
This textual space of absence (or the absence of textual space) suggested by Quinn can 
b e co n trasted w ith  Steven  A lfo rd‘s readin g o f th e Trilogy. Alford argues that the utopia –  as 
‗n o -p lace‘ –  within the Trilogy is implicitly connected with the reconstruction of meaning and 
revolves around the fact that the utopian space imagined by Stillman Sr is founded upon an 
anthropocentric universe: 
 
Its existence is immanent within man himself: the idea of a beyond he might someday 
create in the here and now. For utopia was nowhere –  even, as Dark explained, in its 
‗w o rdh o o d.‘ A n d if m an  co uld b rin g fo rth  th is dream ed -of place, it would only be by 
building it with his own two hands.87 
 
Stillman Sr feels that it is only th ro ugh  m an ‘s effo rts th at m ean in g can  b e created, 
rem in iscen t o f B lo cker‘s argum en ts o n  p ro jective versus non-projective meaning. For Alford, 
the spaces of walkers and mappers (Quinn fits both categories) present within the Trilogy 
                                                 
87 Auster, The New York Trilogy, pp. 46-47. 
 307 
‗exists in  a ―n o w h ere‖ o ut o f w h ich  m ean in g em erges‘.88 T h is is later qualified as, ‗T h e uto p ia 
of The New York Trilogy is not a not-here but a neither-here-nor-there. It is an arena of 
mediation out of which the possibility for the spaces of home-away, self-other, inside-
outside, and pedestrian space-m ap p ed sp ace em erges‘.89 Furthermore, this non-sp ace ‗is n o t 
a p h ysical sp ace, b ut a sp ace o f textuality‘.90 This argues that meaning is constructed as a 
result of this non-p lace, w h ich , as A lfo rd‘s fin al p o in t m akes, b o rro w in g fro m  th e 
term in o lo gy o f H eidegger an d D errida, ‗is a neither-here-nor-th ere‘.91 T h is ‗n eith er-here-nor-
th ere‘, o r textual ‗n o w h ere-n ess‘, o f uto p ia lin ks n ih ilism  an d th e sub lim e. ‗N o w h ere‘ 
in dicates b o th  ‗n o -w h ere‘, th e p urely h etero to p ian  sp ace o f n ih ilism , an d ‗n o w -h ere‘, th e 
sublime moment identified by Newman and Lyotard. 
Q uin n  stub b o rn ly resists in terp retatio n , desp ite A lfo rd‘s b est effo rts, b ecause o f h is 
asso ciatio n  w ith  th e ‗n o t‘. T h is em erges w h en  th in gs ‗literally‘ b egin  to  fall ap art: ‗Q uin n ‘s 
mind dispersed. He arrived in a neverland of fragments, a place for wordless things and 
th in gless w o rds‘.92 T h is ‗n everlan d‘ is also  th e title o f F an sh aw e‘s n o vel w ith in  ‗T h e L o cked  
R o o m ‘, a n o vel ab o ut w h ich  th e reader/n arrato r states ‗I lo st m y w ay after th e first w o rd‘.93 
As such, then, the first word of the Trilogy is the point at which readers begin to lose their 
way –  ‗It‘ –  ‗It w as a w ro n g n um b er th at started it‘.94 What was a wrong number that started 
w h at? T h is questio n  is n ever an sw ered b y th e text: ‗it‘ is d ep en den t up o n  th e ‗F an sh aw e‘ 
mode of reading –  the hermeneutic methodology embedded within an ideology. The Quinn 
                                                 
88 Steven  E . A lfo rd, ‗Sp aced -O ut: Sign ificatio n  an d Sp ace in  P aul A uster‘s The New York Trilogy‘, Contemporary 
Literature, 36:4 (1995), 613-32 (p. 626). 
89 Alford, p. 629. 
90 Alford, p. 625. 
91 Alford, p 631. 
92 Auster, The New York Trilogy, p . 72. T h is also evo kes B eckett‘s ‗th ere w o uld b e n o  th in gs b ut n am eless th ings, 
n o  n am es but th in gless n am es‘. See Sam uel B eckett, Molloy, collected in Molloy/Malone Dies/The Unnameable 
(London: Calder, 1994), p. 31. 
93 Auster, The New York Trilogy, p. 314. 
94 Auster, The New York Trilogy, p. 1. 
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m o de o f readin g, th e disp ersal o f h is m in d, reflects Slo th ro p ‘s resp o n se to  co n ditio n in g in  
G ravity’s R ainbow ; a personal dissolution that reflects narrative dissolution. This novel of un-
sign ified sign ifiers (‗th in gless w o rds‘) an d sign ified un sign ifiers (‗w o rdless th in gs‘) is a direct 
allegory for postmodern literature as a whole. The narrator describes it thus: 
 
If I say nothing about what I found there, it is because I understood very little. All the 
words were familiar to me, and yet they seemed to have been put together strangely, as 
though their final purpose was to cancel each other out. I can think of no other way to 
express it. Each sentence erased the sentence before it, each paragraph made the next 
paragraph impossible. It is odd, then, that the feeling that survives from this notebook is 
one of great lucidity.95 
 
T h e reader can  say ‗n o th in g‘ o f w h at th ey fo un d w ith in  th e text an d all the words, whilst 
fam iliar, ‗h ave b een  p ut to geth er stran gely‘ (o n e m igh t th in k o f L = A = N = G = U = A = G = E  
p o etry h ere). T h e text itself is b lan k, n o t in  th e sen se o f eth ically ‗b lan k‘, as seen  in  ‗b lan k 
fictio n ‘, b ut in  th e sen se th at it is w ritten  b y th e reader. We become, as Danielewski notes in 
House of Leaves, ‗lo st in  th e tw ist o f so  m an y dan gero us sen ten ces‘.96 T h eir ‗fin al p urp o se‘ –  a 
teleological interpretation –  is ‗to  can cel each  o th er o ut‘ –  an anti-teleological intention. Thus, 
within the postmodern, its natural teleology is to cancel out teleology –  the end is to remove 
the possibility of an ending through the means of reflexive paradox. 
E ach  o f th e en din gs o f th e th ree sto ries in  A uster‘s Trilogy defer narrative resolution, 
and instead offer an ellipsis o f th e n arrative, as W illiam  L aven der n o tes: ‗A ll th e co des [… ] 
decip h er to  ellip sis‘.97 T h is ‗decip h erin g‘ o f th e n arrative ‗co de‘ b y th e reader is sign ifican t 
b ecause to  ‗decip h er‘ is literally ‗to  b rin g b ack fro m  th e b lan k term ‘. Jo h n  B arro w  n o tes th at 
                                                 
95 Auster, The New York Trilogy, pp. 313-14. 
96 Danielewski, p. xviii. 
97 W illiam  L avender, ‗T he N o vel o f C ritical E n gagem en t: P aul A uster‘s City of Glass‘, Contemporary Literature, 34:2 
(1993), 219-39 (p. 236). 
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‗cip h er‘ is a term  used to  in dicate ab sen ce –  an unknown, such as x –  that originally referred 
to  ‗n o th in g‘.98 T h e act o f ‗de-co din g‘ o r ‗de-cip h erin g‘ is th erefo re th e act o f ‗re-co din g‘ o r 
‗un -cip h erin g‘: in terp ellatin g ab sen ce in to  a given  h erm en eutic o r ideological framework. 
L aven der‘s o b servatio n  th at all co des ‗decip h er to  ellip sis‘ is th erefo re in terp retin g ab sen ce as 
ellipsis. By interpreting absence as such, Lavender encourages readers to remain ethical 
towards the text, to refuse to propose meaning on what is meaningless. This perception of 
th e ‗n egative‘ h erm en eutic m o m en t o f p o stm o dern  literature is ‗n everlan d‘ –  the space of 
nihilism. It is also, to turn back to any earlier representation of this (both chronologically and 
within this thesis), the space that Edmund desires in A  L on g D ay’s Jou rn ey in to N ight: ‗a w o rld 
w h ere th e truth  is un true an d life can  h ide fro m  itself‘.99 Thus, Neverland stands as a 
representative postmodern text (that is itself absented within another postmodern text), 
defining the space identified within this thesis: the space of postmodern nihilism. 
 
                                                 
98 See John D. Barrow, The Book Of Nothing (London: Vintage, 2001), pp. 49-50. 
99 E ugene O ‘N eill, A  L on g D ay’s Jou rn ey in to N ight (London: Jonathan Cape, 1990), IV (p. 113). 
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‘T h e P reface A gain ’ 
 
 
Their books are also different from our own. Their fiction has but a single plot, with 
every imaginable permutation. Their works of a philosophical nature invariably contain 
both thesis and antithesis, the rigorous pro and contra of every argument. A book that 
does not contain its counter-book is considered incomplete. 
 –  Jo rge L uis B o rges, ‗T lö n , U qb ar, O b is T ertius‘.1 
 
This thesis has argued that nihilism and the sublime are the two vital components of 
p o stm o dern ism , an d h as defin ed th e ch aracteristics o f a ‗p o stm o dern ‘ n ih ilism . H o w ever, to  
conclude, it is important to note a number of problems with this hypothesis. As was seen in 
chapter four, reflexive sentential paradoxes are at the heart of postmodern nihilism and thus 
it is too simple to merely conclude that nihilism and the sublime exist as a duality within 
postmodernism. This conclusion –  en titled ‗T h e P reface A gain ‘ b ecause th at is a 
‗stren gth en ed versio n ‘ o f th e p arado x o f ‗T h e P reface‘ –  must therefore undo the argument 
presented. The paradoxical nature of the formulation of nihilism presented in this thesis 
requires, to be properly argued, the destruction of the very argument that enabled it: in order 
to conclude its hypothesis, this thesis must destroy it. The book expresses its counter-book, 
the thesis expresses its antithesis, although not for the sake of completion, but to indicate 
that nihilism itself is incomplete. It undoes itself by the very language of its construction and 
deconstructs itself. 
This is seen clearly in relation to the main threads of this argument. The first thing of 
note is the historical construction of nihilism and the sublime within the first four chapters. 
                                                 
1 Jo rge L uis B o rges, ‗T lö n , U qb ar, O b is T ertius‘, in  Collected Fictions, trans. by Andrew Hurley (London: 
Penguin, 1998), pp. 68-81 (p. 77). 
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As was observed, this is fundamentally a history of modernity, a grand récit in which nihilism 
an d th e sub lim e are co n structed as th e m ain stays o f m o dern ity. T o  sim p lify ‗m o dern ity‘ to  
such an extent ignores the counter-movements that co-exist with both nihilism and the 
sub lim e durin g th is p erio d. Sim ilarly, th e p ercep tio n  o f n ih ilism  as a ‗tem p o rally-displaced 
fo rm ulatio n  o f th e sub lim e‘ is reductive to  th e p o in t o f ab surdity. T h e co m p lexity o f 
aesthetics within the late-seventeenth and early-eighteenth centuries means that any number 
o f co n clusio n s co uld b e draw n  fro m  th e fo rm ulatio n s o f th e sub lim e, o f w h ich  ‗n ih ilism ‘ is 
only one. When this is appended to the construction of postmodernism, it is equivalent to 
w h at m ath em atician s call an  ‗erro r carried fo rw ard‘ –  the conclusions may be valid but the 
in itial assum p tio n s are in co rrect. T h is m ean s th at b o th  ch ap ters o n  ‗sub lim e p o stm o dern ism ‘ 
an d ‗p o stm o dern  n ih ilism ‘, an d th e literary ch ap ters o f th is th esis, can  b e sum m arised b y 
‗[sic]‘. A lth o ugh  p erip h eral argum en ts w ere made alongside this central thesis, most notably 
the connection between poststructuralism and nihilism, and postmodernism and nihilism, 
these threads do not support the idea that nihilism, the sublime, and postmodernism are 
fundamentally linked, but that some critics have observed similar arguments whereas others 
have not. This is therefore not a thesis so much as a collection of arguments, pro and contra, 
the hypothesis that nihilism, the sublime, and postmodernism are linked. 
T h e p ro ductio n  o f a ‗p o stm o dern  n ih ilism ‘ is th erefo re both accurate and inaccurate. Its 
very transmission requires a proposition, a performative act that invalidates its own 
p erfo rm an ce. T h is is w h at D errida calls ‗th e p erfo rm ative co n tradictio n ‘: ‗T h e p erfo rm ative 
gesture of the enunciation would in the act prove the opposite of what the testimony claims 
to  declare, n am ely, a certain  truth ‘.2 By declaring what nihilism is, this thesis has in fact 
                                                 
2 Jacques Derrida, The Monolingualism of the Other OR The Prosthesis of Origin, trans. by Patrick Mensah (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1998), p. 3. 
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automatically invalidated that argument because nihilism cannot be what has been argued. 
Just as B arth elm e an d L ittle n ever truly rep resen t th e ‗n o th in g‘, an d M ark T aylo r n ever truly 
rep resen ts th e ‗n o t‘, th is th esis can n o t rep resen t n ih ilism  w ith o ut th ereb y rep resen tin g it as 
something that it is not. As Alford notes in discussing the Auster‘s New York Trilogy, ‗W e 
must proceed to the next step of the argument fully conscious of the paradox involved: I am 
asserting the truth of an argument that assumes the unavailability of a truth-based 
certificatio n ‘.3 By arguing the truth of nihilism, this thesis falls into the paradox of asserting a 
truth that cannot be asserted. 
This is suggested by de Lauretis, although she refers to the works of Calvino and 
B eckett. Sh e w rites th at C alvin o  exh ib its ‗a m assive dep lo ym en t o f sign s o f w ritin g, rath er 
than  B eckett‘s ―itin erary to w ard silen ce‖‘.4 T h is is n o t ‗th e im p o ssib ility o f exp ressio n , th e 
absence, the traces, the shredding and dissolution of language into silence, but instead the 
massive presence, the concrete materiality, the pressure, the multiplication of words and 
m ean in gs‘. T h is sup p o rts th e fo rm ulatio n  o f n ih ilism  as b o th  p o st-apocalyptic destruction 
and the absence before Being. However, de Lauretis sees another possibility in this, where 
th is is ‗th e ―im p lo sio n ‖ p ro p h esized b y B audrillard, th e mad rush of both modernism and 
p o stm o dern ism  to geth er in to  th e b lack h o le‘.5 This nihilistic implosion, where modernist 
nihilism and postmodern nihilism are themselves undone, is a black hole where the concept 
of nihilism is itself devalued. 
Anne Stevenso n ‘s p o em  ‗B lack H o le‘ (1993) is a useful allego ry fo r th is. A lth o ugh  th e 
p o em  is ‗ab o ut‘ dep ressio n , th e term in o lo gy suggests th e very am b ivalen ce th at is co n tain ed 
                                                 
3 Steven  E . A lfo rd, ‗M irrors o f M adn ess: P aul A uster‘s The New York Trilogy‘, Critique, 37:1 (1995), 17-33 (p. 22). 
4 T eresa de L auretis, ‗R eadin g th e (P o st)M o dern  T ext: If on  a w in ter’s n ight a traveler‘, in  Calvino Revisited, ed. by 
Franco Ricci (Ottawa: Dovehouse, 1989), pp. 131-45 (p. 143). 
5 de Lauretis, p. 143. 
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w ith in  th is th esis‘ co n cep tio n  o f n ih ilism  (p erh ap s th e ‗earth ‘ o f th e argum en t fallin g in to  ‗th e 
h ap p y dep ressio n  o f its b irth ‘, as B audrillard w o uld say).6 ‗B lack H o le‘ b egin s: 
 
I have grown small 
inside my house of words, 
empty and hard; 
pebble rattling in a shell.7 
 
T h is th esis, as a ‗h o use o f w o rds‘ o r ‗house o f leaves‘, co n tain s w ith in  it a seed of nihilism 
th at h as ‗gro w n  sm all‘, ‗em p ty an d h ard‘. It is th e n ih ilism  th at exists p rio r to  th e co n cep tio n  
of the text, an absolutely interior nihilism that exists within the formulation of nihilism 
presented by this thesis. Later, Stevenson writes: 
 
I can ‘t h elp  b ein g th e h o le 
I‘ve fallen  in to . 
Wish I could tell you 
how I feel.8 
 
Nihilism can only exist as the hole in which it falls into, as paradoxical arguments that undo 
themselves in the very act of being conceived. As such, nihilism cannot communicate 
because it is an absence that is always already absent, an absence that cannot be revealed or 
unveiled by the presence of words. The poem concludes: 
 
                                                 
6 Jean Baudrillard, America, trans. by Chris Turner (Bath: Verso, 1991), p. 71. 
7 A n n e Steven son , ‗B lack H o le‘, in  Four and a Half Dancing Men (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 51. 
8 Stevenson, p. 51. 
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 Piles  
of words, sure, to show 
where I was. But nothing true 
about me left, child.9 
 
This thesis‘ co n structio n  o f n ih ilism  is ‗p iles o f w o rds‘, just as B arth elm e‘s an d L ittle‘s 
‗n o th in g‘, an d T aylo r‘s ‗n o t‘, are ‗p iles o f w o rds‘, w ith  ‗n o th in g true‘ rem ain in g. T h is is b o th  
in  th e sen se o f ‗everyth in g is false‘ an d, p arado xically, ‗n o th in gn ess is tru e‘: n ih ilism  can  o n ly 
be true when it is both true and false, or neither true nor false, and thus nothing remains of 
n o th in g b ut B audrillard's ‗rem ain der o f th e rem ain der‘.10 A lth o ugh  B o un das‘ co n structio n  o f 
a ‗deco n structed n ih ilism ‘ is p lausib le, h e w rites th at ‗N o th in g, in  all th is, p reven ts us fro m  
talking about the rh eto ric o f n ih ilism ‘.11 In  all th ese ‗p iles o f w o rds‘, h o w ever, n o th in gn ess is 
exactly th at w h ich  ‗p reven ts us fro m  talkin g ab o ut the rh eto ric o f n ih ilism ‘ b ecause o f th e 
ethical demand to allow the Other to remain Other. The only way of talking about it is to 
use lan guage an d strategies th at turn  in  o n  th em selves, such  as A uster‘s ‗n everlan d o f 
fragm en ts‘, o r to  just scrap  th e en tire idea, as B arth elm e w rites: ‗W h o ‘s go t a m atch ?‘.12 
How should this conclusion conclude then? It would be possible to end this thesis 
w ith  th e p h rase th at desp ite all th ese facts ‗th is th esis can  b e sum m arised as an  exp lo ratio n  o f 
n ih ilism  in  relatio n  to  p o stm o dern  th eo ry an d literature‘, th ereb y in dicatin g a cyclical return 
to the beginning of the thesis, although this would indicate a form of eternal recurrence 
suggesting an internal logic to the construction of nihilism. Similarly, it could end on an 
                                                 
9 Stevenson, p. 51. 
10 Jean Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation, trans. by Sheila Faria Glaser (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan 
Press, 1997), p. 143. 
11 C o n stan tin  V . B o un das, ‗M ino ritarian  D eco nstructio n  o f th e R h eto ric o f N ih ilism ‘, in  Nietzsche and the Rhetoric 
of Nihilism: Essays on Interpretation, Language and Politics, ed. by Tom Darby, Béla Egyed, and Ben Jones (Ottawa: 
Carleton University Press, 1989), pp. 81-92 (p. 82). 
12 Paul Auster, The New York Trilogy (London: Faber and F ab er, 1988), p . 72; D o n ald B arthelm e, ‗N o th in g: A  
P relim inary A cco un t‘, in  Sixty Stories (New York: Penguin, 1993), pp. 245-48 (p. 247). 
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ellipse, the symbol that has been used throughout to indicate what a postmodern nihilism 
may mean: [… ]. This would also be incorrect because the very act of representing nihilism 
w o uld in co rp o rate it in to  th e ‗o rders o f th e im age‘. In  fact, an y n um b er o f tro p es co uld b e 
suggested on which to end this thesis, from quotations about being trapped in labyrinths to 
th e sim p le co n clusio n  th at th is th esis can n o t strictly en d w ith o ut b ein g o n ly a ‗p relim in ary‘ 
account of what postmodern nihilism is. The solution is found in the presentation of an 
‗eth ical‘ n ih ilism  w ith in  th is th esis b ecause eth ical lan guage, as R o b b in s argues, ‗m ust n o t 
m erely co n state o r describ e th e eth ical, it m ust p erfo rm  it‘.13 This gives us the only possible 
ethical strategy on which to conclude this thesis because to be ethical towards nihilism is to let 
nihilism to speak for itself: 
                                                 
13 Jill Robbins, Altered Reading: Levinas and Literature (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1999), p. 11. 
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